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# Protecting Information and System Integrity in Industrial Control System Environments: Cybersecurity for the Manufacturing Sector

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## Volume A: Executive Summary

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<https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/use-cases/manufacturing/integrity-ics>

# 1 Executive Summary

2 Many manufacturing organizations rely on industrial control systems (ICS) to monitor and control their  
3 machinery, production lines, and other physical processes that produce goods. To stay competitive,  
4 manufacturing organizations are increasingly connecting their operational technology (OT) systems to  
5 their information technology (IT) systems to enable and expand enterprise-wide connectivity and  
6 remote access for enhanced business processes and capabilities.

7 Although the integration of IT and OT networks is helping manufacturers boost productivity and gain  
8 efficiencies, it has also provided malicious actors, including nation states, common criminals, and insider  
9 threats, a fertile landscape where they can exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities to compromise the  
10 integrity of ICS and ICS data to reach their end goal. The motivations behind these attacks can range  
11 from degrading manufacturing capabilities to financial gain, to causing reputational harm.

12 Once malicious actors gain access, they can harm an organization by compromising data or system  
13 integrity, hold ICS and/or OT systems ransom, damage ICS machinery, or cause physical injury to  
14 workers. The statistics bear this out. The [X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2021 \(ibm.com\)](#) stated that  
15 manufacturing was the second-most-attacked industry in 2020, up from eighth place in 2019.

16 One particular case study illustrates the long-lasting effects and damage a single cyber attack can inflict  
17 on an organization. It was reported that a global pharmaceutical manufacturer suffered a cyber attack  
18 that caused temporary production delays at a facility making a key vaccination. More than 30,000 laptop  
19 and desktop computers, along with 7,500 servers, sat idle. Although the company claimed that its  
20 operations were back to normal within six months of the incident, at this writing, news reports stated  
21 that the organization is locked in a legal battle with its insurers and is looking to reclaim expenses that  
22 include repairing its computer networks and the costs associated with interruptions to its operations.  
23 They are seeking more than \$1.3 billion in damages.

24 To address the cybersecurity challenges facing the manufacturing sector, the National Institute of  
25 Standards and Technology's (NIST's) National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) launched this  
26 project in partnership with NIST's Engineering Laboratory (EL) and cybersecurity technology providers.  
27 Together, we have built example solutions that manufacturing organizations can use to mitigate ICS  
28 integrity risks, strengthen the cybersecurity of OT systems, and protect the data that these systems  
29 process.

## 30 CHALLENGE

31 The manufacturing industry is critical to the economic well-being of our nation, and is constantly seeking  
32 ways to modernize its systems, boost productivity, and raise efficiency. To meet these goals,  
33 manufacturers are modernizing their OT systems by making them more interconnected and integrated  
34 with other IT systems and introducing automated methods to strengthen their overall OT asset  
35 management capabilities.

36 As OT and IT systems become increasingly interconnected, manufacturers have become a major target  
37 of more widespread and sophisticated cybersecurity attacks, which can disrupt these processes and

38 cause damage to equipment and/or injuries to workers. Furthermore, these incidents could significantly  
 39 impact productivity and raise operating costs, depending on the extent of a cyber attack.

**This practice guide can help your organization:**







- detect and prevent unauthorized software installation
- protect ICS networks from potentially harmful applications
- determine changes made to a network using change management tools
- detect unauthorized use of systems
- continuously monitor network traffic
- leverage malware tools




40 **SOLUTION**

41 The NCCoE, in conjunction with the NIST EL, collaborated with cybersecurity technology providers to  
 42 develop and implement example solutions that demonstrate how manufacturing organizations can  
 43 protect the integrity of their data from destructive malware, insider threats, and unauthorized software  
 44 within manufacturing environments that rely on ICS.

45 The example solutions use technologies and security capabilities from the project collaborators listed in  
 46 the table below. These technologies were implemented in two distinct manufacturing lab environments  
 47 that emulate discrete and continuous manufacturing systems. This project takes a modular approach in  
 48 demonstrating two unique builds in each of the lab environments.

49 The following is a list of the project’s collaborators.

Collaborator	Component
 DISPEL	Provides secure remote access with authentication and authorization support.
 DRAGOS	Provides network and asset monitoring to detect behavior anomalies and modifications to hardware, firmware, and software capabilities.
 FORESCOUT	Provides network and asset monitoring to detect behavior anomalies and modifications to hardware, firmware, and software capabilities.
 GreenTec™ www.GreenTec-USA.com	Offers secure data storage on-prem.
 Microsoft	Provides network and asset monitoring to detect behavior anomalies and modifications to hardware, firmware, and software capabilities.
 OSIsoft. is now part of AVEVA	Real-time data management software that enables detection of behavior anomalies and modifications to hardware, firmware, and software capabilities.

Collaborator	Component
	Access control platform that secures connections and provides control mechanisms to enterprise systems for authorized users and devices; monitors activity down to the keystroke
	Provides network and asset monitoring to detect behavior anomalies and modifications to hardware, firmware, and software capabilities.
	Provides host-based application allowlisting (the blocking of unauthorized activities that have the potential to pose a harmful attack) and file integrity monitoring.

50 While the NCCoE used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does not  
 51 endorse these particular products, nor does it guarantee compliance with any regulatory initiatives. Your  
 52 organization's information security experts should identify the products that will best integrate with  
 53 your existing tools and IT system infrastructure. Your organization can adopt this solution or one that  
 54 adheres to these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and  
 55 implementing parts of a solution.

## 56 HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE

57 Depending on your role in your organization, you might use this guide in different ways:

58 **Business decision makers, including chief information security and technology officers,** can use this  
 59 part of the guide, *NIST SP 1800-10A: Executive Summary*, to understand the drivers for the guide, the  
 60 cybersecurity challenge we address, our approach to solving this challenge, and how the solution could  
 61 benefit your organization.

62 **Technology, security, and privacy program managers** who are concerned with how to identify,  
 63 understand, assess, and mitigate risk can use *NIST SP 1800-10B: Approach, Architecture, and Security*  
 64 *Characteristics*. It describes what we built and why, including the risk analysis performed and the  
 65 security/privacy control mappings.

66 **IT professionals** who want to implement an approach like this can make use of *NIST SP 1800-10C: How-*  
 67 *To Guides*. It provides specific product installation, configuration, and integration instructions for  
 68 building the example implementation, allowing you to replicate all or parts of this project.

## 69 SHARE YOUR FEEDBACK

70 You can view or download the preliminary draft guide at [https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/use-](https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/use-cases/manufacturing/integrity-ics)  
 71 [cases/manufacturing/integrity-ics](https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/use-cases/manufacturing/integrity-ics). Help the NCCoE make this guide better by sharing your thoughts with  
 72 us. There will be at least 45 additional days for the comment period for this guide.

73 Once the example implementation is developed, you can adopt this solution for your own organization.  
 74 If you do, please share your experience and advice with us. We recognize that technical solutions alone  
 75 will not fully enable the benefits of our solution, so we encourage organizations to share lessons learned  
 76 and best practices for transforming the processes associated with implementing this guide.

77 To provide comments, join the community of interest, or to learn more about the project and example  
78 implementation, contact the NCCoE at [manufacturing\\_nccoe@nist.gov](mailto:manufacturing_nccoe@nist.gov).

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## 79 **COLLABORATORS**

80 Collaborators participating in this project submitted their capabilities in response to an open call in the  
81 Federal Register for all sources of relevant security capabilities from academia and industry (vendors  
82 and integrators). Those respondents with relevant capabilities or product components signed a  
83 Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) to collaborate with NIST in a consortium to  
84 build this example solution.

85 Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials may be identified by name or company  
86 logo or other insignia in order to acknowledge their participation in this collaboration or to describe an  
87 experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply special  
88 status or relationship with NIST or recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE; neither is it  
89 intended to imply that the entities, equipment, products, or materials are necessarily the best available  
90 for the purpose.