## PRACTICE GUIDE | Energy NIST SP 1800-2a





# Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities

### **Executive Summary**

- The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) developed an example solution that electric sector businesses can use to more securely and efficiently manage access to the networked devices and facilities upon which power generation, transmission, and distribution depend.
- The security characteristics in our access management platform are informed by guidance and best practices from standards organizations, including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards.
- The NCCoE's approach uses commercially available products that can be included alongside your current products in your existing infrastructure. They provide a centralized system with a comprehensive view of all users within the enterprise and across the IT, operational, and access control silos often found in electric companies.
- The example solution is packaged as a "How To" guide that demonstrates implementation of standards-based cybersecurity technologies in the real world, based on risk analysis. The guide helps organizations gain efficiencies in access management, while saving them research and proof of concept costs.

#### THE CHALLENGE

The electric power industry is upgrading older, outdated infrastructure to take advantage of emerging technologies that will create "a platform [that] efficiently [integrates] new energy resources, new technologies, and new devices into the system." The ever greater numbers of technologies, devices, and systems connected to utilities' grid networks need protection from physical and cybersecurity attacks. †

Our conversations with utility company employees confirmed that current identity and access management (IdAM) implementations are often decentralized and controlled by numerous departments within a company. Several negative outcomes can result from this: an increased risk of attack and service disruption, inability to identify potential sources of a problem or attack, and a lack of overall traceability and accountability regarding who has access to both critical and noncritical assets.

To better protect power generation, transmission, and distribution, electric companies need to be able to control access to their networked resources, including buildings, equipment, information technology, and industrial control systems—all of which have unique technical and political challenges. <sup>‡</sup> Identity and access management (IdAM) systems for these assets often exist in silos, and employees who manage these systems lack methods to effectively coordinate access to devices and facilities in these silos. This drives inefficiency and can result in security risks for utilities, according to our electric sector stakeholders.

Thought Leaders Speak Out: The Evolving Electric Power Industry, The Edison Foundation Institute, June 2015.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> State of the Electric Utility 2015, Utility Dive, January 2015.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>‡</sup> Protect Critical Infrastructure, McAfee, 2012.

Imagine that a technician has access to several substations and remote terminal units connected to the company's network in those substations. The technician moves out of the region, so she quits her job. Without a centralized IdAM system, managing her access to various facilities and systems can be cumbersome and time-consuming, even errorprone. Electric utilities need the ability to provide the right person with the right degree of access to the right resources at the right time, and quickly.

#### THE SOLUTION

The NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide "Identity and Access Management" demonstrates how commercially available technologies can meet your utility's need to control access to resources across the enterprise.

In our lab at the NCCoE, part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), we built an environment that simulates an electric company's IT architecture, including the typical technology silos found in a utility (such as IT, operational technology, and physical access control systems).

We show how an electric utility can implement a centralized IdAM platform to provide a comprehensive view of all users within the enterprise across all silos, and the access rights they have been granted, by using multiple commercially available products.

#### The guide:

- maps security characteristics to guidance and best practices from NIST and other standards organizations, and to NERC CIP standards
- provides
  - o a detailed example solution with capabilities that address security controls
  - o a demonstrated approach using multiple products that achieve the same result
  - o instructions for implementers and security engineers, including examples of all the necessary components and installation, configuration, and integration
- uses products that are readily available and interoperable with your existing information technology infrastructure and investments
- is modular and suitable for organizations of all sizes, including corporate and regional business offices, power generation plants, and substations

While we have used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does not endorse these particular products, nor does it guarantee regulatory compliance. Your utility's information security experts should identify the standards-based products that will best integrate with your existing tools and IT system infrastructure. Your company can adopt this solution or one that adheres to these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and implementing parts of a solution.

#### **BENEFITS**

Our example solution has the following benefits:

- products and capabilities can be adopted on a component-by-component basis, or as a whole, thereby minimizing impact to the enterprise and existing infrastructure
- can reduce the risk of malicious or untrained people gaining unauthorized access to critical infrastructure components and interfering with their operation, thereby lowering overall business risk
- allows rapid provisioning and de-provisioning of access from a centralized platform, so IT personnel can spend more time on other critical tasks

- improves situational awareness: proper access and authorization can be confirmed via the use of a single, centralized solution
- improves security posture by tracking and auditing access requests and other IdAM activity across all networks
- can enhance the productivity of employees and speed delivery of services, and support oversight of resources, including information technology, personnel, and data

#### SHARE YOUR FEEDBACK

You can get the guide at <a href="http://nccoe.nist.gov">http://nccoe.nist.gov</a> and help improve it by contributing feedback. As you review and adopt this solution for your own organization, we ask you and your colleagues to share your experience and advice with us.

- email energy nccoe@nist.gov
- participate in our forums at <a href="http://nccoe.nist.gov/forums/energy">hhttp://nccoe.nist.gov/forums/energy</a>

Or learn more by arranging a demonstration of this reference solution by contacting us at <a href="mailto:energy\_nccoe@nist.gov">energy\_nccoe@nist.gov</a>.

#### **TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS**

The technology vendors who participated in this project submitted their capabilities in response to a call in the Federal Register. Companies with relevant products were invited to sign a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement with NIST, allowing them to participate in a consortium to build this example solution.

**AlertEnterprise!** 



















# IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES

Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics

For CIOs, CISOs, and Security Managers

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DRAFT





# IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES

### Energy

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#### **DISCLAIMER**

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

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#### NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) addresses businesses' most pressing cybersecurity problems with practical, standards-based solutions using commercially available technologies. The NCCoE collaborates with industry, academic, and government experts to build modular, open, end-to-end reference designs that are broadly applicable and repeatable. The center's work results in publicly available NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guides, Special Publication Series 1800, that provide users with the materials lists, configuration files, and other information they need to adopt a similar approach.

To learn more about the NCCoE, visit <a href="http://nccoe.nist.gov">http://nccoe.nist.gov</a>. To learn more about NIST, visit <a href="http://www.nist.gov">http://www.nist.gov</a>.

#### **NIST CYBERSECURITY PRACTICE GUIDES**

NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guides (Special Publication Series 1800) target specific cybersecurity challenges in the public and private sectors. They are practical, user-friendly guides that facilitate the adoption of standards-based approaches to cybersecurity. They show members of the information security community how to implement example solutions that help them align more easily with relevant standards and best practices.

The documents in this series describe example implementations of cybersecurity practices that businesses and other organizations may voluntarily adopt. The documents in this series do not describe regulations or mandatory practices, nor do they carry statutory authority.

#### **ABSTRACT**

To protect power generation, transmission, and distribution, energy companies need to control physical and logical access to their resources, including buildings, equipment, information technology, and industrial control systems. They must authenticate authorized individuals to the devices and facilities to which they are giving access rights with a high degree of certainty. In addition, they need to enforce access control policies (e.g., allow, deny, inquire further) consistently, uniformly, and quickly across all of their resources. This project resulted from direct dialogue among NCCoE staff and members of the electricity subsector, mainly from electric power companies and those who provide equipment and/or services to them. The goal of this project is to demonstrate a centralized, standards-based technical approach that unifies identity and access management (IdAM) functions across operational technology (OT) networks, physical access control systems (PACS), and information technology systems (IT). These networks often operate independently, which can result in identity and access information disparity, increased costs, inefficiencies, and loss of capacity and service delivery capability. This guide describes our collaborative efforts with technology providers and electric company stakeholders to address the security challenges energy providers face in the core function of IdAM. It offers a technical approach to meeting the challenge, and also incorporates a business value mind-set by identifying the strategic considerations involved in implementing new technologies. This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide provides a modular, open, end-to-end example solution that can be tailored and implemented by energy providers of varying sizes and sophistication. It shows energy providers how we met the challenge using open source and commercially available tools and technologies that are consistent with cybersecurity standards. The use case scenario is based on a normal day-to-day business operational scenario that provides the underlying impetus for the functionality presented in the guide. While the reference solution was demonstrated with a certain suite of products, the guide does not endorse these products in particular. Instead, it presents the characteristics and capabilities that an organization's security experts can use to identify similar standards-based products that can be integrated quickly and cost-effectively with an energy provider's existing tools and infrastructure.

#### **K**EYWORDS

Cyber, physical, and operational security; cyber security; electricity subsector; energy sector; identity and access management; information technology

#### **Acknowledgments**

The NCCoE wishes to acknowledge the special contributions of Nadya Bartol, Senior Cybersecurity Strategist, Utilities Telecom Council; Jonathan Margulies, formerly with NCCoE and now with Qmulos; and Victoria Pillitteri of NIST, who were instrumental in the initial definition and development of the Identity and Access Management use case. Paul Timmel, formerly detailed to NCCoE from the National Security Agency, helped with these stages and also helped to get the project build started.

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#### 1 SUMMARY

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- 2 When the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) met with electricity subsector
- 3 stakeholders, they told us they need a more secure and efficient way to protect access to
- 4 networked devices and facilities. The NCCoE developed an example solution to this problem
- 5 using commercially available products.
- 6 The NCCoE's approach provides a centralized access management system that reduces risk of
- 7 disruption of service by reducing opportunities for cyberattack or human error.
- 8 This example solution is packaged as a "How To" guide that demonstrates how to implement
- 9 standards-based cybersecurity technologies in the real world, based on risk analysis and
- 10 regulatory requirements. The guide helps organizations gain efficiencies in identity and access
- 11 management, while saving them research and proof of concept costs.

#### 12 1.1 The Challenge

- 13 The electric power industry is upgrading older, outdated infrastructure to take advantage of
- 14 emerging technologies that will create "a platform [that] efficiently [integrates] new energy
- resources, new technologies, and new devices into the system." The ever greater numbers of
- 16 technologies, devices, and systems connected to utilities' grid networks need protection from
- 17 physical and cybersecurity attacks.<sup>2</sup>
- 18 IdAM implementations in the electricity subsector are often decentralized and controlled by
- 19 numerous departments within an energy company. Several negative outcomes can result from
- 20 this: an increased risk of attack and service disruption, inability to identify potential sources of a
- 21 problem or attack, and a lack of overall traceability and accountability regarding who has access
- 22 to both critical and noncritical assets.
- 23 To better protect power generation, transmission, and distribution, energy companies need to
- be able to control physical and logical access to their networked resources, including buildings,
- 25 equipment, information technology, and industrial control systems (ICS)—all of which have
- unique technical and political challenges. Identity and access management (IdAM) systems for
- 27 these assets often exist in silos, and employees who manage access to these systems lack
- 28 methods to effectively coordinate access to devices and facilities in these silos. This drives
- 29 inefficiency and creates security risks, according to our electric utility stakeholders.
- 30 We considered a scenario in which a utility technician has access to several physical substations
- 31 and remote terminal units connected to the company's network in those substations. Personal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Thought Leaders Speak Out: The Evolving Electric Power Industry, The Edison Foundation Institute, June 2015.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> State of the Electric Utility 2015, Utility Dive, January 2015.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Protect Critical Infrastructure, McAfee, 2012.

- 32 matters require the technician to move out of the region, so she terminates her employment at
- 33 the company. Without a centralized IdAM system, managing routine events like this one can
- 34 become cumbersome and time-consuming. How can energy companies be confident that
- 35 access to the appropriate physical and technological resources across the enterprise is granted
- or revoked correctly, and in a timely fashion?
- 37 As this scenario shows, energy companies need to be able to authenticate the individuals and
- 38 systems to which they are giving access rights with a high degree of certainty. In addition,
- 39 energy companies need to be able to enforce access control policies (e.g., allow, deny, inquire
- 40 further) consistently, uniformly and quickly across resources.

#### 41 1.2 The Solution

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- 42 The example solution we propose demonstrates the following capabilities:
- centrally assigns and provisions access privileges to users based on a set of programmed business rules for IT, OT, and physical resources
  - creates, activates, and deactivates users for IT, OT, and physical resources
- provides a view of all user accounts within the enterprise and the access rights they have been granted
  - can change an existing user's access to one or more resources
- We accomplished this solution through deployment of a single centralized IdAM platform that implements:
  - an IdAM workflow to manage the overall process and to require explicit approval of requests to access certain resources
  - an identity store, which is the authoritative source for digital identities and their associated access rights to resources
  - a provisioning capability to populate information from the workflow and identity store into the run-time capabilities
- 57 These combined capabilities can greatly reduce the time to update access to IT, OT, and
- 58 physical resources. They reduce opportunities for attack or error and lower the impact of
- identity and access incidents on energy delivery, thereby lowering overall business risk. They
- also improve a company's security posture by integrating all the IdAM-related audit logs into
- one, greatly improving visibility into authentication and authorization activities. Another benefit
- of this example solution is that it supports use of multiple digital identities by a single person. A
- current employee is likely to have several distinct digital identities because of independent
- management of digital identities across IT, OT, and physical resources.
- 65 The guide:
  - maps security characteristics to guidance and best practices from standards organizations, including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC)

68 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards and NIST SP 800-53, Rev.4, "Security 69 and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations " 70

#### provides a

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- detailed example solution and capabilities that address security controls
- demonstrated approach using multiple products to achieve the same result
- how-to for implementers and security engineers with instructions on how the example solution can be integrated and configured into their enterprises in a manner that achieves security goals, with minimum impact on operational efficiency and expense

77 Commercial, standards-based products, like the ones we used, are readily available and 78 interoperable with existing information technology infrastructure and investments. While our 79 simulated environment may be most similar in breadth and diversity to the widely distributed 80 networks of large organizations, this guide is modular and provides guidance on 81 implementation of unified IdAM capabilities to organizations of all sizes. These include, but are 82 not limited to, corporate and regional business offices, power generation plants, and 83 substations.

84 This guide lists all the necessary components and provides installation, configuration, and 85 integration information so that an energy company can replicate what we have built. While we 86 have used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does not endorse 87 these particular products. Your utility's security experts should identify the standards-based 88 products that will best integrate with your existing tools and IT system infrastructure. Your 89 company can adopt this solution or one that adheres to these guidelines in whole, or you can 90 use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and implementing parts of a solution.

#### 91 1.3 Risks

- 92 While risk is addressed in current industry standards, such as NERC CIP, our sector partners told 93 us about additional risk considerations at both the operational and strategic levels.
- 94 Operationally, a lack of a centralized IdAM platform can increase the risk of people gaining 95 unauthorized access to critical infrastructure components. Once unauthorized access is gained, 96 the risk surface increases and the opportunity for introduction of additional threats to the 97 environment, such as malware and denial of service (especially oriented towards OT) is 98 realized.
- 99 At the strategic level, you might consider the cost of mitigating these risks and the potential 100 return on your investment in implementing a product (or multiple products). You may also 101 want to assess if a centralized IdAM system can help enhance the productivity of employees 102 and speed delivery of services, and explore if it can help support oversight of resources, 103 including information technology, personnel, and data. This example solution addresses 104 imminent operational security risks and incorporates strategic risk considerations, too.

- Adopting any new technology can introduce new risks to your enterprise. We understand that this example solution to mitigate the risks of decentralized IdAM may, in turn, introduce new
- 107 risks. By centralizing IdAM functions, we decrease the risk that multiple IdAM platforms can be
- infiltrated to gain unauthorized access to networked devices. We recognize, however, that
- 109 centralizing IdAM functions may provide a point of single infiltration of multiple critical systems
- (OT, PACS, and IT). We address this key risk in detail in Section 5.9.5.1 Threats, Vulnerabilities
- and Assumptions, and provide a comprehensive list of mitigations in Section 5.9.6, Security
- 112 Recommendations.
- **113 1.4 Benefits**
- 114 The example solution described in this guide has the following benefits:
- products and capabilities can be adopted on a component-by-component basis, or as a
   whole
- minimizes impact to the enterprise and existing infrastructure
- reduces opportunities for attack or error, and impact of identity and access incidents on energy delivery, thereby lowering overall business risk
- allows rapid provisioning and de-provisioning of access from a centralized platform, so IT
   personnel can spend more time on other critical tasks
- improves situational awareness: proper access and authorization can be confirmed via
   the use of a single, centralized solution
- improves security posture by tracking and auditing access requests and other IdAM
   activity across all networks
- 126 1.5 Technology Partners
- 127 The technology vendors who participated in this build submitted their capabilities in response
- to a notice in the Federal Register. Companies with relevant products were invited to sign a
- 129 Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with NIST, allowing them to
- participate in a consortium to build this example solution. We worked with:
- ◆ AlertEnterprise
- CA Technologies
- Cisco Systems, Inc.
- GlobalSign
- Mount Airey Group
- RS2 Technologies
- RSA Security, LLC
- 138 RADiFlow

139	Schneider Electric
140	TDi Technologies
141	• XTec, Inc.
142	1.6 Feedback
143 144 145	You can improve this guide by contributing feedback. As you review and adopt this solution for your own organization, we ask you and your colleagues to share your experience and advice with us.
146	• email energy nccoe@nist.gov
147	<ul> <li>participate in our forums at <a href="http://nccoe.nist.gov/forums/energy">http://nccoe.nist.gov/forums/energy</a></li> </ul>
148 149	Or learn more by arranging a demonstration of this example solution by contacting us at <a href="mailto:energy_nccoe@nist.gov.">energy_nccoe@nist.gov.</a>
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151	2 How to Use This Guide
152 153 154	This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide demonstrates a standards-based example solution and provides users with the information they need to replicate this approach to identity and access management. The example solution is modular and can be deployed in whole or in part.
155	This guide contains three volumes:
156	NIST SP 1800-2a: Executive Summary
157 158	NIST SP 1800-2b: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics – what we built and why
159	<ul> <li>NIST SP 1800-2c: How To Guides – instructions for building the example solution</li> </ul>
160	Depending on your role in your organization, you might use this guide in different ways:
161 162	<b>Energy utility leaders, including chief security and technology officers</b> will be interested in the Executive Summary (NIST SP 1800-2a), which describes the:
163 164	<ul> <li>challenges electricity subsector organizations face in implementing and using IdAM systems</li> </ul>
165	<ul> <li>example solution built at the NCCoE</li> </ul>
166 167	<ul> <li>benefits of adopting a secure, centralized IdAM system, and the risks of isolated, decentralized systems</li> </ul>
168 169 170	<b>Technology or security program managers</b> who are concerned with how to identify, understand, assess, and mitigate risk, will be interested in this part of the guide, NIST SP1800-2b, which describes what we did and why. The following sections will be of particular interest:
171 172	<ul> <li>Section 4.3, Risk Assessment and Mitigation, provides a detailed description of two types of risk analysis we performed</li> </ul>
173 174 175 176	<ul> <li>Table 1, Use Case Security Characteristics Mapped to Relevant Standards and Controls, in Section 4.3, Risk Assessment and Mitigation, maps the security characteristics of this example solution to cybersecurity standards and best practices, including NERC-CIP v.3 and v.5</li> </ul>
177 178 179 180 181 182 183	IT professionals who want to implement an approach this like this will find the whole practice guide useful. You can use the How-To portion of the guide, NIST Special Publication Series 1800-2c, to replicate all or parts of the build created in our lab. The How-To guide provides specific product installation, configuration, and integration instructions for implementing the example solution. We do not recreate the product manufacturers' documentation, which is widely available. Rather, we show how we incorporated the products together in our environment to create an example solution.

This guide assumes that IT professionals have experience implementing security products in

energy industry organizations. While we have used a suite of commercial products to address

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- this challenge, this guide does not endorse these particular products. 4 Your organization's
- security experts should identify the standards-based products that will best integrate with your
- existing tools and IT system infrastructure. Your organization can adopt this solution or one that
- adheres to these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring
- and implementing parts of a solution for operational technology systems (OT), physical access
- control systems (PACS), and IT systems (IT). If you use other products, we hope you will seek
- those that are congruent with applicable standards and best practices.
- 193 A NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide does not describe "the" solution, but a possible solution.
- 194 This is a draft guide. We seek feedback on its contents and welcome your input. Comments,
- suggestions, and success stories will improve subsequent versions of this guide. Please
- 196 contribute your thoughts to energy nccoe@nist.gov, and join the discussion at
- 197 http://nccoe.nist.gov/forums/energy.

#### 3 Introduction

- 199 The NCCoE initiated this project because IT security leaders in the electricity subsector told us
- that IdAM was a concern to them. As we developed the original problem statement, or use
- case, on which this project is based, we consulted with electric company chief information
- officers, chief information security officers, security management personnel, and others with
- 203 financial decision-making responsibility (particularly for security).
- The individuals we consulted told us that they need to control physical and logical access to
- their resources, including buildings, equipment, IT, and industrial control systems. They need to
- authenticate only designated individuals and devices to which they are giving access rights with
- a high degree of certainty. In addition, they need to enforce access control policies (e.g., allow,
- deny, inquire further) consistently, uniformly, and quickly across all of their resources. Current
- 209 IdAM implementations are often not centralized and are controlled by numerous departments
- 210 within an energy company. Several negative outcomes can result from this situation: an
- increased risk of attack and service disruption, inability to identify potential sources of a
- 212 problem or attack, and a lack of overall traceability and accountability regarding who has access
- 213 to both critical and noncritical assets. Another key consideration is the need for companies to
- 214 demonstrate compliance with industry standards and/or government regulations.
- 215 We constructed two versions of an end-to-end identity management solution that provides
- access control capabilities across the OT, PACS, and IT networks. We used the same approach
- 217 for each build in that we only interchanged two core products that contained the same

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST or the NCCoE, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

- functionality and capability. Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 detail these two example solutions. The
- 219 end result is that a user's access to facilities and devices can be provisioned from a single
- 220 console. Access privileges can be modified by adding new users and assigning access for the
- first time, modifying existing user access privileges, or disabling user access privileges. Our goal
- was to provide the electricity subsector with a solution that addresses the key tenet of
- 223 cybersecurity—access management/rights—based on the principle of least privilege.<sup>5</sup>
- 224 4 APPROACH
- **225 4.1 Audience**
- 226 This guide is intended for individuals responsible for implementing IT security solutions in
- 227 electricity subsector organizations.
- 228 **4.2 Scope**
- 229 This project began with a detailed discussion between NCCoE and members of the electricity
- 230 subsector community of their main security challenges. The risk of unauthorized access to
- facilities and devices and the inability to verify if user access had been properly established,
- 232 modified, or revoked quickly became the focus.
- 233 In response, the NCCoE drafted a use case that identified numerous desired solution
- characteristics. After an open call in the Federal Register, we chose technology partners on the
- basis of their ability to provide these characteristics. We initially thought it would be feasible to
- 236 include federation of identity management<sup>6</sup> services in the scope. As we progressed through
- the initial stages of solution development, we realized that access, authentication, and
- 238 authorization through federated identity means would vastly increase the amount of time
- 239 needed to complete a build. We narrowed the scope to providing identity management of
- 240 energy company employees including a centralized provisioning capability to the OT, PACS, and
- 241 IT networks. The scope became successful execution of the following provisioning functions:
- 1. enabling access for a new employee
- 2. modifying access for an existing employee
- 3. disabling access for a former employee
- The objective is to perform all three actions from a single interface that can serve as the
- authoritative source for all access managed within an energy provider's facilities, networks, and
- 247 systems.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> J. Saltzer, Protection and the control of information sharing in multics, Communication of the ACM, 17 (7), 388-402 (1974)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> "Federated identity management (FIM) is an arrangement that can be made among multiple enterprises that lets subscribers use the same identification data to obtain access to the networks of all enterprises in the group." <a href="http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/federated-identity-management">http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/federated-identity-management</a>

- 248 4.2.1 Assumptions
- **249** *4.2.1.1 Security*
- 250 All network and system changes have the potential to increase the attack surface within an
- enterprise. In Section 4.3, Risk Assessment and Mitigation, we provide detailed
- recommendations on how to secure this reference solution.
- **253** *4.2.1.2 Modularity*
- 254 This example solution is made of many commercially available parts. You might swap one of the
- 255 products we used for one that is better suited for your environment. We also assume that you
- already have some IdAM solutions in place. A combination of some of the components
- described here, or a single component, can improve your identity and access/authorization
- 258 functions, without requiring you to remove or replace your existing infrastructure. This guide
- 259 provides both a complete end-to-end solution and options you can implement based on your
- 260 needs.
- **261** 4.2.1.3 Human Resources Database/Identity Vetting
- This build is based on a simulated environment. Rather than recreate a human resources (HR)
- 263 database and the entire identity vetting process in our lab, we assumed that your organization
- has the processes, databases, and other components necessary to establish a valid identity.
- **265** *4.2.1.4 Identity Federation*
- 266 We initially intended to work with energy providers to demonstrate a means for sharing
- 267 selected identity information across organizational boundaries. While we assumed the NCCoE
- could implement some type of identity federation mechanism to authenticate and authorize
- 269 individuals both internal and external to the organization, this capability exceeded the scope of
- the build.
- **271** *4.2.1.5 Technical Implementation*
- The guide is written from a "how-to" perspective. Its foremost purpose is to provide details on
- 273 how to install, configure, and integrate components. We assume that an energy provider has
- the technical resources to implement all or parts of the build, or has access to companies that
- can perform the implementation on its behalf.
- **276** *4.2.1.6 Limited Scalability Testing*
- We experienced a major constraint in terms of replicating the user base size that would be
- found at medium and large energy providers. We do not identify scalability thresholds in our
- builds, as those depend on the type and size of the implementation and are particular to the
- 280 individual enterprise.
- **281** *4.2.1.7 Replication of Enterprise Network*
- 282 We were able to replicate the three silos: 1) physical access control systems, 2) information
- technology or corporate networks, and 3) the operational technology network, in a limited

- 284 manner. The goal was to demonstrate both logically and physically that provisioning functions 285 could be performed from a centralized IdAM system regardless of its location in the enterprise. 286 In a real-world environment, the interconnections between the OT, PACS, and IT silos depend 287 on the business needs and compliance requirements of the enterprise. We did not attempt to 288 replicate these interconnections. Rather, we acknowledge that implementing our build or its 289 components creates new interfaces across silos. We focused on providing general information 290 on how to remain within the bounds of compliance should you adopt this example solution. In 291 addition, we provide guidance on how to mitigate any new risks introduced to the 292 environment.
- 293 4.3 Risk Assessment and Mitigation
- 294 We performed two types of risk assessment: the initial analysis of the risk posed to the 295 electricity subsector as a whole, which led to the creation of the use case and the desired 296 security characteristics, and an analysis to show users how to manage the risk to the 297 components introduced by adoption of the solution.
- 298 Assessing Risk Posture
- 299 According to NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, "Risk is the net negative impact of the exercise of a vulnerability, 300 considering both the probability and the impact of occurrence. Risk management is the process 301 302 of identifying risk, assessing risk, and taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level." The 303 NCCoE recommends that any discussion of risk management, particularly at the enterprise level, begin with a comprehensive review of the Risk Management Framework (RMF)<sup>8</sup> material 304 305 available to the public.
- 306 Using the guidance in NIST's series of publications concerning the RMF, we performed two key 307 activities to identify the most compelling risks encountered by energy providers. The first was a 308 face-to-face meeting with members of the energy community to define the main security risks 309 to business operations. This meeting identified a primary risk concern—the lack of centralized 310 IdAM services, particularly on OT networks. We then identified the core risk area, IdAM, and 311 established the core operational risks encountered daily in this area. We deemed these the 312 tactical risks:
  - lack of authentication, authorization, and access control requirements for all OT in the electricity subsector
  - inability to manage and log authentication, authorization, and access control information for all OT using centralized or federated controls

<sup>7</sup> Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-30, Rev. 1, September 2012, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30-rev1/sp800 30 r1.pdf National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Risk Management Framework (RMF)

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/Risk-Management-Framework/

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 inability to centrally monitor authorized and unauthorized use of all OT and user 317 318 accounts 319 inability to provision, modify, or revoke access throughout the enterprise (including OT) 320 in a timely manner 321 Our second key activity was conducting phone interviews with members of the electricity 322 subsector. These interviews gave us a better understanding of the actual business risks as they 323 relate to the potential cost and business value. NIST SP 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk, focuses particularly on the business aspect of risk, namely at the enterprise level. This 324 foundation is essential for any further risk analysis, risk response/mitigation, and risk 325 326 monitoring activities. Below is a summary of the strategic risks: 327 impact on service delivery 328 cost of implementation budget expenditure as they relate to investment in security technologies 329 projected cost savings and operational efficiencies to be gained as a result of new 330 investment in security 331 332 compliance with existing industry standards 333 high-quality reputation or public image risk of alternative or no action 334 335 successful precedents 336 Undertaking these activities in accordance with the NIST RMF guidance yielded the necessary 337 operational and strategic risk information, which we subsequently translated to security characteristics. We mapped these characteristics to NIST's SP 800-53 Rev.4<sup>10</sup> controls where 338 339 applicable, along with other applicable industry and mainstream security standards. 340 4.3.2 Managing IdAM Risk A foundation of cybersecurity is the principle of least privilege, defined as providing the least 341 amount of access (to systems) necessary for the user to complete his or her job. 11 To enforce 342 343 this principle, the access control system needs to know the appropriate privileges for each user 344 and system. An analysis of the IdAM solution reveals two components that need to be 345 protected from both external and internal threat actors: the central identity and authorization

<sup>9</sup> Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53, Rev. 4, April 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4 <sup>10</sup> Managing Information Security Risk, National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-39,

March 2011, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-39/SP800-39-final.pdf

March 2011, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-39/SP800-39-tinal.pdf

11 L Saltzer Protection and the control of information sharing in multics. Communication

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> J. Saltzer, Protection and the control of information sharing in multics, Communication of the ACM, 17 (7), 388-402 (1974)

346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354	store, and the authorization workflow management system. The authorization workflow management system is trusted to make changes to the central identity and authorization store. Therefore, any inappropriate or unauthorized use of these systems could change authorization levels for anyone in the enterprise. If that occurred, the enterprise would experience a lack of integrity of the identity and authentication stores. The central identity and authorization store is the authoritative source for the enterprise and holds the hash for each user password, as well as the authorizations associated with each user. Access to this information would enable an unauthorized user to impersonate anyone in the organization. In this situation, the enterprise would lose the confidentiality of its users. <sup>12</sup>
355 356 357 358 359	To protect the build components, we implemented the following requirements in our lab environment: access control, data security, and protective technology. Section 5.9, Evaluation of Security Characteristics, provides a security evaluation of the example solution and a list of the security characteristics. Please note that we addressed only the core requirements appropriate for the IdAM build.

#### 4.3.3 Security Characteristics and Controls Mapping

As explained in Section 4.3.1, we derived the security characteristics through a risk analysis process conducted in collaboration with our electricity subsector stakeholders. This is a critical first step in acquiring or developing the capability necessary to mitigate the risks as identified by our stakeholders. Table 1 maps the desired security characteristics and example capabilities of the use case to the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, relevant NIST standards, industry standards, and controls and best practices.

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 $<sup>^{12}</sup>$  Section 5.9.5.1.1 describes the security controls in place to mitigate this risk.

Table 1. Use Case Security Characteristics Mapped to Relevant Standards and Controls

Example Characte	Cybersecurity Standards and Best Practices						Specific Related and Best Practices	
Security Characteristics	Example Capability	CSF Function	CSF Category	CSF Subcategory	NIST 800-53 rev4	IEC/ISO27001	SANS CAG20	NERC CIP v3/5 <sup>13</sup>
Authentication for OT	Authentication mechanisms	Protect	Access Control	PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are managed for authorized devices and users	AC-2, IA Family	ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3	CSC 3-3, CSC 12- 1, CSC 12- 10,CSC 16-12	CIP-003-5 R1, CIP-004-5 R4, CIP-004-5 R5, CIP-005-5 R1, CIP-005-5 R2, CIP-007-5 R2, CIP-007-5 R5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The relationship of NERC CIP requirements to the Security Characteristics is derived from a mapping between NIST 800-53 rev4 security controls and NERC CIP requirements. It is provided for reference only. Please consult your NERC CIP compliance authority for any questions on NERC CIP compliance.

Example Characte	Example Characteristic Cybersecurity Standards and Best Practices						Specific Related and Best Practices	
Security Characteristics	Example Capability	CSF Function	CSF Category	CSF Subcategory	NIST 800-53 rev4	IEC/ISO27001	SANS CAG20	NERC CIP v3/5 <sup>13</sup>
Access Control for OT	Access control mechanisms	Protect	Access Control and Protective Technology	PR.AC-2: Physical access to assets is managed and protected PR.AC-3: Remote access is managed PR.PT-3: Access to systems and assets is controlled, incorporating the principle of least functionality	AC-3, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, CM-7, PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE5, PE-6, PE-9	ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.2.2, A.9.1.2A, 11.1.1,A.11.1.2, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.6, A.11.2.3, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1	CSC 3-3, CSC 12- 1, CSC 12-10, CSC 16- 4, CSC 16-12	CIP-003-5 R1, CIP-004-5 R2, CIP-004-5 R4, CIP-004-5 R5, CIP-005-5 R1, CIP-006-5 R2, CIP-006-5 R2, CIP-007-5 R1,
Authorization (provisioning) OT	Access policy management mechanisms	Protect	Access Control	PR.AC-4 Access Permissions are managed, incorporating principles of least privilege and separation of duties.	AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16	ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.2, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4	CSC 3-3, CSC 12- 1, CSC 12-10, CSC 16- 4, CSC 16-12	CIP-003-5 R1, CIP-004-5 R4, CIP-004-5 R5, CIP-005-5 R1, CIP-005-5 R2, CIP-006-5 R1, CIP-007-5 R5

Example Charact	eristic	Cybersecurity Standards and Best Practices						
Security Characteristics	Example Capability	CSF Function	CSF Category	CSF Subcategory	NIST 800-53 rev4	IEC/ISO27001	SANS CAG20	NERC CIP v3/5 <sup>13</sup>
Centrally monitor use of accounts	Log account activity	Detect, Protect	Continuous Monitoring & Protective Technology	DE.CM-3: Personnel activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented	AC-2, AU-12, AU-13, CA-7, CM-10, CM-11 AU family	ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1	CSC 4- 2,CSC 12-1, CSC 12- 10, CSC 14-2, CSC 14- 3,	CIP-003-5 R1, CIP-004-5 R4, CIP-004-5 R5, CIP-005-5 R1, CIP-005-5 R2, CIP-006-5 R2, CIP-007-5 R4, CIP-007-5 R5, CIP-008-5 R2, CIP-010-5 R1, CIP-011-5 R2
Protect exchange of identity and access information	Encryption	Protect	Data Security	PR.DS-1: Data-at- rest is protected PR.DS-2: Data-in- transit is protected	SC-8, SC- 28	ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3	CSC 16- 16, CSC 17-7	CIP-011-5 R1

Example Characte	Cybersecu	Specific Related and Best Practices						
Security Characteristics	Example Capability	CSF Function	CSF Category	CSF Subcategory	NIST 800-53 rev4	IEC/ISO27001	SANS CAG20	NERC CIP v3/5 <sup>13</sup>
Provision, modify or revoke access throughout all federated entities	Mechanisms for centrally managed provisioning of access	Protect	Access Control	PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are managed for authorized devices and users PR.AC-4: Access permissions are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties	AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, IA Family	ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.2, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3 ,A.9.4.4	CSC 3-3, CSC 12- 1, CSC 12-10, CSC 16- 4, CSC 16-12	CIP-003-5 R1, CIP-004-5 R4, CIP-004-5 R5, CIP-005-5 R1, CIP-005-5 R2, CIP-006-5 R1, CIP-007-5 R4, CIP-007-5 R5

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#### 4.4 Technologies

Table 2 provides information about the products and technologies that we implemented in order to satisfy the security control requirements.14

Table 2. Products and Technologies Used to Satisfy Security Control Requirements

Security Characteristics	Example Capability	CSF Subcategory	Application	Company	Product	Version	Use
Authentication	Authentication	PR.AC-1: Identities and	Identity Management	CA	<u>Identity</u> <u>Manager</u>	R12.0 SP14 Build 9140	Implements workflows for creating digital identities and authorizing them access to physical and logical resources, including authoritative source
for O1 mechanisms cred	credentials are managed for authorized devices and users	Platform	RSA	IMG <sup>15</sup> Governance Lifecycle	6.9.74968	Implements workflows for creating digital identities and authorizing them access to physical and logical resources.	
Provision, modify or revoke access throughout all	Mechanisms for centrally managed provisioning of		Virtual Directory		Adaptive Directory	7.1.5 R29692	Authoritative source for digital identities and authorized access to resources.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> This table describes only the product capabilities used in our builds. Many of the products have significant additional security capabilities that were not used in our builds. The product column of the table contains links to vendor product information that describes the full capabilities.

15 RSA IMG is now known as RSA VIA Governance and RSA VIA Lifecycle

Security Characteristics	Example Capability	CSF Subcategory	Application	Company	Product	Version	Use
federated entities	access		Credential Management	GlobalSign	Enterprise PKI	N/A	Provides NAESB-compliant X.509 certificates to OT personnel.
			Credential Management / Physical Access Control	<u>XTec</u>	Credential Issuance Solutions	N/A	Provides PIV-I smartcard credentials and physical access control capability using the smartcard.
Access Control for OT	Access control mechanisms	PR.AC-2: Physical access to assets is managed and	Credential Management / Physical Access Control	XTec	Physical Access Control Logical Access Control Authentication and Validation	N/A	Provides PIV-I smartcard credentials and physical access control capability using the smartcard.
		protected	Physical Access Control Enforcement	RS2 Technologies	AccessIT!	4.1.15	Controls physical access to power facilities, buildings, etc.
Authorization (provisioning) OT	Access policy management mechanisms	PR.AC-4: Access permissions are managed,					Provisions access
Provision, modify or revoke access throughout all federated entities	Mechanisms for centrally managed provisioning of access	incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties	Provisioning	AlertEnterprise	<u>Guardian</u>	4.0 SP04 HF3	authorizations from the IdAM workflow to Access It Universal

Security Characteristics	Example Capability	CSF Subcategory	Application	Company	Product	Version	Use
Authorization (provisioning) OT	Access policy management mechanisms		Identity Management	CA	<u>Identity</u> <u>Manager</u>	R12.0 SP14 Build 9140	Provisions identities and authorizations to Active
			Platform	RSA	IMG <sup>16</sup>	6.9.74968	Directory.
Provision, modify or revoke access throughout all federated entities	Mechanisms for centrally managed provisioning of access		Secure Attribute Management	Mount Airey Group	Ozone Console and Ozone Authority Secure Attribute Management Public Key Enablement Ozone Mobile	Ozone Authority 4.0.1, Ozone Server 2.1.301, Ozone Envoy 4.1.0, Ozone Console 2.0.2	Manages attributes that control access to high-value transactions.
Centrally monitor use of accounts	Log account activity	PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy	Industrial Control System (ICS) User Access Management	TDi Technologies	Console Works	4.9-0u0	Controls access to industrial control system (ICS) devices by people (ICS engineers and technicians).

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 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 16}$  RSA IMG is now known as RSA VIA Governance and RSA VIA Lifecycle

Security Characteristics	Example Capability	CSF Subcategory	Application	Company	Product	Version	Use
		PR.PT-3: Access to systems and assets is controlled, incorporating the principle of least functionality	Industrial Control System (ICS) User Access Management	TDi Technologies	Console Works	4.9-0u0	Creates an audit trail of access to ICS devices by people.
	Access control mechanisms		ICS Device-to- Device Access Management	Radiflow	Industrial Control System Firewall and iSIM Software OT Security Substation Security	iSIM 3.6.07	Controls communication among ICS devices.
			Access Gateway	Cisco	Identity Service Engine (ISE)	1.4.0.253	Controls access to resources in OT by users in IT based on both user identity and device identity.
			Access Gateway	Schneider Electric	ConneXium Tofino Ethernet Firewall	2.10	Controls access to devices in the ICS/SCADA network

#### ARCHITECTURE

#### 5.1 Example Solution Description

IdAM is the discipline of managing the relationship between a person and the resources the person needs to access to perform a job. It encompasses the processes and technologies by which individuals are identified, vetted, credentialed, and authorized access to and held accountable for their use of resources. These processes and technologies create digital identity representations of people, bind those identities to credentials, and use those credentials to control access to resources. IdAM is composed of the capabilities illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1. IdAM capabilities


- 1. **User registration** determines that a reason exists to give a person access to resources, verifies the person's identity, and creates one or more digital identities for the person.
- 2. **Credential issuance and management**<sup>17</sup> provides life-cycle management of credentials such as employee badges or digital certificates.
- 3. Access rights management determines the resources a digital identity is allowed to use.
- 4. **Provisioning** populates digital identity, credential, and access rights information for use in authentication, access control, and audit.
- 5. **Authentication** establishes confidence in a person's digital identity.
- 6. Access control 18 allows or denies a digital identity access to a resource.
- Audit maintains a record of resource access attempts by a digital identity.

The top three capabilities are administrative capabilities in that they involve human actions or are used infrequently. For example, verifying identity typically involves physically reviewing documents such as a driver's license or passport. Credential issuance and management is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> NIST SP 800-63-2, Electronic Authentication Guideline, provides additional information on credential issuance and management, as well as authentication.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> NIST IR 7316, Assessment of Access Control Systems, explains commonly used access control policies, models, and mechanisms.

397 398	when a credential expires.
399 400 401 402 403	The bottom three capabilities are "run-time" capabilities in that they happen whenever a person accesses a resource. Authentication, access control, and audit are typically automated activities that occur every time a person enters a facility using a badge, or logs into a computer system. A directory, such as Microsoft Active Directory (AD), is often used in the implementation of run-time functions.
404 405 406	Provisioning is the "glue" that connects the administrative activities to the run-time activities by providing the run-time capabilities with the information needed from the administrative activities.
407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415	In the electricity subsector today, all of these IdAM capabilities are frequently replicated at least three times—once for a person's access to OT, again for access to PACS, and then to access IT. Additionally, these capabilities may be independently replicated for each system within OT or IT. This replication makes it difficult to ensure that employees have access to the resources they need to perform their jobs, and only those resources. Newly hired employees may not have access to all the resources they need. Employees who change jobs may retain access to resources they no longer need. Terminated employees may retain access long after they have left. Further, multiple, independent IdAM processes make it difficult to periodically review who has access to what resources.
416 417 418	The example solution described here addresses these problems by centralizing some of the administrative capabilities into a core IdAM capability used across OT, PACS, and IT, while leaving the run-time capabilities replicated and distributed. Figure 2 illustrates the example solution



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Figure 2. IdAM example solution

- 422 The centralized IdAM capability implements:
  - an IdAM workflow to manage the overall process
  - an identity store, which is the authoritative source for digital identities and their associated access rights to resources
  - a provisioning capability to populate information from the workflow and identity store into the run-time capabilities

The combined capabilities can reduce the time to update access in the OT, PACS, and IT systems from days to minutes. They also improve the audit trail capture by integrating the three audit logs into one. Provisioning may also verify that authorizations stored locally in the run-time capabilities are consistent with those in the identity store. If locally stored authorizations are inconsistent with authoritative values in the identity store, provisioning may raise an alarm or change locally stored authorizations to be consistent with the identity store.

- The example solution implements three basic transactions:
  - creating all required credentials, authorizing access, and provisioning access for a new employee
  - updating credentials and access for an existing employee who is changing jobs or requires a temporary access change

439 destroying credentials and removing accesses for a terminated employee 440 The IdAM workflow receives information about employees and their jobs from the HR system. 441 For a new employee, HR is responsible for performing initial identity verification. Based on a 442 new employee's assigned job, the IdAM workflow creates one or more digital identities and 443 determines the credentials and resource accesses required. The workflow triggers credential 444 management capabilities to create physical identification badges, physical access cards, and any 445 logical access credentials such as X.509 public key certificates that may be needed. The 446 workflow records information about these credentials in the identity store. 447 The example solution does not assume that each person will have a single digital identity. A 448 current employee is likely to have several distinct digital identities because of independent 449 management of digital identities in physical security, business systems, and operational 450 systems. Requiring a single digital identity would create a significant challenge to adoption of 451 the example solution. 452 Instead, the identity store associates all of an employee's digital identifiers so all of that 453 person's accesses can be managed together. Once the example solution is in place, an 454 organization can continue issuing multiple digital identifiers to new employees or can assign a 455 single digital identifier that is common to physical security, business systems, and operational 456 systems. 457 The workflow automatically authorizes some physical and logical accesses that either are needed by all employees or for an employee's job. The workflow stores information about 458 459 credentials and authorized accesses in the identity store. The workflow can then invoke 460 provisioning to populate run-time functions with credential information and access 461 authorizations. This allows the employee to access facilities and systems. 462 Access to some resources, both logical and physical, will require explicit approval before being 463 authorized. For these, the workflow notifies one or more access approvers for each such resource and waits for responses. When the workflow receives approvals, it stores the 464 465 authorized accesses in the identity store and provisions them to the run-time functions. All information about approved, pending, <sup>19</sup> and provisioned physical and logical access 466 467 authorizations is maintained in the identity store. 468 When the HR system notifies the workflow that an employee is changing jobs, the workflow 469 performs similar actions. First, it identifies resource accesses and credentials associated only 470 with the employee's former job. It revokes those resource accesses in the identity store and de-471 provisions them from the run-time functions. It directs that associated credentials be 472 invalidated and destroyed. It removes information about those credentials from the identity

<sup>19</sup> Pending access authorizations may be either authorizations that have been approved but not yet provisioned or time-bounded authorizations to be provisioned/deprovisioned at a future time.

473 474 475 476 477 478	store and de-provisions credential information from the run-time functions. <sup>20</sup> It then identifies resource accesses needed for the employee's new job, authorizes them in the identity store, and provisions them to the run-time functions. The workflow identifies any new credentials that will be needed in the new job, triggers creation and issuance of those credentials, waits for them to be created, updates the identity store, and provisions new credential information to the run-time functions.
479 480 481 482 483	When the HR system notifies the workflow that an employee has been terminated, the workflow removes all the employee's resource accesses from the identity store and deprovisions them from the run-time functions. It triggers invalidation and destruction of the employee's credentials, removes credential information from the identity store, and deprovisions credential information from the run-time functions.
484 485 486 487	In addition to input from the HR system to process personnel actions, the workflow can provide a portal for employees to request access to resources, which can be reviewed and approved. Also, systems other than HR can be integrated with the workflow to initiate resource access requests. These capabilities reduce overhead and administrative downtime.
488 489 490 491 492 493	5.1.1 The Physical Access Control System Silo The PACS silo hosts both access control and badging systems. The badging systems implement a credential issuance capability that creates the badges employees use to gain access to facilities and other physical resources. The access control systems read information from badges and check authorization information provided by the centralized IdAM capability to determine if a person should be allowed access. If access is allowed, the access control system unlocks a door,

495 Figure 3 shows the architecture of the PACS silo.

allowing the person to enter the facility.

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 $<sup>^{20}</sup>$  Workflow actions are programmable and can be customized to meet organization-specific needs.




Figure 3. Notional PACS architecture

An instance of Microsoft Active Directory contains identities and access control information for the people who operate the badging systems and the people who manage the access control systems. This access control information is provisioned into the PACS Active Directory instance from the centralized IdAM system.

The PACS Active Directory instance may also store authorized physical access information used by the access control systems. If the access control systems are integrated with Active Directory, then the IdAM system will provision authorization information to PACS Active Directory. If the access control systems are not integrated with Active Directory, then authorization information will be provisioned directly to the access control system.<sup>21</sup>

## 5.1.2 The Operational Technology Silo

The OT silo is composed of two types of systems—operational management systems that operators and engineers use to monitor and manage the generation and delivery electric energy to customers, and industrial control systems (ICSs) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that provide real-time and near real-time control of the equipment that produces and delivers electric energy.

Figure 4 shows the notional architecture of the OT silo.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Build #1 provisions directly to the access control system. Build #2 provisions to the PACS AD.




Figure 4. Notional OT silo architecture

The operations and management network within the OT silo has an Active Directory instance that contains identities and access authorizations for operational management systems. These identities and authorizations are provisioned from the centralized IdAM system. A cross-silo access control capability allows some access to operational management systems from the IT silo. The centralized IdAM system provisions authorizations to access OT resources from the IT silo into the OT Active Directory.

An electronic access control and monitoring system (EACMS) controls access to ICS/SCADA devices on the ICS/SCADA network from the operations management network. The EACMS allows operators and engineers terminal access to the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and remote terminal units (RTUs) that provide real-time control of energy production and delivery. Authorizations allowing access via the EACMS may be provisioned into the OT Active Directory instance or directly into the EACMS by the centralized IdAM system. The centralized IdAM system can provide time-bounded authorizations that will allow access during a limited time period. When the period expires, a workflow is triggered that revokes the authorization in the identity store and de-provisions the authorization from the OT Active Directory instance.

An ICS/SCADA firewall controls communication among ICS/SCADA devices. The centralized IdAM system does not currently manage or provision authorizations that control device-to-device communication. Authorizations for device-to-device communications are either learned by the firewall in training mode, or configured using a vendor-supplied application. This capability could be added in a future version of the centralized IdAM system.

# 5.1.3 The Information Technology Silo

The IT silo hosts business systems. These systems consist of user workstations and business applications running on Microsoft Windows or Linux servers. An IT Active Directory instance contains identities and access authorizations for both business system users and system administrators who manage the applications and servers. These authorizations are provisioned from the centralized IdAM system. Applications that are not integrated with Active Directory can be provisioned directly by the centralized IdAM system.

# Figure 5 shows the notional architecture of the IT silo.




Figure 5. Notional IT silo architecture

# 5.2 Example Solution Relationship to Use Case

When we first defined this challenge  $^{22}$  in collaboration with industry members, we wrote the following scenario:

"An energy company technician attempts to enter a substation. She is challenged to prove her identity in a way that provides a high degree of confidence and is not onerous (i.e., does not require a significant behavior change). Her attempt at entry initiates an authentication request that, if possible, connects to the company's authentication and authorization services to validate her identity, ensure that she is authorized to access the substation, and confirm that a work order is on file for that substation and that worker at that time.

Once she gains access to the substation, she focuses on the reason for her visit: She needs to diagnose a remote terminal unit (RTU) that has lost its network connectivity. She identifies the cause of the failure as a frayed Ethernet cable and replaces the cable with a spare. She then

 $<sup>^{22}\</sup> http://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nccoe/NCCoE\_ES\_Identity\_Access\_Management.pdf$ 

uses her company-issued mobile device, along with the same electronic credential she used for physical access, to log into the RTU's Web interface to test connectivity. The RTU queries the central authentication service to ensure the authenticity and authority of both the technician and her device, then logs the login attempt, the successful authentication, and the commands the technician sends during her session."

The first portion of the scenario deals with physical access to a substation. Unlike the description in this scenario, the example solution provides centralized management of identities and authorizations, but assumes the decision to allow a particular technician access to a particular facility at a particular time may be distributed. Distributing the access decisionmaking capability helps ensure that access control continues to function in the event of communication failures. Utilities have indicated that communication failures with substations are common. Therefore, authorization to allow the technician access to the substation will be created centrally by the IdAM workflow, placed in the identity store, and then provisioned to the PACS responsible for the substation. Accomplishing this requires integrating the work order management system with the IdAM workflow. Assigning the technician a work order that requires access to a substation triggers actions within the IdAM workflow to authorize access to the substation and provision that authorization to the substation PACS. When the technician presents her physical access credential at the substation, the PACS uses the provisioned authorization to determine if she should be allowed access. Likewise, while not explicitly stated in the example, completion of the work order triggers the IdAM workflow to remove the technician's substation access authorization and de-provision it from the substation PACS.

The second portion of the scenario deals with logical access to ICS/SCADA devices within the substation. Again, unlike the description in the scenario, the example solution centralizes management of identities and authorizations but assumes that run-time functions such as authenticating a user and granting her access to specific ICS/SCADA devices are distributed functions. In this case, the example solution assumes that the substation contains an EACMS to which the technician connects her mobile device. The EACMS authenticates the technician and controls her access to ICS/SCADA devices within the substation. Assigning the technician to this work order triggers an IdAM workflow that authorizes her access to ICS/SCADA devices in the substation, stores these authorizations in the identity store, and provisions both the authorizations and any needed authentication credentials to the substation's EACMS. Completion of the work order triggers removal of the access authorization and de-provisioning of authorizations and credentials from the substation EACMS.

## **5.3 Core Components of the Reference Architecture**

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- To verify the modularity of the example solution and to demonstrate alternative provisioning methods, we created two builds of the centralized IdAM capability. Both builds used the following products:
  - AlertEnterprise Guardian implements provisioning to an RS2 Technologies (RS2)
     AccessIT! Physical Access Control System (PACS).

- TDi Technologies ConsoleWorks and a Schneider Electric Tofino firewall serve as an EACMS.
  - A RADiFlow ICS/SCADA firewall controls interactions between two Modbus-speaking RTUs—a Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL) RTU and an RTU emulated by a Raspberry Pi single-board computer.

Build #1 used CA Technologies (CA) Identity Manager to implement the IdAM workflow and aspects of provisioning, and CA Directory to implement the identity store. Build #2 used the RSA Identity Management and Governance (IMG) [now known as RSA VIA Governance and RSA VIA Lifecycle] to implement the IdAM workflow and the RSA Adaptive Directory to implement the identity store and aspects of provisioning.

### 5.3.1 Build #1

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Figure 6 illustrates Build #1.

Authoritative Data Approvers CA Identity Manager CA HR Identity Management Workflow, Directory IT and AD provisioning Identity Store AlertEnterprise Guardian Workflow PACS and OT Provisioning Callout IT 느 AD PACS RS2 Technologies Access It! PACS RTU Emulation TDi Technologies Console Work 4 Serial SEL RTU

Figure 6. Build #1

CA Identity Manager implements the IdAM workflow. It receives input from an HR system in the form of comma-separated value (.csv) files. We simulated the HR system using manually produced .csv files. Identity Manager also provisions information to Microsoft Active Directory

514 515	these Active Directory instances is assumed.
516 517 518 519	IT applications are assumed to be integrated with Active Directory and use credential information and authorization information in the IT Active Directory instance. If there are IT applications that are not integrated with Active Directory, the provisioning capabilities of CA Identity Manager would be used to directly provision the applications.
520 521 522 523	AlertEnterprise Guardian <sup>23</sup> provisions physical access authorizations into the RS2 PACS. CA Identity Minder supports call-outs within a workflow that can be used to invoke external programs. A call-out is used to connect with AlertEnterprise Guardian and provide information to be provisioned to the RS2 PACS.
524 525 526 527 528	An instance of TDi Technologies ConsoleWorks is installed in the OT silo and integrated with the OT Active Directory instance. Identity Manager provisions ICS/SCADA access authorizations in the OT Active Directory instance. ConsoleWorks uses the access authorizations in OT Active Directory to control user access to ICS/SCADA devices. Console Works also captures an audit trail of all user access to the ICS/SCADA network.
529 530 531 532 533	A Schneider Electric Tofino firewall is installed between Console \Works and the ICS/SCADA network. The firewall determines which IP addresses within the ICS/SCADA network are accessible through ConsoleWorks and which network protocols can be used when accessing those addresses. The combination of Console Works and the Tofino firewall implement an Electronic Access Control and Monitoring System (EACMS) between the Energy Management System / Operations Management Network and the ICS/SCADA network.
535 536	5.3.2 Build #2 Figure 7 illustrates Build #2.

 $^{23}$  Guardian is also capable of implementing workflow and provisioning ICS devices. However, those capabilities were not used in this build.




Figure 7. Build #2

RSA IMG implements the IdAM workflow. It receives input from an HR system in the form of .csv files. RSA IMG also has the capability to provision information to systems. In Build #2, RSA IMG stores information in RSA Adaptive Directory, which subsequently provisions the information to its associated Active Directory instances.

RSA Adaptive Directory implements the identity store and provisioning portions of the example solution. RSA Adaptive Directory is a virtual directory that acts as a proxy in front of multiple back-end directories. The build assumes that each silo—OT, PACS, and IT—hosts a Microsoft Active Directory instance. No relationship among these Active Directory instances is assumed. When an IMG workflow stores information in Adaptive Directory, that information is actually stored in one or more of the underlying Active Directory instances. In this way, storing information in Adaptive Directory provisions that information into one or more Active Directory instances.

- AlertEnterprise Guardian provisions physical access authorizations into the RS2 PACS. RSA IMG
- writes these authorizations into Adaptive Directory, which stores them in the PACS Active
- Directory instance. AlertEnterprise Guardian monitors the Active Directory PACS instance for
- 655 updates such as changed physical access authorizations for an existing user, addition of a new
- user with physical access authorizations, or removal of an existing user and associated access
- authorizations. When changes are detected, Guardian provisions them into the RS2 PACS.
- As in Build #1, TDi Technologies ConsoleWorks and a Schneider Electric Tofino firewall are used
- is used in the OT silo to provide an EACMS between the EMS/Operations Management Network
- and the ICS/SCADA network. ConsoleWorks utilizes the OT Active Directory for authorization of
- users in this build as well.
- 5.3.3 Implementation of the Use Case Illustrative Scenario
- This section explains how each of the two builds implements the scenario in Section 5.2
- A work order management system assigns a technician to resolve an issue with an RTU at a
- substation. The system initiates a workflow in either CA Identity Manager or RSA IMG that
- authorizes the technician physical access to the substation. In Build #1, this authorization is sent
- to AlertEnterprise Guardian via a call-out in the workflow in CA Identity Manager. Guardian
- provisions the authorization into the RS2 PACS. The authorization is also stored in the CA
- directory. In Build #2, this authorization is written to Adaptive Directory and stored in the PACS
- Active Directory instance. AlertEnterprise Guardian detects the authorization change for the
- 671 technician and provisions it to RS2. When the technician arrives at the substation and scans her
- credentials at the door, RS2 allows her entry.
- The workflow also authorizes access to ICS/SCADA devices in the substation. In Build #1,
- 674 Identity Manger stores this authorization in the CA directory and provisions it to the OT Active
- 675 Directory instance. In Build #2, IMG writes this authorization to Adaptive Directory, which
- stores it in the OT Active Directory instance. When the technician connects her mobile device to
- 677 ConsoleWorks in the substation, she is authenticated, and ConsoleWorks checks the OT Active
- 678 Directory instance, sees that she is authorized, and allows her to access the ICS/SCADA devices
- in the substation.
- When the work order is closed, the work order management system triggers another workflow
- that removes the technician's access authorizations. In Build #1, the authorizations are
- removed from the CA directory. Substation physical access is de-provisioned from RS2 via a call-
- out from the workflow to AlertEnterprise Guardian. Identity Manager de-provisions ICS/SCADA
- access from the OT Active Directory. ConsoleWorks detects the change in the OT Active
- Directory instance and de-provisions the technician's access to the RTU.
- In Build #2, IMG removes the authorizations from Adaptive Directory. This removes the
- authorizations from the PACS and OT Active Directory instances. AlertEnterprise Guardian
- detects the change in the PACS Active Directory instance and de-provisions the technician's
- 689 substation physical access. ConsoleWorks detects the change in the OT Active Directory
- instance and de-provisions the technician's access to the RTU.

Without an active assigned work order, the technician has no physical or logical access to the substation.<sup>24</sup> 692 693 **5.4 Supporting Components of the Reference Architecture** 694 In addition to the products used to build an instance of the core example solution (the build), 695 several products provide supporting components to the build as show in Figure 8. These 696 products implement IdAM capabilities that, while necessary to completely implement IdAM 697 within an organization, are not an integral part of the centralized IdAM capability. 698 XTec AuthentX and GlobalSign demonstrate outsourcing some credential issuance and 699 management capabilities. XTec AuthentX also demonstrates outsourcing of some physical 700 access control capabilities. XTec AuthentX Identity and Credential Management System<sup>25</sup> provides a personal identity 701 702 verification interoperable (PIV-I) smartcard credential based on NIST standards that can be used 703 for logical and physical access. AuthentX demonstrates outsourcing of some aspects of user 704 registration, credential issuance and management, authentication, and access control 705 capabilities. These capabilities are provided using a cloud-hosted solution with identity vetting 706 workflows, credential issuance stations, and full life-cycle maintenance tools. AuthentX 707 produces Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12-compliant smart cards that are 708 interoperable with and trusted by federal counterparts. 709 XTec demonstrates a cloud-based implementation of the XTec physical access control (PACS) 710 product. The components of the XTec solution in our lab included XNode, card readers, and 711 compliant PIV-I cards. The XTec product places the XNode, an IP addressable RS232/RS485 712 controller within close range of the reader and door strike, as opposed to a typical central 713 control panel deployment. The XNode can also control SCADA devices and send them 714 encrypted instructions. 715 AuthentX IDMS/CMS can also provide a Web-based implementation of the IdAM workflow in 716 the example solution, as well as credential management and provisioning. AuthentX IDMS/CMS 717 can control, log, and account for identity vetting, credential issuance, and credential usage with 718 AuthentX PACS and logical access controls, as well as control credential revocation to all 719 interoperable resources immediately.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> The reference architecture requires substations to have power and communications to receive provisioned authorizations. The reference architecture does not address crisis / emergency situations where this requirement is not met. The reference architecture assumes existing energy company procedures for crisis / emergency response will be used / updated to address this challenge.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> The description of the XTec product and its role supporting the implementation of the example solution was provided to NCCoE by XTec.

720	GlobalSign operates a North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB)-accredited Software as
721	a Service Certificate Authority. It illustrates an outsourced credential issuance and management
722	capability that provides NAESB-compliant X.509 digital certificates. NAESB-compliant digital
723	certificates are required credentials for authenticating Open Access Same-Time Information
724	Systems (OASIS) transactions and access to the Electronic Industry Registry—the central
725	repository for information related to energy scheduling and management activities in North
726	America. <sup>26</sup>
727	Mount Airey Group (MAG) Ozone and Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) demonstrate access
728	control decision and enforcement capabilities that the centralized IdAM capability can
729	provision. MAG Ozone can also provide authorization management capabilities.
730	The MAG Ozone product provides a high-assurance attribute-based access control <sup>27</sup> (ABAC)
731	implementation. ABAC controls access to resources by evaluating access rules using attributes
732	associated with the resource being accessed, the person accessing the resource, and the
733	environment. Ozone Authority provides a high-assurance attribute store. Attributes stored in
734	Ozone Authority are managed using Ozone Console. Ozone manages attributes that control
735	access to high-value transactions such as high-dollar-value financial transactions.
736	Ozone Authority pulls attributes either from Adaptive Directory in Build #2 or from an AD
737	instance in Build #1. Once Ozone Authority pulls the attributes, their values are managed
738	through Ozone Console.

https://www.GlobalSign.com/en/digital-certificates-for-naesb/
 NIST Special Publication 800-162, Guide to Attributed Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations.




Figure 8. Supporting components

Ozone Server uses these attributes, in either the OT or IT silo, to decide if a user is allowed to perform a transaction. Ozone Server provides its decision to the policy enforcement point associated with the application.

MAG provided an application for the IT silo to demonstrate some of Ozone's capabilities. The application is described in Appendix C.<sup>28</sup>

Cisco ISE controls the ability of devices to connect over the network. ISE expands on basic network address-based control to include the identity of the person using a device. ISE is used in the builds to provide a gateway function between OT and IT, limiting which users and devices are allowed to connect from IT to resources in OT.

Other than the MAG demonstration application, a full ABAC capability was not included in the architecture. A separate NCCoE project is creating an ABAC building block that could be used in IT or OT. http://nccoe.nist.gov/content/attribute-based-access-control

# 5.5 Build #3 - An Alternative Core Component Build of the Example Solution

RSA, CA, and AlertEnterprise all provide products that can implement the IdAM workflow, identity store, and provisioning. Our initial builds of the example solution used RSA and CA products to implement the IdAM workflow, the identity store, and Active Directory provisioning. AlertEnterprise Guardian was used to provision the RS2 PACS; however, Guardian can also implement the IdAM workflow, identity store, and both OT and IT provisioning. To illustrate Guardian's full capabilities, AlertEnterprise created this independent build of the example solution in their labs using the Guardian product.




Figure 9. Build #3

AlertEnterprise Guardian implements the IdAM workflow. It receives input from an HR system in the form of comma-separated value (.csv) files. We simulated the HR system using manually produced .csv files. Guardian provisions information to Microsoft Active Directory instances in OT and IT. No relationship among these Active Directory instances is assumed.

IT applications are assumed to be integrated with Active Directory and use credential information and authorization information in the IT Active Directory instance. If there are IT

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766 767	applications that are not integrated with Active Directory, the provisioning capabilities of Guardian would be used to directly provision the applications.
768 769 770 771	Guardian provisions physical access authorizations into the RS2 PACS. Physical Access and Cardholder life cycle functions are supported through Guardian workflow to ensure right level of access is granted to the right people based on training, compliance and security requirements.
772 773 774 775 776 777	An instance of TDi Technologies ConsoleWorks and a Schneider Electric Tofino firewall are installed in the OT silo to implement an EACMS between the EMS/Operations Management network and the ICS/SCADA network. ConsoleWorks is integrated with the OT Active Directory instance. Guardian provisions ICS/SCADA access authorizations in the OT Active Directory instance. ConsoleWorks uses the access authorizations in OT Active Directory to control user access to ICS/SCADA devices.
778 779	Additional information about Build #3 is available from the AlertEnterprise Web site at <a href="http://www.alertenterprise.com/resources-standards-nistcoe.php">http://www.alertenterprise.com/resources-standards-nistcoe.php</a> .
780	5.6 Build Implementation Description
781 782 783 784 785	The infrastructure was built on Dell model PowerEdge R620 server hardware. The server operating system was VMware vSphere virtualization operating environment. In addition, we used a 6-terabyte Dell EqualLogic network attached storage (NAS) product, and Dell model PowerConnect 7024, and Cisco 3650 physical switches to interconnect the server hardware, external network components, and the NAS.
786 787 788 789	The NCCoE built two instantiations of the example solution to illustrate the modularity of the technologies. Build #1 uses the CA Technologies Identity Manager product. Build #2 uses the RSA Identity Management and Governance (IMG) [now known as RSA VIA Governance and RSA VIA Lifecycle] and RSA Adaptive Directory products.
790 791 792 793	The lab network is connected to the public Internet via a virtual private network (VPN) appliance and firewall to enable secure Internet and remote access. The lab network is not connected to the NIST enterprise network. Table 3 lists the software and hardware components we used in the build, as well the specific function each component contributes.

Table 3. Build Architecture Component List

Product Vendor	Component Name	Function
Dell	PowerEdge R620	Physical server hardware
Dell	PowerConnect 7024	Physical network switch
Dell	EqualLogic	Network attached storage
VMware	vSphere vCenter Server version 5.5	Virtual server and workstation environment
Microsoft	Windows Server 2012 r2 Active Directory Server	Authentication and authority
Microsoft	Windows 7	Information management
Windows	Windows Server 2012 r2 DNS Server	Domain name system
Windows	SQL Server	Database
AlertEnterprise	Enterprise Guardian	Interface and translation between IdAM central store and the PACS management server
CA Technologies	Identity Manager Rel 12.6.05 Build 06109.28	Identity and access automation management application, IdAM provisioning
Cisco	ISE Network Server 3415	Network access controller
Cisco	Catalyst Model 3650	TrustSec-enabled physical network switch
GlobalSign	Digital Certificates	Cloud certificate authority
Mount Airey Group	Ozone Authority	Central attribute management system
Mount Airey Group	Ozone Console	Ozone administrative management console

Product Vendor	Component Name	Function
Mount Airey Group	Ozone Envoy	Enterprise identity store interface
Mount Airey Group	Ozone Server	Ozone centralized attribute based authorization server
RADiFlow	(iSIM) Industrial Service Management Tool	Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) router management application
RADiFlow	SCADA Router RF-3180S	Router/firewall for SCADA network
RSA	Adaptive Directory Version 7.1.5	Central identity store, IdAM provisioning
RSA	IMG Version 6.9 Build 74968	Central IdAM system (workflow management)
TDi Technologies	ConsoleWorks	Privileged user access controller, monitor, and logging system
RS2 Technologies	AccessIT! Universal Release 4.1.15 Physical access control components	Configures and monitors the PACS devices (e.g., card readers, keypads, etc.)
Schweitzer Electronics Laboratory	SEL-2411	Programmable automation controller
Schneider Electric	Tofino Firewall model number TCSEFEA23F3F20	Industrial Ethernet firewall
XTEC	XNode	Remote access control and management

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# 5.6.1 Build Architecture Components Overview

The build architecture consists of multiple networks that mirror the infrastructure of a typical energy industry corporation. The networks are a management network and a production

800 801 802 803	implementation, configuration, and management of the underlying infrastructure, including the physical servers, vSphere infrastructure, and monitoring. The production network, Figure 11	
804	the demilitarized zone (DMZ)	
805	• IdAM	
806	<ul> <li>OT—ICS/SCADA industrial control system and energy management system (EMS)</li> </ul>	
807	PACS—physical access control system network	
808	IT—business management systems	
809 810 811 812 813	These networks were implemented separately to match a typical electricity subsector enterprise infrastructure. Firewalls block all traffic except required internetwork communications. The primary internetwork communications are the user access and authorization updates from the central IdAM systems between the directories and OT, PACS, and IT networks.	
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



Figure 10. Management and production networks



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Figure 11. IdAM build architecture production network


The IdAM network represents the proposed centralized/converged IdAM network/system. This network was separated into OT, PACS, and IT to highlight the unique IdAM components proposed to address the use case requirements.

The IT network represents the business management network that typically supports corporate email, file sharing, printing, and Internet access for general business-purpose computing and communications.

The OT network represents the network used to support the EMSs and ICS/SCADA systems. Typically, this network is either not connected to the enterprise IT network or is connected with a data diode (a one-way communication device from the OT network to the IT network). Twoway traffic is allowed per NERC-CIP and is enabled via the OT firewall only for specific ports and protocols between specific systems identified by IP address.

The PACS network represents the network that supports the physical access control systems across the enterprise. Typically, this network uses the enterprise IT network and is segmented from the user networks by virtual local area networks (VLANs). In our architecture, a firewall

835 836	and authorization information. Technically, this communication consists of user role and responsibility directory updates originating in the IdAM system.		
837 838 839	5.6.2 Build Network Components  Internet – The public Internet is accessible by the lab environment to facilitate both cloud services and access for vendors and NCCoE administrators.		
840 841 842 843 844	<b>VPN Firewall</b> – The VPN firewall is the access control point for vendors to support the installation and configuration of their components of the architecture. We used this access to facilitate product training and implementation support. This firewall also blocks unauthorized traffic from the public Internet to the production networks. We used additional firewalls to secure the multiple domain networks (OT, PACS, IT, and IdAM).		
845 846 847 848			
849 850	<b>Demilitarized Zone</b> – The DMZ provides a protected neutral network space that the other networks of the production network can use to route traffic to/from the Internet or each other		
851 852	5.6.3 Operational Technology Network The builds include the following OT network components:		
853	directory instance		
854	OT management workstation		
855	RTU with IP interface		
856	RTU with serial interface		
857	ICS/SCADA router		
858	router management workstation		
859	ICS/SCADA gateway/access control system		
860 861	This network emulates an energy enterprise OT network and systems. The specific vendor products used in this network are identified in Table 3 and Figure 12. OT network.		



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
4 Figure 12. OT network

In the OT network, the RADiFlow router performs the ICS/SCADA network firewall function. The ConsoleWorks product provides the access control/gateway function. The build used the gateway function to manage access to the OT router and RTU management/console interface. The interface can be used to configure the RTU as well as issue real-time function commands (e.g., open/close relays). The access control/gateway uses the OT directory to obtain access authority for each user requesting access to an RTU.

## 5.6.4 Information Technology Network

- The builds include the following IT network components:
- 873 Active Directory
- 874 Cisco ISE
- 875 TrustSec switch
- 876 workstation
- A typical enterprise includes information-sharing systems, email, and application servers. We did not include these systems in the architecture because they are not needed to demonstrate

the effectiveness of the IdAM example solution. The specific vendor products used in this network are identified in Table 3 and Figure 13.



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Figure 13. IT network

- 883 5.6.5 Physical Access and Control System Network
- The builds include the following PACS network components:
- Active Directory
- PACS control server Access IT!
  - integrated access control unit (including a card reader, keypad, and door strike)—RS2
     Technologies
- workstation
- This network emulates a typical enterprise PACS. The specific vendor products used in this network are identified in Table 3 and Figure 14.




Figure 14. PACS network

Two technologies are demonstrated in the PACS network: XTEC XNode and RS2 Technologies AccessIT!. XTEC XNode is a physical access system using smart card readers, pin pads, and an Internet cloud-based authorization service. The cloud service can federate (interoperate) with corporate identity and access stores or can be operated as a fully outsourced PACS IdAM solution. The RS2 Technologies system includes card readers, pin pads, and the AccessIT! local management server. The local management server is integrated with the central identity and access store via the AlertEnterprise Guardian product. In Build #1, Guardian receives IdAM data directly from Identity Manager. Once the information is received, Guardian provisions the information to the PACS management server. In Build #2, Guardian monitors the PACS directory for IdAM changes. Once changes are identified, Guardian collects the information and provisions the IdAM information to the PACS management server.

- 5.6.6 Identity and Access Management Network
- *5.6.6.1* Build #1
- 907 Build #1 includes the following IdAM network components:

- 908 central IdAM system
- 909 PACS IdAM interface system
- 910 Structured Query Language (SQL) server
  - MAG Ozone components

The IdAM was separated to highlight the unique IdAM components proposed to address the use case requirements. The implementation is not a recommendation to separate IdAM functions on their own network. The products used in this build are identified in Table 3 and Figure 15. Central IdAM network.

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
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# **Identity and Access Management Area**



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
Figure 15. Central IdAM network, Build #1

919 The central IdAM system is the authoritative central store for identity and access authorization 920 data. CA Identity Manager provides central identity and access store as well as workflow 921 management capability in Build #1 (see Figure 15). The central IdAM system takes over control 922 of the directory instances in each silo. The control is implemented by providing an 923 administrative account credential for each managed directory to the IdAM system. This is an 924 important aspect of the implementation. When the administrative credential is issued, the 925 organization must limit access to the managed directories of the IdAM system to a reduced

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926 927	number of administrative users. The security of the solution partially depends on limited access to the managed directories, as discussed in Section 5.9.6, Security Recommendations.		
928 929 930 931 932	using Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Secure (LDAPS). This synchronization is set up to sync changes immediately from the IdAM system to each directory. In addition, an automated sync function can be implemented to check for unauthorized changes in each directory to increase the security of the implementation. Automated sync was not implemented in this		
934 935 936 937	AlertEnterprise Guardian integrates the IdAM central store with the PACS access management system (AccessIT!). Guardian includes integration and translation capabilities to transfer the IdAM data to the AccessIT! management server database. In this build, Guardian is integrated with Identity Manager for IdAM synchronization.		
938	5.6.6.2 Build #2		
939 940 941 942 943 944	The IdAM network components include a central IdAM system, PACS IdAM interface system, and the MAG Ozone components. The IdAM network represents the proposed centralized/converged identity and access management network/system. This network was separated to highlight the unique IdAM components proposed to address the use case requirements. The implementation is not a recommendation to separate IdAM functions own their own network. The products used in this build are identified in Table 3 and Figure 16.		

# **Identity and Access Management Area**



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Figure 16. Central IdAM network, Build #2

The central IdAM systems are the authoritative central store for identity and access authorization data. RSA IdAM products and AlertEnterprise provide central identity and access stores as well as workflow management capability. The central IdAM system takes over control of the directory instances in each silo. The control is implemented by providing an administrative account credential for each managed directory to the IdAM system. This is an important aspect of the implementation. When the administrative credential is issued, the organization must limit the access to the managed directories of the IdAM system to a reduced number of administrative users. The security of the solution partially depends on limited access to the managed directories, as discussed in Sections 5.9.6

In this build, the OT, PACS, and IT directories sync with the central IdAM system using LDAPS. This synchronization is set up to sync changes immediately from the IdAM system to each directory. The IdAM system automatically syncs with each directory to check for unauthorized changes to increase the security of the implementation.

In this build, Guardian was used to integrate the IdAM system with the PACS access management system (AccessIT!). Guardian includes integration and translation capabilities to transfer the IdAM data to AccessIT! Guardian monitors the PACS directory for IdAM updates.

964 The MAG Ozone product provides secure attribute distribution within the enterprise. Section 965 5.4 describes its use. 966 5.6.7 Access Authorization Information Flow and Control Points 967 The access and authorization for each user is based on the business and security rules 968 implemented in workflows within the central IdAM system products (RSA IMG, CA Identity 969 Manager). The workflows include management approval chains as well as approval/denial data 970 logging. Once the central IdAM system has processed the access and authority request, the 971 updated user access and authorization data is pushed to the central ID store. The central ID 972 store contains the distribution mechanism for updating the various downstream (synchronized) 973 directories with user access and authorization data. This process applies to new users, 974 terminated users (disabled or deleted users), and any changes to a user profile. Changes include 975 promotions, job responsibility changes, and anything else that would affect the systems a user 976 needs to access. 977 5.6.7.1 OT Access and Authorization Information Flow 978 This section describes the OT ICS/SCADA access and authorization information flow for both 979 builds.

# **OT Network Identity Access and Management**

All messages traverse the DMZ between networks




Figure 17. Access and authorization information flow for OT ICS/SCADA devices


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1004	_	depicts the access and authorization information flow for OT ICS/SCADA devices. The
1005		indicate the access and authorization data exchanges. The black lines depict the data
1006	paths of t	wo OT ICS/SCADA technicians accessing RTUs in the SCADA network (one from the IT
1007	network	and one from the OT network). Note that all data routed between networks flows
1008	through t	he DMZ and network firewalls.
1009	In the OT	network, ConsoleWorks controls access to the OT ICS/SCADA devices. ConsoleWorks
1010	uses the	OT directory to determine which users are authorized to access OT ICS/SCADA devices
1011	It is the c	ontrol point for users accessing OT network devices. ConsoleWorks stores profiles for
1012	groups ar	nd specific users. The profiles define which OT devices each user is authorized to
1013	access. In	addition, ConsoleWorks monitors and logs each user session. This feature allows an
1014	organizat	ion to monitor user activity, block undesired activities, and generate alerts for
1015	suspiciou	s or undesired activities.
1016	In the IT i	network, a TrustSec switch controls which users have access to the OT network. ISE
1017	controls t	he TrustSec switch. This meets the NERC CIP-005 requirement to maintain an
1018	electroni	security perimeter between the ICS/SCADA network and the rest of the corporate
1019	networks	. ISE uses the IT directory identity store to determine user access authority and limit
1020	access to	the ICS/SCADA network to authorized users. This capability enhances the enterprise's
1021	ability to	follow NERC CIP-005. ConsoleWorks also authorizes users to access OT devices.
1022	5.6.7.2	PACS Access and Authorization Information Flow
1023	The PACS	access and authorization information flows in each build are described below.
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#### 1025 Build #1

# **PACS Network Identity Access and Management**

All messages traverse the DMZ between networks



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Figure 18. Access and authorization information flow for the PACS network, Build #1

1028 1029 1030 The PACS network includes devices such as door locks and keypads. In Figure 18, the red lines indicate the access and authorization data exchanges. Note that all data routed between networks flows through the DMZ and network firewalls.


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1034 1035 In the PACS network, the AccessIT! management server controls physical access to facilities, rooms, and the like. AccessIT! updates the PACS devices as needed. The devices also report/log user accesses to this server for logging/auditing purposes. In most environments, the PACS network is segregated from other networks, typically using VLANs. Guardian provides the access and authorization data that it collects from the Identity Manager provisioning server to AccessIT!.

# PACS Network Identity Access and Management

All messages traverse the DMZ between networks



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Figure 19. Access and authorization information flow for the PACS network, Build #2

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
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The red lines in Figure 19 indicate the access and authorization data exchanges or PACS access in Build #2. In this build, IMG provisions all PACS IdAM data to the PACS directory. AlertEnterprise provides the access and authorization data that it collects from the PACS directory to AccessIT!.

# IT Network Identity Access and Management

All messages traverse the DMZ between networks



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Figure 20. Access and authorization information flow for the IT network

The red lines in Figure 20 indicate the access and authorization data exchanges in both builds. Note that all data is routed among the OT, PACS, IT, and IdAM networks through the DMZ. In the IT network, the hosts and other systems access the IT directory to determine which users are authorized to access devices on the IT network. Active Directory provides the typical identity store function of storing the access permissions.

### 5.7 Data

The builds required a user dataset to populate the central IdAM system. In both builds, the IdAM system was initially populated with user data from a synthetic dataset. The dataset was designed to mirror a typical HR system dataset export file. A .csv file was used, which is a typical HR system export file type. The data included user names, titles, access assignments, unique identifiers, and other details required to complete valid directory entries. Once the set of user data was loaded into the IdAM system, each silo directory was provisioned with the appropriate user data. Each silo directory was pre-configured with the group and attribute fields needed to support the builds. For example, the OT network directory had user groups corresponding to the ConsoleWorks user groups. The details are included in the How-To guide.

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## 5.8 Security Characteristics Related to NERC-CIP

The example solution both impacts and is impacted by the requirement to conform to NERC-CIP standards. <sup>29</sup>

Because the example solution uses routed protocols, by definition, it falls within the security perimeter of the adopting electricity subsector organization.<sup>30</sup> According to NERC-CIP, there must be a well-defined process for controlling access to all components within the organization's security perimeter.<sup>31</sup> So, access to the IdAM network must be controlled.

The example solution is informed by NERC-CIP requirements and may contribute to CIP-aligned implementations by providing mechanisms for centralizing logging and auditing of all IdAM activity efficiently and cost-effectively. 32 With this solution in place, information regarding which users have access to what components is easily available via the central identity store. Without the solution, this information would have to be gathered separately from each of the IT, OT, and PACS network access control/directory components.

Table 4 describes how the centralized IdAM solution relates to NERC-CIP requirements.

1079 Table 4. NERC-CIP Requirements

NERC-CIP Requirement	IdAM Role
CIP 004-3a Maintain a list of individuals with logical or unescorted physical access to Critical Cyber Assets.	IdAM maintains, in the identity store, a record of all logical and physical access to resources. If critical cyber assets are identified as such, IdAM inherently maintains such a list.
CIP 004-3a Conduct a cybersecurity training program for individuals with logical or unescorted physical access to Critical Cyber Assets.	The IdAM workflow can be configured to check a training system before granting access to critical cyber assets.
CIP 004-3a Conduct personnel risk	The IdAM workflow can be configured to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) cybersecurity standards provide specific requirements that apply to the bulk power system and were used as a reference by the development team. The proposed solution is designed to be CIP-informed. This document attempts to capture some of the key areas where CIP standards are relevant to elements of the solution and its implementation, for reference purposes. Please consult your NERC-CIP compliance authority for any questions on NERC-CIP compliance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> NERC Standard CIP-002-3 Cyber Security — Critical Cyber Asset Identification, Requirements section R3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> NERC Standard CIP-005-3a Cyber Security – Electronic Security Perimeter(s), Requirements section R2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> NERC Standard CIP-007-3a Cyber Security – Systems Security Management, Requirements section R6.

NERC-CIP Requirement	IdAM Role
assessment. Individuals must have an acceptable risk assessment before being granted access to Critical Cyber Assets.	verify that individuals have an acceptable risk assessment before granting access to critical cyber assets.
CIP 004-3a A list of all personnel with logical or unescorted physical access to Critical Cyber Assets must be maintained.	The identity store maintains authoritative information on all logical and physical access to resources. The identity store is a list of all personnel with logical or unescorted physical access to critical cyber assets.
CIP 004-3a Personnel with logical of physical access to Critical Cyber Assets must have that access removed within 24 hours if terminated for cause and within 7 days otherwise.	The IdAM workflow receives information from the HR system on terminations and can immediately de-provision access for terminated employees. Information from the HR system will need to be provided to the IdAM workflow at least daily to meet the 24-hour constraint.
CIP 005-3 requires documentation of the process for authorizing access in accordance with NERC CIP 004-3.	The IdAM workflow is the process for authorizing access. The workflow design and implementation documents the process.

NERC CIP 005-3 requires cyber assets used in access control and/or monitoring of an electronic security perimeter to be protected per CIP requirements. In both builds, the IdAM workflow, the identity store, and the provisioning capability control the information used to make access control decisions. They are considered inside the electronic security perimeter and must be protected according to NERC-CIP requirements. Connections from the IdAM components to IT, OT, and PACS must be considered access points to the electronic security perimeter.

## **5.9 Evaluation of Security Characteristics**

The security characteristic evaluation seeks to understand the extent to which the IdAM example solution provides a more secure, centralized, uniform, and efficient solution for managing authentication and authorization services and access control across three independent electricity subsector networks. In addition, it seeks to understand the security benefits and drawbacks of the example solution.

# 5.9.1 Scope

The evaluation included analysis of the example solution to identify weaknesses, discuss mitigations, and understand benefits and trade-offs.

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1096	ve considered the following elements of the IdAM example solution:			
1097 1098 1099	<ul> <li>security functionality of components depicted within the OT, PACS, IT, and IdAM networks in Figure 2, and their interactions with each other, with the exception of the XTEC stand-alone access control system</li> </ul>			
1100 1101 1102 1103	<ul> <li>analysis of the capabilities and overall workflow process for centralizing the management of authentication and authorization services on and access control to th IT, OT, and PACS networks, including assumptions, threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations benefits, drawbacks, trade-offs, and risks related to the following characteristics:</li> </ul>			
1104	o centralization			
1105	o automation			
1106	<ul> <li>audit (accountability and tracking)</li> </ul>			
1107	o authentication			
1108	o authorization			
1109	o access control			
1110	o provisioning			
1111 1112	<ul> <li>new "cross-silo" attacks that would not have been possible without the centralized IdAN capability</li> </ul>			
1113 1114	<ul> <li>how the example solution addresses the security characteristics listed in the use case description <a href="https://nccoe.nist.gov/content/energy">https://nccoe.nist.gov/content/energy</a></li> </ul>			
1115 1116	<ul> <li>security recommendations that should be addressed when deploying the IdAM design in a real-world, operational environment</li> </ul>			
1117 1118	<ul> <li>hands-on evaluation of the laboratory build as appropriate to support analysis and demonstrate value</li> </ul>			
1119 1120	<ul> <li>security-related aspects of the OT, PACS, and IT networks as they potentially impact the solution posed by the example solution</li> </ul>			
1121	The following elements of the example solution were <b>not</b> considered:			
1122	evaluation of any specific vendor product or its implementation			
1123 1124	<ul> <li>considerations regarding how to secure direct access to each of the three energy networks (OT, PACS, and IT)</li> </ul>			
1125 1126	<ul> <li>aspects of the build that are specific to the laboratory setting in which the build is implemented</li> </ul>			
1127 1128	5.9.2 Security Characteristics Evaluation Assumptions and Limitations This security characteristic evaluation has the following limitations:			

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- The evaluation examines the security claims made by the example solution; however, it is not a comprehensive test of all security components.
  - The evaluation cannot identify all weaknesses. Its purpose is to verify that the example solution meets its security claims, and to understand the trade-offs involved in doing so.
  - This is not a red team exercise. The intent was to verify the security claims, not to break hardware or software involved in the example solution.
  - The lab routers and firewalls were not included in the evaluation. It is assumed that they are hardened. Testing these devices would reveal only weaknesses in implementation that would not be of value to those adopting this example solution.

## 5.9.3 Example Solution Analysis

Table 5 lists the example solution components, their functions, and the security characteristics they provide. This analysis focuses on these security capabilities rather than on the vendor-specific components. In theory, any number of commercially available components can provide these security capabilities. Some of these components are in Build #1 of the IdAM example solution and others are in Build #2. We discuss them as generic components providing a specific security functionality rather than as vendor products. One vendor product could be substituted for another that provides the same security functionality without affecting the results of the evaluation.

Table 5. IdAM Components and Security Capability Mapping

Component	Specific Product	Function	Security Characteristic
Identity, Authorization, and Workflow Manager	RSA IMG Or CA Identity Manager	IdAM workflow engine; manages identities, credentials, and authorization for all other network components in the use case. Enforces workflows to ensure that access control policies are enforced.	Authentication and authorization
Identity Store	RSA Adaptive Directory (identity Store), which is used with RSA IMG Or Windows SQL 2012, which is used with CA Identity Manager	Database of user identities	Authentication and authorization
High Assurance Attribute Service (AAS)	MAG Ozone System	Access control solution with ABAC architecture; provides increased assurance by signing attributes with private key infrastructure (PKI) and requiring users to authenticate with PKI	

Component	Specific Product	Function	Security Characteristic
Translator between Active Directory and PACS and OT Access Management Systems (AMS)	AlertEnterprise Guardian	Translates from RSA/CA IdAM stores on IdAM network to OT and PACS access management systems, enabling access management devices in the OT and PACS networks to be provisioned from the IdAM network	Authorization, access control
Directory Service	MS Active Directory (for IT devices) Or RS2 PACS Server (for PACS devices)	Database of PACS or IT resource and user identifiers and their associated security policies	Authentication and authorization
SCADA Router and Remote Manager (RM) of SCADA Router	RADiFlow	IP-addressable industrial control system gateway that enables remote control of physical devices: Management workstation enables remote management of physical SCADA router; SCADA router serves as firewall, terminal server, IP-to-serial connectivity	Access control
Network Access Control (AC) and Policy Enforcement System (PES)	Cisco ISE	Allows access policies for network endpoints to be controlled centrally	Network security
Stand-alone Smartcard Provisioning (SP) and Access System (AS)	XTEC	Smartcard-based physical access control	Authentication, authorization, access control

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#### 5.9.4 Security Characteristics Addressed

- 1150 One aspect of our security evaluation involved assessing how well the IdAM example solution
- addresses the security characteristics that it was intended to support. These security
- characteristics are listed in a security control map published in the appendix of the IdAM use
- 1153 case description
- 1154 (http://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nccoe/NCCoE ES Identity Access Management.pdf).
- Six security characteristics are listed, each of which is further classified by the Cybersecurity
- 1156 Framework (CSF) categories and subcategories to which they map. The CSF subcategories
- further map to specific sections of each standard and best practice cited in the CSF in reference
- to that subcategory. Figure 21 depicts an example of the process.

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


Figure 21. Example process for determining the security standards-based attributes for the example solution

We used the CSF subcategories to provide structure to the security assessment by consulting the specific sections of each standard that are cited in reference to that subcategory. The cited sections provide example solution validation points by listing specific traits that a solution that supports the desired security characteristics should exhibit. Using the CSF subcategories as a basis for organizing our analysis and consulting the specific sections of the security standards that are cited with respect to each subcategory allowed us to systematically consider how well the example solution supports the security characteristics identified in the use case description.

The remainder of this subsection discusses how the example solution addresses the six desired security characteristics that are listed in the use case description appendix:<sup>33</sup>

- 1170 authentication for OT
- 1171 access control for OT
- 1172 authorization (provisioning) OT
- centrally monitor use of accounts
  - protect exchange of identity and access information
    - provision, modify or revoke access throughout all federated entities

1176 This section also discusses how the authentication, access control, and authorization (provisioning) security characteristics are addressed for PACS.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> http://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nccoe/NCCoE\_ES\_Identity\_Access\_Management.pdf

1178	5.9.4.1 Authentication, Access Control, and Authorization for OT
1179 1180 1181	The implementation includes the capabilities that support these security characteristics. Section 5.6.7.1 describes the information flows for supporting authentication, access control, and authorization (provisioning) on the OT network.
1182	5.9.4.2 Centrally Monitor Use of Accounts
1183 1184	The example solution supports centralized accountability and tracking of user accounts, with the IdAM identity, authorization, and workflow manager acting as the locus of this capability.
1185 1186 1187 1188	On the OT network, the console access manager, which acts as the gatekeeper to all ICS/SCADA devices, monitors and logs all ICS/SCADA access requests and responses, as well as all user interactions with the ICS/SCADA OT devices. These logs should be centrally monitored along with other ICS/SCADA OT monitoring within the enterprise.
1189 1190 1191 1192	The network access control component also logs all access requests and responses received at and generated by the IT network switch that controls access to the OT network from the IT network. These logs should be centrally monitored along with other ICS/SCADA OT monitoring within the enterprise.
1193 1194 1195 1196 1197	On the PACS network, the PACS devices also report/log user access requests and responses to the PACS server. These logs should be centrally monitored along with other ICS/SCADA OT monitoring within the enterprise. In addition, the IdAM identity, authorization, and workflow manager and the translator component log the PACS access change (add, delete, or change) requests.
1198	5.9.4.3 Protect Exchange of Identity and Access Information
1199 1200 1201 1202 1203	All IdAM-related information exchange between IdAM components (as shown by the red lines in Figures $17 - 20$ ) should be performed in protected mode. In other words, at the least, integrity checking mechanisms are performed on this communication so that tampering can be detected. Preferably, these communications are encrypted. In particular, the following should be in protected mode:
1204	• all information exchange to/from the directory services in the IT, OT, and PACS networks
1205 1206	<ul> <li>all information exchanges between the console access manager (e.g., the ConsoleWorks component in Figure 17) and the OT directory service</li> </ul>
1207 1208	<ul> <li>all information exchange between the PACS server and the PACS translator component (e.g., the AlertEnterprise component in Figures 18 and 19)</li> </ul>
1209 1210 1211	Because of time constraints, the laboratory builds of the example solution did not include encryption or integrity assurance for every IdAM information exchange. Nevertheless, such protection is strongly recommended when deploying the example solution.

1212	5.9.4.4 Provision, Modify, or Revoke Access
1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221	User authorizations for use of all IT, OT, and PACS network account assets, for ICS/SCADA devices, and for physical access to rooms, facilities, and the like are provisioned, modified, and revoked by modifying user authorization information in the central IdAM identity, authorization, and workflow manager (CA Identity Manager or RSA IMG). These components, in turn, propagate the changes to all entities used to make local authorization and access determinations. Such information propagation ensures that all attempts to access IT, OT, and PACS network assets, SCADA devices, and rooms and facilities are handled uniformly because they are subject to the same updated access and authorization information when the silo directory, console manager, PACS server, or other IdAM device is consulted in response to the access attempt.
1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228	5.9.5 Assessment of Reference Architecture The IdAM example solution is not intended to encompass all aspects of electricity subsector organization operations. It was designed to centralize management of authorization and access in three disparate IdAM silos. Thus, our assessment considers the solution itself, not the broader problem of providing general security to all aspects of electricity subsector organization operations.
1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235	The example solution includes three network silos (OT, PACS, and IT,), plus an IdAM network with numerous components that provide centralization, uniformity, and efficiency through the use of IdAM workflows. All threats and vulnerabilities that are present on the IT, OT, and PACS networks are also present in the example solution, so they will need to be addressed during solution deployment. This evaluation assumes that the OT, PACS, and IT, networks are already protected using physical access control and network security components such as firewalls and intrusion detection devices that are configured according to best practices.
1236	5.9.5.1 Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Assumptions
1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244	This evaluation concerns the IdAM network itself, its components, and their interaction with IdAM components on the IT, OT, and PACS networks, which both provide the benefits afforded by the example solution and introduce new attack surfaces and potential threats. For example, each of the IT, OT, and PACS networks has directory services components that must be secured. If the information in these directories is not safeguarded against tampering, the organization is at risk. These directories must be safeguarded in both the existing three-silo architecture and the example solution. The example solution, however, includes additional, related directory components that must also be protected. <sup>34</sup>
1245 1246	The identity, authorization, and workflow manager and the identity store on the IdAM network must be protected from unauthorized access and their information safeguarded. All of the data

 $^{34}$  Section 5.6 describes the components and products in each build of the reference solution.

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1247 in the directory service components in the OT, PACS, and IT networks is accessible by the 1248 identity, authorization, and workflow manager and the identity store. The ability to propagate 1249 data from the IdAM network to the OT, PACS, and IT networks is the main strength as well as 1250 the greatest vulnerability of the example solution. If the IdAM identity store or the identity, 1251 authorization, and workflow manager that has access to it were compromised, this would 1252 equate to a compromise of each of the directory services in the IT, OT, and PACS networks. As a 1253 result, controlling access to the IdAM network, controlling access to each IdAM component, 1254 and securing communications among IdAM components is essential to securing the example 1255 solution. Therefore, analysis of the security of the IdAM network, its components, and the 1256 communications among IdAM components is central to the evaluation of the IdAM example 1257 solution.

5.9.5.1.1. Controlling Access to the Identity, Authorization, and Workflow Manager<sup>35</sup>

The identity, authorization, and workflow manager on the IdAM network contains information regarding actual users and accounts for the OT, PACS, and IT. It manages the identities and credentials for the rest of the use case, but it does not manage them for itself. In other words, the identity, authorization, and workflow manager component itself does not control user access to the identity, authorization, and workflow manager. It has a separate set of user accounts and passwords that are specific to this component and that IdAM administrators use to log into it. This access must be strictly controlled so that only authorized IdAM administrators can log into the identity, authorization, and workflow manager. Users or authorized systems (such as HR or a work order management system) must log into the identity, authorization, and workflow manager to provision all electricity subsector systems (i.e., add identity information and authorization rules for new users, delete information for former users, and modify information as user authorizations change).

There is no Active Directory running on the IdAM network. In the builds, access to the identity, authorization, and workflow manager and to all other components of the IdAM network is granted by the use of username and credential, presented either via Web interface or via each machine's operating system (OS) console. An organization deploying the example solution operationally would of course be free to implement alternative access control mechanisms. While both privileged and unprivileged users may access the identity, authorization, and workflow manager and other IdAM components, only highly privileged users should be permitted to create, delete, or modify accounts. Monitoring, logging, and auditing all activity performed directly on IdAM components such as the identity, authorization, and workflow manager or the identity store is essential to ensure that authorized users are not performing unauthorized activities.

<sup>35</sup> Section 4.3.2 describes the risks associated with access to the IdAM workflow.

1282	5.9.5.1.2.	Logging Activity	on IdAM C	omponents
1202	0.0.0.1.2.	Logging / totivit	y Oli iaz tivi O	OTTIPOTIOTIC

- Logging all activity performed on IdAM components is crucial for securing the example solution.
- 1284 Ideally, access to all components on the IdAM network should be logged for the purpose of
- auditing and accountability. The example solution is designed to allow logging of all user activity
- on IdAM systems (e.g., identity, access, and authorization changes). The example solution
- should also log all activity performed by administrators so that no activity is exempt from
- monitoring, logging, and audit. Here is a closer look at three different types of IdAM system
- users (in terms of the amount of privilege they have) and whether or not their activity should
- 1290 be logged.
- 1291 Unprivileged users, by definition, are not authorized to interact with any IdAM system. They
- 1292 cannot create an account on the identity, authorization, and workflow manager or modify the
- privileges of a user who already has an account. A user who works for HR, for example, who
- needs to add a user identity or modify a user's authorizations, would have an account on the
- identity, authorization, and workflow manager (that was set up by a privileged user) that allows
- him/her to add to or modify the information in the identity, authorization, and workflow
- manager component via Web interface. Such a user would never be able to access the identity,
- 1298 authorization, and workflow manager via its machine's OS console. Console access would
- enable the user to manage the operating system on which the component is running. All the
- unprivileged user needs is the ability to use his/her own, unprivileged, user-level account on
- the identity, authorization, and workflow manager's machine. Because the example solution is
- designed to monitor and log all activity that occurs over a Web interface, it will log all
- 1303 unprivileged user activity.
- 1304 Administrators, by definition, can access OS consoles and create user accounts on IdAM
- machines such as the identity, authorization, and workflow manager. However, they are not
- authorized to change the access control policies within the console access manager. As a result,
- when administrators access the consoles of an IdAM system operating system, they must do so
- 1308 via the console access manager. The console access manager will log and monitor all
- 1309 administrator activity at any OS console.
- 1310 **Super-administrators**, by definition, can not only access machine consoles and create user
- accounts on IdAM machine operating systems; they can change the access control policies
- 1312 within the console access manager. Therefore, the example solution cannot force them to use
- the console access manager when accessing the consoles of IdAM system machine operating
- 1314 systems. If super-administrators do access the consoles of IdAM system's OS without doing so
- 1315 via the console manager, their activity will not be logged or monitored. So, while super-
- administrators should be strongly encouraged by policy to use the console access manager,
- 1317 IdAM does not provide a technical mechanism to ensure that they will.
- 1318 Access to the identity store on the IdAM network must also be strictly controlled, and the
- identity store should be configured so that it will only perform addition, modification, and
- deletion requests received from the identity, authorization, and workflow manager. If the
- 1321 identity store were to accept updates or edits from another entity, the result could be
- 1322 catastrophic. Any updates made by an administrator would have to be made via machine

1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328	console, so at least these would be logged. Updates made by a super-administrator could escape detection if the super-administrator were to defy organization policy and access the identity store console without going through the console access manager. We acknowledge insider threats but feel that mitigating the risk of insider threats presently relies more on organizational policy decisions rather than technology. Therefore, addressing insider threat is outside the scope of this project.
1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336	5.9.5.1.3. Unauthorized Modification of Access and Authorization Information User identity and credential information is input into the identity, authorization, and workflow manager and then propagated to other IdAM components. If this information were deleted, modified, or falsified while in transit between components or while stored in a component, the result could be catastrophic. It is essential to protect access to each IdAM component so that adversaries cannot modify IdAM information stored in the components, and so IdAM information has at least its integrity and ideally its confidentiality protected when in transit between IdAM components.
1337	5.9.5.2 Mitigations: Essentials for Securing the IdAM Example Solution
1338 1339 1340	Based on the information flows for supporting OT authentication, OT access control, and OT authorization described in Section 5.6.7 securing the part of the IdAM example solution that supports OT access control requires:
1341	securing access to the
1342 1343 1344 1345	<ul> <li>identity, authorization, and workflow manager, identity store, and network access control components on the IdAM network (i.e., ensuring that only authorized users can access and add, modify, or delete information on these components)</li> </ul>
1346 1347 1348	<ul> <li>directory service and console access manager components on the OT network (i.e., ensuring that only authorized users can access and add, modify, or delete information on these components)</li> </ul>
1349 1350	<ul> <li>IT network access control switch that serves as a gateway to the OT network from the IT network</li> </ul>
1351	<ul> <li>protecting the integrity of the information exchanged between the</li> </ul>
1352	<ul> <li>identity manager and the identity stores</li> </ul>
1353	<ul> <li>identity store and the directory service on the OT network</li> </ul>
1354 1355 1356	<ul> <li>directory service and the console access manager components on the OT network, as well as the network access control and policy enforcement system within the IT network</li> </ul>
1357	<ul> <li>network access control component identity stores</li> </ul>
1358 1359	<ul> <li>network access control component on the IT network and the IT network access control switch that serves as a gateway to the OT network</li> </ul>

1360 1361 1362	Based on the information flows for supporting PACS authentication, PACS access control, and PACS authorization described in Section 5.6.7 securing the part of the IdAM example solution that supports PACS access control requires:
1363	<ul> <li>securing access to the</li> </ul>
1364 1365 1366	<ul> <li>identity, authorization, and workflow manager; identity store; and IdAM translator components on the IdAM network (i.e., ensuring that only authorized users can access and add, modify, or delete information on these components)</li> </ul>
1367 1368 1369	<ul> <li>IdAM identity store and PACS directory service components on the PACS network (i.e., ensuring that only authorized users can access and add, modify, or delete information on these components)</li> </ul>
L370	<ul> <li>protecting the integrity of the information exchanged between the</li> </ul>
1371	<ul> <li>identity manager and identity stores</li> </ul>
1372 1373	<ul> <li>identity store on the IdAM network and the PACS directory service on the PACS network</li> </ul>
L374 L375	<ul> <li>IdAM translator component on the IdAM network and the IdAM directory service on the PACS network</li> </ul>
L376 L377	<ul> <li>IdAM translator component on the IdAM network and the PACS management server on the PACS network</li> </ul>
1378	5.9.5.3 Trade-offs
1379 1380 1381 1382 1383	As mentioned earlier, the very characteristics that are the main objectives of the example solution, namely centralization and uniformity of the management of authorization and access, are also its main vulnerabilities. A successful attack on the IdAM network or its components could result in a compromise of one or all of the OT, PACS, and IT networks. Organizations that implement the example solution may incur additional costs to secure the IdAM network and its components.
1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394	5.9.5.3.1 Benefits  The benefits of the IdAM example solution include consolidated management of identity and access audit data; documented and repeatable business and security access decision processes (workflows); approval/denial data logging; rapid provisioning and de-provisioning using consistent, efficient, and automated processes; and better situational awareness through the ability to track and audit all access requests and other IdAM activity across all four networks. Other important benefits include greatly reduced time to implement access control changes and highly automated identity synchronization across silos. For example, an OT, PACS, and/or IT access change request can be implemented in minutes. These benefits directly reduce the cost of the regulatory audit requirements imposed on the energy industry. They enable IdAM processes to be handled efficiently, and with more granular, prompt, and cost-effective control.

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1396	5.9.6	Security Recommendation
1390	5.9.6	Security Recommendation

- While the example solution provides a centralized IdAM security solution, the solution itself provides a single attack vector that, if compromised, could have devastating consequences.

  Therefore, an organization that implements the example solution must take great care to
- secure the IdAM example solution itself. When deploying their own implementations,
- organizations should adhere to the following security recommendations:
- Conduct their own evaluations of their example solution implementation.
  - Deploy all components on securely configured operating systems that use multifactor authentication and are configured according to best practices.<sup>36</sup>
  - Ensure that all operating systems on which example solution implementation components are running are hardened, maintained, and kept up-to-date in terms of patching, version control, and virus and malware detection.
  - Put into place a security infrastructure that will protect the example solution itself and secure the communications among the components on the IdAM network and between these components and the IdAM components on the other three networks, as described in Section 5.9.5.2. Many of the remaining recommendations relate to providing such a security infrastructure.
  - Design the authorization and workflow policies that are enforced by the identity, authorization, and workflow manager component to enforce the principle of least privilege and separation of duties.
  - Design the authorization and access control policies that govern user access to the IdAM components themselves to enforce the principle of least privilege and separation of duties.
  - Segregate IdAM components onto their own network, either physically or using private VLANs and port-based authentication or similar mechanisms.<sup>37</sup>
  - Deploy a security infrastructure to secure the IdAM network and the IdAM platforms themselves. This infrastructure must consist of a holistic set of components that work together to prevent the IdAM network, components, and workflow from being used as an attack vector.
  - Protect the IdAM network using security components such as firewalls and intrusion detection devices that are configured according to best practices.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> The laboratory instantiation of the example solution builds did not implement every rule or guide in the STIGs upon which the builds installations were based. Exceptions were made to allow for only the needed operation of the solution. See the How-To section for details.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> IEEE 802.1X is a standard for Port-based Network Access Control that provides an authentication mechanism to devices that are to be attached to a local area network.

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- Protect each of the OT, PACS, and IT, networks using security components such as
   firewalls and intrusion detection devices that are configured according to best practices.
  - Strictly control physical access to the OT, PACS, IT, and IdAM networks.
  - Configure firewalls to limit connections between the IdAM network and the production (IT, OT, and PACS) networks, except for connections needed to support required internetwork communications to specific IP address and port combinations in certain directions. The primary required, authorized internetwork communications are user authorization updates from the identity, authorization, and workflow manager component to the directory services on the production networks, the OT console access manager, and the PACS server, and logging information in the reverse direction. Firewalls should block all incoming connections from the Internet and to limit outgoing connections to the Internet, if any, to specific systems and required ports.
  - Perform all IdAM-related information exchanged between IdAM components (as shown by the red lines in Figures 17 - 20) in protected mode, meaning that, at the least, integrity checking mechanisms are performed on this communication so that tampering can be detected. Preferably, these communications should be encrypted. In particular:
    - Perform all information exchange to/from the directory services in each of the OT, PACS, and IT, networks in protected mode.
    - Perform all information exchange between the console access manager (i.e., the ConsoleWorks component in Figure 17) and the OT directory service in protected mode.
    - Perform all information exchange between the network access control manager (i.e., the Cisco ISE component in Figure 17) and the switch in the IT network that controls access to the OT network in protected mode.
    - Perform all information exchange between the PACS server and the PACS translator component (e.g., the AlertEnterprise component in Figure 18 and 19 in protected mode.

In the case of IdAM exchanges with the silo directories, protected mode is defined as the use of Start Transport Layer Security (TLS) (RFC 2830) rather than LDAPS, which uses Secure Socket Layer and has been deprecated in favor of Start TLS.

- Install, configure, and use each component of the example solution (e.g., the identity, authorization, and workflow manager or the PAC server) according to the security guidance provided by the component vendor.
- Configure all IdAM components on the IdAM network so that it is impossible to access them remotely.
- Log all IdAM activity, for example direct access to IdAM components on the IdAM network and all messages exchanged between IdAM components. Limit the number of users able to control whether or not activity performed is logged.
- Require super-administrators (i.e., users who are authorized to change the access control policies within the console access manager) to use a console access manager
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- when accessing the console of all devices on the IdAM network and never to access any console directly. Use of a console access manger ensures that all activity performed via the console is logged.
  - Configure the console access manager to have an always-on connection to all devices on the IdAM network so that it can monitor each device's console port. This configuration ensures that all activity performed over the console port will be logged. Configure the console access manager to generate an alert if the always-on connection to any device is disconnected. This configuration ensures that security auditors can be aware of any times during which the console port of a device may have been accessed without the activity being logged or monitored.
  - Configure all devices on the IdAM network so that they have only one console port (the
    port to which the console access manager has an always-on connection). Alternatively
    (where applicable), configure the devices on the IdAM network to allow only one
    console connection or login at a time. This will ensure that the console access manager
    will log all activity performed via the console of any of these devices.

#### 1482 5.9.7 Security Characteristics Evaluation Summary

1483 Overall, the example solution and the workflow processes that it enforces succeed in 1484 centralizing IdAM functions across the OT, PACS, and IT networks to provide an efficient, 1485 uniform, and secure solution for authenticating and authorizing access across all systems and 1486 facilities. The solution enables access control policies across all three networks to be enforced 1487 consistently, quickly, and with a high degree of granularity, so that users are granted only 1488 enough privilege necessary to complete their work for only the necessary amount of time. It 1489 also enables a centralized, simplified audit capability for accountability and tracking. Such 1490 benefits come with a cost. This cost is the requirement to secure and log all access to the IdAM 1491 network, its components, and the information exchanged between these components and 1492 IdAM components on the OT, PACS, and IT, networks.

#### **6 FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION**

- We conducted a functional evaluation of the IdAM example solution to verify that several
   common key provisioning functions of the example solution, as implemented in our laboratory
   build, worked as expected. The IdAM workflow capability demonstrated the ability to centrally
- assign and provision access privileges to users based on a set of programmed business
   rules in the OT, PACS, and IT, networks and systems
  - create, activate, and deactivate users in the OT, PACS, and IT, networks and systems
  - change an existing user's access to the various networks and systems
- Section 6.1 explains the functional test plan in more detail and lists the procedures used for each of the functional tests.

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#### **6.1 IdAM Functional Test Plan**

This test plan includes the test cases necessary to conduct the functional evaluation of the IdAM use case. The IdAM implementation is currently deployed in a lab at the NCCoE. Section 5 describes the test environment.

Each test case consists of multiple fields that collectively identify the goal of the test, the specifics required to implement the test, and how to assess the results of the test. Table 6 provides a template of a test case, including a description of each field in the test case.

1510 Table 6. Test Case Fields

Test Case Field	Description
Parent requirement	Identifies the top-level requirement or the series of top-level requirements leading to the testable requirement.
Testable requirement	Drives the definition of the remainder of the test case fields. Specifies the capability to be evaluated.
Associated Security Controls	The NIST SP 800-53 rev 4 controls addressed by the test case.
Description	Describes the objective of the test case.
Associated test cases	In some instances a test case may be based on the outcome of another test case(s). For example, analysis-based test cases produce a result that is verifiable through various means such as log entries, reports, and alerts.
Preconditions	The starting state of the test case. Preconditions indicate various starting state items, such as a specific capability configuration required or specific protocol and content
Procedure	The step-by-step actions required to implement the test case. A procedure may consist of a single sequence of steps or multiple sequences of steps (with delineation) to indicate variations in the test procedure.
Expected results	The specific expected results for each variation in the test procedure.
Actual results	The actual observed results in comparison with the documented expected results.

Overall result	The overall result of the test as pass/fail. In some test case instances, the determination of the overall result may be more involved, such as	
	determining pass/fail based on a percentage of errors identified.	

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### **6.2 IdAM Use Case Requirements**

This section identifies the ES IdAM functional evaluation requirements that are addressed using this test plan. Table 7 lists those requirements and associated test cases.

Table 7. IdAM Functional Requirements

Capability Requirement (CR) ID	Parent Requirement	Sub- requirement 1	Sub- requirement 2	Test Case
CR 1	The IdAM system shall include an IdAM workflow capability that assigns and provisions access privileges to users based on a set of programmed business rules in the following networks:			
CR 1.a		IT		
CR 1.a.1			Allow access	IdAM-1
CR 1.a.2			Deny access	IdAM-1
CR 1.b		ОТ		
CR 1.b.1			Allow access	IdAM-1
CR 1.b.2			Deny access	IdAM-1
CR 1.c		PACS		
CR 1.c.1			Allow access	IdAM-1
CR 1.c.2			Deny access	IdAM-1
CR 2	The IdAM system shall include an IdAM workflow capability that can create and activate new users in the following networks and systems:			
CR 2.a		IT		IdAM-2
CR 2.b		ОТ		IdAM-2
CR 2.c		PACS		IdAM-2

CR 3	The IdAM system shall include an IdAM workflow capability that can de-activate users in the following networks and systems:			
CR 3.a		IT		IdAM-2
CR 3.b		ОТ		IdAM-2
CR 3.c		PACS		IdAM-2
CR 4	The IdAM system shall include a workflow capability that can change an existing user access to the various networks and systems.			
CR 4.a		IT		
CR 4.a.1			Allow to deny	IdAM-3
CR 4.a.2			Deny to allow	IdAM-3
CR 4.b		ОТ		
CR 4.b.1			Allow to deny	IdAM-3
CR 4.b.2			Deny to allow	IdAM-3
CR 4.c		PACS		
CR 4.c.1			Allow to deny	IdAM-3
CR 4.c.2			Deny to allow	IdAM-3

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6.3 Test Case: IdAM-1 1518

1519 Table 8. Test Case ID: IdAM-1

### **Parent** requirement

(CR 1) The IdAM system shall include an IdAM workflow capability that assigns and provisions access privileges to users based on a set of programmed business rules in the following networks and systems:

(CR 1.a) IT, (CR 1.b) OT, (CR 1.c) PACS

## **Testable** requirement

(CR 1.a.1-2) IT, (CR 1.b.1-2) OT, (CR 1.c.1-2) PACS

#### Description

Show that the IdAM solution can assign and provision access in the OT and IT networks as well as in the PACS network and system, including allowing and denying access.

#### Associated test cases

# Controls

Associated Security AC-2, AC-3, IA-2, PE-2, PE-3

#### **Preconditions**

- 1. HR representative .csv file is available.
- 2. IdAM example solution is implemented and operational in the lab environment
- 3. Standard and privileged user sets are known to the testers.
- 4. A PACS system with a card reader and simulated door access demonstration system is operational in the lab.
- 5. A simulated OT network with an RTU and RTU emulator (Raspberry Pi) is implemented in the lab.

#### **Procedure**

- 1. Activate IdAM workflow engine and run command to ingest the HR .csv file.
- 2. At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to log in as a user known to have access in the IT network.
- 3. At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to log in as a user known to be denied in the IT network.
- 4. At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to log in as a user known to have access in the OT network.
- 5. At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to access the Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL) RTU administrative interface as a user

known to have access to the SEL RTU.

- At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to access the RTU
  emulator administrative interface as a user known to have access to
  the RTU emulator.
- 7. At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to access the SEL RTU administrative interface as a user known to be denied access to the SFL RTU.
- 8. At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to access the RTU emulator administrative interface as a user known to be denied access to the RTU emulator.
- 9. At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to log in as a user known to be denied access in the OT network.
- 10. At the demonstration PACS card reader, attempt an "access" with a card for a user known to have access allowed.
- 11. At the demonstration PACS card reader, attempt an "access" with a card for a user known to not have access allowed.

# Expected results (pass)

#### **Network Access Allowed**

Users with allowed access are able to log into a workstation on the IT network.

Users with allowed access are able to log into a workstation on the OT network as well as the SEL RTU and RTU emulator.

Users with allowed access are able to log into a workstation on the PACS network.

Users with allowed access are authorized and allowed access by the PACS card reader and door access demonstration system.

**Network Access Denied** 

Users who are denied access to the IT network are unable to log into a workstation on the IT network.

Users who are denied access to the OT network are unable to log into a workstation on the OT network as well as the SEL RTU and RTU emulator.

Users who are denied access PACS network are unable to log into a workstation on the PACS network.

Users without access are not authorized and not allowed access by the PACS

	card reader and door access demonstration system.
Actual results	This test functioned appropriately and provided the expected results. User that were denied access were unable to login to the OT and IT networks, and denied access to PACS. Users granted access to each system were able to access the OT and IT networks and granted access via PACS.
Overall result	Pass

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Table 9. Test Case ID: IdAM-2

Parent requirement	(CR 2) The IdAM system shall include an IdAM workflow capability that can create and activate new users in the following networks and systems: (OT, PACS, IT,)				
	(CR 3) The IdAM system shall include an IdAM workflow capability that can de-activate users in the following networks and systems: (IT, OT, PACS)				
Testable	(CR 2.a) IT, (CR 2.b) OT, (CR 2.c) PACS				
requirement	(CR 3.a) IT, (CR 3.b) OT, (CR 3.c) PACS				
Description	Show that the IdAM solution can create new users, assign access based on business rules, and provision those users to the appropriate network and system access control systems. New users are users without entries in the authoritative identity store.				
Associated test cases	CR 1				
Associated security controls	AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-16, AU-12, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-6, PE-2, PE-3, PE-6				
Preconditions	New HR .csv file created with new users included.				
Procedure	<ol> <li>Demonstrate that the new users in the HR .csv file do not have access in the OT, PACS, or IT, networks or systems using Test Case IdAM-1.</li> </ol>				
	2. Perform procedure 1 of CR 1 with the new HR .csv file.				
	3. At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to log in as a new user known to have access in the IT network.				
	<ol> <li>At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to log in as a new user known to have access in the OT network.</li> </ol>				
	<ol> <li>At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to access the SEL RTU administrative interface as a new user known to have access to the SEL RTU.</li> </ol>				
	<ol> <li>At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to access the RADiFlow router administrative interface as a new user known to have access to the RADiFlow router administrative interface.</li> </ol>				
	7. At a workstation on the PACS network and system, attempt to log in as a new user known to have access in the PACS network and demonstration				

system.

- 8. At a PACS card reader, attempt an "access" with a card for a new user known to have access allowed.
- 9. Using the IdAM system, deactivate access for one or more users with access to the OT, PACS, and IT, networks and systems. If one user has access to all three, deactivating that user is sufficient.
- 10. At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to log in as a recently deactivated user known to previously have access in the IT network.
- 11. At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to log in as a recently deactivated user known to previously have access in the OT network.
- 12. At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to access the SEL RTU administrative interface as a user known to previously have access to the SEL RTU.
- 13. At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to access the RTU emulator administrative interface as a user known to previously have access to the RTU emulator.

#### **Expected results** (pass)

(CR 2) Create and activate a new user.

New users are created and access to the three networks and systems is confirmed.

(CR 2.a) IT

(CR 2.b) OT network, SEL RTU and RTU emulator

(CR 2.c) PACS network and demonstration card reader access system

(CR 3) Deactivate a user.

User is deactivated and access is denied to the network(s) and systems that the user previously had allowed access.

(CR 3.a) IT

(CR 3.b) OT network, SEL TRU, and RTU emulator

(CR 3.c) PACS network and demonstration card reader access system

#### **Actual results**

This test was conducted with the expected results received. A CSV file with users was successfully uploaded. Upon approval of the user access stated in the file, the user accounts successfully logged into OT, PACS, and IT. User

	access was deactivated and the deactivation approved. The users were no longer able to access the OT, PACS, or IT.		
Overall result	Pass		
6.5 Test Case IdAM-3			
	Table 10. Test Case ID: IdAM-3		
Parent requirement	(CR 4) The IdAM system shall include a workflow capability that can change an existing user's access to the various networks and systems.		
	(CR 4.a) IT, (CR 4.b) OT, (CR 4.c) PACS		
Testable	(CR 4.a.1, CR 4.b.1, CR 4.c.1) Allow to deny		
requirement	(CR 4.a.2, CR 4.b.2, CR 4.c.2) Deny to allow		
Description	Show that the IdAM solution can change user access for any network or system.		
Associated test cases	CR 2		
Associated security controls	AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, AU-12, CM-7, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-6, PE-2, PE-3, PE-6		
Preconditions	Reuse IdAM system in the state after IdAM-2 is completed.		
Procedure	<ol> <li>Choose a set of users with known access and a set of users without access for each of the OT, PACS, and IT networks and systems.</li> </ol>		
	2. Use the IdAM workflow to deny access for the set of users with known access chosen in 1 above.		
	<ol><li>Use the IdAM workflow to allow access for the set of users without access chosen in 1 above.</li></ol>		
	<ol> <li>At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to log in as a user whose access had been changed from "allowed" to "denied".</li> </ol>		
	<ol><li>At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to log in as a user whose access had been changed from denied to allowed.</li></ol>		
	<ol><li>At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to log in as a user whose access had been changed from allowed to denied.</li></ol>		
	<ol><li>At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to log in as a user whose access had been changed from denied to allowed.</li></ol>		

- 8. At a workstation on the PACS network, attempt to log in as a user whose access had been changed from allowed to denied.
- 9. At a workstation on the PACS network, attempt to log in as a user whose access had been changed from denied to allowed.
- 10. At a PACS card reader, attempt an "access" with a card for a user whose access had been changed from allowed to denied (card access denied in the demo system).
- 11. At a PACS card reader, attempt an "access" with a card for a user whose access had been changed from denied to allowed (card access allowed in the demo system).
- 12. At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to access the RADiFlow router administrative interface as a user whose access had been changed from allowed to denied.
- 13. At a workstation on the IT network, attempt to access the RADiFlow router administrative interface as a user whose access had been changed from denied to allowed.
- 14. At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to access the SEL RTU administrative interface as a user whose access had been changed from allowed to denied.
- 15. At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to access the SEL RTU administrative interface as a user whose access had been changed from denied to allowed.
- 16. At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to access the RTU emulator administrative interface as a user whose access had been changed from allowed to denied.
- 17. At a workstation on the OT network, attempt to access the RTU emulator administrative interface as a user whose access had been changed from denied to allowed.

#### **Expected results** (pass)

(CR 4.) Change user access.

(CR 4.a) IT

(CR 4.a.1) Allow-to-deny changes are successfully provisioned.

(CR 4.a.2) Deny-to-allow changes are successfully provisioned.

(CR 4.b) OT

	(CR 4.b.1) Allow-to-deny changes are successfully provisioned.  (CR 4.b.2) Deny-to-allow changes are successfully provisioned.
	(CR 4.c.1) Allow-to-deny changes are successfully provisioned.  (CR 4.c.2) Deny-to-allow changes are successfully provisioned.
Actual results	The test provided the expected results with the impact of changes to user access (allow to deny, deny to allow) and privilege levels (privileged to non-privileged, non-privileged to privileged) verified.
Overall result	Pass

# 1528 APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

Acronym	Literal Translation
ABAC	Attribute-Based Access Control
AD	Active Directory
CA	CA Technologies
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CR	Capability Requirement
CSF	Cybersecurity Framework
.csv	Comma-Separated Value
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
EACMS	Electronic Access Control and Monitoring System
EAP	Electronic Access Point
EMS	Energy Management System
ESP	Electronic Security Perimeter
HR	Human Resources
ICS	Industrial Control System
ID	Identity
IdAM	Identity and Access Management
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IMG	Identity Management and Governance
IP	Internet Protocol
ISE	Identity Services Engine
LDAPS	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Secure
MAG	Mount Airey Group

Acronym	Literal Translation
NAESB	North American Energy Standards Board
NAS	Network Attached Storage
NCCoE	National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS	Operating System
ОТ	Operational Technology
PACS	Physical Access Control System
PIV-I	Personal Identity Verification Interoperable
PKI	Private Key Infrastructure
RTU	Remote Terminal Unit
SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SQL	Structured Query Language
SSL	Secure Socket Layer
STIG	Security Technical Implementation Guideline
TLS	Transport Layer Security
VLAN	Virtual Local Area Network
VPN	Virtual Private Network

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# 1531 APPENDIX C: MOUNT AIREY GROUP, INC. PERSONAL PROFILE APPLICATIONS

- DEMONSTRATION APPLICATION
- 1533 The Personal Profile Application (PPA) was developed by Mount Airey Group, Inc. in order to
- demonstrate the functionality of the Ozone® Suite of products.
- 1535 Ozone® implements atomic authorization for the protection of critical resources by
- 1536 cryptographically binding credentials to specific authorizations, access rights, and/or explicit
- 1537 privileges; as well as provides a privacy protecting mechanism that allows these authorizations
- 1538 to be distributed across the enterprise as close to the protected resource as necessary –
- 1539 without concern for tampering, data mining, or compromise; and is meant to protect an
- organizations most sensitive or highest risk resources. If an application relies on PKI-based
- 1541 smart cards and/or biometrics for authentication, then that system should implement the
- 1542 congruent security for the authorization of users for access to that resource as is provided by
- 1543 Ozone®.
- 1544 In support of the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) Electricity Subsector
- 1545 Identity & Access Management (IDAM) Use Case, the PPA was configured to incorporate digital
- 1546 certificates that were generated by GlobalSign, Inc., to be compliant with the North American
- 1547 Energy Standards Board (NAESB) certificate profile. Each certificate was provisioned within
- 1548 Ozone® to have specific authorizations related to the PPA demonstration application.
- 1549 This application has three main information groups for which actions can be authorized:
- 1550 Personal Information, Credit Reports, and Criminal History. Based on the authorizations
- associated with a credential, results pages are dynamically populated.
- 1552 In order to bring up the demonstration application, the user must present a digital certificate to
- 1553 the application. Upon inspection of the authorizations provisioned within Ozone® for the

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selected certificate, the application dynamically populates the table at the bottom of the first 1554 1555 screen with the results of the authorization queries. If the certificate has been authorized for a 1556 specific action, then the results table will display "true" for that specific action. The information 1557 identifying the certificate that was selected is also displayed above the table.

At that point, the user may either enter a name to search for in the search box on the right, or simply hit the search button to display the Search Results page of the application. The search will return a list of names as well as links to additional information about the people listed. The links listed will vary depending upon the authorizations for which the user was authorized at logon to the PPA. The available authorizations are:

- View Personal Information View the personal information of the selected person.
- Edit Personal Information Add or edit the personal information of people in the application.
- View Criminal History View the criminal history of the selected person.
- Edit Criminal History Add or edit the criminal history of people in the application.
- View Credit Report View the credit report of the selected person.
- Request a New Credit Report Request an updated credit report for the selected person.

#### Sample First Page Table:

1572 Authorizations for: C=US, O=Blue Corp, OU=People, CN=Criminal History Editor

PPA Proof	Authorized
Edit Criminal History	true
Edit Personal Information	false
Request Credit Report	false
View Credit Report	false
View Criminal History	true
View Personal Information	false

#### 1574 Sample Search Results Page Table:

# 1575 Search Results:

Name	View CH	Add CH	View CR	Request CR
Hicks, Chick	<u>View</u>	<u>Add</u>	<u>View</u>	<u>Request</u>
McQueen, Lightning	<u>View</u>	<u>Add</u>	<u>View</u>	Request
Sullivan, James P	<u>View</u>	<u>Add</u>	<u>View</u>	Request
Waternoose, Henry J	<u>View</u>	<u>Add</u>	<u>View</u>	Request
Add a new entry <u>editPI.jsp</u>				

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For the NCCoE Electricity Subsector IDAM Use Case, the following authorizations have been

1578 configured for the NAESB certificates:

#### 1579 **Jim McCarthy**

1580 Email Address = <u>james.mccarthy@nist.gov</u>, CN = James McCarthy, OU = GSUS, OU = NCCoE NIST

1581 Energy IdAM test account, O = GMO GlobalSign Inc., L = Portsmouth, ST = NH, C = US

View Personal
Information
Edit Personal Information
View Criminal History
Edit Criminal History
View Credit Report

Request Credit Report

1582

1583

#### **Donald Faatz**

1584 Email Address = donald.faatz@nist.gov, CN = Donald Faatz, OU = GSUS, OU = NCCoE NIST

1585 Energy IdAM test account, O = GMO GlobalSign Inc., L = Portsmouth, ST = NH, C = US

View Criminal History Edit Criminal History

1587	Harry Perper
1588 1589	Email Address = <a href="mailto:harry.perper@nist.gov">harry.perper@nist.gov</a> , CN = Harry Perper, OU = GSUS, OU = NCCoE NIST Energy IdAM test account, O = GMO GlobalSign Inc., L = Portsmouth, ST = NH, C = US
	View Personal Information Edit Personal Information View Criminal History
1590	View Credit Report
1591	John Wiltberger
1592 1593	Email Address = <u>iwiltberger@mitre.org</u> , CN=Johnathan Wiltberger, OU = GSUS, OU = NCCoE NIST Energy IdAM test account, O = GMO GlobalSign Inc., L = Portsmouth, ST = NH, C = US
	View Personal Information View Criminal History View Credit Report Request Credit Report
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1595	

# IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES

# **How-To Guides**

**For Security Engineers** 

Jim McCarthy Don Faatz Harry Perper

Chris Peloquin John Wiltberger

Leah Kauffman, Editor-in-Chief

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# IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES

# Energy

Draft

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#### **NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE**

The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) addresses businesses' most pressing cybersecurity problems with practical, standards-based solutions using commercially available technologies. The NCCoE collaborates with industry, academic, and government experts to build modular, open, end-to-end reference designs that are broadly applicable and repeatable. The center's work results in publicly available NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guides, Special Publication Series 1800, that provide users with the materials lists, configuration files, and other information they need to adopt a similar approach.

To learn more about the NCCoE, visit <a href="http://nccoe.nist.gov">http://nccoe.nist.gov</a>. To learn more about NIST, visit <a href="http://www.nist.gov">http://www.nist.gov</a>.

#### **NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guides**

NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guides (Special Publication Series 1800) target specific cybersecurity challenges in the public and private sectors. They are practical, user-friendly guides that facilitate the adoption of standards-based approaches to cybersecurity. They show members of the information security community how to implement example solutions that help them align more easily with relevant standards and best practices.

The documents in this series describe example implementations of cybersecurity practices that businesses and other organizations may voluntarily adopt. The documents in this series do not describe regulations or mandatory practices, nor do they carry statutory authority.

#### **ABSTRACT**

To protect power generation, transmission, and distribution, energy companies need to control physical and logical access to their resources, including buildings, equipment, information technology, and industrial control systems. They must authenticate authorized individuals to the devices and facilities to which they are giving access rights with a high degree of certainty. In addition, they need to enforce access control policies (e.g., allow, deny, inquire further) consistently, uniformly, and quickly across all of their resources. This project resulted from direct dialogue among NCCoE staff and members of the electricity subsector, mainly from electric power companies and those who provide equipment and/or services to them. The goal of this project is to demonstrate a centralized, standards-based technical approach that unifies identity and access management (IdAM) functions across operational technology (OT) networks, physical access control systems (PACS), and information technology systems (IT). These networks often operate independently, which can result in identity and access information disparity, increased costs, inefficiencies, and loss of capacity and service delivery capability. This guide describes our collaborative efforts with technology providers and electric company stakeholders to address the security challenges energy providers face in the core function of IdAM. It offers a technical approach to meeting the challenge, and also incorporates a business value mind-set by identifying the strategic considerations involved in implementing new

technologies. This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide provides a modular, open, end-to-end example solution that can be tailored and implemented by energy providers of varying sizes and sophistication. It shows energy providers how we met the challenge using open source and commercially available tools and technologies that are consistent with cybersecurity standards. The use case scenario is based on a normal day-to-day business operational scenario that provides the underlying impetus for the functionality presented in the guide. While the reference solution was demonstrated with a certain suite of products, the guide does not endorse these products in particular. Instead, it presents the characteristics and capabilities that an organization's security experts can use to identify similar standards-based products that can be integrated quickly and cost-effectively with an energy provider's existing tools and infrastructure.

#### **KEYWORDS**

Cyber, physical, and operational security; cyber security; electricity subsector; energy sector; identity and access management; information technology

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# 1 Introduction

#### 2 1.1 PRACTICE GUIDE STRUCTURE

- 3 This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide demonstrates a standards-based example solution and
- 4 provides users with the information they need to replicate this approach to identity and access
- 5 management (IdAM). The example solution is modular and can be deployed in whole or in
- 6 parts.

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- 7 This guide contains three volumes:
  - NIST SP 1800-2a: Executive Summary
    - NIST SP 1800-2b: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics what we built and why
    - NIST SP 1800-2c: How To Guides instructions for building the example solution



- 13 The following instructions show IT professionals and security engineers how the National
- 14 Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) implemented example solutions to the challenge of
- 15 a centralized IdAM system. We developed two builds that conform to federal standards and best
- 16 practices, and address the challenge of providing a secure, centralized, uniform, and efficient
- 17 solution for managing authentication and authorization services, access control, and
- 18 provisioning across what are currently three independent and disparate corporate silos: IT,
- 19 operational technology (OT), and physical access control systems (PACS) networks.
- 20 This example solution is packaged as a "How To" guide. The guide demonstrates how to
- 21 implement standards-based, commercially available cybersecurity technologies in the real
- world, based on risk analysis.
- 23 We cover all the products that we employed in this example solution. We do not recreate the
- 24 product manufacturer's documentation, which is presumed to be widely available. Rather, these
- 25 guides show how we incorporated the products together in our environment.
- 26 These guides assume that the people using this document have experience implementing
- 27 information technology security products (including systems integration and administration of
- 28 networked Windows and Linux systems, firewalls, routers, etc.) in an electricity subsector
- 29 organization. While we have used the commercially available products described here, we
- 30 assume that you have the knowledge and expertise to choose other products that might better
- 31 fit your IT systems and business processes. If you use substitute products, we hope you'll seek

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

products that are congruent with standards and best practices, as we have. Refer to NIST SP 1800-2b: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics, Section 4.5, Table 2, for a list of the products that we used, mapped to the cybersecurity controls provided by this example solution, to understand the characteristics you should seek in alternate products. Section 4.4 Security Characteristics and Controls Mapping, of that document describes how we arrived at this list of controls.
The security characteristics in our access management platform are informed by guidance and best practices from standards organizations, including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards. In addition, this document was reviewed by the NERC ES-ISAC to ensure that the approach was informed by standards and NERC regulations.
While we have used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does not endorse these particular products, nor does it guarantee regulatory compliance. Your utility's information security experts should identify the standards-based products that will best integrate with your existing tools and IT system infrastructure. Your company can adopt this solution or one that adheres to these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and implementing parts of a solution. This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide does not describe "the" solution, but a possible solution. This is a draft version. We are seeking feedback on its contents and welcome your input. Comments and suggestions will improve subsequent versions of this guide. Please contribute your thoughts to energy_nccoe@nist.gov, and join the discussion at http://nccoe.nist.gov/forums/energy.
NOTE: These are not comprehensive tutorials. There are many possible service and security configurations for these products that are out of scope for this example solution.
1.2 CONVENTIONS
Filenames, pathnames, partitions, URLs, and program names are in italic text:
filename.conf
/folder/filename.conf
http://nccoe.nist.gov
Commands and status codes are in Courier:
mkdir
Code that a user inputs is in Caramand hald
Code that a user inputs is in Garamond bold:  service sshd start

## 2 BUILD OVERVIEW

The NCCoE constructed the IdAM build infrastructure using off-the-shelf hardware and software. The infrastructure was built on Dell model PowerEdge R620 server hardware. The server operating system was VMware vSphere virtualization operating environment. In addition, a 6-terabyte Dell EqualLogic network attached storage (NAS) product was used for storage, Dell model PowerConnect 7024 and Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3550 physical switches were used to interconnect the server hardware, external network components, and the NAS.

The lab network was accessible from the public Internet via a virtual private network (VPN) appliance and firewall to enable secure Internet and remote access. The lab network was not connected to the NIST enterprise network. Table 1 lists which software and hardware components were used in the builds, the specific function each component contributes, and whether the product was installed within the virtual environment or as physical device.

Table 1. Build Implementation Component List (including security controls)

Product Vendor	Component	Function	Implementation (physical device or virtual environment)
Dell	PowerEdge R620	Server hardware	Physical device
Dell	PowerConnect 7024	Network switch	Physical device
Dell	EqualLogic	Network attached storage	Physical device
VMware	vSphere vCenter Server version 5.5	Virtual server and workstation environment	Virtual environment
Microsoft	Windows Server 2012 r2 Active Directory Server	Authentication and authority	Virtual environment
Microsoft	Windows 7	Information management	Virtual environment
Windows	Windows Server 2012 r2 DNS Server	Domain name system	Virtual environment
Windows	SQL Server	Database	Virtual environment

Product Vendor	Component	Function	Implementation (physical device or virtual environment)
AlertEnterprise	Enterprise Guardian	Interface and translation between IdAM central store and the PACS management server	Virtual environment
CA Technologies	Identity Manager Rel 12.6.05 Build 06109.28	Identity and access automation management application, IdAM provisioning	Virtual environment
Cisco	ISE Network Server 3415	Network access controller	Virtual environment
Cisco	Catalyst 3550	Network switch	Physical device
Cisco	Catalyst 3650	TrustSec-enabled physical network switch	Physical device
GlobalSign	SSL Certificate	Cloud certificate and registration authority	Virtual environment
Mount Airey Group	Ozone Authority	Central attribute management system	Virtual environment
Mount Airey Group	Ozone Console	Ozone administrative management console	Virtual environment
Mount Airey Group	Ozone Envoy	Enterprise identity store interface	Virtual environment
Mount Airey Group	Ozone Server	Ozone centralized attribute based authorization server	Virtual environment
RADiFlow	Industrial Service Management Tool (iSIM)	Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) router management application	Physical device

Product Vendor	Component	Function	Implementation (physical device or virtual environment)
RADiFlow	SCADA Router RF-3180S	Router/firewall for SCADA network	Physical device
RSA	Adaptive Directory Version 7.1.5	Central identity store, IdAM provisioning	Virtual environment
RSA	IMG Version 6.9 Build 74968	Central IdAM system (workflow management)	Virtual environment
TDi Technologies	ConsoleWorks	User access controller, monitor, and logging system	Virtual environment
RS2 Technologies	AccessIT! Universal Release 4.1.15 Physical access control components	Configures and monitors the PACS devices (e.g., card readers, keypads)	Virtual environment server and physical device card reader
Schweitzer Electronics Laboratory	SEL-2411	Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)	Physical device
Schneider Electric	Tofino Firewall model number TCSEFEA23F3F20	Ethernet/IP firewall	Physical device
XTEC	Xnode	Remote access control and management	Physical device

## 78 2.1 BUILD IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW

- 79 The build implementation consists of multiple networks implemented to mirror the
- 80 infrastructure of a typical energy industry corporation. The networks include a management
- 81 network and a production network, Figure 1. The management network was implemented to
- 82 facilitate the implementation, configuration, and management of the underlying infrastructure,
- 83 including the physical servers, vSphere infrastructure, and monitoring. The production network,
- 84 Figure 1, consists of
- the demilitarized zone (DMZ)

- Identity and Access Management IdAM
- IT business management system
- OT ICS/SCADA industrial control system and energy management system (EMS)
- PACS physical access control system networks
- 90 These networks were implemented separately to match a typical electric utility enterprise
- 91 infrastructure. Firewalls are configured to route traffic and limit access among the production
- 92 networks to block all traffic except required inter-network communications. The primary inter-
- 93 network communications are the user access and authorization updates from the central IdAM
- 94 systems to and from the directories and PACS, IT, and OT networks. The DMZ provides a
- 95 protected neutral network space that the other networks of the production network can use to
- 96 route traffic to and from the Internet or each other.





Figure 1. Management and production networks

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Figure 2. IdAM build implementation production network

The IdAM network represents the proposed centralized/converged IdAM network/system. This network was separated to highlight the unique IdAM components proposed to address the use case requirements.

The IT network represents the business management network that typically supports corporate email, file sharing, printing, and Internet access for general business-purpose computing and communications.

The OT network represents the network used to support the energy management systems (EMS)s and industrial control systems (ICS)/supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Typically, this network is either not connected to the enterprise IT network or is connected with a data diode (a one-way communication device from the OT network to the IT network). Two-way traffic is allowed per NERC-CIP and is enabled via the OT firewall only for specific ports and protocols between specific systems identified by IP address.

The PACS network represents the network used to support the physical access control systems across the enterprise. Typically, this network uses the enterprise IT network and is segmented

116 117 118 119	from the user networks via virtual local area networks (VLANs). In our architecture, a firewall is configured to allow limited access to and from the PACS network to facilitate the communication of access and authorization information. Technically, this communication consists of user role and responsibility directory updates originating in the IdAM system.
120 121	The public Internet is accessible by the lab environment to facilitate both cloud services and access for vendors and NCCoE administrators.
122 123 124 125 126	The VPN firewall was the access control point for vendors to support the installation and configuration of their components of the architecture. The NCCoE also used this access to facilitate product training. This firewall also blocked unauthorized traffic from the public Internet to the production networks. Additional firewalls are used to secure the multiple domain networks (IT, OT, IdAM, and PACS) explained below.
127 128 129	Switching in the implementation is executed using a series of physical and hypervisor soft switches. VLAN switching functions are handled by physical Dell switches and the virtual environment. Routing was accomplished using the firewalls.
130	2.2 BUILD IMPLEMENTATION DESCRIPTIONS
131 132 133 134 135 136	Figure 3 depicts the build network comprising the management, VendorNet, IdAM, DMZ, IT, OT and PACS subnetworks. VendorNet provides remote access for vendors to access, configure, demonstrate, and provide training for each of the implemented products. The IdAM network contains the central IdAM components of the build (described below). The IT, OT, and PACS networks contain the representative components of a typical electric utility enterprise, as described below.




Figure 3. Build Network

The IdAM network (Figure 4 and Figure 5) contains the central IdAM components for Build #1 and Build #2. The IdAM components are placed into a separate network to highlight the importance of protecting these assets and to simplify the demonstration of their capabilities.





Figure 4. Build #1 IdAM Network

Build #1 uses the CA Identity Manager product for the IdAM system and identity store.

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
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Figure 5. Build #2 IdAM Network

Build #2 uses the RSA IMG and Adaptive Directory products for the IdAM system and identity 149 150 store.

The IT network (Figure 6) contains the components common in the business operations IT networks/systems in all organizations.



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Figure 6. IT Network

The OT network (Figure 7) contains the OT components, which include representative components found in electric utility OT networks/systems. These components were chosen to demonstrate the integration capabilities of the central IdAM capability. The lab did not attempt to replicate a fully operational OT network or set of systems. Because we had a limited number of remote terminal units (RTUs) available, we used Raspberry Pi on the network to emulate an RTU.




Figure 7 OT Network

The PACS network (Figure 8) contains the PACS components, which include representative components found in electric utility physical access control systems. These components were chosen to demonstrate the integration capabilities of the central IdAM capability.




Figure 8 PACS Network

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## 2.3 IP NETWORK ADDRESS ASSIGNMENTS

Table 2 includes the IP address assignments used for the builds.

170 Table 2 Build IP Address Assignments

DMZ Network IP	System	Vendor Access Network	System	IdAM Mgmt IP Network IP	System
10.32.2.0/25	Subnet	10.32.2.128/25	Subnet	172.16.4.0/24	Subnet
10.32.2.1	NCCoE FW/Gateway	10.32.2.129	NCCoE FW/Gateway	172.16.4.1	IdAM FW LAN
10.32.2.10	Vcenter	10.32.2.130	Vendor AD	172.16.4.2	RSA IMG
10.32.2.11	ESXi #1	10.32.2.131	Vendor RDS	172.16.4.3	RSA Adaptive Directory
10.32.2.12	ESXi #2	10.32.2.132	RSA/SCE	172.16.4.5	AlertEnter prise
10.32.2.22	Border FW WAN	10.32.2.133	AlertEnt	172.16.4.9	Ozone Console
10.32.2.50	RS1 FTP Synology	10.32.2.134	CA	172.16.4.10	Ozone Server
10.32.2.X	Veam Backup Server	10.32.2.135	RADiFlow	172.16.4.11	Ozone Authority
		10.32.2.136	MAG	172.16.4.12	Ozone Envoy
		10.32.2.137	TDi	172.16.4.13	Ozone PPA
		10.32.2.232	Border FW OPT1	172.16.4.15	CA IM
				172.16.4.22	Microsoft SQL
				172.16.4.253	CentOS DNS

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Table 2. (cont.) Build IP Address Assignments

IT Network IP	System	PAC Network IP	System	OT Network IP	System
172.16.5.0/ 24	subnet	172.16.7.0/25	Subnet	172.16.6.0/25	Subnet
172.16.5.1	IT FW LAN	172.16.7.1	PACS FW LAN	172.16.6.1	OT FW LAN
172.16.5.2	IT AD, DNS, CA	172.16.7.2	PACS AD, DNS, CA	172.16.6.2	OT AD, DNS, CA
172.16.5.6	Workstation	172.16.7.5	n/a	172.16.6.4	RADiFlow FW/SW
172.16.5.7	Workstation	172.16.7.6	XTEC XNode	172.16.6.5	Schneider Firewall
		172.16.7.11	PACS Console	172.16.6.6	Workstation
		172.16.7.15	PACS Workstation	172.16.6.8	TDi ConsoleWorks
		172.16.7.101	LAB Door Controller	172.16.6.100	RADiFlow Terminal Server for SEL
				172.16.6.202	RADiFlow Vendor Host

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#### 3 BUILD INFRASTRUCTURE

#### 176 3.1 OPERATING SYSTEMS

- 177 All machines used in the build had one of the following operating systems (OS) installed:
- Windows 7 enterprise
- Windows server 2008 R2
- Windows server 2012 R2
- MicroFocus SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11
- 182 CentOS 7.

# 183 3.1.1 Windows Installation and Hardening Details

- 184 The NCCoE Windows OS images are derived from the Department of Defense (DoD) Security
- 185 Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) images. The Windows systems were installed using
- installation files provided by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). These images
- were chosen because they are standardized, hardened, and fully documented. The STIG
- guidelines are available on-line at http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/Pages/index.aspx.

189 190 191	Modifications to the STIG compliant OS configurations were required for each product to enable its operation. The compliance results in Section 17 identify the specific OS configuration modifications (noncompliant configuration items) needed in each case.
192 193 194 195 196 197	3.1.2 SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 Installation and Hardening Details The SUSE OS was included as part of the virtual appliance image provided by RSA for the IMG product. The center did not make any OS configuration changes. The OS was not configured to meet the DoD CentOS 6 STIG. The STIG guidelines are available on-line at <a href="http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/Pages/index.aspx">http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/Pages/index.aspx</a> . The OS configurations for SUSE Linux implementation are listed in Section 17. The compliance results report for SUSE Linux is included for illustration purposes, Section 20.2.
199 200 201 202 203 204 205	3.1.3 Base Linux Installation and Hardening Details  The NCCoE base Linux OS used in the build is CentOS 7. This OS is available as an open source image. The OS was configured to meet the DoD CentOS 6 STIG, because no CentOS 7 STIG was available at the time the build was implemented. The STIG guidelines are available on-line at <a href="http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/Pages/index.aspx">http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/Pages/index.aspx</a> . The OS configurations for each Linux implementation are listed in section 17. The compliance results reports identify the configuration items that do not conform to the STIG configuration guide.  3.2 FIREWALL CONFIGURATIONS
207 208 209	The firewalls were deployed to minimize the allowed traffic among the silo networks as well as to minimize traffic received from the DMZ and the public Internet. The goal was to limit the cross-network traffic/connections to only those required to support the use case.
210 211	The following firewall configurations include the rules that were implemented in each of the firewalls for the build implementation. These configurations are provided to enable the reader

to reproduce the traffic filtering/blocking that was achieved in the build implementation.

Table 3. Border Firewall Rules

		Aliases
Name	Values	Description
VirtualInfra	10.32.2.10-12	Virtualization Systems for Build
VPNserver	172.16.7.253	VPN Server

	WAN Interface						
Allow/Deny	Protocol	Source	Port	Destination	Port	Description	
Allow	IPv4 – All	10.32.2.0/25	Any	Any	Any	Allow all management network traffic	
Allow	IPv4 – All	10.255.2.0/25	Any	Any	Any	Center VPN to all systems	
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	WAN Address	80	Allow access to WebGUI pfSense	
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	10.255.2.0/25	Any	172.16.4.8	5176	Center VPN to Consoleworks	
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	10.255.2.0/25	Any	172.16.4.8	443	Center VPN to Consoleworks HTTPS	
Deny	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	WAN Address	Any	Block All access to pfSense	
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	172.16.7.110	3389	RDP to Lab-PC on PACS (Backups)	

Table 4. Border Firewall Rules (continued)

	LAN Interface								
Allow/Deny	Protocol	Source	Port	Destination	Port	Description			
Allow	IPv4 – All	172.16.7.135	Any	VirtualInfra	Any	Lab laptop to			
						Virtualization			
Deny	IPv4 – All	Any	Any	VirtualInfra	Any	Block all to			
						Virtualization			
Deny	IPv4 – TCP	172.16.8.0/24	Any	10.32.2.0/25	Any	Block Vendor VPN from			
						Management			
Deny	IPv4 – TCP	10.32.2.128/25	Any	10.32.2.0/25	Any	Block Vendor VPN from			
						Management			
Allow	IPv4 – All	LAN Net	Any	Any	Any	Default Allow Any LAN			
Allow	IPv6 – All	LAN Net	Any	Any	Any	Default Allow Any LAN			
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	172.16.7.128/25	Any	10.32.2.117	3389	RDP to 117			
Allow	IPv4 – UDP	172.16.7.128/25	Any	10.32.2.117	3389	RDP to 117			
Deny	IPv4 – All	Any	Any	Any	Any	Block IPv4			
Deny	IPv6 – All	Any	Any	Any	Any	Block IPv6			

Table 5. IdAM Firewall Rules

	Aliases					
Name	Values	Descriptio	n			
AD_DCs_All	172.16.{5,6,7},2	All DCs in				
		Infrastructu	ire			
LinuxSystems	172.16.4.{2,3,8,1	Used for SS	SH .			
	0,11,12,253}					
MAG_Linux	172.16.4.{10,11,	Systems for N	ЛAG			
	12}					
				WAN Interface		
Allow/Deny	Protocol	Source	Port	Destination	Port	Description
Allow	IPv4 – All	10.32.2.0/25	Any	Any	Any	Allow all management network traffic
Allow	IPv4 – All	10.255.2.0/25	Any	Any	Any	Center VPN to all systems
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	172.16.7.133	Any	Any	Any	IT to IdAm
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	LinuxSystems	IMG	Allow SSH to Linux
Allow	IPv4 – All	Any	Any	172.16.4.8	161,162,514	Allow SNMP, Syslog, default to TDi
					,5176	
Allow	IPv4 – All	AD_DCs_All	Any	172.16.4.15	Any	AD DCs to IdAM-CA
Allow	IPv4 – All	172.16.8.50	Any	172.16.4.15,22	Any	CA to CA_srv12, CA_SQL_srv12
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	172.16.4.2	5900-5910	VNC to IMG
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	172.16.7.2	Any	172.16.4.2	Any	PACS AD to IMG
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	172.16.7.2	Any	172.16.4.3	Any	PACS AD to Adaptive Directory
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	10.32.2.0/25	Any	172.16.4.8	517, 6443	MGMT to TDi Consoleworks
				LAN Interface		
Allow/Deny	Protocol	Source	Port	Destination	Port	Description

Allow/Deny Protocol Source Port Destination Port Description

Allow IPv4 – All LAN Net Any Any Any Default Allow Any LAN

Allow IPv6 – All LAN Net Any Any Any Default Allow Any LAN

Table 6. IT Firewall Rules

Aliases

Name	Values	Description
Alert_Enterprise	172.16.4.5	AlertEnterprise
CA	172.16.4.15	CA
CA_RSA_Alert	172.16.4.{2,3,5,15},	CA, RSA, Alert
	172.16.7.132	
ConsoleWorks	172.15.4.8	Console Works
IT_Network	172.16.7.132	IT network
LinuxSystems	172.16.5.4	All Linux on IT
Ozone	172.16.4.10-12	Ozone products
RSA	172.16.4.2-3	IMG, Adaptive
		Dir

	WAN Interface							
Allow/Deny	Protocol	Source	Port	Destination	Port	Description		
Allow	IPv4 – All	10.32.2.0/25	Any	Any	Any	Allow all management network traffic		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	172.16.7.132	Any	Any	Any	IdAM to IT		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	LinuxSystems	22	Allow SSH to Linux		
Allow	IPv4 – All	Any	Any	172.16.5.2	53	Allow DNS		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	IT_Network	Any	172.16.5.4	25443	Alert to ITEMAIL		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	ConsoleWorks	Any	LAN net	22,161-162	TDI to IT-Net		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	CA_RSA_Alert	Any	172.16.5.2	389, 636	LDAP/LDAPS to AD		
	_	_	LAN I	nterface	-			

Allow/Deny **Protocol** Source Port Destination Port Description Allow IPv4 – All LAN Net Default Allow Any LAN Any Any Any Allow IPv6 – All LAN Net Any Any Any Default Allow Any LAN

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220 Table 7. OT Firewall Rules

Aliases						
Name	Values	Description				

LinuxSystems	172.16.6.7	All Linux on OT
RADiFlow	172.16.6.{4,6,202}	All RADiFlow IPs

	WAN Interface							
Allow/Deny	Protocol	Source	Port	Destination	Port	Description		
Allow	IPv4 – All	10.32.2.0/25	Any	Any	Any	Allow all management network		
						traffic		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	172.16.6.10	22	SSH to RPi RTU		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	LinuxSystems	22	Allow SSH to Linux		
Allow	IPv4 – All	Any	Any	172.16.6.2	53	Allow DNS		
Allow	IPv4 – All	172.16.4.8	Any	LAN net	22,161-	TDI to OT-Net		
					162			
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	172.16.6.2	389, 636	Any LDAP to AD		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	172.16.4.{2,3,15}	Any	172.16.6.2	Any	AdaptiveDir, IMG, CA IM to AD		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	172.16.6.100	2001-	Telnet Access through RADiFlow		
					2101			

LAN Interface						
Allow/Deny	Protocol	Source	Port	Destination	Port	Description
Allow	IPv4 – All	LAN Net	Any	Any	Any	Default Allow Any LAN
Allow	IPv6 – All	LAN Net	Any	Any	Any	Default Allow Any LAN

Table 8. PACS Firewall Rules

Aliases							
Name Values Description							
VirtualInfra	10.32.2.10-12	Virtualization Systems for Build					

	WAN Interface							
Allow/Deny	Protocol	Source	Port	Destination	Port	Description		
Allow	IPv4 – All	10.32.2.0/25	Any	Any	Any	Allow all management network traffic		
Allow	IPv4 – All	172.16.7.132	Any	172.16.7.{2,11}	Any	IdAM to PACS-Console, PACSDC		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	172.16.7.2	389, 636	Any LDAP to AD		
Allow	IPv4 – All	Any	Any	172.16.7.2	53	Allow DNS		
Allow	IPv4 – All	172.16.4.8	Any	LAN net	22,161-	TDI to PACS-Net		
					162			
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	172.16.4.{2,3,15}	Any	172.16.7.2	Any	AdaptiveDir, IMG, CA IM to AD		
Allow	IPv4 – TCP	Any	Any	172.16.7.110	3389	MRDP Nat to LAB Machine PACS		

LAN Interface						
Allow/Deny	Protocol	Source	Port	Destination	Port	Description
Allow	IPv4 – All	LAN Net	Any	Any	Any	Default Allow Any LAN
Allow	IPv6 – All	LAN Net	Any	Any	Any	Default Allow Any LAN

225 3.3 NETWORK SERVICES 226 Microsoft Active Directory was used to provide directory services in each silo networks (OT, 227 PACS, IT). Linux CentOS 7 was used to provide DNS services in the IdAM network. Microsoft 228 Windows Server was used to provide certificate authority services in each network. 229 IT Network – Network Services (AD and Certificate Authority) Installation and Configuration Settings 230 3.3.1.1 Active Directory 231 Use these basic domain controller configuration settings: 232 • Hostname: ITDC 233 Domain: ES-IDAM-B1.TEST • **IP**: 172.16.5.2 234 235 Step-by-step instructions: 236 1. Launch Server Manager. 237 From the dashboard, select Option 2, Add Roles and Features. 238 3. Select Role-based or Feature-based installation. 239 4. From the server pool, select the local server named ITDC. 240 5. Select Active Directory Domain Service and DNS Server. 6. When prompted to add features, select Add Features for each role. 241 242 7. Wait for Server Manager to finishes installing, 243 8. Select Post-Deployment Configuration for Active Directory from the Task menu. 244 9. After Active Directory Domain Services Configuration Wizard automatically launches. 245 Select Add a New Forest deployment operation. Specify ES-IDAM-B1.TEST root domain, then select Next >. 246 247 Select Windows Server 2012 R2 for both the Forest Functional Level and the 248 Domain Functional Level, 249 Under Domain Controller Capabilities: 250 Check both DNS server and Global Catalog. 251 Uncheck read-only domain controller. 252 Specify a password for DSRM and select Next >. 253 Continue through the Wizard without modifying any options. 254 Select Install on the next window. After installation, the server automatically

# 256 3.3.1.2 Certificate Authority Role

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reboots.

- Use these basic certificate authority configuration settings: CA Setup Type:
- 258 Enterprise CA
- CA Type: Root CA
- Cryptographic options: RSA 2048 and SHA1
- CN: IT-ES-IDAM-B1-IDAM-ITDC
- DN suffix: DC=IT-ES-IDAM-B1, DC=TEST
- 263 Step-by-step instructions:
- 1. From the Server Manager dashboard, select Option 2, Add Roles and Features.
- 265 2. Select Role-based or Feature-based installation (this is a single option to choose).
- 3. From the server pool, select the local server named OTDC.
- Select Active Directory Certificate Services.
- 5. When prompted to add features, select Add Features.
- 6. When prompted to select roles services, check Certificate Authority.
- After the Server Manager finishes installing, select Post-deployment Configuration for
   Certificate Services from the Task menu.
- 8. When prompted to specify setup type, select Enterprise CA.
- 9. When prompted to specify CA type, select Root CA.
- 274 10. When prompted to specify private key, select Create a new private key.
- 275
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- 12. Leave the CN and DN suffix, which should be based on the computers hostname and domain.
- 279 13. Select 5 years for certificate validity period.
- 280 14. Leave the default options for the certificate database and log location.
- 281 15. After configuration is complete, restart the server.
- 3.3.2 OT Network Network Services (AD, DNS Server, and Certificate Authority) Installation and
   Configuration Settings
- 284 3.3.2.1 Active Directory Domain Services and DNS Server
- Use these basic certificate authority configuration settings: Hostname: OTDC
- Domain: OT-ES-IDAM-B1.TEST
- IP: 172.16.6.2
- 288 Step-by-step instructions:
- 289 1. Launch Server Manager.

290 2. From the dashboard, select Option 2, Add Roles and Features. 291 Select Role-based or Feature-based installation. 292 4. From the server pool, select the local server named OTDC. 5. Select Active Directory Domain Service and DNS Server. 293 294 6. When prompted to add features, select Add Features for each role. 295 7. After the Server Manager finishes installing, select Post-deployment Configuration for Active Directory from the Task menu. 296 297 8. The Active Directory Domain Services Configuration Wizard launches: 298 For the deployment operation, select Add a New Forest. 299 For the root domain, specify OT-ES-IDAM-B1.TEST, then select Next >. 300 For both the Forest Functional Level and the Domain Functional Level, select 301 Windows Server 2012 R2. 302 Under Domain Controller Capabilities: 303 Check both DNS server and Global Catalog. 304 Uncheck read-only domain controller. 305 Specify a password for DSRM and select Next >. 306 Continue through the wizard without modifying any options. 307 On the last page, select Install. After installation, the server automatically 308 reboots. 309 3.3.2.2 Certificate Authority Role 310 Use these basic certificate authority configuration settings:CA Setup Type: Enterprise CA 311 312 • CA Type: Root CA 313 • Cryptographic options: RSA 2048 and SHA1 314 • CN: OT-ES-IDAM-B1-IDAM-OTDC 315 • DN suffix: DC=OT-ES-IDAM-B1, DC=TEST 316 Step-by-step instructions: 317 1. Ensure the domain controller installation has been completed before proceeding. 318 2. From the Server Manager dashboard, select Option 2, Add Roles and Features. 319 3. Select Role-based or Feature-based installation (this is a single option to choose)

From the server pool, select the local server named OTDC.

6. When prompted to add features, select Add Features.

5. Select Active Directory Certificate Services.

320

321

- 323 7. When prompted to select roles services, check Certificate Authority. 324 8. After the Server Manager finishes installing, select Post-deployment Configuration for 325 Certificate Services from the Task menu. 326 9. When prompted to specify setup type, select Enterprise CA. 327 10. When prompted to specify CA type, select Root CA. 328 11. When prompted to specify a private key, select Create a new private key. 329 12. When prompted to specify cryptographic options, select RSA with a key length of 2048 330 and select SHA1 for the hash algorithm. 331 13. Leave the CN and DN suffix, which should be based on the computer's hostname and 332 domain. 333 14. Select 5 years for certificate validity period. 334 15. Leave the default options for the certificate database and log location. 335 16. After configuration is complete, restart the server. 336 3.3.3 PACS Network - Network Services: AD, DNS Server, and Certificate Authority Installation and 337 **Configuration Setting** 338 3.3.3.1 Active Directory Domain Services and DNS Server 339 Use these basic domain controller configuration settings: 340 Hostname: PACSDC 341 Domain: PACS-ES-IDAM-B1.TEST • **IP**: 172.16.7.2 342 343 Step-by-step instructions: 344 1. Launch Server Manager. 345 2. From the dashboard, select Option 2, Add Roles and Features. 3. Select Role-based or Feature-based installation (this is a single option to choose). 346 347 4. From the server pools, select the local server named PACSDC. 5. Select Active Directory Domain Service and DNS Server. 348
- 6. When prompted to add features, select Add Features for each role.
- After the Server Manager finishes installing, select Post-deployment Configuration for
   Active Directory from the Task menu.
- 352 8. The Active Directory Domain Services Configuration Wizard launches:
  - Select Add a new forest for the deployment operation. Specify PACS-ES-IDAM-B1.TEST for the root domain, then select Next.

Select Windows Server 2012 R2 for both the forest functional level and the 355 domain functional level. 356 357 Under domain controller capabilities: 358 Check both DNS server and Global Catalog. 359 Uncheck read-only domain controller. 360 Specify a password for DSRM and select Next >. 361 Continue through the Wizard without modifying any options. 362 On the last page, select Install. After installation, the server automatically 363 reboots. 3.3.3.2 Installation of Certificate Authority Role on the PACS network 364 365 Use these basic domain controller configuration settings: 366 • CA Setup Type: Enterprise CA 367 • CA Type: Root CA 368 • Cryptographic options: RSA 2048 and SHA1 • CN: PACS-ES-IDAM-B1-IDAM-PACSDC 369 370 DN suffix: DC=PACS-ES-IDAM-B1, DC=TEST 371 Step-by-step instructions: 372 1. From the Server Manager dashboard, select the Option 2, Add Roles and Features. 373 2. Select Role-based or Feature-based installation. 374 3. From the server pools, select the local server named OTDC. 375 4. Select Active Directory Certificate Services. 376 5. When prompted to add features, select Add Features. 377 6. When prompted to select roles services, check Certificate Authority. 378 7. After the Server Manager finishes installing, select Post-deployment Configuration for Certificate Services from the Task menu. 379 380 8. When prompted to specify setup type, select Enterprise CA. 381 9. When prompted to specify CA type, select Root CA. 382 10. When prompted to specify private key, select Create a new private key. 383 11. When prompted to specify cryptographic options, select RSA with a key length of 2048

12. Leave the CN and DN suffix, which should be based on the computer's hostname and

domain.

384

385

386 387 and select SHA1 for the hash algorithm.

13. Select 5 years for certificate validity period.

14. Leave the default options for the certificate database and log location. 388 389 15. After configuration is complete, restart the server. 390 3.3.3.3 Modify the AD Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) schema with custom PACS attributes. 391 392 Custom attribute details: 393 • Common Name: pacsAllDoors 394 • X.500 OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.1 395 • Syntax: Boolean 396 • Common Name: pacsHomeAccess 397 • X.500 OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.2 398 • Syntax: Boolean 399 • Common Name: pacsWorkAccess 400 • X.500 OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.3 401 • Syntax: Boolean 402 Step-by-step instructions: 403 1. Launch Command Prompt as an administrator. 404 2. Run the command: regsvr32 schmgmt.dll 405 3. Launch the Microsoft Management Console. 406 4. Select File > Add/Remove Snap-in. 407 5. From the Snap-in menu, select Active Directory Schema, then select OK. 408 6. Expand the Active Directory Schema, then select Attributes. 7. To create an attribute for the all doors access level, right-click on Attributes, then select 409 410 Create Attribute. 411 8. Select OK when prompted with the Schema Object Creation Warning. 9. Enter the following fields: 412 413 • Common Name: pacsAllDoors • LDAP Display Name: pacsAllDoors 414 415 • Unique X500 Object ID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.1 416 • Svntax: Boolean

11. Create an attribute for the home access level by entering the following fields:

• LDAP Display Name: pacsHomeAccess

• Common Name: pacsHomeAccess

10. Select OK when finished.

417

418

419

```
421
                  • Unique X500 Object ID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.2
422
                     Syntax: Boolean
423
          12. Create an attribute for the work access level by entering the following fields:
424
                     Common Name: pacsWorkAccess
425
                     LDAP Display Name: pacsWorkAccess
426
                     Unique X500 Object ID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.3
427
                     Syntax: Boolean
428
          13. After creating custom attributes, add the attributes to the user class so that every user
429
              contains the attribute:
430
                  • Select the Classes drop-down under Active Directory Schema.
431
                     Right-click on User, then select Properties.
432
                     Select the Attributes tab, then select Add.
433
                     Select the attribute you want to add to the user class. Then select OK. Do this for
434
                     the pacsAllDoors, pacsHomeAccess and pacsWorkAccess attributes.
435
                     Then select Apply and OK.
436
                     Restart the server.
437
              IdAM Network – Network Services (DNS Server) Installation and Configuration Settings
438
       A Linux CentOS 7 DNS server was established on the IdAM network to provide DNS services to
439
       the IdAM components. No other network service was installed in the IdAM network.
440
       System Environment Settings
441

    CentOS 7

          • VM with 4 CPU Quad Core 2.199GHz.
442
443

    VM with 16384MB of memory.

444

    Virtual Hard Disk containing 98GB of storage.

       Linux CentOS DNS Configuration
445
446
       Basic DNS configuration settings are specified using three different system files that are located
447
       in the /etc and /var subdirectories of the root directory as follows.
448
       3.3.4.1 System file 1 – named.conf in the /etc subdirectory
449
              //
450
              // named.conf
451
              //
```

```
452
              // Provided by Red Hat bind package to configure the ISC BIND named(8) DNS
453
              // server as a caching only nameserver (as a localhost DNS resolver only).
454
              //
455
              // See /usr/share/doc/bind*/sample/ for example named configuration files.
456
              //
457
458
              options {
459
                    listen-on port 53 { 127.0.0.1; 172.16.4.253; };
460
                    #listen-on-v6 port 53 { ::1; };
461
                    #listen-on-v6 { none; };
462
                    directory
                                  "/var/named";
463
                                  { 8.8.8.8; 8.8.4.4; };
                    forwarders
464
                    dump-file
                                  "/var/named/data/cache_dump.db";
                    statistics-file "/var/named/data/named stats.txt";
465
466
                    memstatistics-file "/var/named/data/named_mem_stats.txt";
467
                     allow-query { localhost; 172.16.4.0/22; };
                     allow-transfer { localhost; 172.16.4.0/22; };
468
469
                     /*
470
471
                     - If you are building an AUTHORITATIVE DNS server, do NOT enable
472
              recursion.
473
                     - If you are building a RECURSIVE (caching) DNS server, you need to
474
              enable
475
                     recursion.
476
                     - If your recursive DNS server has a public IP address, you MUST enable
477
              access
478
                     control to limit queries to your legitimate users. Failing to do so will
479
                     cause your server to become part of large scale DNS amplification
480
                     attacks. Implementing BCP38 within your network would greatly
481
                     reduce such attack surface
482
                     */
483
                    recursion yes;
484
485
                     dnssec-enable yes;
```

```
486
                    dnssec-validation yes;
487
                    dnssec-lookaside auto;
488
                    /* Path to ISC DLV key */
489
                    bindkeys-file "/etc/named.iscdlv.key";
490
491
492
                    managed-keys-directory "/var/named/dynamic";
493
494
                    pid-file "/run/named/named.pid";
                    session-keyfile "/run/named/session.key";
495
496
             };
497
                    logging {
498
                    channel default_debug {
499
                    file "data/named.run";
500
                    severity dynamic;
501
                    };
502
                    };
503
504
                    zone "." IN {
505
                           type hint;
                           file "named.ca";
506
507
                    };
508
509
                    zone "idam-es-idam-b1.test" IN {
510
                    type master;
511
                    file "idam-es-idam-b1.test";
512
                    allow-update { none; };
513
                    };
514
                    zone "4.16.172.in-addr.arpa" IN {
515
516
                           type master;
517
                           file "4.16.172.db";
518
                           allow-update { none; };
```

```
519
                     };
520
                     zone "ot-es-idam-b1.test" IN {
521
522
                     type slave;
523
                     masters {
524
                            172.16.6.2;
525
                            };
526
                     forwarders {};
527
                     };
528
529
                     zone "pacs-es-idam-b1.test" IN {
530
                     type slave;
531
                     masters {
                            172.16.7.2;
532
533
                            };
                     forwarders {};
534
535
                     };
536
                     zone "es-idam-b1.test" IN {
537
538
                     type slave;
539
                     masters {
540
                            172.16.5.2;
541
                            };
542
                     forwarders {};
543
                     };
544
545
              include "/etc/named.rfc1912.zones";
546
              include "/etc/named.root.key";
547
548
       3.3.4.2 System file 2 – 4.16.172.db in the /var subdirectory
549
              $TTL 86400
550
                          idam-dns.idam-es-idam-b1.test.
                                                               root.idam-es-idam-b1.test. (
              @ IN SOA
551
                     2011071001
                                   ;Serial
```

```
552
                     3600
                            ;Refresh
553
                     1800
                            ;Retry
554
                     604800 ;Expire
555
                     86400 ;Minimum TTL
556
              )
557
              (a)
                     IN NS idam-dns.idam-es-idam-b1.test.
558
              (a)
                     IN PTR
                                    idam-es-idam-b1.test.
559
              idam-dns
                             IN A 172.16.4.253
560
561
562
              101
                     IN PTR
                                    idam-dns.idam-es-idam-b1.test.
563
              System file – idam-es-idam-b1.test in the /etc subdirectory
564
565
              $TTL 86400
566
                     IN
                             SOA
                                    idam-dns.idam-es-idam-b1.test.
              (a)
                                                                        root.idam-es-idam-b1.test. (
567
                             2011071001
                                           ;Serial
568
                             3600
                                    ;Refresh
569
                             1800
                                    ;Retry
570
                             604800 ;Expire
571
                             86400 ;Minimum TTL
572
              )
573
574
                                    NS
                             IN
                                           idam-dns.idam-es-idam-b1.test.
              (a)
575
                             IN
                                    A
              (a)
                                           172.16.4.253
576
              idam-dns
                                    A
                             IN
                                           172.16.4.253
577
                                    IN
                                           A
                                                  172.16.4.15
              idam-ca
578
                             IN
                                    A
                                           172.16.4.22
              idam-sql
579
              adaptivedir
                             IN
                                    A
                                           172.16.4.3
580
              img
                             IN
                                    A
                                           172.16.4.2
581
                            IN
                                    A
                                           172.16.4.8
              consoleworks
582
                                           172.16.4.10
              ozoneserver
                             IN
                                    Α
583
                             IN
                                           172.16.4.12
              ozoneenvoy
                                    A
584
              ozoneauthority IN
                                    A
                                           172.16.4.11
585
              alertentIN
                             A
                                    172.16.4.5
586
           WIN-IPERGL2ELUD IN
                                           A
                                                  172.16.4.5
```

587	4 REMOTE TERMINAL UNITS (RTUS)
588 589 590 591	Remote terminal units (RTU) provide the cyberspace to physical interface. Remote terminal units are used to collect data such as voltage, current and phase from substation equipment. They are also used to deliver commands via contact closures or output voltage to change device operations such as switches, circuit breakers or capacitors.
592	4.1 TCP/IP RTU
593 594	The TCP/IP RTU in this build is emulated with a RaspberryPi 2 system. The system was developed to simulate a Modbus protocol programmable logic controller (PLC).
595	4.2 SERIAL RTU
596 597 598	The serial RTU in this build is a Schweitzer Engineering Laboratory SEL-2411 programmable automation controller configured to support the Modbus protocol. It is connected to the RADiFlow ICS Firewall via serial interface.
599	5 IDENTITY SERVICES ENGINE (ISE) AND TRUSTSEC ENABLED SWITCH: CISCO
600 601 602 603	Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) controls the ability of devices to connect over the network. ISE expands on basic network address-based control to include the identity of the person using a device. ISE is used in the builds to provide a gateway function between IT and OT, limiting which users and devices are allowed to connect from IT to resources in OT.
604 605 606	The Cisco ISE component should be installed in a virtual machine (VM) on the IT network. This ISE component will be used in conjunction with the TrustSec switch that is located on the IT network to control access from the IT network to the OT network.
607	5.1 SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS
608 609	Cybersecurity Framework Category: PR.PT-3: Access to systems and assets is controlled, incorporating the principle of least functionality
610	NIST 800-53 rev 4 Security Controls: AC-3, CM-7
611	5.2 PRE-INSTALLATION TASK
612 613 614 615	<ol> <li>Obtain OVA file from Cisco for Cisco ISE 1.4.</li> <li>Place OVA file in Datastore for vSphere installation.</li> <li>Ensure that the user domain has a security group (the build used <i>OTAccess</i>) for determining access to the OT network.</li> </ol>

#### 616 5.3 INSTALL AND CONFIGURE 617 1. Follow the guide located at: http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/ise/1-618 4/installation quide/b ise InstallationGuide14/b ise InstallationGuide14 chapter 010 619 0.html • This is the Cisco Identity Services Engine Hardware Installation Guide, Release 620 621 1.4, section on Installing ISE on a VMware Virtual Machine. 622 To deploy the OVA file, follow the instructions at the heading "Installing Cisco ISE 623 on Virtual Machines." 624 After OVA is deployed, follow instructions at heading "Installing Cisco ISE 625 Software on a VMware System." 626 2. After the system is installed, type setup at the prompt. 627 3. The following are prompts and build responses: 628 • Enter hostname: ise 629 • Enter IP address[]: 172.16.4.77 630 • Enter IP netmask[]: 255.255.255.0 631 • Enter IP default gateway[]: 172.16.4.1 632 • Enter default DNS domain[]: idam-es-idam-b1.test 633 • Enter primary nameserver[]: 172.16.4.253 634 Add secondary nameserver? Y/N[N]: <blank> 635 • Enter NTP server[time.nist.gov]: 172.16.4.1 636 Add another NTP server? Y/N[N]: <blank> 637 Enter system time zone[UTC]: EST 638 Enable SSH service? Y/N [N]: Y 639 • Enter username [admin]: admin 640 • Enter password: <password> 641 Enter password again: <password> 4. After ISE finishes the installation, connect to ISE through the web browser using the IP 642 643 address specified during the setup phase. 644 5. Begin the Setup Assistant. 645 6. Select Wired for setup access services, and select the Enforce radio button. For subnets 646 to protect, type the target network (in build, the OT network: 172.16.6.0/24). Press 647 Next. 648 7. Uncheck Cisco Unified IP Phone box 649 Select AD group:es-idam-b1.test/Builtin/Users 650 Leave the default checked boxes as is. 651 8. Select Yes for authenticate users using Cisco ISE, select Join the Active Directory domain, 652 and add domain credentials (in build, we used es-idam-b1.test for domain and the

domain admin credentials to connect). Fill in the Employee Switched VLAN Interface box

with: 172.16.5.0 /24. Press Next.

653

- 9. Select switch (build used Cisco Catalyst 3560 Series Switches), fill in pertinent
   information for switch. For Employee VLAN ID, build used 104. Select a RADIUS Shared
   Secret (build used password). Press Next.
- 10. Confirm all settings are correct, then select Confirm Configuration Settings.
- TrustSec switch configuration information: Taken from the Network Device Configuration tab in the Setup Assistant Review section, the recommended configurations to be set globally on the
- TrustSec-enabled switch are as follows:

```
662
     aaa new-model
663
664
     aaa authentication dot1x default group radius
665
     aaa authorization network default group radius
666
     aaa authorization auth-proxy default group radius
667
     aaa accounting delay-start all
668
     aaa accounting auth-proxy default start-stop group radius
669
     aaa accounting dot1x default start-stop group radius
670
     aaa accounting network default start-stop group radius
671
     aaa server radius dynamic-author
672
     client 172.16.4.77 server-key 7 15020A1F173D24362C
673
674
     aaa session-id common
675
     switch 1 provision ws-c3650-48ps
     authentication mac-move permit
676
677
     ip routing
678
679
     ip device tracking
680
     ip dhcp snooping vlan 102
681
     no ip dhcp snooping information option
     ip dhcp snooping
682
683
     dot1x system-auth-control
684
685
     diagnostic bootup level minimal
686
     spanning-tree mode pvst
687
     spanning-tree extend system-id
688
689
     redundancy
690
     mode sso
691
     !
692
693
     ip ssh version 2
694
```

```
695
     class-map match-any non-client-nrt-class
696
      match non-client-nrt
697
698
     policy-map port child policy
699
      class non-client-nrt-class
700
      bandwidth remaining ratio 10
701
     snmp trap mac-notification change added
702
      spanning-tree portfast
703
704
     ip access-list extended ACL-DEFAULT
705
      remark Allow DHCP
706
      permit udp any eq bootpc any eq bootps
707
      remark Allow DNS
708
      permit udp any any eq domain
709
      permit icmp any any
710
      permit tcp any host 172.16.4.77 eq 8443
711
      permit tcp any host 172.16.4.77 eq 443
712
      permit tcp any host 172.16.4.77 eq www
713
      permit tcp any host 172.16.4.77 eq 8905
714
      permit tcp any host 172.16.4.77 eq 8909
715
      permit udp any host 172.16.4.77 eg 8905
716
      permit udp any host 172.16.4.77 eg 8909
717
      deny ip any any
718
     ip access-list extended ACL-WEBAUTH-REDIRECT
719
      permit tcp any any eq www
720
      permit tcp any any eq 443
721
      deny ip any any
722
723
     logging origin-id ip
724
     logging source-interface GigabitEthernet1/0/48
725
726
     radius-server attribute 6 on-for-login-auth
727
     radius-server attribute 6 support-multiple
728
     radius-server attribute 8 include-in-access-req
729
     radius-server dead-criteria time 5 tries 3
730
     radius-server host 172.16.4.77 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813 key 7
731
     140713181F13253920
732
733
     radius server host
734
735
     wsma agent exec
736
     profile httplistener
```

```
737
      profile httpslistener
738
     wsma agent config
739
      profile httplistener
740
      profile httpslistener
741
     wsma agent filesys
742
     profile httplistener
743
      profile httpslistener
744
     wsma agent notify
745
     profile httplistener
746
      profile httpslistener
747
748
     wsma profile listener httplistener
749
      transport http
750
751
     wsma profile listener httpslistener
752
     transport https
753
     ap group default-group
754
     end
755
756
     For each interface that is to be controlled, the recommended configurations are as follows:
757
     interface GigabitEthernet1/0/10
758
      switchport access vlan 101
759
      switchport mode access
760
      switchport block unicast
761
      switchport voice vlan 105
762
      ip arp inspection limit rate 2000
763
      ip access-group ACL-DEFAULT in
764
      authentication event fail action next-method
765
      authentication event server dead action authorize vlan 101
766
      authentication event server alive action reinitialize
767
      authentication host-mode multi-auth
768
      authentication open
769
      authentication order dot1x mab
770
      authentication priority dot1x mab
771
      authentication port-control auto
772
      authentication periodic
773
      authentication timer reauthenticate server
774
      authentication timer inactivity 180
775
      authentication violation restrict
776
      mab
```

```
777    dot1x pae authenticator
778    dot1x timeout tx-period 10
779    spanning-tree portfast
780    spanning-tree bpduguard enable
781    ip dhcp snooping limit rate 2048
```

- 11. Go to the top tabs and click Administration > System > Deployment. (If a warning that says "This node is standby mode. To register other...Role to Primary" click OK.) Under the Deployment Nodes Hostnames click on the <u>ise</u> link. Then click Profiling Configuration, and ensure that Netflow, Radius, DNS, SNMPQUERY, and SNMPTRAP are selected. If they are not selected, select them. Then click Save.
- 12. Select Administration > Identity Management > External Identity Sources. In the frame on the left choose Active Directory, then choose ise.idam-es-idam-b1.test. Click Connections tab, select the checkbox next to the domain es-idam-b1.test. Check to see if there is a green check in the Status column. If yes click Save. If not, Click Join, and type in the AD Credentials and click Save. A green check should appear in the Status column.
- 13. Select Administration > Identity Management > External Identity Sources > Groups tab. Click Add > Select Group From Directory. Click retrieve groups. Check the es-idam-b1.test/Users/Domain Users box and the es-idam-b1.test/Builtin/Users box and the es-idam-b1.test/Users/OTAccess box. These items are specified for protected access (the build used OTAccess). Then Click OK. Then click Save. Relogin as directed.
- 14. Select Administration > System > Settings. Click on Policy Sets in the frame at the left of the screen, and click enabled (if it is not already clicked). Click Save if needed.
- 15. Select Policy > Policy Elements > Results. In the frame at the left of the screen, left column, click Authorization, then Downloadable ACL List. Create the following (all IP addresses are pertinent to the current build.; these addresses will need to be replaced with IP addressing that is appropriate to the target environment):
  - All But OT-Access-DACL
    - Name: All But OT-Access-DACL
    - DACL Content:

```
deny ip any 172.16.6.0 0.0.0.255 permit ip any any
```

Click Save

- 16. In the left column, select Authorization Profiles and click Add to create the following:
  - All and OT
    - Name: All and OT
    - Access Type: ACCESS ACCEPT
- 816 Check DACL Name: PERMIT ALL TRAFFIC
- 817 Click Submit

818	<ul><li>All_But_OT_Access</li></ul>
819	<ul><li>Name: All_But_OT_Access</li></ul>
820	<ul><li>Access Type: ACCESS_ACCEPT</li></ul>
821	<ul><li>Check DACL Name: All_But_OT-Access-DACL</li></ul>
822	Click Submit
823	<ul> <li>DenyAccess</li> </ul>
824	■ Name: DenyAccess
825	<ul> <li>Access Type: ACCESS REJECT</li> </ul>
826	Click Submit
827	17. Select Policy > Policy Elements > Conditions. In the left column, select Authorization,
828	then Simple Conditions. Click Add to create the following:
829	<ul> <li>NotOTAccess</li> </ul>
830	■ Name: NotOTAccess
831	Attribute: Select the domain (build uses es-idam-b1.test) >
832	ExternalGroups
833	<ul><li>Operator: Not Equals</li></ul>
834	<ul> <li>Value: Select the Security Group (build uses es-idam-</li> </ul>
835	b1.test/Users/OTAccess)
836	Click Submit
837	<ul><li>IT_DomainUsers</li></ul>
838	<ul><li>Name: IT_DomainUsers</li></ul>
839	<ul><li>Attribute: Select the domain (build uses es-idam-b1.test) &gt;</li></ul>
840	ExternalGroups
841	<ul><li>Operator: Equals</li></ul>
842	<ul> <li>Value: Select domain users group (build uses es-idam-</li> </ul>
843	b1.test/Users/Domain Users)
844	Click Submit
845	18. Select Policy > Policy Sets. Select Default and configure policies. Choose the arrow next
846	to Authorization to expand the section. Choose the top rule and click the option arrow
847	to the right of the Edit link within the policy. Click New rule above.
848	<ul> <li>Rule 1: Click the plus sign in the Conditions box. Select Create New Condition</li> </ul>
849	(Advanced Option). Select Attribute > es.idam-b1.test > External Groups. Leave
850	equals Select Attributes > es-idam-b1.test/Users/OTAccess. Click the plus sign in
851	the Permissions box. Select item drop down choose Standard > All_and_OT. Click
852	Done button on right.
853	Click the arrow to the right of the Edit link within the top policy (new policy
854	created above) Click Insert Below.
855	<ul> <li>Rule 2: Click the plus sign in the Conditions box. Select Existing Condition from</li> </ul>
856	Library. Select arrow to choose simple conditions > NotOTAccess. Select arrow
857	next to the gear icon (on right). Select Add Condition from Library. Select Arrow

858	to choose Simple conditions > IT_DomainUsers. Click on the Permissions input
859	box. Click the plus sign in the Permissions box. Click the arrow and choose
860	standard > All_But_OT_Access. Click Done. Click Save.
861	6 IDENTITY MANAGER: CA TECHNOLOGIES (CA) INSTALLATION – BUILD #1
862	CA Identity Manager implements the central IdAM workflow in Build #1. It receives input from
863	an HR system in the form of .csv files. The access and authorization for each user is based on the
864	business and security rules implemented in workflows within Identity Manager. The workflows
865	include management approval chains as well as approval/denial data logging. Once Identity
866	Manager has processed the access and authority request, the updated user access and
867	authorization data is pushed to the central ID store. The central ID store contains the
868	distribution mechanism for updating the various downstream (synchronized) directories with
869 870	user access and authorization data. This process applies to new users, terminated users (disabled or deleted users), and any changes to a user profile. Changes include promotions, job
871	responsibility changes, and any other change that would affect the systems a user needs to
872	access.
873	6.1 SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS
874	Cybersecurity Framework Categories:
875	<ul> <li>PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are managed for authorized devices and users</li> </ul>
876	PR.AC-4: Access permissions are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege
877	and separation of duties
878	NIST 800-53 rev 4 Security Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, IA Family
879	CA Identity Manager is installed on the IdAM network on a VM running the Windows Server
880	2012 R2 OS.
881 882	<b>Important:</b> The following instructions are for a single server demo environment and are not intended to be used for a production deployment.
883	This guide walks you through a basic installation of CA Identity Manager on JBoss, on a single
884	Windows server. For comprehensive instructions for installing CA Identity Manager, refer to the
885	CA Identity Manager Installation Guide for JBoss at <a href="https://support.ca.com">https://support.ca.com</a> .
886	6.2 Installation Prerequisites
887	The following steps are required prior to the CA Identity Manager installation. (For supported
888	versions of all software, review the CA Identity Manager Support Matrix at
889	https://support.ca.com.)
890	1. Use a server with a supported OS (e.g., Windows 2012 R2).
891	2. Install a supported version of the JDK. (e.g., 1.7.0 71).

- 3. Install a supported version of JBoss. (e.g., jboss-eap-6.3).
- 4. To install JBoss as a Windows service, follow the instructions at the following link:
- 894 <a href="https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-">https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-</a>
- 895 <u>US/JBoss Enterprise Application Platform/6.3/html/Installation Guide/Install JBoss En</u>
- 896 <u>terprise Application Platform 6 Microsoft Windows Service.html</u>
- 5. Create a Database and associated user with DBA permissions on a supported database (e.g., MSSQL 2012).
- 6. Download and unzip CA Identity Manager software from <a href="https://support.ca.com">https://support.ca.com</a>.
- 900 6.3 INSTALL CA DIRECTORY
- 901 1. From the unzipped location, go to *CADirectory\_x64\dxserver\windows* and execute 902 *dxsetup.exe*.
- 903 2. Select Typical installation.
- 904 3. Uncheck "DXmanager will manage..."
- 905 4. Accept all other defaults.
- 906 6.4 INSTALL CA IDENTITY MANAGER
- 907 1. From the unzipped location, execute ca-im-12.6.XX-win32.exe
- Select Components: deselect "Connect to Existing SiteMinder Policy Server" and
   "Extensions for Siteminder...". Leave the rest of the checkboxes checked.
- 910 3. Deployment Size: compact
- 911 4. Provisioning Server Hostnames: Just click Next
- 912 5. Provisioning Directory Information: enter a shared secret and confirmation.
- 913 6. Destination Location: accept default
- 914 7. FIPS Information: accept default
- 915 8. Application Server Information: JBoss
- 9. JBoss Application Server Information: Choose and locate the folder where JBoss is
   917 installed. Enter the fully qualified URL and Port for JBoss. Leave the Cluster fields blank.
- 918 10. Select Java Virtual Machine: Click "Search for Others". Select jdk1.7.0 71\bin\java.exe.
- 919 11. Key Encryption Information: accept default
- 920 12. Select Database Type: Select SQL 2005, 2008, or 2012
- 13. Database Connection Information: Enter hostname, database and credentials as createdin the prerequisites above.
- 14. Login Information: Enter a username and password to be used for the Management
   Console. Leave the Enable Secure Login for Management Console checked

925	15	. HTTP Proxy Settings: Leave blank
926	16	. Review Settings: Click Install
927 928	17	. After the installation completes, start JBoss by executing <i>jboss-eap-6.3\bin\standalone.bat</i> .
929 930	18	. Review the log file to verify that JBoss started without error: jboss-eap-6.3\standalone\log\server.log
931 932 933 934	19	. If you receive a timeout error such as "Timeout after [300] seconds waiting for service container stability", increase the timeout by modifying standalone.bat, adding the following attribute to the startup script:  -Djboss.as.management.blocking.timeout=900
935	6.5	CREATE THE SAMPLE NETEAUTO DIRECTORY
936	1.	Open a command prompt as the administrator user
937	2.	cd to "C:\Program Files (x86)\CA\Identity Manager\IAM Suite\Identity
938		Manager\tools\samples\NeteAuto\Organization"
939		<ul> <li>You will see several sample files. For this example, we will use neteauto.ldif</li> </ul>
940	3.	Execute the following commands:
941 942 943 944 945		<pre>dxnewdsa -s500 neteauto 3895 "dc=security,dc=com" dxserver install neteauto dxserver stop neteauto dxloaddb -v -s neteauto neteauto.ldif dxserver start neteauto</pre>
946	4.	To log in to the IM Management Console, navigate to
947		http:// <servername>:8080/iam/immanage and log in using the credentials you supplied</servername>
948		in Login Information above.
949	5	From Directories, select "Create or Update from XML".
950		Browse to C:\Program Files (x86)\CA\Identity Manager\IAM Suite\Identity
951	0.	Manager\tools\samples\NeteAuto\Organization.
952	7.	Select directory.xml. Click Next.
953		Supply values for the fields in this window as follows:
954		Name - NeteAuto
955		Description - (Optional)
956		Connection Object Name - neteauto
957		Host - the machine name where you ran the dxserver commands above
958		• <b>Port</b> - 3895
959		Username/User DN - uid=NeteAuto
960		Administrator, ou=People, ou=Employee, ou=NeteAuto, dc=security, dc=com
961		Password/Confirm Password - test
962		Secure Connection - Unchecked

963	9. Click Next, then Finish.
964	6.6 CREATE THE PROVISIONING DIRECTORY
965	1. From Directories, select "Create or Update from XML".
966	2. Browse to C:\Program Files (x86)\CA\Identity Manager\IAM Suite\Identity
967	Manager\tools\directoryTemplates\ProvisioningServer.
968	3. Select directory.xml. Click Next.
969	4. Supply values for the fields in this window as follows:
970	Name - Provisioning
971	<ul> <li>Description - (Optional)</li> </ul>
972	<ul> <li>Connection Object Name - provisioning</li> </ul>
973	<ul> <li>Host - the machine name where IM is installed</li> </ul>
974	Provisioning Domain - im
975	<ul> <li>Username - the username you supplied in Login Information above</li> </ul>
976	<ul> <li>Password/Confirm Password - the password you supplied in Login Information</li> </ul>
977	above
978	5. Click Next, then Finish.
979	6.7 CREATE THE NETEAUTO ENVIRONMENT
980	1. From Environments, select "New".
981	2. Supply the following information:
982	Environment name - NeteAuto
983	Description - (Optional)
984	URL alias - neteauto
985	<ul> <li>Base URL – accept the default (make sure it is a fully qualified host name in the</li> </ul>
986	URL)
987	3. Click Next.
988	4. Select the "NeteAuto" directory. Click Next.
989	5. Select the "Provisioning" directory. Click Next.
990	URL alias used to reference public tasks – neteauto_pub
991	User for anonomous authentication – SelfRegUser     Colline Validate Themselial Newton
992	<ol> <li>Click Validate. Then click Next.</li> <li>Select "Create Default Roles". Click Next.</li> </ol>
993 994	<ol> <li>Select "Create Default Roles". Click Next.</li> <li>Select the Checkbox for Active Directory.</li> </ol>
	9. Scroll down and click the Browse button.
995	
996	10. Select the NIST_PXPolicies.xml file provided with this guide. (Download the file from
997	https://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nccoe/NIST_PXPolicies.zipx and unzip it.)
998	11. Click Next.
999	System Manager – SuperAdmin
1000	12. Click Add. Then click Next.

1001	<ul> <li>Inbound Administrator – SuperAdmin</li> </ul>
1002	13. Click Next.
1003	<ul> <li>Password/Confirm Password - the password you supplied in Login Information</li> </ul>
1004	above
1005	14. Click Next.
1006	15. Review the settings, then click Finish.
1007	16. Allow a few minutes for the Environment to deploy.
1008	17. When finished with "0 error(s)", click Continue.
1009	18. Click "NeteAuto".
1010	19. Click "Advanced Settings", then "Workflow". Enable both check boxes and click Save.
1011	20. Click the "Restart Environment" button.
1012	21. Verify that you can login to the environment by going to the environment URL and
1013	logging in:
1014	<ul><li>http://<fullyqualifiedservername>:8080/iam/im/<protectedalias></protectedalias></fullyqualifiedservername></li></ul>
1015	Username: SuperAdmin
1016	Password: test
1017	6.8 CONFIGURE CONNECTION TO ALERTENTERPRISES DATABASE
1018	Generate the encrypted password for the Alert Database as follows:
1019 1020 1021 1022	<ul> <li>1. From a command prompt, cd to C:\Program Files (x86)\CA\Identity Manager\IAM Suite\Identity Manager\tools\PasswordTool</li> <li>Execute the following command: pwdtools -JSAFE -p <alertdbpassword></alertdbpassword></li> </ul>
1023	<ul> <li>The result displays the Encrypted value with a prefix of {PBES}.</li> </ul>
1024	Copy this encrypted password to be used below for EncryptedALERTDBPassword.
1025 1026 1027	<ul> <li>2. From the JBoss installation directory, create the following folder structure:         jboss-eap-6.3\modules\com\mysql\main         Download Connector/ J from http://dev.mysql.com/downloads/connector/     </li> </ul>
1028	Select Platform Independent, Compressed Zip Archive. Download.
1029 1030	<ul> <li>Unzip and copy the mysql-connector-java-5.1.35-bin.jar to the mysql\main folder you created above.</li> </ul>
1031 1032 1033	<ul> <li>Under the same folder, create a text file named module.xml. Paste the following text into the file:</li> </ul>
1034 1035 1036 1037	<pre><?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <module name="com.mysql" xmlns="urn:jboss:module:1.1">     <resources>       </resources></module></pre>

```
1038
                 bin.jar"/>
1039
                   </resources>
1040
                   <dependencies>
1041
                    <module name="javax.api"/>
                   </dependencies>
1042
1043
                  </module>
1044
         3. From jboss-eap-6.3\standalone\configuration edit standalone-full.xml
         4. In the "<drivers>" section, add:
1045
1046
            <driver name="mysql" module="com.mysql">
1047
             <driver-class>com.mysql.jdbc.Driver</driver-class>
            </driver>
1048
         5. Just above the "<drivers>" section, add a new data source:
1049
            <datasource jndi-name="java:/iam/im/jdbc/jdbc/AlertDB"</pre>
1050
1051
            pool-name="MySQLPool" use-java-context="true">
1052
             <connection-url>
            jdbc:mysql://ALERTDBServerName:3306/ALERTDBName
1053
             </connection-url>
1054
             <driver>
1055
1056
               mysql
1057
             </driver>
1058
             <pool>
1059
               <max-pool-size>30</max-pool-size>
1060
             </pool>
1061
             <security>
1062
               <security-domain>mysqldb</security-domain>
1063
             </security>
1064
            </datasource>
         6. In the "<security-domains>" section, add the following security domain:
1065
            <security-domain name="mysqldb">
1066
            <authentication>
1067
1068
               <login-module
1069
            code="com.netegrity.jboss.datasource.PicketBoxPasswordEncry
            ptedLogin" flag="required" module="com.ca.iam.idmutils">
1070
1071
                  <module-option name="userName"</pre>
1072
            value="ALERTDBUserName"/>
                  <module-option name="password" value="</pre>
1073
            EncryptedALERTDBPassword "/>
1074
1075
                  <module-option name="managedConnectionFactoryName"</pre>
            value="jboss.jca:name=iam/im/jdbc/jdbc/WPDS,service=LocalTx
1076
1077
            CM"/>
1078
               </loain-module>
             </authentication>
1079
1080
            </security-domain>
```

1081	7.	Restart the JBoss service
1082 1083	8.	Review the log file to verify that JBoss started without error: <i>jboss-eap-6.3\standalone\log\server.log</i>
1084	6.9	POLICY XPRESS POLICY REVIEW
1085 1086	1.	Log in to the NeteAuto Environment that you created above by navigating to <a href="http://&lt;FullyQualifiedServerName">http://<fullyqualifiedservername< a="">:8080/iam/im/<protectedalias></protectedalias></fullyqualifiedservername<></a>
1087	2.	For NeteAuto the username/password is superadmin/test.
1088	3.	Navigate to Policies > Policy Xpress > Modify Policy Xpress Policy, and click Search.
1089	4.	Select the desired Policy to review and modify as desired.
1090 1091		<ul> <li>Check for Duplicates on Create: Stops the task with a message to the user if duplicates are detected for the CardNumber or the UserID on the Alert Database</li> </ul>
1092 1093		<ul> <li>Check for Duplicates on Modify: Stops the task with a message to the user if the CardNumber is already used by another user on the Alert Database.</li> </ul>
1094 1095		<ul> <li>Check for Numeric on Create and Modify: Stops the task with a message to the user if the PIN, FacilityCode, or CardNumber is not an integer.</li> </ul>
1096 1097		<ul> <li>Check PACs fields on Create and Modify: Stops the task with a message to the user if none of the PACs checkboxes are selected. At least one must be selected.</li> </ul>
1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104		<ul> <li>Create AE User: Creates User on the Alert Database if all above checks pass.         Provisions user to Active Directory.     </li> <li>Disable AE User: Disables User on the Alert Database, by setting the UserStatus to "Inactive"</li> <li>Enable AE User: Enables User on the Alert Database, by setting the UserStatus to "Active"</li> <li>Modify AE User: Modifies User on the Alert Database if all above checks pass.</li> </ul>
1105	6.10	UPDATE CREATE USER AND MODIFY USER SCREENS
1106	1.	From Roles and Tasks > Admin Tasks > Modify Admin Task, search and select Create User.
1107	2.	Go to the Tabs tab and click the edit pencil next to Profile.
1108	3.	Click Browse Next to the Create User Profile.
1109	4.	Select the Default User Profile, and click the Edit button.
1110	5.	Click the edit pencil next to each of the following fields:
1111		Office: Change Name to PIN
1112 1113		<ul> <li>Postal Code: Change Name to Facility Code. Change Permission to Read/Write Required.</li> </ul>
1114		Cell Phone: Change Name to Home Phone.

- 1115 • Business Phone: Change Name to Work Phone. 1116 • State: Change Name to Pacs All Door. Change Style to Checkbox. Set Check 1117 value to 1. Set Unchecked Value to 0. 1118 • City: Change Name to Pacs Work Access. Change Style to Checkbox. Set Check value to 1. Set Unchecked Value to 0. 1119 1120 • Address: Change Name to Pacs Home Access. Change Style to Checkbox. Set 1121 Check value to 1. Set Unchecked Value to 0. 1122 Employee Number: Change Name to Card Number. Change Permission to 1123 Read/Write Required. 1124 • For any non-required fields that you don't want to display: Change Style to 1125 Hidden. 6. Click OK. 1126 1127 7. Select the Create User Profile, and click the Edit button. 1128 8. Repeat Step 5 for this profile. When finished, click OK. 1129 9. Navigate to Users >Manage Users >Create User, and click "Yes" for the warning message 1130 about losing changes. 1131 10. Select Create New User, and click OK. 1132 11. Verify that the fields you updated are changed as desired. 1133 12. Navigate to Users >Manage Users >Modify User, and click "Yes" for the warning message 1134 about losing changes. 1135 13. Select Create Modify User, and click OK. 1136 14. Verify that the fields you updated are changed as desired. 1137 6.11 INSTALL ACTIVITY DIRECTORY CERTIFICATE 1138 1. Obtain the Active Directory certificate(s) from the domain controller(s) you want to 1139 connect to and copy them to the Identity Manager server. 1140 2. Double-click on the certificate, and click Install Certificate. 1141 3. Select Local Machine, then Place all Certificates in the following store. Click Browse. 1142 Select Trusted Root Certification Authorities, Click OK twice. 1143 **6.12** ACQUIRE ACTIVITY DIRECTORY ENDPOINT 1144 1. From Endpoints > Manage Endpoints > Create Endpoint, select Create a new endpoint of 1145 Endpoint type ActiveDirectory. Click OK.
- Hostname: Fully qualified host name for the Active 1148 Directory Domain Controller

Endpoint: Give your endpoint a name

1146

- 1149 User ID: Fully qualified User ID, for example: domain\userid.
- 1150 Password/Confirm Password: Password for the AD User
- 2. Click the Security tab. Check the "Use LDAP SSL Encryption" checkbox. 1151
- 1152 3. Click Submit.
- 1153 **6.13 EXPLORE AND CORRELATE ACTIVE DIRECTORY**
- 1154 From Endpoints >Explore and Correlate Definitions >Create Explore and Correlate 1155 Definition, select Create a New Object of Type Explore and Correlate and click OK.
- 1156 2. Explore and Correlate Name: Give it a name such as "Explore AD < domain 1157 controller name>"
- 1158 3. Select the Explore endpoint... checkbox. Uncheck the rest of the checkboxes.
- 1159 4. Click the Select Container/Endpoint/Explore Method button.
- 1160 5. Select Active Directory and click Search.
- 1161 6. Select the endpoint you created above. Click Select.
- 1162 7. Click Search.
- 1163 8. Select the containers that you want to be connected to Identity Manager.
- 1164 9. Click Select, then Submit.
- 1165 10. From Endpoints > Execute Explore and Correlate, select Execute Now and click Next.
- 11. Browse for the Explore and Correlate Definition you just created, then click Finish. 1166
- 1167 12. Repeat the steps above to create and execute a Correlate Definition, with only one 1168 difference: On the step Explore endpoint step, uncheck Explore endpoint, and check 1169 Update User Fields, Correlate Accounts to Users, and Create Users as needed.
- 1170 13. From System > View Submitted tasks, click Search.
- 1171 14. Verify that both the Explore and Correlate definitions completed successfully.
- 1172 6.14 CREATE THE ACTIVE DIRECTORY ACCOUNT TEMPLATE AND PROVISIONING ROLE
- 1173 From Endpoints > Account Templates > Create Account Template, select Create a new Account Template of Endpoint Type "Active Directory". Click OK. 1174
- 2. Give the Account Template a name, such as "<domain controller name> Account 1175 1176 Template".
- 1177 From the Endpoints tab, add the Active Directory Endpoint you created above.
- 1178 4. From the Groups tab, add the Active Directory groups you want to provision to the user.
- 1179 5. When finished, click Submit.

- 1180 6. From Roles >Provisioning Roles >Create Provisioning Role, select Create a new provisioning role, click OK.
- 7. Give the Provisioning Role a name such as "<domain controller name> Provisioning Role"
- 1184 8. From the Account Templates tab, add the Account Template you just created above.
  - 9. From the Administrators tab, select a user, or group of users that you want to be the Administrators of this role. For example, to make the members of a certain Admin role the administrators of this provisioning role:
    - Click Add.
    - From the Users drop-down select a group of users, such as Users who are members of <role-rule>, then admin role.
    - Browse, search, and select the Admin Role you want to add.
    - From the Owners tab, select a user, or group of users that you want to be the Owners of this role, using the same process as used for the Administrators tab.
- Click Submit.

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### 1195 6.15 MODIFY CREATE AE USER POLICY TO INCLUDE THE NEW PROVISIONING ROLE

- 1. From Policies >Policy Xpress >Modify Policy Xpress Policy, search and select the Create AE User policy.
- 1198 2. From the Action Rules tab, click the edit pencil next to Create User
- Click the edit pencil next to Add otdc. Click the Browse "..." button next to the
   Provisioning Role Name. Select the Provisioning Role you just created.
- 1201 4. Click Select, OK, OK, Submit.

# 1202 6.16 ADD WORKFLOW CONTROL OVER CREATE USER AND ANY OTHER TASK AS DESIRED


- 1203 1. From Roles and Tasks >Admin Tasks >Modify Admin Task, search and select Create User.
- 1204 2. From the Events tab, click the edit pencil next to the CreateUserEvent workflow process.
- 1205 3. Select the Non-Policy Based workflow process "SingleStepApproval."
- 1206 4. For the approval, select "Approve Create User" \*
- 5. For the Participant resolver select the type of members you want to assign. For example, Admin Role Members. \*
- 6. Click Add Admin Roles. Search and select the Admin Roles you want to have approve this workflow. \*
- 7. Repeat the above 3 steps with \* for the Primary Approver.
- 1212 8. When finished with both approvers, click OK, then Submit.

1213 1214	The above steps can be used for the Modify User and Enable/Disable User tasks (or any other task).		
1215	6.17 TEST CREATION OF A USER MANUALLY		
1216	1. From Users > Manage Users > Create User, select Create a New User, click OK.		
1217 1218 1219	<ol><li>Fill out the fields as desired for the new user, keeping in mind the policy rules expl above. For example, PIN, Facility Code, and Card Number must be integers, and at one Pacs access checkbox must be checked.</li></ol>		
1220	3. Click Submit, then OK.		
1221 1222	<ol> <li>From Home &gt; View My Worklist, select and approve the workflow for the Create L task *</li> </ol>	ser	
1223 1224	<ol><li>From System &gt;View Submitted tasks, click Search. Verify that the Create User task completed successfully. *</li></ol>		
1225	6. Connect to the AE Database. Verify that the user was created successfully. *		
1226 1227	<ol><li>Connect to the Active Directory Domain Controller. Verify that the user was create successfully. *</li></ol>	d	
1228	Repeat all the steps above for Modify User, Enable User, and Disable User.		
1229	6.18 TEST CREATION OF A USER WITH A CSV FILE		
1230 1231	<ol> <li>Download the file HRBulkUsers4.csv from https://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nccoe/HRBulkUsers4.csv.</li> </ol>		
1232 1233	<ol><li>Modify the CSV file to enter the desired values for the new users to be created. Ke mind the policy rules that must be followed as described above.</li></ol>	ep in	
1234	3. From System > Bulk Loader, Browse for the CSV file.		
1235	4. What field represents the action to perform on the object: action.		
1236	5. What field will be used to uniquely identify the object: uid.		
1237	6. Click Next.		
1238	7. What is the Primary Object: USER.		
1239	8. Select a task to execute for action 'create': Create User		
1240	9. Click Finish.		
1241	Repeat the steps from Section 9.17 (above) with an asterisk (*) to approve the users a	nd	

verify that they were successfully created.

1244	RSA IMG implements the central IdAM workflow in Build #2. It receives input from an HR system		
1245	in the form of .csv files. The access and authorization for each user is based on the business and		
1246	security rules implemented in workflows within RSA IMG. The workflows include management		
1247	approval chains as well as approval/denial data logging. Once IMG has processed the access and		
1248	authority request, the updated user access and authorization data is pushed to the central ID		
1249	store. The central ID store contains the distribution mechanism for updating the various		
1250	downstream (synchronized) directories with user access and authorization data. This process		
1251	applies to new users, terminated users (disabled or deleted users), and any changes to a user		
1252	profile. Changes may include promotions, job responsibility changes, and any other change that		
1253	would affect the systems a user needs to access.		
1233	would uncer the systems a user needs to decess.		
1254	7.1 SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS		
1255	Cybersecurity Framework Categories:		
1256	<ul> <li>PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are managed for authorized devices and users</li> </ul>		
1257	PR.AC-4: Access permissions are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege		
1258	and separation of duties		
1259	NIST 800-53 rev 4 Security Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16, IA Family		
1233	1131 000 33 16V 4 366dirty controls. No 2, No 3, No 3, No 3, No 10, INTUINITY		
1260	7.2 IMG Installation		
1261	Install IMG using the included installation guide on a server running SUSE Linux OS or from an		
1262	IMG virtual appliance image. The RSA Installation guide is available for licensed customers at		
1263	http://www.emc.com/domains/rsa/index.htm.		
1264	7.3 IMG Configuration and Integration with Directories		
1201	7.5 INC CONTROLLATION AND INTEGRATION WITH DIRECTORIES		
1265	After install, open a web browser and point it to the IP Address or DNS name of the RSA IMG		
1266	server. The following instructions are provided along with screenshots depicting each step.		
1267	Unless stated otherwise the settings are included in each screenshot.		
1268	Log in with the default credentials:		
1269	Username: AveksaAdmin (case sensitive)		
1209	Password: aveksa123		
12/0	Password: aversal23		
1271	Change the password when prompted to change.		
1272	7.3.1 Set Up Custom Attributes		
1273	1. Navigate to 'Admin' then 'Attributes':		

7 IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE (IMG): RSA (BUILD #2)



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1276

Figure 9. IMG Attributes Window

1. Click on 'User' then 'Edit' as shown in Figure 10.



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Figure 10. IMG Edit User

# 1279 2. Modify your attributes to match Figures 11-13.





Figure 11. IMG Attributes Examples



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Figure 12. IMG Attributes Examples




1283

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Figure 13. IMG Attributes Examples

- 1285 3. Click on OK.
  - 4. Click on 'Account' then 'Edit' as shown in Figure 14.




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Figure 14. IMG Edit Attributes

5. Modify your attributes to match those shown in Figure 15. IMG Attribute Example.



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
Figure 15. IMG Attribute Example

1292 6. Click on 'OK'.

# 7.3.2 Set up Organization Users

The next step is to set up the organization's existing users. In the example solution, we used a CSV file that contains all the users in the organization. This CSV file needs to be copied to a convenient location on the IMG server. You can get a sample CSV file, HR\_Data\_Move.csv at https://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nccoe/HR\_Data\_Move.csv.


- 1. Once the CSV file is copied to the server, perform the following actions:
- 2. Navigate to 'Resources' and under resources, select 'Directories' as shown in Figure 16.



# Figure 16. IMG Resources Directories

1302

3. Click 'Create Directory' as shown in Figure 17.




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Figure 17. IMG Create Directory

4. Select 'Other Directory' and click 'Next' as shown in Figure 18.



1306 1307

Figure 18. IMG Create Directory

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5. Enter 'HR' in the 'Directory Raw Name' field. Click 'Finish' as shown in Figure 19.

reate Direc	tory	_
reace Direc	cory	
Directory Raw Name*:	HR	
Directory:	HR	
Description:		
Long Description:		
Short Description (Tooltip):		
Help Link:		
Allow Account Disabling:	○ Yes   No	
Allow Account Locking:	○ Yes	
irectory Attributes		
Business Use:		
Category:		
Classification:		
Functional Ownership:		

1312

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
1316

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
Figure 19. IMG Directory Information

You have now created your first directory which will serve as a repository for all the HR Data for the organization.

6. Repeat the above steps, creating a second directory. This one will be named 'RSA Adaptive Directory'. This container will be used to pull AD accounts from the Adaptive Directory server. In this case be sure to select the two options as shown in Figure 20.



- 1322 7.3.3 Populate the HR Directory
- 1323 The next step is to populate the HR directory with users.
- 1. Click on 'Resources' and 'Directories' again as shown in Figure 21.




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Figure 21. IMG Directories

2. Click on your new HR directory you just created as shown in Figure 22.




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Figure 22. IMG Directories

Click on 'Collectors' then click 'Create Identity Collector' as shown in Figure 23Figure 23.
 IMG Create Identity Collector.



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Figure 23. IMG Create Identity Collector


4. Enter details as below as shown in Figure 24.



Figure 24. IMG HR Identities

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5. Click 'Next', and enter details as below as shown in Figure 25.



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
1340 Figure 25. IMG HR Identities (cont.)

1341 6.

- 6. Use the same username and password you use to log into the IMG management web page.
- 1343 The URL will point to the folder that the CSV file is located in. In this example, the full field is:
- 1344 jdbc:csv:////home/oracle/database/SampleData/Demo/HR/?\_CSV\_Header=true;tmpdir=/hom 1345 e/oracle
- 1346 The CSV file is located in home/oracle/database/SampleData/Demo/HR
- 1347
- 7. Click 'Next'.
- 1348 8. Leave 'Users' selected and click 'Next' as shown in Figure 26.




1350	Figure 26. IMG HR Identities - Users
1351 1352	<ol> <li>Enter details as shown in Figure 27 and Figure 28, below. The full text of the 'User Data Query' is as follows:</li> </ol>
1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359	select fname, lname, case when substr(lname,1,2) = 'IT' then 'it' when substr(lname,1,2) = 'OT' then 'ot' else 'pacs' end as OU, login, email as sAMAccountName, email, location, bu, department, title, supervisor, job_level, job_status, login as SR, is_terminated, previous_manager, jobcode, previous_manager as backjp_supervisor, job_family,concat(lname,', ',fname)as fullname, is_manager, email as UniqueID from HR_Data_Move
1360 1361 1362 1363	The highlighted section is specific to this example, based off of our sample data, the OU that the user needs to be provisioned in is based off of the last name. Basically, when the 1 <sup>st</sup> two letters of the last name = IT, the user will have 'it' set to the OU attribute, if it's OT, then 'ot' is set as the OU attribute, any other scenario the OU attribute is set to 'pacs'.



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Figure 27. IMG HR Identities




1369

- 9. Click 'Finish' 1370
- 1371 **Configure Adaptive Directory Container**
- 1372 The next step is to configure the Adaptive Directory Container with Identity and Account 1373 collectors.

1374

1375 1. Navigate to the Adaptive Directory Container as shown in Figure 29.



13771378

Figure 29. IMG Adaptive Directory Container

1379 This identity collector will tie together user identities in Adaptive Directory to user identities in 1380 the HR CSV file.

2. Click on 'Collectors' and 'Create Identity Collector' as shown in Figure 30.



Figure 30. IMG Identity Collector

1384 1385 3. Create the ID collector as follows, clicking 'Next' between each screen shown in Figure 31, Figure 32, Figure 33, Figure 34 and Figure 35.



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Figure 31. IMG AD Identity Collector






Figure 32. IMG AD Identity Collector





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Job Code :			
Job Family :			
Job Level :			
Job Status :			
Last Name ;			
Location (			
Login ID :			
OU:			
Other :		value is User User ID	•
PACS All Doors :	pacsAllDoors		
PACS Home ACcess :	pacsHomeAccess		
PACS Work Access :	pacsWorkAccess		
Self Reviewer :		value is User   User ID	*
Supervisor :			
Termination Date :			
Title :			
Unique ld :			

1399

Figure 35. IMG AD Identity Collector

- 1401 4. Click Finish
- 1402 7.3.5 Create an Account Collector
- 1403 The next step is to create an account collector which pulls all relevant attributes from Adaptive 1404 Directory.
- 1. Click on 'Collectors' and 'Create Account Collector' as shown in Figure 36.



Figure 36. IMG AD Create Account Collector

Create the Account collector as follows, clicking 'Next' between each screenshot, Figure
 37 through Figure 46 below.



Figure 37. IMG Edit Collector



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Figure 38. IMG Edit Collector

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
1416

Edit Collector	RSA AD Directory Accounts	
Mapping for account a	and user account attributes	
Search Configura	tion for Accounts	
Accounts will be created	by the User Account Mapping, unless the Accounts option is selected in this collector.	
Account Base DN*:	dc=master,dc=test	
Account Search : Scope*	Subtree ▼	
Account Search Filter*:	(&(objectCategory=person)(objectClass=user)(sAMAccountName=*))	
Account ID*:	distinguishedName	
Account Attribute	Attribute in Ldap schema	
Last Login Date :	lastLogon	
Account Disabled :		
Account Locked :		
Account email :	userPrincipalName	
Account expiration : date	accountExpires	
Account full name :	displayName	
Account status :	userAccountControl	
Account technical : name	sAMAccountName	

1419

Figure 40. IMG Edit Collector

DN:	dn	
Login ID :		Figure 41. IMG Edit Collector
PACS All Doors :	pacsAllDoors	
PACS Home ACcess:	pacsHomeAccess	
PACS Work Access :	pacsWorkAccess	
User Account Mapping Attribute	Attribute in Ldap schema	
User ID*:	userPrincipalName	



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Figure 42. IMG Edit Collector

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1429 Figure 44. IMG Edit Collector



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1431 Figure 45. IMG Edit Collector




1432

1433 Figure 46. IMG Edit Collector

1434 3. Click 'Finish'

- 1435 A Test button is provided with each account collector and identity collector.
- 1436 4. Test each account collector you created using the test button. This action verifies that 1437 IMG can retrieve the account information for each directory added as shown in Figure 47 below. 1438



1440 Figure 47. IMG Account Test

1441 A successful test will look something like Figure 48.

1439

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```
Test Collector: RSA AD Directory Accounts
  <tns:account-data is-data-encoded="true" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.aveksa</pre>
       <account id="CN=DoD_Admin,ou=it,dc=master,dc=test">
            <attributes userAccountControl="512" lastLogon="130791210124985148" sAMAccountControl="512" lastLogon="512" lastL
       </account>
       <account id="CN=xGuest,ou=it,dc=master,dc=test">
            <attributes userAccountControl="514" lastLogon="0" sAMAccountName="xGuest"
       <account id="CN=krbtgt,ou=it,dc=master,dc=test">
            <attributes userAccountControl="514" lastLogon="0" sAMAccountName="krbtgt"</p>
       </account>
       <account id="CN=IdAM,ou=it,dc=master,dc=test">
            <attributes userAccountControl="66048" displayName="IdAM" lastLogon="13079"</p>
       <account id="CN=Tony2ITInfrUser,ou=it,dc=master,dc=test">
            <attributes userAccountControl="512" lastLogon="0" sAMAccountName="Tony2IT</p>
       </account>
       <account id="CN=DoD Admin,ou=ot,dc=master,dc=test">
            <attributes userAccountControl="512" lastLogon="130790259983919639" sAMAcco
       <account id="CN=xGuest,ou=ot,dc=master,dc=test">
             <attributes userAccountControl="514" lastLogon="0" sAMAccountName="xGuest"
       </account>
       <account id="CN=krbtgt,ou=ot,dc=master,dc=test">
            <attributes userAccountControl="514" lastLogon="0" sAMAccountName="krbtgt"
       <account id="CN=IdAM,ou=ot,dc=master,dc=test">
            <attributes userAccountControl="66048" displayName="IdAM" lastLogon="0" sAl ▼
                                                                                                                                                                                            Cancel
```

Figure 48. IMG Successful Test Example

You can see valid data in an XML format. A failed test will generate an error message that can help you isolate the problem.

- 1446 7.3.6 Edit the Unification Configuration Participating Collectors
- 1447 The next step is to configure Unification this is the process of joining Identities from the HR
- 1448 CSV and the Adaptive Directory collectors.

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1. Click on 'Collectors' and 'Unification Config' as shown in Figure 49.




Figure 49. IMG Unification Configuration

2. Choose the Participating Collectors tab. Click on Edit as shown in Figure 50.





Figure 50. IMG Participating Collectors

1455 3. Configure as shown in Figure 51 and Figure 52. Click Next on each screen.



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1457 Figure 51. IMG Edit Participating Collectors




Figure 52. IMG Edit Participating Collectors

In the above example, we have HR Identities at the top. This indicates that HR Identities is authoritative source – if there are any discrepancies between the data between the two, then the one at the top will win by default, but this can be overridden, which we will see later.

- Click Finish.
- 1464 7.3.7 Edit Unification Configuration Attribute Source

The next step is to change the default behavior of the authoritative source for the necessary attributes.

1. Choose the Attribute Sources tab. Click on Edit as shown in Figure 53.



## Figure 53. IMG Unification Configuration Attribute Sources

1470 1471 2. Edit the Attributes shown in Figure 54 and Figure 55. Leave alone any attribute shown as 'Not Set'. These attributes will use the default behavior:





Figure 54. IMG Edit User Attribute Mapping



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1476 3. Click on OK.

## 1477 7.3.8 Edit Unification Configuration Attribute Source

The next step is to configure which attribute to use from each directory so IMG knows how to tie users together.

1. Choose the Joins tab. Click on Edit as shown in Figure 56.



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Figure 56. IMG Unification Configuration Joins

2. Choose the HR Identities from the Primary Identity Collector dropdown box as shown in Figure 57.



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1487

Figure 57. IMG Edit Joins


1488

3. Click 'Finish'.

1489 1490

Start Data Collection 7.3.9 The next step is to start collecting identity data.

1491 1492 1. From the home page choose the Resources > Directories tab. Click Collect Data (all) button as shown in Figure 58.




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Figure 58. IMG Start Data Collection

2. Click OK on the next window as shown in Figure 59.




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Figure 59. IMG Collect Data

3. The process will take 30 seconds or so to complete. You can check the progress under 'Admin' and 'Monitoring' as shown in Figure 60.



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
Figure 60. IMG Data Collection Monitoring

You will see all the processes change to 'Complete' when done.

## 7.3.10 Review Data Collected

Now you can look at this data by going to 'Users' then 'Users' and 'Groups'.


1. From the home page choose the Users > Groups tab as shown in Figure 61 to review the data collected.



1510

Figure 61. IMG Data Collection Review

- 1511 7.3.11 Configure Business Rules
- 1512 The next step is to configure Business Roles.
- 1513 1. Click on Roles > Roles as shown in Figure.




1514

1515

Figure 62. IMG Roles

1516 2. Click on 'Create / Discover' and 'Discover Roles' as shown in Figure 63.



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1519

Figure 63. IMG Discover Roles

3. Configure as follows as shown in Figure 64 through Figure 66.






Figure 64. IMG Discover Roles



1523

Figure 65. IMG Discover Roles




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Figure 66. IMG Discover Roles

4. Notice how there are some duplicates – the job codes are the same, but the descriptions are slightly different. You can combine these rolls into one as shown in Figure 67:



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1533

Figure 67. IMG Discover Roles

5. When you are done combining duplicates, click Finish.

## 7.3.12 Create Automated Rules

The next step is to create rules for automatically detecting and invoking work flows for new users and terminations.

1534 1. Click on 'Rules' and 'Definitions' as shown in Figure 68.



# Figure 68. IMG Roles Definitions

2. Click on 'Create Rule' and configure as shown in Figure 69 and Figure 70 for New Users.

Edit Rule: New User		
Rule Name* ;	New User	
Description :	ita	
Owner* ;	AveksaAdmin, 🤻 🕕	
Control URL :		
Control Description :	4.5	
Type* :	Provisioning - Joiner/Mover	
Status* ;	Active	
Rule Set* ;	Existing rule set	
	O New rule set named	
Condition		
	☑ Trigger when new users are detected (joiners)	
	Trigger when users change categories (movers)	
Actions		
	✓ Assign provisioning request form Default Provisioning Form  ✓	
	Provisioned entitlements*:	
	Entitlement Suggestion Modeling  For these users: All  Categorize them based on: Job Code  Consider the following entitlements when making suggestions: All  Suggested entitlements that 0% of members have	

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Figure 69. IMG New User

	Optional entitlements that 0% of m	nembers have	
	Allow arbitrary entitlements		
	Allow selection from <u>All</u> ™		
	Allow user comparisons		
	Assignee*:		
	<ul><li>Supervisor</li></ul>		
	<ul> <li>Specified by target user attrib</li> </ul>	ute	
	Selected user		
	☐ For movers also generate a review using	review definition:	
	Processing Schedule/Trigger		
		<ul> <li>Use global configuration</li> </ul>	O Define for this rule
	Scheduled: O Yes   No		
	Triggered ; 📝 Run after identity unification		
1541			
1542		Figure 70. IMG New User	
1543	3. Click on 'Create Rule' and configu	ure as shown in Figure 71 and Figure 72	for User

Terminations.

Rule Name*:   Termination    Description:    Owner*: AveksaAdmin,**	Edit Rule: Terr	mination
Owner*: AveksaAdmin,**  Control URL:  Control Description:  Type*: Provisioning - Termination  Status*: Active  Rule Set*: Existing rule set Default Rule Set  New rule set named  Condition  Condition*: For terminated users matching the following condition  IT Users **  Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request  Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Perform this action  Image:	Rule Name* :	Termination
Owner*: AveksaAdmin,**  Control URL:  Control Description:  Type*: Provisioning - Termination  Status*: Active  Rule Set*: Existing rule set Default Rule Set  New rule set named  Condition  Condition*: For terminated users matching the following condition  IT Users **  Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request  Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Perform this action  Image:	Description	
Control URL:  Control Description:  Type*:	Description ;	
Control URL:  Control Description:  Type*:		af
Control Description:  Type*: Provisioning - Termination  Status*: Active  Rule Set*: Existing rule set Default Rule Set  New rule set named  Condition  Condition*: For terminated users matching the following condition  IT Users*  Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request  Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Pelete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All*  Perform this action  Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  Shared Accounts  Shared Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  Shared Accounts  Status*: Ves Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  Shared Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger	Owner* :	AveksaAdmin, 🤻 🕕
Type*: Provisioning - Termination  Status*: Active  Rule Set*: © Existing rule set Default Rule Set  New rule set named  Condition  Condition*: For terminated users matching the following condition  IT Users **  Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request  Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Pelete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All **  Perform this action  © Immediately O After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  Shared Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger  © Use global configuration O Define for this rule	Control URL :	
Type*: Provisioning - Termination  Status*: Active  Rule Set*: © Existing rule set Default Rule Set  New rule set named  Condition  Condition*: For terminated users matching the following condition  IT Users **  Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request  Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Pelete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All **  Perform this action  © Immediately O After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  Shared Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger  © Use global configuration O Define for this rule	Control Description ;	
Status*: Active  Rule Set*: © Existing rule set Default Rule Set  New rule set named  Condition  Condition*: For terminated users matching the following condition  IT Users*  Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request  Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Pelete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All*  Perform this action  © Immediately		
Status*: Active  Rule Set*: © Existing rule set Default Rule Set  New rule set named  Condition  Condition*: For terminated users matching the following condition  IT Users*  Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request  Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Pelete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All*  Perform this action  © Immediately		
Rule Set*:   Existing rule set Default Rule Set  New rule set named  Condition  Condition*: For terminated users matching the following condition  IT Users*  Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request  Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Pelete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All*  Perform this action  Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  Shared Accounts  Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger  Use global configuration Define for this rule	Type*:	Provisioning - Termination
Ondition  Condition  Condition  Condition: For terminated users matching the following condition IT Users   Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Delete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts) For particular accounts All Perform this action Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts) Shared Accounts Service Accounts Processing Schedule/Trigger   © Use global configuration Define for this rule	Status* ;	Active
Ondition  Condition  Condition  Condition: For terminated users matching the following condition IT Users   Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Delete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts) For particular accounts All Perform this action Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts) Shared Accounts Service Accounts Processing Schedule/Trigger   © Use global configuration Define for this rule	Rule Set* :	Existing rule set    Default Rule Set
Condition*: For terminated users matching the following condition IT Users*  Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Pelete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts) For particular accounts All* Perform this action Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Shared Accounts Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger   Use global configuration Define for this rule		
Condition*: For terminated users matching the following condition IT Users*  Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Pelete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts) For particular accounts All* Perform this action Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Shared Accounts Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger   Use global configuration Define for this rule	Condition	
Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request  Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Pelete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All Perform this action  Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  Shared Accounts  Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger   Use global configuration Define for this rule		For the spiritual control of the following and thing
Actions  Each action will submit a separate change request  □ Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  ☑ Delete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All  Perform this action  ② Immediately ○ After □ days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  □ Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts) □ Shared Accounts □ Service Accounts □ Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger  ③ Use global configuration ○ Define for this rule	Condition*;	
Each action will submit a separate change request  Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  Pelete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All Perform this action  Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  Shared Accounts  Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger  Use global configuration Define for this rule	A stiens	
Disable accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  ✓ Delete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All™  Perform this action  ✓ Immediately ✓ After ☐ days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  ☐ Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  ☐ Shared Accounts  ☐ Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger  ✓ Use global configuration ✓ Define for this rule  Scheduled: ○ Yes   ② No		
Delete accounts (excludes shared and service accounts)  For particular accounts All™  Perform this action  Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  Shared Accounts  Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger   Use global configuration Define for this rule  Scheduled: Yes No	E	
For particular accounts All Perform this action  Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts) Shared Accounts Service Accounts Use global configuration Define for this rule  Scheduled: Yes No		
Perform this action  Immediately After days  Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)  Shared Accounts Service Accounts  Use global configuration Define for this rule  Scheduled: Yes No		
● Immediately		
Figure 71. IMG User Termination  Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts) Shared Accounts Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger		
Revoke user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts) Shared Accounts Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger		immediately After days
Shared Accounts Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger		Figure 71. IMG User Termination
Service Accounts  Processing Schedule/Trigger	Revoke	e user entitlements (excludes shared and service accounts)
Processing Schedule/Trigger  © Use global configuration Openine for this rule  Scheduled: Oyes No	☐ Shared	Accounts
● Use global configuration ○ Define for this rule  Scheduled: ○ Yes ● No		
Scheduled: O Yes  No	Processing Schedule/Trigg	
	61.111.00	
Triggered: 🗹 Run after identity unification		


1546

Figure 72. IMG User Termination

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- 4. Click 'OK'. 1550
- 1551 7.3.13 Create Provisioning Template
- 1552 The next step is to create a template that IMG uses when provisioning accounts in Adaptive
- 1553 Directory:
  - 1. Click on 'Requests', 'Configuration', 'Account Template' tab, then 'Create Account Template' as shown in Figure 73.




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Figure 73. IMG Request Configuration

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2. Enter a name, and click OK as shown in Figure 74.



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Figure 74. IMG Account Template

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3. Click on the name of the account template you just created and add parameters as shown in Figure 75.




Figure 75. IMG IT Account Template

Next configure the IMG AFX module which will allow IMG to provision to Adaptive Directory:

4. Click on 'AFX' and 'Connectors' as shown in Figure 76.

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


Figure 76. IMG AFX Connectors

5. Click on 'Create Connector' as shown in Figure 77.



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Figure 77. IMG Create Connector

6. Configure the 'General' tab as shown in Figure 78.




1573


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Figure 78. IMG AD Connector AFX Server

7. Configure the 'Settings' tab as shown in Figure 79 through Figure 81.







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Figure 80. IMG AD Connector AFX Server



8. Configure the 'Capabilities' tab as shown in Figure 82.



1584	Figure 82. IMG AD Connector IT
1585	
1586 1587	9. Check all capabilities needed for to the connector. Once all are selected, click on the capability name one by one and configure as shown in Figure 83 through Figure 96.




Figure 83. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration

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Figure 84. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration



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Figure 85. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration




Figure 86. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration

Figure 87. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration




Figure 88. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration

Edit Connector: RSA Adaptive Directory Connector IT Settings Capabilities Disable an Account Create an Account on an AD server Delete an Account from an AD server **Command Input Parameters** ✓ Reset an Account's password Add Account to AD Group Parameter Name Type **Default Value** Required Encrypted Display Name Mapping Description Remove Account from AD Group STRING ... Account Name \${Account.Name} Full DN Account ✓ Enable an Account ✓ Disable an Account Add More... **✓** Update an Account ✓ Move an Account ✓ Lock an Account Unlock an Account

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Figure 89. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration



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Figure 90. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration



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
Figure 91. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration



Figure 92. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration

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1610 Figure 93. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration



Figure 94. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration

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


Figure 95. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration




Figure 96. IMG AD Connector IT Capability Configuration


1620 10. Click OK.

1615 1616

1617

1618

- 1621 7.3.14 Configure Adaptive Directory to Use AFX Connector
- 1622 The next step is to configure the RSA Adaptive Directory 'Directory' to use the new AFX
- 1623 Connector.
- 1. Click on Resources > Directories tab as shown in Figure 97 and select HR and click OK.



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
1628

Figure 97. IMG Resources Directories

- 2. Then in the next window choose the AFX Connector Binding tab as shown in Figure 98.
  - 3. Click the Edit Connector Binding as shown in Figure 98.



Figure 98. IMG AD Accounts



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Figure 99. IMG AD AFX Connector Binding

- 1633 4. Click OK as shown in Figure 99.
- 1634 Now the system is ready.
- **1635 7.4 USING RSA IMG**
- **1636** 7.4.1 Adding a New User
  - 1. Open the HR CSV file and add a user.
- 1638 2. Go to 'Resources', 'Directories' and click 'Collect Data (all)' as shown in Figure 100.





Figure 100. IMG Resources Directories

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1642 1. Click 'OK' as shown in Figure 101.



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
Figure 101. IMG Collect Data

2. After about 30 seconds go to 'Requests', 'Activities' and click 'Perform' next to the request to add a new user as shown in Figure 102.



#### Figure 102. IMG Requests Activities

1649 1650 3. Select a group you would like to add the user to, Click 'Next', then 'Accepted' as shown in Figure 103.



1651

1652

4. Enter a description if you wish, and click 'Finish'.

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5. Go to 'Requests', and click 'Requests'. Click the name of the request as shown in Figure 104.

Figure 103. IMG Accepted Access Request




Figure 104. IMG Requests

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
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
6. After about 30 seconds, your new user will be provisioned to AD and added to the group you selected as shown in Figure 105.



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### Figure 105. IMG New User Provisioned

Note: The state of the group add will remain pending, and the overall status will remain at 50% until you recollect data from the Directories page so that IMG can detect that the user has been added to the group successfully as shown in Figure 106.



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1668 7.4.2 Moving a User

- 1. Open your CSV file and change the attribute that defines the OU that the user is in to a different OU.
- Collect data again.
  - 3. The OU change is detected, and IMG deletes the user from the original OU and adds the user to the new OU.
- 4. Go to 'Requests' and 'Activities' and click 'Perform' as shown in Figure 107.



Figure 107. IMG Requests Activities


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- 5. Select the group you would like the moved user to have access to, click 'Next' and 'Accepted', then 'Finish' on the final screen. As you did before for adding a new user.
- 6. Collect data again so IMG can confirm that the user is added to the appropriate group in the new OU.
- 7. Terminating a user
- 8. Delete the user from the HR CSV file.
- Collect data again.
- 1684 10. The user is automatically removed.
- 11. Collect data again, so IMG can confirm the user is no longer in Adaptive Directory.
- 12. Check the Status in 'Requests', and 'Requests' as shown in Figure 108.



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Figure 108. IMG Request Status

## 8 Installation of Adaptive Directory: RSA (Build #2)

RSA Adaptive Directory implements the central IdAM ID store in Build #2. It receives input from central IdAM system (RSA IMG). The central ID store contains the distribution mechanism for updating the various downstream (synchronized) directories with user access and authorization data. This process applies to new users, terminated users (disabled or deleted users), and any changes to a user profile. Changes include promotions, job responsibility changes, and any other change that would affect the systems a user needs to access.

## 8.1 SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS

- 1697 Cybersecurity Framework Categories: PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are managed for authorized devices and users
- 1699 NIST 800-53 rev 4 Security Controls: AC-2, IA Family
- 1700 8.2 RSA ADAPTIVE DIRECTORY IS INSTALLED ON THE IDAM NETWORK, ON A VM THAT IS RUNNING
- 1701 **CENTOS 7**
- The following lines detail the command line installation procedure for RSA Adaptive Directory, including displayed responses:


```
1704
        [root@localhost ~]# ls
1705
        anaconda-ks.cfg reports xml
1706
        [root@localhost ~]# cd ...
1707
        [root@localhost/]#ls
1708
        bin dev home lib64 mnt proc run srv tmp var
1709
        boot etc lib media opt root sbin sys usr
1710
        [root@localhost/]# cd media
1711
        [root@localhost media]#ls
1712
        cdrom
1713
        [root@localhost media]#cd cdrom
1714
        [root@localhost cdrom]# 1s
1715
        Documentation rsa_7.1.5_linux_64.bin rsa_7.1.5_windows_64.exe
1716
        [root@localhost cdrom]# su root ./rsa 7.1.5 linux 64.bin
1717
        Preparing to install...
        WARNING: /tmp does not have enough disk space!
1718
1719
         Attempting to use /root for install base and tmp dir.
1720
        Extracting the JRE from the installer archive...
1721
        Unpacking the JRE...
1722
        Extracting the installation resources from the installer archive...
1723
        Configuring the installer for this system's environment...
1724
        Launching installer...
1725
1726
        Graphical installers are not supported by the VM. The console mode will be used instead...
1727
1728
        RSA Adaptive Directory 7.1.5 (created with InstallAnywhere)
1729
1730
        Preparing CONSOLE Mode Installation...
1731
1732
1733
1734
        License Agreement
1735
1736
        Please read the following License Agreement carefully.
1737
        LICENSE AGREEMENT
1738
        *** IMPORTANT INFORMATION - PLEASE READ CAREFULLY ***
```

	ministrator password
Please pro	ovide a password for the administrator user :
Password	(DEFAULT: ): secretsecret
Confirm P	assword (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret
Adaptive	Directory port numbers
	er port numbers for Adaptive Directory:
Adaptive	Directory Port (DEFAULT: 2389): 2389
Scheduler	Port (DEFAULT: 1099): 1099
Adaptive	Directory SSL Port: (DEFAULT: 1636): 1636
=======	=======================================
TLS Config	
Enable TL	S (Y/N)? (DEFAULT: N): N
====== Adaptive	Directory HTTP port numbers
	er port numbers for Adaptive Directory HTTP services:
	Directory HTTP Port (DEFAULT: 8089): 8089
Adaptive	Directory HTTPS Port (DEFAULT: 8090): 8090
	=======================================
	configuration
Use an ex	sting certificate (Y/N)? (DEFAULT: N): N

Enter information below to configure the Application Server  - Administrator user name for initial server instance.  - Administrator password for initial server instance (must be at least 8 characters in length).  - Administration server port number for initial server instance.  - HTTP/HTTPS port number for initial server instance.  - JMX port number for initial server instance.  Admin User (DEFAULT: admin): admin  Password (DEFAULT:): secretsecret  Confirm Password (DEFAULT:): secretsecret  Admin Port (DEFAULT: 4848): 4848  HTTP Port (DEFAULT: 9090): 9090	
- Administrator password for initial server instance (must be at least 8 characters in length) Administration server port number for initial server instance HTTP/HTTPS port number for initial server instance JMX port number for initial server instance. Admin User (DEFAULT: admin): admin Password (DEFAULT:): secretsecret Confirm Password (DEFAULT:): secretsecret Admin Port (DEFAULT: 4848): 4848	
characters in length).  - Administration server port number for initial server instance.  - HTTP/HTTPS port number for initial server instance.  - JMX port number for initial server instance.  Admin User (DEFAULT: admin): admin  Password (DEFAULT:): secretsecret  Confirm Password (DEFAULT:): secretsecret  Admin Port (DEFAULT: 4848): 4848	
- Administration server port number for initial server instance HTTP/HTTPS port number for initial server instance JMX port number for initial server instance.  Admin User (DEFAULT: admin): admin  Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret  Confirm Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret  Admin Port (DEFAULT: 4848): 4848	
- HTTP/HTTPS port number for initial server instance.  - JMX port number for initial server instance.  Admin User (DEFAULT: admin): admin  Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret  Confirm Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret  Admin Port (DEFAULT: 4848): 4848	
- JMX port number for initial server instance.  Admin User (DEFAULT: admin): admin  Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret  Confirm Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret  Admin Port (DEFAULT: 4848): 4848	
Admin User (DEFAULT: admin): admin Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret Confirm Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret Admin Port (DEFAULT: 4848): 4848	
Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret  Confirm Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret  Admin Port (DEFAULT: 4848): 4848	
Confirm Password (DEFAULT: ): secretsecret Admin Port (DEFAULT: 4848): 4848	
Admin Port (DEFAULT: 4848): 4848	
HTTP Port (DEFAULT: 9090): 9090	
HTTPS Port (DEFAULT: 9191): 9191	
JMX Port (DEFAULT: 8686): 8686	
Control Panel Configuration	
These are the settings for the Web Server hosting the Control Panel.	
Enter the HTTP/HTTPS ports to configure the Web Server on the main in	stance
These are the settings for the Web Server hosting the Control Panel.	
HTTP Port (DEFAULT: 7070): 7070	
Enter the HTTP/HTTPS ports to configure the Web Server on the main in	stance
HTTPS Port (DEFAULT: 7171): 7171	
======================================	=====
 Control Panel HTTP port These are the settings for the Web Server hosti	ng the
Control Panel. is invalid.	<u> </u>
Control i anci. is invalia.	
Please select a new one.	

(	Control Panel Configuration
	These are the settings for the Web Server hosting the Control Panel.
I	Enter the HTTP/HTTPS ports to configure the Web Server on the main instance
I	HTTP Port (DEFAULT: <b>7070):</b> 7070
	HTTPS Port (DEFAULT: 7171): 7171
	======================================
	Please Review the Following Before Continuing:
I	Product Name: RSA Adaptive Directory 7.1.5
I	Install Folder: /root/rsa/adaptivedirectory
I	Install Set: RSA Adaptive Directory New Cluster / Standalone
١	Product Features: Application, Sample Data
	Java VM Installation Folder: /root/rsa/adaptivedirectory/jdk
,	Administrator User: cn=Directory Manager
,	Adaptive Directory Ports: 2389 8089 8090
•	Scheduler Port: 1099
•	SSL Configuration: 1636
•	Start TLS Configuration: TLS is disabled.
(	Certificate Configuration: Self signed certificate.
,	App Server Configration: 4848 9090 9191 8686
١	Web Server Configuration: 7070 7171
I	Disk Space Information (for Installation Target):
	Required: 1,164.03 MegaBytes
	Available: 49,030.86 MegaBytes
I	PRESS <enter> TO CONTINUE: Enter</enter>
	======================================
-	
	[==========


I	nstallation Complete
-	
(	Congratulations. RSA Adaptive Directory 7.1.5 has been successfully installed to:
	root/rsa/adaptivedirectory In order to start working with RSA Adaptive Directory 7.1.5, please follow these steps:
	- LOG OFF
	Then
•	- LOG IN
-	Copy and paste your license key when prompted after running RSA Adaptive
[	Directory 7.1.5
_	Run /root/rsa/adaptivedirectory/bin/openControlPanel.sh
F	PRESS <enter> TO EXIT THE INSTALLER: Enter</enter>
8	3.3 ADDITIONAL STEPS REQUIRED AFTER INSTALLATION IS COMPLETE
-	Then you need to install netstat: yum install net-tools
(	Copy the license.lic file to: /root/rsa/adaptivedirectory/vds_server
(	Open all relevant firewall ports on the CentOS server
F	Run /root/rsa/adaptivedirectory/bin/openControlPanel.sh
F	Run /root/rsa/adaptivedirectory/bin/runContextBuilder.sh
I	From a web browser go to: http:IPADDRESS:7070
9	Start the server by clicking the Start button.
(	Click on Tools menu item, and start the Application Server.
(	Configuration Procedure:
	From a web browser, connect to the Adaptive Directory server and log in (Note the URL with port number) using the following credentials: (Default credentials) See Figure 109.
	Jsername: cn=Directory Manager Password: secretsecret
1	assword. Sected Sected



1910

Figure 109. Adaptive Directory Login Page

1911 On the main page, Figure 110, start the Adaptive Directory server:



1912

1913

Figure 110. Adaptive Directory Main Page

1914 On the Tools tab, Figure 111, click Start it to start the Persistent Cache service:





Figure 111. Adaptive Directory Tools Page

Now go to the Settings tab, Figure 112 and click Server Backend Settings and then click LDAP Data Sources.



1919

1920

Figure 112. Adaptive Directory Server Backend Settings

1921 Click Add.





Figure 113. Adaptive Directory LDAP Data Source

Enter details for your "backend AD" as shown in Figure 113. Click the Test Connection button to be sure your settings are correct. Repeat this process for all the AD clusters, i.e., for the backend ADs on the IT, OT, and PACS networks. You can Clone your first connection to make repeat additions easier.


Now click on Directory, click on Configuration, right-click on Root Naming Contexts, and select Naming context as shown in Figure 114.



1931

Figure 114. Adaptive Directory Configuration of Naming Context

1932 You are presented with this screen, Figure 115:



1933


1934

1935

1936

Figure 115. Adaptive Directory New Naming Context

Enter the "name" you would like your new Virtual LDAP directory to be configured with. Select Virtual Tree and click Next.



1938

1939 1940

Figure 116. Adaptive Directory Configure Virtual Tree

Leave the defaults selected as shown in Figure 116, and click OK. You will see the following screen, Figure 117.



19411942

1945

Figure 117. Adaptive Directory Virtual Tree

You now have a virtual directory naming context created, and the next step is to configure this virtual directory to include all the backend AD clusters.

Right-click on your newly created Virtual Directory and select New Level as shown in Figure 118:





Figure 118. Adaptive Directory Create New Level

1948 Enter a "name" for this LDAP backend mapping. This name will be an OU in the Virtual 1949 Directory as shown in Figure 119.




1950

1951

Figure 119. Adaptive Directory New Level Name


1952 Right-click this new OU in your Virtual Directory and select Backend Mapping as shown in Figure 1953 120.



1955


Figure 120. Adaptive Directory Backend Mapping

1956 Leave LDAP Backend selected and click Next as shown in Figure 121.



1958 Figure 121. Adaptive Directory Backend Mapping

Now select one of your backend AD clusters we configured earlier and click OK as shown in Figure 122.



1961

1962

Figure 122. Adaptive Directory Configure LDAP Backend

1963 Repeat this procedure for all your backend AD clusters (i.e., for the backend ADs on the IT, OT, and PACS networks).

1965 By default, the Adaptive Directory server will return default AD attributes.

#### 8.4 CUSTOM ATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATION

1967 Custom attributes are required and are configured as follows:

Click on Directory, then Configuration, and then expand the virtual directory you are working with and select the backend mapping to AD to which you want to make changes. Then click the Attributes tab and Add as shown in Figure 123.




Figure 123. Adaptive Directory Addition Attributes

Find the attribute you would like to add in the top drop-down list, and enter a "name" (it could be the same or different) for the attribute you want Adaptive Directory to return. Then select DN Remapping and click OK as shown in Figure 124.



Figure 124. Adaptive Directory Add/Edit Main Attribute

Complete this procedure for any additional custom attributes that are required and for any additional AD backends to which you may need to add attributes.

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Your Adaptive Directory virtual directory is now complete and can be accessed from RSA IMG / Aveksa or any other application that can access LDAP directories.

You can address this virtual directory by configuring the connecting application with the IP address or DNS name of the Adaptive Directory server and using port 2389. For the base DN, you would use the name of your virtual directory—in the above example, 'dc=master,dc=test' and the relevant OU (backend AD cluster) you want to access. You would use the same username (cn=Directory Manager) and password you use to log in to the application.

For example, Figure 125 and Figure 126 show the connection information from RSA IMG to Adaptive Directory.



1989

1982


1983

1984

1985

1986

1990 Figure 125. Adaptive Directory Edit Collector



1991

1992

1995

1996

Figure 126. Adaptive Directory Search Configuration for Accounts

1993 8.5 RSA AD OPTIMIZATION AND TUNING

## 1994 8.5.1 Disable Referral Chasing

Referral chasing should be disabled for performance reasons. Check the Disable Referral Chasing option when you define the LDAP data source.

## 1997 8.5.2 Limit Attributes Requested from the LDAP Backend

1998 Whenever RSA Adaptive Directory queries a backend LDAP, the default behavior is to ask for all attributes (although *only* the attributes requested in the query will be returned to the client).

2000 This default behavior of RSA Adaptive Directory is for the following reasons:

- Joins have been configured and the filter in the search request involves attributes from both the primary and secondary sources (i.e., the query filter contains conditions on both primary and secondary objects).
- Interception scripts may involve logic based on attributes from the backend and so require these attributes. These attributes may not be specifically requested or searched for by the client. However, RSA Adaptive Directory must retrieve them from the backend in order for the script logic to be valid.
- Access Control List (ACL) checking. You can set up ACLs based on attribute/values of an entry (e.g., mystatus=hidden), so RSA Adaptive Directory may need the whole entry to check the authorization.
- For entry caching. The entire entry needs to be in the entry cache.
- 2012 If your virtual view does not require all attributes to be requested for any of the conditions
- 2013 mentioned above, you can enable the option to limit the attributes that are requested for
- better performance. If this option is enabled, RSA Adaptive Directory will guery the backend
- server only for attributes requested from the client in addition to attributes set as Always
- 2016 Requested on the Attributes tab.

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## 2017 8.5.3 Process Joins and Computed Attributes Only When Necessary

- 2018 The default behavior of RSA Adaptive Directory is to process associated joins and build
- 2019 computed attributes whenever a virtual object is reached from a query regardless of whether
- 2020 the attributes requested come from a secondary source or computation. If you enable the
- option to process joins and computed attributes only when necessary, RSA Adaptive Directory
- 2022 will not perform joins or computations when a client requests or searches for attributes from a
- 2023 primary object only. If a client requests or searches for attributes from secondary objects or
- 2024 computed attributes, RSA Adaptive Directory will process the join(s) and computations
- accordingly. Use caution when enabling this option if you have interception scripts defined on
- these objects or if access controls based on filters are being used (both of which may require
- 2027 other attributes returned from secondary sources or computations regardless of whether or not
- 2028 the client requested or searched for them).

## 2029 8.5.4 Use the Client Sizelimit Value to Query the Backend

- 2030 Whenever Adaptive Directory queries a backend LDAP, the default behavior is to ask for all
- 2031 entries (sizelimit=0) even if the client to Adaptive Directory indicates a sizelimit. This is the
- 2032 default behavior because the entries returned by the backend are possible candidates but may
- 2033 not be retained for the final result that is sent to the client. For example, if an ACL has been
- 2034 defined in Adaptive Directory, not all entries from the backend may be authorized for the user
- 2035 (who is connected to Adaptive Directory) to access. As another example, when joins or
- interception scripts are involved with the virtual view, they may also alter the entries that match
- 2037 the client's search. To limit the number of entries from the backend, using paging is the

2038 2039 2040 2041	recommended approach. If the backend supports paging, Adaptive Directory will not get all the results at once; rather, it will get only one page at a time (pagesize is indicated in the configuration). In this case, if Adaptive Directory has returned to the client the sizelimit required, Adaptive Directory will not go to the next page.
2042 2043 2044 2045 2046	If your virtual view does not involve any of the conditions mentioned above (joins, interceptions, ACL), and using paging between Adaptive Directory and the backend is not possible, you can enable the Client Sizelimit value option to limit the number of entries requested from the backend. If this option is enabled, Adaptive Directory will use the sizelimit specified by the client instead of using sizelimit=0 when querying the backend.
2047	9 PRIVILEGED USER ACCESS CONTROL: ALERTENTERPRISE GUARDIAN INSTALLATION
2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055	AlertEnterprise Guardian is installed on the IdAM network, in a VM running the Windows Serve 2012 R2 OS. Guardian is used to control privileged user access to the components located on the network OT systems. Guardian collects user authorization information from the AD located within the OT network. There are three parts to the AlertEnterprise Guardian How-To guide, each of which is provided in the subsections below: Subsection 12.2 provides general product installation and set-up information. Subsection 12.3 provides the AlertEnterprise configuration information as configured in the RSA build. Subsection 12.4 provides the AlertEnterprise configuration information as configured in the CA build.
2056	9.1 SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS
2057 2058	Cybersecurity Framework Categories: PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are managed for authorized devices and users
2059	NIST 800-53 rev 4 Security Controls: AC-2, IA Family
2060	9.2 INSTALLATION ON TOMCAT AND WINDOWS
2061 2062 2063	This section describes the detailed procedure of installing AlertEnterprise products on Tomcat on a Windows platform. It lists the hardware and software pre-requisites as well as the steps to install and use the AlertEnterprise suite of applications.
2064 2065 2066	When copying text from this guide, it is recommended that you first paste text to a Notepad file and then copy it from there to use it for running scripts. You should use the "Notepad++" application for this purpose.
2067	Installation Prerequisites
2068 2069 2070 2071	The AlertEnterprise Suite is delivered as a WAR (Web application Archive) file that needs to be deployed on the client's application server. Before you actually start deploying on your application server, you must check for the pre-requisites. Refer to AlertEnterprise Systems Requirements document included in the installation package.
2072	Pre-Installation Verification

- 2073 Before you start installing AlertEnterprise product, verify the proper functioning of the 2074 underlying software systems. Verify that: 2075 • Your system meets all the software and hardware prerequisites as described in Systems 2076 Requirement Specification document. 2077 Compatible version of Java Runtime Environment (JRE) is installed and working on the 2078 system. 2079 • Compatible version of the web server is installed and running. 2080 • Compatible version of the database server is installed and running. 2081 Supported Internet Browser (for example, Microsoft Internet Explorer) is working 2082 properly. 2083 Zip extracting software is required. You can download WinZip from 2084 www.winzip.com/downwz.com. 2085 **Installing Mandatory Software Applications** 2086 Before deploying the AlertEnterprise application, install JRE and a Web Application Server (for example, Tomcat). You must also install the latest version of Adobe Flash Player to enable the 2087 2088 Internet browser you will be using to access the AlertEnterprise application. 2089 **Installing JRE** 2090 To install JRE: 2091 1. Download the application server-compatible JRE. 2092 2. Double-click the setup launcher to start the installation process. 2093 **Setting Java Home** 2094 1. Make sure that JAVA HOME variable is set to the folder where Java is installed and 2095 %JAVA HOME%/bin is in the system's path. 2096 2. Open the Command Prompt in Administrator Mode (Right Click > Run As Administrator) 2097 and issue: 2098 2099 Set JAVA\_HOME=<PATH OF JDK/JRE> 2100 2101 Where <PATH OF JDK/JRE> is the path where Java is installed, for example, 2102 C:\Program Files\Java\JDK1.6 2103 2104 3. Setting Path: 2105
- 2110 Echo %JAVA\_HOME%2111 Echo %PATH%

21072108

2109 2110 4. Checking JAVA HOME and PATH:

PATH= C:\Program Files\Java\JDK1.6.0-21\bin; %PATH%

2112 Checking JAVA Version: Java -version

#### Running ActiveMQ as Windows Service

After extracting the folder, the folder name appears as "apache-activemq" at the specified location.

2115 2116 2117

2118

2119

2120


2121

2122 2123

2113

2114

- 1. Go to the folder apache-activemq and move to bin/win32 in Windows Explorer and right-click on InstallService.bat file and select Run as Administrator. Refer to .
- 2. Once the above batch file gets executed, verify that the ActiveMQ is added as Windows Services.
- 3. Go to Run command and enter services.msc. The Services window appears. Refer to the following screen shot.



2124 2125

Figure 127. Adaptive Directory Search Configuration for Accounts

2126 2127

4. The Apache ActiveMQ service has an administrative console. To check if the service is running correctly, you simply need to connect to the admin console.

2128 2129 2130

URL: <IP address of the server where Active MO is installed>:8161/admin

2131 2132

- 5. Perform the following if Active MQ is on a server other than AlertEnterprise server:
- 2133 2134

Search for the URL that starts with TCP://<IP Address>:61616 in activemq.log located in Apache ActiveMQ home directory/data folder.

2135 Refer to the following screen shot:




Figure 128. Guardian ActiveMQ Home/Data Directory

2138 2139

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Copy the URL and update the context.xml file in the <Tomcat Home > / conf and appContextDB.properties file located in <Tomcat Home/webapps/AlertEnterprise/WEB-INF/classes>.

2141 2142 2143

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## **Steps for Failure Case:**

If the system throws an error message while executing the bat file or the ActiveMQ Services screen does not appear, follow these steps:

- 1. Navigate to the folder <ActiveMQ home directory>\bin\win32.
- 2. Open the InstallService.bat file in a local text editor.
- 3. Modify the bottom part of the script to look like the following. Note that your JAVA HOME environment variable needs to already be set and also need to pass it as a variable to the wrapper.

2151

```
2152
      :conf
2153
      set WRAPPER CONF="%ACTIVEMQ HOME%\bin\win32\wrapper.conf"
2154
      set ACTIVEMQ HOME="set.ACTIVEMQ HOME=%ACTIVEMQ HOME%"
2155
      set ACTIVEMQ BASE="set.ACTIVEMQ BASE=%ACTIVEMQ BASE%"
2156
      set JAVA HOME="set.JAVA HOME=%JAVA HOME%"
2157
2158
      rem Install the Wrapper as an NT service.
2159
      Rem
2160
      :startup
```

2161

"%ACTIVEMQ HOME%\bin\win32\wrapper.exe" -i % WRAPPER CONF%

2162 % ACTIVEMQ HOME% % ACTIVEMQ BASE% % JAVA HOME%

2163 if not errorlevel 1 goto :eof

2164 pause

2165 2166


4. Open the <ActiveMQ home directory>\bin\win32\wrapper.conf in a local text editor and change this:

2167 2168 2169

## # Java Application

```
2170
       wrapper.java.command=java
2171
       to this:
2172
       # Java Application
2173
       wrapper.java.command=%JAVA HOME%\bin\java.exe
2174
2175
       After you have performed these steps, you should be able to run the InstallService.bat
2176
       successfully.
2177
2178
           5. To also use the UninstallService.bat file, open it and hard-code the path to
2179
              the wrapper:
2180
2181
       rem
2182
       rem Uninstall the Wrapper as an NT service.
2183
       rem
2184
       :startup
2185
        "%ACTIVEMQ HOME%\bin\win32\wrapper.exe" -r % WRAPPER CONF%
2186
       if not error level 1 goto : eof
2187
       pause
2188
       After executing the InstallService.bat file, you can see the ActiveMQ in Services.
2189
2190
           6. If the ActiveMQ server is not up and the system throws the following error:
2191
2192
        | WARN | tmpdir | org.eclipse.jetty.util.log | WrapperSimpleAppMainjava.io.IOException: The
2193
       system cannot find the path specified
2194
       at java.io.WinNTFileSystem.create File Exclusively (Native Method)
2195
       at java.io.File.check And Create (File.java:1343)
2196
       at java.io.File.create Temp File (File.java:1431)
2197
2198
       Solution:
2199
       You must manually create two folders: <ActiveMQ home directory>/work and
2200
        <a href="#">ActiveMQ home directory>/temp.</a>
2201
2202
       To check whether ActiveMQ is started, access the following link as shown in Figure 129.
```

http://<Server IP Address>:8161/admin/



2205

Figure 129. Guardian ActiveMQ

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## **Installing Apache Tomcat**

You must install hardware and operating system versions specific to Apache Tomcat:

- 1. Double-click the setup launcher to start the setup. It will start the installation process.
- 22. Click Next to start the installation process.
- 3. Click I Agree to accept the license terms. It displays the Choose Components screen.
- 4. Select Custom as install type and uncheck the Examples option.
- 5. Click Next to specify the Destination Folder for installation. We strictly recommend using
   D:\AlertEnterprise\Tomcat location.
  - 6. Click Next to specify configuration parameters.
- 7. Enter the desired port in the Connector Port text area. 8080 is the default port.
- 2217 8. Specify the User Name and Password in the respective fields.
- 9. Click Next to select the path of JRE installed on the system.
- 2219 10. Select the path of JDK/JRE you just installed. For example, C:\Program
   2220 Files\Java\jre1.6.
- 11. Click Install to start the file copying process. Uncheck Run Apache Tomcat and Show
   Readme options in the final dialog box.
  - 12. Click Finish to finish the installation.

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2226

## **Apache Tomcat Configuration**

You need to specify Tomcat configuration as specified in the following steps:

- 2227 1. Click Start > Programs > Apache Tomcat > Configure Tomcat option.
- 2228 2. Click Java tab in the Apache Tomcat Properties dialog box.
- 2229 3. Enter the following settings:
  - Initial memory pool: 1024
  - Maximum memory pool: 1024
- 2232 Thread stack size: 300

2230

2231

Note: These settings may vary with the volume of random access memory (RAM) in the server.

2235 2236

4. Click Apply and OK to close the dialog box.

2237 2238 2239

## **Configuring Database Server**

2240 You need to perform some configurations in the database server to install AlertEnterprise applications. You must perform these configurations through the database administrator login. 2241

- The current version of AlertEnterprise products supports Oracle and MS SQL Server databases. 2242
- 2243 The NCCoE build also supports MySQL server database.

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- 2245 To configure the database server:
  - 1. Create a schema/SID as per your naming convention in the database server. The steps to create schema can be different with different database management systems. Refer to the administrators guide for the database management system installed at your landscape.
  - 2. Create a new user with full access to the created schema.
    - 3. Run the included SQL files AlertReport471.ddl or AlertReport471.sql and AlertQuartz.sql on the new schema created. This step should be performed while installing the AlertEnterprise application for the first time.

#### 2254 **Avoiding Case-sensitivity Issues in Alert DB**

- 2255 To avoid case-sensitivity issues while using the search and sort functionalities in the
- 2256 AlertEnterprise applications, enable "Case Insensitiveness" search in the database. By default, it is set as case-sensitive.
- 2257

2258 2259

- Follow these steps to avoid case-sensitivity issues:
- 2260 1. Create a trigger to support case insensitiveness.

```
/*********
2262
```

- 2263 create or replace
- 2264 trigger set nls onlogon
- 2265 AFTER LOGON ON SCHEMA
- 2266 DECLARE

- 2267 BEGIN
  2268 EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'ALTER SESSION SET NLS\_SORT="BINARY\_CI"';
  2269 EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'ALTER SESSION SET NLS\_COMP="LINGUISTIC"';
  2270 END set\_nls\_onlogon;
  2271 /\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*/
- 2272 2. Restart the AlertEnterprise Application server.

The effect may not be visible in some client tools like SQL Developer. To see the effect in the SQL Developer tool: :

- 1. Open SQL Developer and click Tools > Preferences.
- 2. Click Database > NLS and do the following:
  - Set the Sort option to BINARY CI.
  - Set the Comparison option to LINGUISTIC.

## **Enabling Support for International Characters**

Storage of character data is controlled by character-set setting at database level. It is recommended to have the following database settings to support international characters:

## 2285 For Oracle:

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2276

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22922293

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2303

2304

2305

23062307

```
2286 NLS_CHARACTERSET = AL32UTF8
2287 NLS_NCHAR_CHARACTERSET = AL16UTF16
```

## 2289 For SQL Server:

• Server Collation = SQL\_Latin1\_General\_CP1\_CI\_AS

# **Deploying the Application**

After you have successfully configured the database, proceed to deploy the AlertEnterprise product on your web application server. The following deployment steps are required for the Tomcat 6.0 version:

- 1. Stop the Tomcat server from the Windows services if it is already running. Click Start > Run and type services.msc then click OK. Select the Apache Tomcat and click the Stop Service icon to stop the service.
- 2. Copy the AlertEnterprise.war, AccessMap.war (if you possess AlertInsight license), and AlertEnterpriseHelp.war, and jasperserver-pro.war files to <Tomcat installation folder>\webapps\ path.
- 3. You need to copy password management war file AIPM.war to <Tomcat installation folder>/webapps if you possess license for the Password Management application.
- 4. Create a new folder AlertCommonLib and AlertExternalLib under <Tomcat Installation Folder>.

- 2308 5. Extract AlertCommonLib.zip under AlertCommonLib folder. You will see 2309 many new files in this folder.
- 2310 6. Edit the <Tomcat Installation Folder>\conf\catalina.properties 2311 using any editor and add append the following to the common.loader as described 2312 below:
  - common.loader=\${catalina.base}/lib,\${catalina.base}/lib/\*.jar,\${catalina.home}/lib,\${cat alina.home}/lib/\*.jar,\${catalina.home}/AlertCommonLib/\*.jar,\${catalina.home}/AlertExt ernalLib/\*.jar (bold path added). Save the file and close the editor.
  - 7. Add Database Connection. Add a new <resource> entry as below with name "idbc/alntdb" in < Tomcat installation folder>\conf\context.xml. Replace the code in <> with relevant information.

#### For MY-SQL Server:

2313

2314

2315

2316

2317

2318 2319 2320

2339 2340

2341

2342 2343

2344

```
2321
2322
      <Resource
2323
      description="DB Connection"
2324
      name="jdbc/alntdb" auth="Container"
2325
      type="com.mchange.v2.c3p0.ComboPooledDataSource"
2326
      factory="org.apache.naming.factory.BeanFactory"
2327
      user="username"
2328
      password="password"
2329
      jdbcUrl="jdbc:mysql://<IP of DB Server>:3306/<DB Instance Name>"
2330
      driverClass="com.mysql.jdbc.Driver"
2331
      maxPoolSize="100" minPoolSize="5" acquireIncrement="5"
2332
      numHelperThreads="20" maxIdleTime="600"
2333
      maxIdleTimeExcessConnections="300"
2334
      debugUnreturnedConnectionStackTraces="true"
2335
      unreturnedConnectionTimeout="900"
2336
      />
2337
2338
```

## For repository setting in same context.xml, add the following entry:

<ResourceLink name="AlertEnterpriseRepo" global="AlertEnterpriseRepo"</pre> type="javax.jcr.Repository" />

## For ActiveMQ settings in same context.xml, add the following entry:

```
2345
      <Resource name="jms/connectionFactory"</pre>
2346
                  auth="Container"
2347
            type="org.apache.activemq.ActiveMQConnectionFactory"
            description="JMS Connection Factory"
2348
2349
            factory="org.apache.activemq.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
            brokerURL="tcp://localhost:61616"
2350
```

```
2351
            brokerName="LocalActiveMQBroker"
2352
            useEmbeddedBroker="false"/>
2353
2354
          <Resource name="jms/requestSubmissionQueue"</pre>
2355
            auth="Container"
2356
            type="org.apache.activemq.command.ActiveMQQueue"
2357
            description="JMS Queue requestSubmissionQueue"
2358
            factory="org.apache.activemq.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
2359
            physicalName="requestSubmissionQueue"/>
2360
2361
          <Resource name="jms/requestApprovalQueue"</pre>
2362
            auth="Container"
2363
           type="org.apache.activemq.command.ActiveMQQueue"
2364
           description="JMS Queue requestApprovalQueue"
2365
           factory="org.apache.activemq.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
2366
           physicalName="requestApprovalQueue"/>
2367
2368
          <Resource name="jms/autoApprovalQueue"</pre>
2369
            auth="Container"
2370
            type="org.apache.activemq.command.ActiveMQQueue"
2371
            description="JMS Queue autoApprovalQueue"
2372
            factory="org.apache.activemg.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
2373
            physicalName="autoApprovalQueue"/>
2374
2375
          <Resource name="jms/queue/taskSubmissionQueue"</pre>
2376
               auth="Container"
2377
               type="org.apache.activemq.command.ActiveMQQueue"
2378
               description="JMS Queue taskSubmissionQueue"
2379
               factory="org.apache.activemq.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
2380
               physicalName="taskSubmissionQueue"/>
2381
2382
          <Resource name="jms/queue/taskRejectionQueue"</pre>
2383
               auth="Container"
2384
               type="org.apache.activemq.command.ActiveMQQueue"
2385
               description="JMS Queue taskRejectionQueue"
2386
               factory="org.apache.activemq.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
2387
               physicalName="taskRejectionQueue"/>
2388
2389
          <Resource name="jms/queue/projectCancelQueue"</pre>
2390
               auth="Container"
2391
               type="org.apache.activemq.command.ActiveMQQueue"
2392
               description="JMS Queue projectCancelQueue"
```

```
2393
               factory="org.apache.activemg.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
2394
               physicalName="projectCancelQueue"/>
2395
2396
          <Resource name="jms/queue/projectCompleteQueue"</pre>
2397
               auth="Container"
2398
               type="org.apache.activemg.command.ActiveMOOueue"
2399
               description="JMS Queue projectCompleteQueue"
2400
               factory="org.apache.activemq.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
2401
               physicalName="projectCompleteQueue"/>
2402
2403
          <Resource name="jms/eventRequestQueue"</pre>
2404
               auth="Container"
2405
                  type="org.apache.activemq.command.ActiveMQQueue"
2406
                  description="JMS Queue eventRequestQueue"
2407
                  factory="org.apache.activemq.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
2408
                  physicalName="eventRequestQueue"/>
2409
2410
      <Resource auth="Container" description="my Queue"</pre>
2411
      factory="org.apache.activemg.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
2412
      name="jms/reqQueue" physicalName="requestQueue"
2413
      type="org.apache.activemq.command.ActiveMQQueue"/>
2414
2415
      <Resource auth="Container" description="my Queue"</pre>
2416
      factory="org.apache.activemg.jndi.JNDIReferenceFactory"
2417
      name="jms/resQueue" physicalName="responseQueue"
2418
      type="org.apache.activemg.command.ActiveMQQueue"/>
2419
2420
         8. Edit <Tomcat installation folder>\conf\server.xml. Replace the
2421
            code in <> with relevant information:
2422
2423
      <GlobalNamingResources>
2424
       <! -- Editable user database that can also be used by
2425
          UserDatabaseRealm to authenticate users
2426
       ->
2427
      <Resource auth="Container"</pre>
2428
      configFile="/AlertEnterpriseRepo/repository.xml"
2429
      description="AlertEnterprise Repository"
2430
      factory="com.alnt.repository.jndi.JackrabbitRepositoryFactory"
2431
      homeDir="/AlertEnterpriseRepo" name="AlertEnterpriseRepo"
2432
      type="javax.jcr.Repository"/>
2433
2434
      <Resource auth="Container" description="Rule Engine Service"</pre>
2435
      factory="com.sae.ruleengine.jndi.RuleEngineFactory"
```

```
2436
       name="Sedna" password="MANAGER" type="com.sae.ruleEngine.RuleEngine"
2437
       username="SYSTEM"/>
2438
       <Resource name="UserDatabase" auth="Container"</pre>
2439
       type="org.apache.catalina.UserDatabase"
2440
       description="User database that can be updated and saved"
2441
       factory="orq.apache.catalina.users.MemoryUserDatabaseFactory"
2442
       pathname="conf/tomcat-users.xml"/>
2443
       </GlobalNamingResources>
2444
2445
2446
           9. Open <Webserver installation folder>\bin location and double-click tomcat5w.exe. Click
2447
              Java tab and under Java options add the following lines at the end:
2448
2449
       -XX:PermSize=512m
2450
       -XX:MaxPermSize=512m
2451
       -Xms1024m
2452
       -Xmx1024m
2453
       -Djs.license.directory=C:\AlertApplication\Tomcat
2454
       6.0\webapps\jasperserver-pro
2455
       -Dcom.alnt.fabric.loadInitData=force
2456
       -Dalert.db.update=update
2457
2458
           Note: These settings may vary with the volume of RAM in the server.
2459
2460
           10. Start the Tomcat server.
2461
           11. Start the AlertEnterprise application by using the address, which is of the form
2462
              http://<Server IP Address>:8080/AlertEnterprise.
2463
              Note: The name and contents of the init script will vary depending on the database
2464
              management system of the organization. 8080 is the default port on local host. If you
              want to change it, then change it in the sever.xml.
2465
2466
           12. Log on to the application by using admin credentials. You should be able to view Home
2467
              screen of the application.
2468
       9.3 ALERTENTERPRISE APPLICATION CONFIGURATIONS FOR THE RSA BUILD
2469
       Systems/Connectors
2470
       9.3.1 System Type Import of DB Connector:
2471
           1. Log in to Application.
2472
           2. Go to Setup tab > Manual Configuration > Import/Export.
2473
           3. Check System Types and click on Import.
```

- 4. Select the .csv files, which are there in the software build package under connector \ALNTDbconnector\InitDataFiles folder.
- 5. After selecting all the files, click on the Upload button.
- 2477 6. Refresh page until it shows as success or failed.
- 2478 7. Restart the server if required.
- 2479 9.3.2 System Types Param of DB Connector:
- 2480 1. Log in to Application.
- 2. Go to Setup tab >Manual Configuration >Systems > System Types.
- 3. Search for Connector named "DBConnector" and click on Modify button.
- 2483 4. Click on Next button.
- 2484 5. Add the following attributes one by one and click on the ADD button –
- 2485 The following fields need to be provided under Name field and Label can be any user-
- 2486 friendly name see Figure 130.
- 2487 CREATE USER0
- 2488 UPDATE USERO
- 2489 LOCK USER0
- 2490 UNLOCK USER0
- 2491 DELIMIT USER0
- 2492 USER PROVISIONEDO
- 2493 ADD ROLESO
- 2494 DEPROVE ROLESO
- 2495 CREATE USER1
- 2496 LOCK USER1

Name	Label	Parameter Level
jndiName	Jndi Name	Mandatory
DATE_TIME_FORMAT	Date and Time Forma	Mandatory
DATE_TIME	Date Format	Mandatory
passwordColumnName	Passwrd Column Name	Mandatory
userIdColumnName	UserId Column Name	Mandatory
EXTERNAL_USER_ID_AT	External UserId Att	Mandatory
MODIFIED_ENTITLEMEN	Fetch User Entitlem	Mandatory
GET_ALL_USERS0	GET_ALL_USERS0	Mandatory
GET_INCREMENTAL_USE	GET_INCREMENTAL_USE	Mandatory
CREATE_USER0	Create CardHolder Q	Mandatory
UPDATE_USER0	Update CardHolder Q	Mandatory
LOCK_USER0	Lock CardHolder Que	Mandatory

UNLOCK_USERO	Unlock Card Holder	Mandatory
DELIMIT_USERO	Change CardHolder V	Mandatory
USER_PROVISIONEDO	Check Card Holder P	Mandatory
ADD_ROLES0	Assign Roles to Car	Mandatory
DEPROVE_ROLESO	Remove Roles From C	Mandatory
GET_GENERATED_USERI	Retrieve User Id Qu	Mandatory
driverName	driverName	Mandatory
url	URL	Mandatory
userName	userName	Mandatory

2500

2501

2502

2506

Figure 130. Guardian DB Connector Attributes

## **CONFIGURATION: Create "PACS AD" System**

- 2503 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Systems > System.
- 2504 2. Click on New to create a new system.
- 2505 3. Definition...Enter the following:
  - System Type LDAP from drop-down
- 2507 Connector Name - PACS AD
- 2508 Connector Description - PACS AD
- 2509 Connector Long Description - PACS AD
- 2510 Connector Type - LDAP (default)
- 2511 4. Click on Next.
- 2512 5. Parameters...Enter the following:

Table 9. Guardian PACS AD Parameters

System Param Name	System Param Value
bindPass	o60ypIUQT3IOqHmbuRWeuw==
useSSL	FALSE
baseDns	DC=pacs-es-idam-b1,DC=test
groupBaseDn	DC=pacs-es-idam-b1,DC=test
reconBaseDN	
getIncrementGrpChanges	FALSE

System Param Name	System Param Value
wsdlURL	
wsUserName	
wsPwd	
rootLevelDomain	
cookieLocation	
adUserName	
SYS_CON_ATTR_POST_CREATE_SCRIPT	
SYS_CON_ATTR_POST_CREATE_SCRIPT_PARAMS	
objectClass	User
Skipprovisioning	Yes
lastModifiedColumnRole	whenChanged
lastModifiedColumn	whenChanged
host	172.16.7.2
port	389
bindDn	CN=AlertEnterprise, CN=Users,DC=pacs-es-idam-b1,DC=test

- 2514 6. Click on Next.
- 2515 7. Attributes...Enter the following:
- Application Alert Access
- Check the following boxes Provisioning, Role Management, Offline System.
- Leave Connector Category as Production.
- Time Zone Greenwich Mean Time from drop-down
- 2520 8. Click on Next.
- 2521 9. Click on Save.
- 2522 CONFIGURATION: Create "Identity DB" System

2523	<ol> <li>Setup &gt; Manual Configuration &gt; Systems &gt; System.</li> </ol>
2524	2. Click on New to create a new system.
2525	3. DefinitionEnter the following:
2526	<ul> <li>System Type – Database (JDBC J2EE) from drop-down</li> </ul>
2527	<ul> <li>Connector Name – IDENTITYDB</li> </ul>
2528	<ul> <li>Connector Description - IDENTITYDB</li> </ul>
2529	<ul> <li>Connector Long Description - IDENTITYDB</li> </ul>
2530	<ul> <li>Connector Type – Database (JDBC J2EE) (default)</li> </ul>
2531	4. Click on Next.
2532	5. ParametersEnter the following:

## Table 10. Guardian Identity DB Parameters

System Param Name	System Param Value
driverName	
url	
userName	
password	
whereClause	
jndiName	java:comp/env/jdbc/alntdb

2534	6.	Click on Next.
2535	7.	AttributesEnter the following:
2536		Application – All
2537 2538		<ul> <li>Check the following boxes – Provisioning, Certification, Identity Provider, Allow Modify Role and Allow Time Change.</li> </ul>
2539		Leave Connector Category as Production.
2540		Time Zone – Eastern Daylight Time from drop-down
2541	8.	Click on Next.
2542	9.	Click on Save.

2544	1.	Setup > Manual Configuration > Systems > System.
2545	2.	Click on New to create a new system.
2546	3.	DefinitionEnter the following:
2547		System Type – DBConnector from drop-down
2548		<ul> <li>Connector Name – ACCESSIT PACS</li> </ul>
2549		• Connector Description - ACCESSIT PACS
2550		• Connector Long Description - ACCESSIT PACS
2551		<ul> <li>Connector Type – DBConnector (default)</li> </ul>
2552	4.	Click on Next.
2553	5.	ParametersEnter the following:

Table 11. Guardian ACCESSIT PACS Parameters

System Param Name	System Param Value
driverName	
URL	jdbc:sqlserver:// <host_name>:<port>;databaseName=Al Universal</port></host_name>
userName	DB User Name
password	DB User Password
Date and Time Format	CardholderID
External Userld Attribute	CardholderID
Create CardHolder Query	INSERT INTO [AlUniversal].[dbo].[Cardholders]([CardholderID],[LastName],[FirstName],[MiddleInitial],[CompanyID],[Notes],[LastModified],[LastModifiedByUser],[DateCreated],[CreatedByUser],[MemberOfAllSites],[UserText1],[UserText2],[UserText3],[UserText4],[UserText5],[UserText6],[UserText7],[UserText8],[UserText9],[UserText10],[UserText11],[UserText12],[UserText13],[UserText13],[UserText14],[UserText15],[UserText16],[UserText17],[UserText18],[UserText19],[UserText2 0],[Department],[UserDate1],[UserDate2],[UserDate3],[UserDate4],[UserDate5],[UserNumeric1],[UserNumeric2],[UserNumeric3],[UserNumeric4],[UserNumeric5],[CardholderStatus ],[CardholderActiveDate],[CardholderExpireDate]) VALUES (NEWID(),\$LastName,\$FirstName,\$MiddleInitial,\$CompanyID,\$Notes,GetUTCDate(),'alertent','1',\$UserText1,\$UserText2,\$UserText3,\$UserText4,\$UserText5,\$UserText6,\$UserText7,\$UserText4,\$UserText2,\$UserText4,\$UserText4,\$UserText5,\$UserText6,\$UserText4,\$UserText5,\$UserText6,\$UserNumeric6,\$UserNu
Update CardHolder Query	update [dbo].[Cardholders] set LastModified=GetUTCDate() where CardholderID=\$CardholderID

System Param Name	System Param Value
Lock CardHolder Query	update [dbo].[Cardholders] set CardholderStatus='0' where CardholderID=\$CardholderID
Unlock Card Holder Query	update [dbo].[Cardholders] set CardholderStatus='1' where CardholderID=\$CardholderID
Check Card Holder Provisioned Query	select CardholderID from [dbo].[Cardholders] where CardholderID =\$CardholderID
Assign Roles to Card Holder Query	INSERT INTO [dbo].[CardholderAccessLevels] ( [CardholderAccessLevelID], [CardholderID], [AccessLevelID], [LastModified], [ActivateDate], [DeactivateDate]) VALUES ( NEWID(), \$CardholderID, (select AccessLevelID from [dbo].[AccessLevels] where AccessLevelName=\$ROLE_NAME), GetUTCDate(), NULL, NULL)
Remove Roles From Card Holder Query	delete from [dbo].[CardholderAccessLevels] where CardholderID=\$CardholderID and AccessLevelID=(select AccessLevelID from [dbo].[AccessLevels] where AccessLevelName=\$ROLE_NAME)
Retrieve User Id Query	select CardholderID from [dbo].[Cardholders] where UserText1=\$UserText1
CREATE_USER1	INSERT INTO [AlUniversal].[dbo].[Cards] ([CardID],[CardholderID],[CardNumber],[FacilityCode],[PINNumber],[PINExempt],[APBExe mpt],[UseExtendedAccessTimes],[CardStatus],[ActiveDate],[ExpireDate],[UserLevel],[UseC ustomReporting],[EventInfo],[Notes],[LastModified],[LastModifiedByUser],[DateCreated],[CreatedByUser],[IssueLevel],[DeactivateExempt],[VacationDate],[VacationDuration],[UseCo unt],[TempDeactivateStart],[TempDeactivateEnd],[Classification],[IPLocksetUserType],[IPLo cksetAccessMode],[IPLocksetCredentialFormat],[IPLocksetAccessAlways],[RawPrimaryCred ential],[LargeEncodedCardID],[EmbossedNumber]) VALUES (NEWID(),(select CardholderID from [dbo].[Cardholders] where UserText1=\$UserText1),\$CardNumber,\$FacilityCode,\$PIN,'0','0','1',NULL,NULL,'0','0','NULL,NULL,'0','NULL,NULL,'NULL,
LOCK_USER1	update [AlUniversal].[dbo].[Cards] set CardStatus='0',Classification='InActive' where [CardNumber]=\$CardNumber

- 2555 6. Click on Next.
- 2556 7. Attributes...Enter the following:
- Application All
- Check the following boxes Provisioning, Role Management, and Offline System.
- Leave Connector Category as Production.
- Time Zone Eastern Daylight Time from drop-down
- 2561 8. Click on Next.
- 2562 9. Click on Save.

## 2563 Identity & Access – Enable Identity

- 2564 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Identity & Access>Enable Identity.
- 2565 2. Enable the following for "Identity DB" system, see Figure 131.



2567


2569

Figure 131. Guardian Identity Configuration

- 2568 9.3.3 Identity & Access—User Field Mapping
  - 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Identity & Access > User Field Mapping.
- 2570 2. Select User = Identity (from drop-down) and click on Go.
- 2571 3. Click the Create New button.
   2572 Select values for respective fields and hit on save (Refer to below sheet for values selection.)
- 4. Repeat Steps 1–4 for all fields in the sheet.
- Follow the steps above to configure the User Field mappings manually. You can match the values in the file at <a href="https://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nccoe/UserFieldMapping\_data.csv">https://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nccoe/UserFieldMapping\_data.csv</a>.

### 2577 Identity & Access > Recon Authoritative Fields

- 2578 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Identity & Access > Recon Authoritative Fields.
- 2579 2. Click on Create.
- 2580 3. Enter the following shown in Figure 132.



2581

2582


Figure 132. Guardian Recon Authoritative Fields

## 2583 Identity & Access > Request Categories

- 2584 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Identity & Access > Request Categories.
- 2585 2. Click on New.
- 2586 3. Enter following at define Request Category screen:
- Name New Hire
- Description New Hire

2589	<ul><li>Visible – Yes</li></ul>
2590	Hover Text –
2591	<ul> <li>Provisioning Actions – Create User, Change Roles</li> </ul>
2592	Request Category Type - Resources
2593	<ul> <li>Display the following in USS – Enterprise Roles</li> </ul>
2594	4. Click on Save.
2595	5. Repeat similar to above for following Request Categories:
2596	Termination
2597	Name – Change Access
2598	<ul> <li>Description – Change of Access</li> </ul>
2599	<ul><li>Visible – Yes</li></ul>
2600	Hover Text —
2601	<ul> <li>Provisioning Actions – Create User, Change Roles, Change User</li> </ul>
2602	<ul> <li>Display the following in USS – Resources</li> </ul>
2603	<ul> <li>Add Existing – Systems and Remove Roles</li> </ul>
2604	6. Click on Save.
2605	ChangeAccess
2606	<ul> <li>Name – Terminate</li> </ul>
2607	<ul> <li>Description – Terminate User</li> </ul>
2608	<ul><li>Visible – Yes</li></ul>
2609	○ Hover Text —
2610	<ul> <li>Provisioning Actions – Lock User, Change Roles</li> </ul>
2611	<ul> <li>Display the following in USS – Resources</li> </ul>
2612	<ul> <li>Add Existing – Systems</li> </ul>
2613	7. Click on Save.
2614	Identity & Access>Provisioning>Provisioning Mapping
2615	1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Identity & Access > Provisioning > Provisioning Mapping
2616	2. On the next screen select System and click Next.

3. Follow the mapping shown in Figure 133 to Create/Update provisioning mappings for the ACCESS IT PACS system.



2619

2620

2622

Figure 133. Guardian DB Connector Attribute Mapping

#### 2621 **User Data> User Data Source**

- 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > User Data > User Data Source.
- 2623 2. Follow the mappings and configurations found in the files at https://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nccoe/UserManagement-UserDataSource.zip. 2624 2625 Create/Update accordingly.

#### 2626 **User Data> User Mapping**

- 2627 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > User Data > User Mapping.
- 2. Select "Identity DB" system from the list and click on Save button. 2628

### 2629 **Policy Engine> Rules**

- 2630 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Policy Engine > Rules.
- 2631 2. Click on New and add the following:

2632 Table 12. Guardian Policy Engine Rules

Rule Name	Entity Type	Rule Type	Description	Applicable to	Attributes	Drop down value	Selection Value
							1. True and New Hire
							2. True and Remove User
				Suggest/Default			Access
All Door Access New	Workflow	AlertAccess	All Door Access New		PacsALLDoors AND Request Category	Equals	3. True and ChangeAccess
							1. True and New Hire
							2. True and Remove User
				Suggest/Default			Access
Home Access Level New	Workflow	AlertAccess	Home Access Level New		PacsALLDoors AND Request Category	Equals	3. True and ChangeAccess
							1. True and New Hire
							2. True and Remove User
				Suggest/Default			Access
WO Access Level New	Workflow	AlertAccess	WO Access Level New		PacsALLDoors AND Request Category	Equals	3. True and ChangeAccess

2633

## **Policy Engine > Suggest/Default Access**

1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Policy Engine > Suggest/Default Access.

2. Click on New and enter the following:

Table 13. Guardian Policy Engine Suggest/Default Access

Name	Туре	Rule Name	Search By	Default System	Selected Role
All Door Access	Default	All Door Access NEW	Systems	ACCESSIT PACS	ALL DOORS
Home Access Level	Default	Home Access Level	Systems	ACCESSIT PACS	Home Access Level
WO Access Level	Default	Home Access Level	Systems	ACCESSIT PACS	WO Access Level
NewHireDefaultSystems	Default	NewHireDefaultSyst ems	Systems	ACCESSIT PACS	

2639

2640

2641

2642

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2637

2638

## **Policy Engine>Rule Action Handler**

1 – Setup > Manual Configuration > Policy Engine > Rule Action Handler.

2 – Click New and create the following Action Handlers:

2643 Table 14. Guardian Policy Engine Rule Action Handler

Action Handler Name	Workflow	Task Type	Value	Priority	Update Identity Info	Evaluate Enterprise Role
Recon New Hire	AlertAccess	Recon Create Request	New Hire	0	Yes	No
Recon terminate Handler	AlertAccess	Recon Create Request	Terminate	0	Yes	No
Recon Error Handler	AlertAccess	Recon Exception Record Task		0		


ReconChangeHa	AlertAccess	Recon Create	Change	0	Yes	No
ndler		Request	Access			

### 2645 Policy Engine>Policy Designer

- 2646 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Policy Engine > Policy Designer
- 2. Select New to create new Policy designer as: 2647

## **User Policy New** 2648

- 2649 1. Name - User Policy New
- 2650 2. Rule Type – AlertAccess
- 2651 3. Description – User Policy
- 2652 4. Priority – 29
- 2653 5. Active - Yes
- 2654 6. Default Process - No
- 2655 Figure 134 depicts the new policy interface to create the User Policy described above.



2657

The following table describes User Policy New.

2659

Table 15. Guardian User Policy

Step	Name	Туре	Condition	Is Task handler	Task Handler	Update Query
1	User ID Check	Decision	\$masterUser[UserId] .size='0'			
2	Create User	Task Handler		Yes	Recon New Hire	
3	Terminate Check	Decision	\$checkStatus[UserSt atus,Active,InActive] .action='LOCK'			
4	Terminate	Task Handler		Yes	Recon Terminate	

Step	Name	Туре	Condition	Is Task handler	Task Handler	Update Query
					Handler	
5	Remove Access Check	Decision	\$checkAuthFields[].s tatus='Yes'			
6	Error Handler	Task Handler		Yes	Recon Error Handler	
7	Change Handler	Task Handler		Yes	Recon Change Handler	

# Job Scheduler>Triggers Field Map

- 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Job Scheduler > Triggers Field Map
- 2663 2. Click on New.
- 3. Enter Group Name PACSAD Field Map
- 2665 4. Description PACSAD Field Mapping
- 5. Select Type Reconciliation
- 2667 6. After creating Field Map, select the newly created map and select Configure.
- 7. Click New and create mapping per below table.

AE Attribute	Mapped Key	userType	roleTyp e	userRol e	userBadg e	userEnt RoleTyp e	User Trainin g Type
sAMAccountName	Userld	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
accountExpires	ValidTo	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
givenName	FirstName	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
sn	LastName	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
userAccountContr ol	statusLDAP	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
pacsAllDoors	PacsAllDoors	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
pacsHomeAccess	PacsHomeAcces s	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
pacsWorkAccess	PacsWorkAccess	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

2671

## **Job Scheduler>Triggers**

<u>AlertDbConnectorTrigger</u>

2672

- 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Job Scheduler > Triggers
- 2673
- 2. Click New and create the following Triggers:

# 2674

2675

Table 17. Guardian Job Scheduler Triggers

Name	PACSAD Trigger
Description	PACSAD Trigger
Туре	Reconciliation
Batch Size	100
Number of Attempts	3
Policy Designer for	User policy New

Users/Roles	
System: Reconciliation From	PACS AD
Reconciliation System	PACS AD
Field Mapping Group	PACSAD Field Map
User Type	True
User Role	True

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2683


2684

2686

2687

## Job Scheduler>Scheduler

- 2679 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Job Scheduler > Scheduler.
- 2680 2. Click New and enter the following as shown in Figure 135:
- 2681 • Job Type – Reconciliation Job
  - Job Name < Job Name>
  - Reconciliation for User
    - Reconciliation Type Incremental Reconciliation
- 2685 Reconciliation Triggers – PACSAD Trigger
  - Select the schedule as Immediate, Once, periodic or Advance. For Periodic Job, specify the Job Start date, End date, and duration of job frequency.



2689

Figure 135. Guardian Reconciliation Job

- 2690 3. Click Save.
- 2691 9.4 SECTION 3. ALERTENTERPRISE APPLICATION CONFIGURATIONS FOR THE CA BUILD
- 2692 9.4.1 System Type Import of DB Connector:
- 2693 1. Log in to Application.
- 2694 2. Go to Setup tab > Manual Configuration > Import/Export
- 2695 3. Check System Types and click on Import.
- 4. Select the .csv files, which are there in software build package under Connector \ALNTDbconnector\InitDataFiles folder.
- 5. After selecting all the files, click on Upload button.

- 2699 6. Refresh page until it shows as success or failed.
- 2700 7. Restart the server if required.
- 2701 9.4.2 System Types Param of DB Connector:
- 2702 1. Log in to Application.
- 2. Go to Setup tab> Manual Configuration \_> Systems > System Types
- 3. Search for Connector named "DBConnector" and click on Modify button.
- 2705 4. Click on Next.

2708

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5. Add the following attributes one by one and click on the ADD button.

The following fields in Table 18 need to be provided under Name field and Label can be any user-friendly name as shown in

MODIFIED_ENTITLEMEN	Fetch User Entitlem	Mandatory
GET_ALL_USERS0	GET_ALL_USERS0	Mandatory
GET_INCREMENTAL_USE	GET_INCREMENTAL_USE	Mandatory
CREATE_USER0	Create CardHolder Q	Mandatory
UPDATE_USER0	Update CardHolder Q	Mandatory
LOCK_USERO	Lock CardHolder Que	Mandatory

and Figure 136: (If the name or label already exists do not add)

Table 18. Guardian Name and Label Fields

Name	Label
jndiName	Jndi Name
DATE_TIME_FORMAT	Date and Time Format
DATE_TIME	Date Format
passwordColumnName	Passwrd Column Name
userIdColumnName	UserId Column Name
EXTERNAL_USER_ID_ATTRIBUTE	External UserId Attribute
MODIFIED_ENTITLEMENTS	Fetch User Entitlement based on last modified date(not by user)
GET_ALL_USERS0	GET_ALL_USERS0
GET_INCREMENTAL_USERS0	GET_INCREMENTAL_USERS0

CREATE_USER0	Create CardHolder Query
UPDATE_USER0	Update CardHolder Query
LOCK_USER0	Lock CardHolder Query
UNLOCK_USER0	Unlock Card Holder Query
DELIMIT_USER0	Change CardHolder Validity Query
USER_PROVISIONED0	Check Card Holder Provisioned Query
ADD_ROLES0	Assign Roles to Card Holder Query
DEPROVE_ROLES0	Remove Roles From Card Holder Query
GET_GENERATED_USERID0	Retrieve User Id Query
driverName	driverName
url	URL
userName	userName
password	password
CREATE_USER1	CREATE_USER1
LOCK_USER1	LOCK_USER1

0	Name -	Labat	Desemble I was
Ш	Name	Label	Parameter Level
	jndiName	Jndi Name	Mandatory
	DATE_TIME_FORMAT	Date and Time Forma	Mandatory
	DATE_TIME	Date Format	Mandatory
	passwordColumnName	Passwrd Column Name	Mandatory
	userIdColumnName	UserId Column Name	Mandatory
	EXTERNAL_USER_ID_AT	External UserId Att	Mandatory
	MODIFIED_ENTITLEMEN	Fetch User Entitlem	Mandatory
	GET_ALL_USERSO	GET_ALL_USERS0	Mandatory
	GET_INCREMENTAL_USE	GET_INCREMENTAL_USE	Mandatory
	CREATE_USERO	Create CardHolder Q	Mandatory
	UPDATE_USERO	Update CardHolder Q	Mandatory
	LOCK_USERO	Lock CardHolder Que	Mandatory

2713

UNLOCK_USERO	Unlock Card Holder	Mandatory
DELIMIT_USERO	Change CardHolder V	Mandatory
USER_PROVISIONEDO	Check Card Holder P	Mandatory
ADD_ROLES0	Assign Roles to Car	Mandatory
DEPROVE_ROLESO	Remove Roles From C	Mandatory
GET_GENERATED_USERI	Retrieve User Id Qu	Mandatory

2716

Figure 136. Guardian DB Connector Attributes

2717 9.4.3 Create System Connectors for all Target Systems

2718

2719

- 1. CONFIGURATION: Create connector for "Alert User Database (External)"
- This connector is required to connect the Alert user table exposed to third-party systems (CA in this case) and get the data.
- 2722 Steps to create this connector:
- 2723 1. Setup Tab > Manual Configuration > Systems > System.
- 2724 2. Click New to create a new system.
- 2725 3. Definition...Enter the following:
- 2726 System Type DBConnector
  - Connector Name ALERTDBCONNECTOR
- Connector Description ALERT DB CONNECTOR
- Connector Long Description ALERT DB CONNECTOR
- Connector Type DbConnector (Label)
- 2731 4. Click on Next.
- 2732 5. Parameters...Enter the following:
- 2733 Table 19. Guardian Manual Configuration System Parameters

System Param Name	System Param Value
Jndi Name	java:comp/env/jdbc/alertdb
Date and Time Format	MM/dd/yyyy HH:mm:ss
GET_ALL_USERS0	select UserId, FirstName,LastName,Email,WorkPhone,HomePhone,Department,EmployeeType,PacsAllDoor,Case WHEN PacsAllDoor='1' then 'TRUE' Else 'FALSE' END as PacsAllDoor,CASE WHEN PacsHomeAccess='1' then 'TRUE' else 'FALSE' END as PacsHomeAccess , CASE WHEN PacsWorkAccess='1' then 'TRUE' else 'FALSE' END as PacsWorkAccess,CardNumber,FacilityCode,LastModifiedDate,ValidFrom,ValidTo,Title,UserStatus,PIN

System Param Name	System Param Value
	from alnt_idm_user_dtls
GET_INCREMENTAL_USERS0	select UserId, FirstName,LastName,Email,WorkPhone,HomePhone,Department,EmployeeType,PacsAllDoor,Case WHEN PacsAllDoor='1' then 'TRUE' Else 'FALSE' END as PacsAllDoor,CASE WHEN PacsHomeAccess='1' then 'TRUE'else 'FALSE' END as PacsHomeAccess , CASE WHEN PacsWorkAccess='1' then 'TRUE' else 'FALSE' END as PacsWorkAccess,CardNumber,FacilityCode,LastModifiedDate,ValidFrom,ValidTo,Title,UserStatus,PIN from alnt_idm_user_dtls where LastModifiedDate> STR_TO_DATE(\$LAST_RUN_DATE,'%m/%e/%Y %H:%i:%s') and UserStatus='Active'
External UserId Attribute	Userld
UserId Column Name	UserId

2735

- 6. Click on Next.
- 2736 7. Attributes...Enter the following:
- 2737 Application – Alert Access
- 2738 Check the following boxes – Provisioning, Role Management, Offline System.
- Leave Connector Category as Production 2739
- 2740 Time Zone – Eastern Daylight Time from drop-down

*Note:* TimeZone should be same as the TimeZone where application is hosted. 2741

- 2742 8. Click on Next.
- 9. Click on Save. 2743

2744

- 2. CONFIGURATION: Create "Identity DB" System
- This is connector is required for internal purposes. Ignore this step if **Identity DB** Connector 2746 2747 already setup
- 2748 Steps to create this connector:
- 2749 1. Setup Tab > Manual Configuration > Systems > System.
- 2750 2. Click New to create a new system.
- 2751 3. Definition...Enter the following:
- 2752 • System Type – Database (JDBC J2EE) from drop-down
- 2753 Connector Name – IDENTITYDB
- 2754 Connector Description - IDENTITYDB

2755	<ul> <li>Connector Long Description - IDENTITYDB</li> </ul>
2756	<ul> <li>Connector Type – Database (JDBC J2EE) (default)</li> </ul>
2757	4. Click on Next.
2758	5. ParametersEnter the following:
2759	

Table 20. Guardian Identity DB Parameters

System Param Name	System Param Value
driverName	(use default)
url	(use default)
userName	(use default)
password	(use default)
whereClause	(use default)
jndiName	java:comp/env/jdbc/alntdb

- 2761 6. Click on Next.
- 2762 7. Attributes...Enter the following:
- Application All
- Check the following boxes Provisioning, Certification, Identity Provider, Allow
   Modify Role and Allow Time Change.
- Leave Connector Category as Production
- Time Zone Eastern Daylight Time from drop-down
- 2768 8. Click on Next.
- 2769 9. Click on Save.
- 2770 3. CONFIGURATION: Create "ACCESSIT PACS" System
- This is connector is required for integrating with RS2 PACS system and performing various provisioning operations.
- 2773 Steps to create this connector:
- 1. Setup Tab > Manual Configuration > Systems > System.
- 2. Click New to create a new system.
- 2776 3. Definition...Enter the following:
- System Type DBConnector from drop-down
- Connector Name ACCESSIT PACS
- Connector Description ACCESSIT PACS
- Connector Long Description ACCESSIT PACS

• Connector Type – DBConnector (default)

2782 4. Click on Next.

5. Parameters...Enter the following:

2784

Table 21. Guardian PACS DBConnector Parameters

System Param Name	System Param Value
driverName	com.microsoft.sqlserver.jdbc.SQLServerDriver
URL	jdbc:sqlserver:// <host_name>:<port>;databaseName=Al Universal</port></host_name>
	<pre><host_name> should be replaced with the hostname of the RS2 PACS system</host_name></pre>
username	Login User Name to connect to RS2 PACS database
Password	Login password to connect to RS2 PACS database
Date and Time Format	MM/dd/yyyy HH:mm:ss
External Userld Attribute	CardholderID
Create CardHolder Query	INSERT INTO [AlUniversal].[dbo].[Cardholders]([CardholderID],[LastName],[FirstName],[MiddleInitial],[CompanyID],[Notes],[LastModified],[LastModifiedByUser],[DateCreated],[CreatedByUser],[MemberOfAllSites],[UserText1],[UserText2],[UserText3],[UserText4],[UserText5],[UserText6],[UserText7],[UserText8],[UserText10],[UserText11],[UserText12],[UserText13],[UserText14],[UserText15],[UserText16],[UserText17],[UserText18],[UserText19],[UserText2],[UserText2],[UserDate3],[UserDate4],[UserDate5],[UserNumeric1],[UserNumeric2],[UserNumeric3],[UserNumeric4],[UserNumeric5],[CardholderStatus],[CardholderActiveDate],[CardholderExpireDate]) VALUES (NEWID(),\$LastName,\$FirstName,\$MiddleInitial,\$CompanyID,\$Notes,GetUTCDate(),'alertent',GetUTCDate(),'alertent','1',\$UserText1,\$UserText2,\$UserText3,\$UserText4,\$UserText5,\$UserText6,\$UserText7,\$UserText8,\$UserText9,\$UserText10,\$UserText11,\$UserText12,\$UserText13,\$UserText14,\$UserText15,\$UserText16,\$UserText17,\$UserText17,\$UserText17,\$UserText17,\$UserText19,\$UserText19,\$UserText18,\$UserText19,\$UserText19,\$UserText14,\$UserText19,\$UserText29,\$UserText29,\$UserText29,\$UserText29,\$UserText29,\$UserText29,\$UserText29,\$UserText29,\$UserText29,\$UserText29,\$UserText29,\$User
Update CardHolder Query	update [dbo].[Cardholders] set LastModified=GetUTCDate() where CardholderID=\$CardholderID
Lock CardHolder Query	update [dbo].[Cardholders] set CardholderStatus='0' where CardholderID=\$CardholderID
Unlock Card Holder Query	update [dbo].[Cardholders] set CardholderStatus='1' where CardholderID=\$CardholderID

System Param Name	System Param Value
Check Card Holder Provisioned Query	select CardholderID from [dbo].[Cardholders] where CardholderID =\$CardholderID
Assign Roles to Card Holder Query	INSERT INTO [dbo].[CardholderAccessLevels] ( [CardholderAccessLevelID], [CardholderID], [AccessLevelID], [LastModified], [ActivateDate], [DeactivateDate]) VALUES ( NEWID(), \$CardholderID, (select AccessLevelID from [dbo].[AccessLevels] where AccessLevelName=\$ROLE_NAME), GetUTCDate(), NULL, NULL)
Remove Roles From Card Holder Query	delete from [dbo].[CardholderAccessLevels] where CardholderID=\$CardholderID and AccessLevelID=(select AccessLevelID from [dbo].[AccessLevels] where AccessLevelName=\$ROLE_NAME)
Retrieve User Id Query	select CardholderID from [dbo].[Cardholders] where UserText1=\$UserText1
CREATE_USER1	INSERT INTO [AlUniversal].[dbo].[Cards] ([CardID],[CardholderID],[CardNumber],[FacilityCode],[PINNumber],[PINExempt],[APBExe mpt],[UseExtendedAccessTimes],[CardStatus],[ActiveDate],[ExpireDate],[UserLevel],[UseC ustomReporting],[EventInfo],[Notes],[LastModified],[LastModifiedByUser],[DateCreated],[CreatedByUser],[IssueLevel],[DeactivateExempt],[VacationDate],[VacationDuration],[UseCo unt],[TempDeactivateStart],[TempDeactivateEnd],[Classification],[IPLocksetUserType],[IPLo cksetAccessMode],[IPLocksetCredentialFormat],[IPLocksetAccessAlways],[RawPrimaryCred ential],[LargeEncodedCardID],[EmbossedNumber]) VALUES (NEWID(),(select CardholderID from [dbo].[Cardholders] where UserText1=\$UserText1),\$CardNumber,\$FacilityCode,\$PIN,'0','0','0','1',NULL,NULL,'0','0','NULL,NULL,'U,'0','255',NULL,NULL,'V,'Active',NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NUL
LOCK_USER1	update [AIUniversal].[dbo].[Cards] set CardStatus='0',Classification='InActive' where [CardNumber]=\$CardNumber

- 2785 6. Click on Next.
- 2786 7. Attributes...Enter the following:
- 2787 Application All
- Check the following boxes Provisioning, Role Management, and Offline System.
- Leave Connector Category as Production
- Time Zone Eastern Daylight Time from drop-down
- 2791 8. Click on Next.
- 2792 9. Click on Save.
- **Form customization Attributes**
- 2794 Create New Custom Form Attributes

- 2795 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Form customization > Attributes
- 2796 2. Click on New Button
- 2797
   3. Create new attribute called **PacsAllDoors** based on the information provided below in
   2798
   Table 22.
  - 4. Click Save

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Table 22. PacsAllDoors Attributes

Field Name	Field Value
Name	PacsAllDoors
Label	PacsAllDoors
Description	PacsAllDoors
Visible	Yes
Mandatory	No
Read Only	No
Field Type	TextField (Select this value from drop down)
USS Create Request	Yes(Select CheckBox)
USS User Information	Yes(Select CheckBox)
Approver View	Yes(Select CheckBox)
Provisioning	Yes(Select CheckBox)
Create Request Sequence	10
User Info Sequence	10
Approver Sequence	10
Group Name	Personnel Information (Select this value from drop down)

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## 5. Repeat Steps 1-4 to create the following custom form attributes

1. Create PacsHomeAccess Attributes (See Table 23)

Table 23. PacsHomeAccess Attributes

Field Name	Field Value
Name	PacsHomeAccess
Label	PacsHomeAccess
Description	PacsHomeAccess
Visible	Yes
Mandatory	No
Read Only	No
Field Type	TextField (Select this value from drop down)
USS Create Request	Yes(Select CheckBox)
USS User Information	Yes(Select CheckBox)
Approver View	Yes(Select CheckBox)
Provisioning	Yes(Select CheckBox)
Create Request Sequence	11
User Info Sequence	11
Approver Sequence	11
Group Name	Personnel Information (Select this value from drop down)

# 2. Create PacsWorkAccess Attributes (as shown in Table 24)

2807

Table 24. PacsWorkAccess Attributes

Field Name	Field Value
Name	PacsWorkAccess
Label	PacsWorkAccess
Description	PacsWorkAccess

Field Name	Field Value
Visible	Yes
Mandatory	No
Read Only	No
Field Type	TextField (Select this value from drop down)
USS Create Request	Yes(Select CheckBox)
USS User Information	Yes(Select CheckBox)
Approver View	Yes(Select CheckBox)
Provisioning	Yes(Select CheckBox)
Create Request Sequence	12
User Info Sequence	12
Approver Sequence	12
Group Name	Personnel Information (Select this value from drop down)

### 3. Create FacilityCode Attributes as shown in Table 25. 2809

Table 25. FacilityCode Attributes

Field Name	Field Value
Name	FacilityCode
Label	Facility Code
Description	Facility Code
Visible	Yes
Mandatory	Yes
Read Only	No
Field Type	TextField (Select this value from drop down)

Field Name	Field Value		
USS Create Request	No		
USS User Information	No		
Approver View	No		
Provisioning	Yes(Select CheckBox)		
Create Request Sequence			
User Info Sequence			
Approver Sequence			
Group Name	Personnel Information (Select this value from drop down)		

## **4.** Create **PIN** Attributes as shown in Table 26.

Table 26. PIN Atributes

Field Name	Field Value		
Name	PIN		
Label	PIN		
Description	PIN		
Visible	Yes		
Mandatory	No		
Read Only	No		
Field Type	TextField (Select this value from drop down)		
USS Create Request	Yes(Select CheckBox)		
USS User Information	No(Select CheckBox)		
Approver View	No(Select CheckBox)		
Provisioning	Yes(Select CheckBox)		
Create Request	12		

Field Name	Field Value
Sequence	
User Info Sequence	
Approver Sequence	
Group Name	Personnel Information (Select this value from drop down)

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## **Modify Employee Type Attribute**

- 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Form customization > Attributes
- 2. Select Employee Type Field from list of Attributes and Click Modify
- 3. Click on DropDown Values Icon
- 4. On the popup window, Click on New and Provide Employee in both Name and Label fields, Figure 137.



Figure 137. Create DropDownValues

5. Similarly configure values for Contractor field, Figure 138.



Figure 138. Contractor Field

- 6. Click **Save** and then Click **Save** to save the configuration
  - 7. Ignore this step if these values already exists

## **Modify Status Attribute**

- 2827 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Form customization > Attributes
  - 2. Select Status field from list of Attributes and Click Modify
- 2829 3. Click on DropDown Values Icon
- 2830 4. On the popup window Click on New and provide Active in both Name and Label 2831 fields, Figure 139.



2832 Figure 139. DropDownValues



2834 Figure 140. InActive

- 5. Similarly configure values for **InActive** field, Figure 140
- 2836 6. Click **Save** and then Click **Save** to save the configuration
- 2837 7. Ignore this step if these values already exists for Status field

## 2838 Identity & Access- Enable Identity

- 2839 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Identity & Access> Enable Identity
- 2. Enable the following for Identity DB system as shown in Figure 141.



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2848 2849

Figure 141. Guardian Identity Configuration

## 2843 9.4.4 Identity & Access—User Field Mapping

- 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Identity & Access > User Field Mapping.
- 2845 2. Select User = Identity (from drop-down) and click Go.
- 2846 3. Click the Create New button.
  - Select Custom Field, Primary Key, Visible In List, IsSearchable fields based on the table listed below. Select checkbox for these fields if it is specified as "Yes" otherwise, keep it as unselected.
- 2850 5. Click on Save button to save the record
- 2851 6. Repeat Steps 1–5 for all fields in the following table, Table 27. Ignore fields if pre-existing mapping already exists for a particular field.

Table 27. User Field Mapping Table

Custom Field	Primary Key	Visible In List	IsSsearchable
UserId	No	Yes	No
ValidFrom	No	Yes	No
ValidTo	No	Yes	No
FirstName	No	Yes	Yes
LastName	No	Yes	Yes
Email	No	No	No
Building	No	No	No
ManagerId	No	No	No
BadgeStatus	No	No	No
BadgeType	No	No	No
BadgeValidFrom	No	No	No
BadgeValidTo	No	No	No
Location	No	No	No
BadgeId	No	No	No
EmployeeType	No	No	No
Department	No	No	No
Password	No	No	No
Groups	No	No	No
ManagerName	No	No	No
ManagerLN	No	No	No
Manager	No	No	No
ManagerId	No	Yes	No
Status	No	No	No
Telephone	No	No	No
ImageUpload	No	No	No
Password_AD	No	No	No
PacsAllDoors	No	Yes	No
PacsHomeAccess	No	Yes	No
PacsWorkAccess	No	Yes	No

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
# Identity & Access > Recon Authoritative Fields

1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Identity & Access > Recon Authoritative Fields.

2. Click on New. 2857

PacsHomeAccess

2858 Select ALERTDBCONNECTOR from Systems Drop down and select Authoritative field as 2859 PacsAllDoors as shown in Create Recon Authoritative Fields \* Systems ALERTDBCONNECTOR • \* Authoritative Field PacsAllDoors • Cancel Save 2860 2861 Figure 142. Authoritative Fields 2862 4. Click Save button to save the mapping. 2863 5. Repeat Steps 1-4 to configure mapping other fields PacsWorksAccess and 2864 PacsHomeAccess as listed in the screenshot shown in Figure 139. ALERTOBCONNECTOR PacsAllDoors ALERTOBCONNECTOR PacsWorkAccess



1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Identity & Access > Provisioning > External Provisioning


**Attributes** 

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ALERTDBCONNECTOR

- 2879 2. Select ACCESSIT PACS system from the list and Click Configure
  - 3. On the Next screen, Click on **New** Button and provide "LastName" in both Name and description fields
    - 4. Click **Save** to save the configurations as shown in Figure 144.



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Figure 144. External Provisioning Attribute

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Repeat the Steps 1-4 to configure the following fields listed in the following screenshot, Figure 145. *Note*: The Fields Names are <u>case sensitive</u>.

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Figure 145. Attribute Fields


2891 2892

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### **Identity & Access>Provisioning>Provisioning Mapping**

- 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Identity & Access > Provisioning > Provisioning Mapping.
- 2894 2. Select ACCESSIT PACS and click on **Configure**.
  - 3. On the Next Screen, Figure 146, Click **New** Button and select UserText1 from




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Figure 146. Provisioning Mapping

- 2898 4. Click on Save button to save the mapping
  - 5. Repeat the steps 1-4 to configure other fields as shown in Figure 140.



29002901

Figure 147. Guardian DB Connector Attribute Mapping

## 2902 Policy Engine > Rules

- 2903 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Policy Engine > Rules
- 2904 2. Click New Button
- 2905 3. On the Next screen provide following information. See Figure 148.




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2908 4. Click **Next** Button

5. On the next screen, Figure 149, click **New** to define a new Rule Condition for NewHire request category



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2912 Figure 149. Rule Conditions

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6. Repeat the step 5 to define rule condition for other request categories Remove User Access and ChangeAccess as shown in Figure 150.

If	PacsAllDoors	and	Request Category
	= True		= NewHire
	= True		= Remove User Access
	= True		= ChangeAccess
	= true		= ChangeAccess

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Figure 150. Rule Conditions

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7. Repeat Step 1-6 to configure Other Rules Home Access Level New and WO Access Level New as shown in following Table 21.

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Table 28. Guardian Manual Configuration Policy Engine Rules


Rule Name	Entity Type	Rule Type	Description	Applicable to	Attributes	Drop down value	Selection Value
							1. True and New Hire
							2. True and Remove User
				Suggest/Default			Access
All Door Access New	Workflow	AlertAccess	All Door Access New		PacsALLDoors AND Request Category	Equals	3. True and ChangeAccess
							1. True and New Hire
							2. True and Remove User
				Suggest/Default			Access
Home Access Level New	Workflow	AlertAccess	Home Access Level New		PacsALLDoors AND Request Category	Equals	3. True and ChangeAccess
							1. True and New Hire
							2. True and Remove User
				Suggest/Default			Access
WO Access Level New	Workflow	AlertAccess	WO Access Level New		PacsALLDoors AND Request Category	Equals	3. True and ChangeAccess

2922

2923

## **Policy Engine> Suggest/Default Access**

- 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Policy Engine > Suggest/Default Access. 2924
- 2925 2. Click New and enter the following information to create All Door Access criteria, shown 2926 in Figure 151.



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Figure 151. Default Access

- 2929 3. Click Next Button
  - 4. On the Next screen, Enter ACCESSIT PACS in System Name Field and hit Search button
  - **5.** The System will appear in Search Results pane. Click **Add** link under Action column to add the system to Selected Systems section
- 2933 **6.** Click **Next** Button
  - 7. On the next screen, enter ALL DOORS in Role Name Field and hit Search button
  - **8.** The Role will appear in Search Results pane. Click **Add** link under Action column to add the role to Selected Roles section
  - **9.** Click Save button to save the configuration
  - 10. Repeat the steps 1-9 to configure other criteria for Home Access Level,

**WO Access Level, NewHireDefaultSystems** as listed in Table 29. Manual Configuration Policy Engine Suggest/Default Access

2941

Table 29. Manual Configuration Policy Engine Suggest/Default Access

Name	Туре	Condition	Search By System	Selected System	Selected Role
All Door Access	Default	All Door Access NEW	Yes (Select check box)	ACCESSIT PACS	ALL DOORS

Home Access Level	Default	Work Access Level New	Yes (Select check box)	ACCESSIT PACS	Home Access Level
WO Access Level	Default	Home Access Level New	Yes (Select check box)	ACCESSIT PACS	WO Access Level
NewHireDefaultSy stems	Default	NewHireDefaultSy stems	Yes (Select check box)	ACCESSIT PACS	

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
11. Select all existing Suggest Default Access criterias other than the one listed in Table 22 and Click **Delete** button to delete them.

#### **Policy Engine>Rule Action Handler**

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2946

- 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Policy Engine > Rule Action Handler.
- 2948
- 2. In Action Handlers List page select ReconChangeHandler and Click **Modify**
- 2949
- 3. On the next screen Select **Recon Create Request** Task Type and Click **Update Task**
- 2950 2951
- 4. On the popup window Click on **Value** drop down field and select **ChangeAccess** from the list as shown in Figure 152.



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2953

Figure 152. Modify Task

2954 5. Click of


5. Click on **Save Task** and then Click **Save** Button

2955 2956

#### Policy Engine>Policy Designer

- 2957
- 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Policy Engine > Policy Designer
- 2958 2. Select New to create new Policy designer as shown in Figure 153.
- 2959 Name – User Policy New
- 2960 Rule Type - AlertAccess
- 2961 Description – User Policy

2962



them onto the layout page and connect each node as shown in

M

2963

Figure 153. Policy Designer

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- 2964
- 2965 3. Click Next 4. Drag the elements from the tool bar section, available on top of the page and place
- 2966 2967
- 2968


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Figure 154.





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
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2976

represents Start button

represents End Button

UserID Check represents Decision



5. Guide lines to configure the policy

- a. To place an element/node on the layout page, drag it from the toolbar and place it.
- b. To connect two nodes, select transition icon from tool bar and then mouse over to the first node and connect to the other node in the same direction specified in the Figure 23)
- c. To provide text for a Decision or Task or Line, double click on the corresponding node and enter the text. Hit Enter after that to come out of the edit mode.

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
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2997 2998

2999 3000 Figure 155. Guardian User Policy

- 6. Click on Step 1 decision box and it will open popup window with some fields. See Figure 156
- 7. Enter \$\pmasterUser[UserId].size='0' in the Condition text box and hit Enter



Figure 156. Tasks Popup

- 8. Similarly, click on other Steps (2 to 7) and configure the data based on Table 30.
- 9. For decision nodes provide Condition value and for Task nodes like Create User, Terminate User, Change Handler, Error Handler provide IsTaskHandler and Task Handler fields

Table 30. Condition Decision Values

Step	Name	Туре	Condition	Is Task handler	Task Handler	Update Query
1	User ID Check	Decision	\$masterUser[UserId].size='0'			
2	Create User	Task Handler		Yes	Recon New Hire	
3	Terminat e Check	Decision	\$checkStatus[UserStatus,Active,InActive].action='LOCK'			
4	Terminat e	Task Handler		Yes	Recon Terminate Handler	
5	Remove Access Check	Decision	\$checkAuthFields[].status='Ye s'			
6	Error Handler	Task Handler		Yes	Recon Error Handler	
7	Change Handler	Task Handler		Yes	Recon Change Handler	

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## Job Scheduler>Triggers Field Map

3004 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Job Scheduler > Triggers Field Map.

3005 2. Click New

3. Enter Group Name – Alert DbConnector Field Mapping

3007 4. Description – Alert DbConnector Field Mapping

5. Select Type – Reconciliation

6. After creating Field Map, select the newly created map and select Configure

3010 7. Click New and create mapping per below, Table 31

Table 31. Guardian Job Scheduler Triggers Field Map

AE Attribute	mappedKey	userType	roleType	userRole	userBadge	userEntRoleType	userTrainingType
UserId	UserId	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
FirstName	FirstName	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
LastName	LastName	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Email	Email	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Telephone	WorkPhone	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Mobile	HomePhone	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
EmployeeType	EmployeeType	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
PacsAllDoors	PacsAllDoor	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
PacsHomeAccess	PacsHomeAccess	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
PacsWorkAccess	PacsWorkAccess	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
BadgeId	CardNumber	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Format	FacilityCode	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
ValidFrom	ValidFrom	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
ValidTo	ValidTo	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Title	Title	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Status	UserStatus	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
PIN	PIN	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
AlertDepartment	Department	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

# Job Scheduler>Triggers

3015 1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Job Scheduler > Triggers

2. Click New and create the following Triggers in Table 32.

## 3017 3018

3016

## AlertDbConnectorTrigger

3019 3020

Table 32. Guardian AlertEnterprise DB Trigger

Name	AlertDbConnectorTrigger
Description	AlertDbConnectorTrigger
Туре	Reconciliation
Batch size	100
Number of Attempts	3
Policy Designer for Users/ Roles	User policy New
System: Reconciliation From	ALERTDBCONNECTOR
Reconciliation System	ALERTDBCONNECTOR
Field Mapping Group	ALERTDBCONNECTOR Field Mapping
User Type	True
User Role	True


3021 3022

3023

#### Job Scheduler>Scheduler

1. Setup > Manual Configuration > Job Scheduler > Scheduler.

3024	2.	Click New and enter the following, shown in Figure 142.
3025	3.	Click Save.
3026		<ul> <li>Job Type – Reconciliation Job</li> </ul>
3027		<ul><li>Job Name - <job name=""></job></li></ul>
3028		Select Global check box
3029		<ul> <li>Reconciliation for – User</li> </ul>
3030		<ul> <li>Reconciliation Type – Incremental Reconciliation</li> </ul>
3031		<ul> <li>Reconciliation Triggers – AlertDbConnectorTrigger</li> </ul>
3032		<ul> <li>Select the schedule as Immediate, Once, periodic or Advance.</li> </ul>
3033 3034		<ul> <li>For a periodic job, specify the job start date, end date, and duration of job frequency.</li> </ul>



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3037 3. Click Save.

#### 10 PACS Server: RS2 Access It Universal Server Installation

The Access It Universal RS2 Technologies PACS Server is installed on the PACS Network to help control physical access to simulated facilities, rooms, etc. RS2 Technologies cards and card readers were also included in both builds. The RS2 Technologies PACS Server is installed on a VM that is running the Windows Server 2012 R2 OS.

#### **10.1 SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS**

- 3044 Cybersecurity Framework Categories: PR.AC-2: Physical access to assets is managed and 3045 protected
- 3046 NIST 800-53 rev 4 Security Controls: PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5, PE-6, PE-9

3047	10.2	SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT
3048 3049	-	rstem for the PACS-Console Server configured by the NCCoE contains the following uration settings and environmental constraints:
3050 3051 3052 3053	•	Windows Server 2012 R2 VM with CPU Quad Core 2.199GHz VM with 8192MB of memory Virtual Hard Disk containing 240 GB of storage.
3054	10.3 A	AIUNIVERSAL INSTALLATION
3055 3056		Insert the AIUNIVERSAL CD into the CD-ROM drive. Launch Setup64.exe as Administrator.
3057	3.	Follow install instructions:
3058		<ul> <li>Select I do not have a SQL Server installed.</li> </ul>
3059		<ul> <li>When prompted to install SQL Server 2008 R2 Express Edition select Yes.</li> </ul>
3060		<ul> <li>After installation of SQL Server. Select Install Access It! Universal.</li> </ul>
3061		• When prompted to install a Stand-Alone Server version of Access It! select OK.
3062		<ul> <li>When prompted by the install wizard select Next &gt;.</li> </ul>
3063 3064		<ul> <li>Read the license agreement and select Next &gt; if you agree with the terms of the agreement.</li> </ul>
3065 3066		<ul> <li>Use default installation folder C:\Program Files(x86)\RS2 Technologies\Access It Universal\ then select Next &gt;.</li> </ul>
3067		<ul> <li>When the installer is ready select Next &gt; to continue.</li> </ul>
3068		Select Close to exit the installer after completion.
3069	10.4 F	POST INSTALLATION
3070	1.	Launch Access It! by selecting it from the Start menu.
3071	2.	When prompted to select server, enter the host name of server: PACS-CONSOLE.
3072	3.	Log in with the default user name and password.
3073	10.4.1	Connect Access It! Universal to Door Controller
3074	1.	Under the Main > Hardware tab, select Channels.
3075	2.	Create a new Channel.
3076	3.	For Channel Type select IP Server.
3077	4.	Ensure Protocol Type is SCP.

3078 Select Save. 3079 6. Create a new SCP. 3080 7. Under the General tab ensure that Model is set to EP-1501Plus. 3081 8. Under the Comm tab ensure that Channel is set to Channel 000 (the channel just 3082 created). 3083 9. TCP/IP Settings: 3084 • IP Address: 172.16.7.101 3085 Port Number: 3001 3086 10. Encryption Settings: None. 11. Under the Card Formats tab: 3087 3088 Format Name: 26 Bit Wiegand Facility code: 20 3089 Format Name: 26 Bit Wiegand Facility code: 219 3090 12. Save changes to SCP 000. 3091 13. Under SIOs 3092 14. Fdit SCP 000 - SIO 00 15. Under General tab ensure Model is set to EP-1501. 3093 3094 16. Edit SCP 000 - SIO 01 3095 17. Under General tab ensure Model is set to MR-52. 3096 18. Under Main > Hardware select Installed Readers 3097 19. Create SCP 000 - SIO 00-Reader 1 3098 20. Create SCP 000 - SIO 01-Card Reader 3099 21. Create SCP 000 -SIO 01-MRDT Keypad 3100 22. Under Configuration > Access Levels create New Access Level. 3101 23. Create new access levels. 3102 Access Level Name: All Doors. 3103 Assigned Readers for All Doors: SCP 000 – SIO 01-Card Reader and SCP 000 – SIO 3104 01-MRDT Keypad. 3105 Access Level Name: Home Access Level. 3106 Assigned Reader for Home Access Level: SCP 000 – SIO 01-MRDT Keypad. 3107 Access Level Name: Work Order Access Level. 3108 Assigned Reader for Work Order Access Level: SCP 000 - SIO-Card Reader

3109	10.4.2 Enable TCP/IP to SQL 2008 R2 Server
3110	1. Launch Microsoft SQL Server Configuration Manager.
3111	2. Expand SQL Server Network Configuration (32-bit).
3112	3. Select Protocols for AIUNIVERSAL.
3113	4. Right-click on TCP/IP and then select Properties.
3114	5. Select tab IP Addresses.
3115	6. Under IP1 ensure IP Address is set to 0.0.0.0 and TCP Port is set to 1433.
3116	7. Under IPALL ensure TCP Dynamic Ports is set to 52839 and TCP Port is set to 1433.
3117 3118	8. Restart the SQL server by selecting SQL Server Services then right click on SQL Server (AIUNIVERSAL) and select Restart.
3119	11 PRIVILEGED USER ACCESS CONTROL: TDI CONSLEWORKS SERVER INSTALLATION
3120 3121 3122 3123	The TDi ConsoleWorks server was installed in two different locations in the builds. It was installed on the OT network to control and monitor access between OT technicians and physical devices such as the RTUs and the RADiFlow ICS firewall. The following two sections provide details on the steps needed to install and configure each of these servers.
3124	11.1 SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS
3125	Cybersecurity Framework Categories:
3126 3127 3128 3129	<ul> <li>PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy</li> <li>PR.PT-3: Access to systems and assets is controlled, incorporating the principle of least functionality</li> </ul>
3130	NIST 800-53 rev 4 Security Controls: AU Family, AC-3, CM-7
3131	11.2 CONSOLEWORKS SERVER INSTALLATION
3132 3133 3134	ConsoleWorks was installed on the OT network to control and monitor access between OT technicians and physical devices such as the RTUs and the RADiFlow ICS firewall. ConsoleWorks uses the OT directory to authenticate users requesting access to these devices. It also
3135 3136 3137 3138 3139	establishes a permanent SSH or telnet connection to each of the RTUs and ICS firewall using pre-established usernames and passwords. As users request access and are authenticated ConsoleWorks makes the cross-connection from the user to the specific SSH or telnet session to allow access. Once the cross-connection is established the user has access to the device to make any changes needed. When the user completes their task they log-off of the connection
3140	and ConsoleWorks removes the cross-connect between the user and the SSh or telnet session.

3141 3142 3143	pre-de	ConsoleWorks logs all user access requests, all of the traffic on the session, and can alert on any pre-defined aspect of the traffic. Directory based authentication is used to manage the user access in near real time.					
3144 3145		e OT network, the ConsoleWorks Server is installed on a VM that is running the Windows 2012 R2 (hardened server OS) image, as explained in Section 1.					
3146 3147 3148	The sy	System Environment stem for the OT Network ConsoleWorks Server configured by the NCCoE contains the ing configuration settings and environmental constraints:					
3149 3150 3151 3152	•	Windows Server 2012 R2 OS VM with CPU Quad Core 2.199GHz VM with 8192MB of memory Virtual Hard Disk containing 240 GB of storage.					
3153	11.2.2	ConsoleWorks Server Installation on the OT Network					
3154 3155	1.	After installing the OS, download the TDi Technologies Installer from <a href="http://support.tditechnologies.com/get_consoleworks">http://support.tditechnologies.com/get_consoleworks</a> .					
3156 3157	2.	Launch the <i>cw_server_v4.9-0u0.exe</i> application. The installer requires administrative privileges to execute.					
3158	3.	When prompted by Windows User Account Control, select Yes to continue.					
3159 3160	4.	The ConsoleWorks Server InstallShield Wizard should display a welcome message. Select Next > to continue.					
3161 3162 3163	5.	When prompted by the InstallShield Wizard to accept the license agreement, read carefully. If you agree with the license terms, select Next > to continue with the installation.					
3164	6.	Enter the User Name and Organization fields, then select Next > to continue.					
3165	7.	Select Complete when prompted for setup type, then select Next > to continue.					
3166	8.	Click Install to begin installation of ConsoleWorks Server.					
3167 3168	9.	After the InstallShield Wizard has completed, ensure that Launch upgrade script (if upgrading from 32 bit) is unchecked.					
3169	10	. Select Finish.					
3170	11.2.3	Post-installation Configuration of ConsoleWorks on the OT Network					
3171 3172	1.	Copy TDi Technologies license key files into C:\ProgramData\ConsoleWorks/Server\LMF\TDI_Licenses					
3173	2.	Go to Start > Run > services.msc.					

3. Right-click on the ConsoleWorks Server Service, then select Properties.

3175 3176	4.	Select Start to start the service. Then change the Startup Type from Manual to Automatic.
3177 3178	5.	Select Apply to save changes. Both the ConsoleWorks Server and ConsoleWorks LMF Server services should be running.
3179 3180	6.	Test browser connectivity by going to <a href="http://localhost:5176">http://localhost:5176</a> . The default account is CONSOLE_MANAGER. The default password is: Setup
3181	11.2.4	Configuring External Authentication for the OT Network ConsoleWorks Server
3182	1.	From the left menu, select the SECURITY tab.
3183	2.	Select External Authentication.
3184	3.	Ensure the Enable External Authentication checkbox has been selected.
3185	4.	Select Add.
3186		• Parameter 1: OT-ES-IDAM-B1
3187		Parameter 2: CW
3188		Required Profile: CONSOLE_WORKS
3189		Template User: CONSOLE_MANAGER
3190		Leave all other fields blank.
3191 3192	5. 6.	Then select Next. Enter a Username and Password to test External Authentication settings.
3193	7.	Then select Next.
3194	8.	Then select Save.
3195	12 10	CS/SCADA FIREWALL: RADIFLOW
3196 3197 3198 3199	systen manag	iFlow switch is installed on the physical network that represents the industrial control of component that can be accessed and controlled via the OT network. A RADiFlow gement workstation is installed on the OT network. The RADiFlow Management tation is installed on a VM that is running the Windows 7 Enterprise OS.
3200	12.1	SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS
3201 3202	•	security Framework Categories: PR.PT-3: Access to systems and assets is controlled, orating the principle of least functionality
3203	NIST 8	00-53 rev 4 Security Controls: AC-3, CM-7


3204	12.2	OT Network RADiFlow Management Workstation Installation
3205	12.2.1	Installing iSIM
3206	1.	Launch the iSIM installer as an administrator
3207	2.	Set the Destination Directory to C:\Program Files (x86).
3208	3.	Leave default settings for all other options
3209	12.2.2	iEMS
3210	1.	Launch iEMS from the Start menu.
3211	2.	From the menu items, select System > Switch Initialization > Force Switch Model > 3180.
3212 3213	3.	In the main windows dialog box, enter the switches IP address 172.16.6.4 and then select Refresh.
3214	4.	From the menu items, select Configuration > Interfaces > Serial Ports
3215 3216	5.	Select the Terminal Server tab and ensure Service 1 and Service 2 dialog boxes are checked.
3217	6.	Under Service 1, enter these settings:
3218		Service ID: 1
3219		• Local IP Address: 172.16.6.100
3220		Telnet Port: 2050
3221		Null CR Bit Mode: OFF
3222	7.	Under Service 2, enter these settings:
3223		Service ID: 2
3224		• Local IP Address: 172.16.6.100
3225		Telnet Port: 2051
3226 3227	8.	Null CR Bit Mode: OFF Then Select Create/Update.
3228	9.	Select the Serial Ports tab ensure Port-1 and Port-2 dialog boxes are checked.
3229	10	. Under Port 1 enter these settings:
3230 3231 3232 3233 3234 3235 3236		<ul> <li>Application: Terminal Server</li> <li>Local Position: Slave</li> <li>Service-id: 1</li> <li>Operation Mode: Transparent</li> <li>Buffer Mode: byte</li> <li>Protocol: any</li> <li>Baudrate: 9600</li> </ul>

3237	<ul><li>Databits: 8</li></ul>
3238	<ul><li>Stopbits: 1</li></ul>
3239	<ul><li>Parity: no</li></ul>
3240	<ul> <li>Allowed-latency: 6</li> </ul>
3241	<ul><li>Bus-idle-time: 30</li></ul>
3242	<ul><li>Dtr-dsr: enable</li></ul>
3243	<ul> <li>Rts-cts: enable</li> </ul>
3244	<ul><li>Local-dsr-delay: 0</li></ul>
3245	<ul><li>Local-cts-delay: 0</li></ul>
3246	<ul><li>Tx-delay: 10</li></ul>
3247	<ul><li>Bits-for-sync1: 28</li></ul>
3248	<ul><li>Bits-for-sync2: 1</li></ul>
3249	<ul><li>Unit-id length: 2</li></ul>
3250	<ul><li>lec101-link-address-len: 2</li></ul>
3251	11. Under Port 2 enter these settings:
3252	<ul> <li>Application: Terminal Server</li> </ul>
3253	<ul> <li>Local Position: Slave</li> </ul>
3254	<ul><li>Service-id: 2</li></ul>
3255	<ul> <li>Operation Mode: Transparent</li> </ul>
3256	<ul> <li>Buffer Mode: byte</li> </ul>
3257	<ul><li>Protocol: any</li></ul>
3258	<ul><li>Baudrate: 9600</li></ul>
3259	<ul><li>Databits: 8</li></ul>
3260	<ul><li>Stopbits: 2</li></ul>
3261	<ul><li>Parity: no</li></ul>
3262	<ul> <li>Allowed-latency: 6</li> </ul>
3263	<ul><li>Bus-idle-time: 30</li></ul>
3264	<ul> <li>Dtr-dsr: enable</li> </ul>
3265	<ul> <li>Rts-cts: enable</li> </ul>
3266	<ul><li>Local-dsr-delay: 0</li></ul>
3267	<ul><li>Local-cts-delay: 0</li></ul>
3268	<ul><li>Tx-delay: 10</li></ul>
3269	<ul><li>Bits-for-sync1: 28</li></ul>
3270	<ul><li>Bits-for-sync2: 1</li></ul>
3271	<ul><li>Unit-id length: 2</li></ul>
3272	<ul><li>lec101-link-address-len: 2</li></ul>
3273	12. Then Select Create/Update.

## 3274 13 OZONE: MAG INSTALLATION

Four Ozone components are installed on the IdAM network: Console, Authority, Server, and Envoy. These components are installed on VMs running the CentOS 7 image.

- 3277 13.1 SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS
- 3278 Cybersecurity Framework Categories: PR.AC-4: Access permissions are managed, incorporating
- 3279 the principles of least privilege and separation of duties
- 3280 NIST 800-53 rev 4 Security Controls: AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16
- 3281 13.2 Ozone Console Installation and Authority Configuration
- 1. Install CA Certificate into trusted root store (MAG DEV CA.crt).
- 3283 2. Install Ozone Authority Certificate into Trusted People store (ozoneauthority.crt).
- 3. Install Administrator keys into Personal store (admin1.crt and admin2.crt).
- 3285 4. Run Setup Ozone Console.exe
  - Run Ozone Console.
    - Go to Configuration>Ozone Authority>New...see Figure 158.
  - In the Proof Settings tab:
    - Select SHA256 for the Entity Digest Algorithm.
    - o Select SHA256withRSA for the Proof Signature Algorithm.



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
3289

3290

Figure 158. Ozone Proof Settings

3293 5. In the Authority Web Service tab, Figure 159.

- Set the HTTPS Port to 443.
- Select SHA1withRSA for the Message Signature Algorithm.



**3297** Figure 159. Ozone Authority Web Service

- Click Save.
- 3299 6. Select a certificate to be used to digitally sign the configuration (Admin 1).
- 3300 7. Save the file as AuthorityConfiguration.xml.
- 3301 8. SCP the file to Ozone Authority machine.
- 3302 13.3 OZONE AUTHORITY INSTALLATION
- 3303 Create keys and certificates and store in Java Keystore (JKS)

3305 Install java

3304

3307

```
3306 [root@ozone ~] # yum install java
```

3308 Install mariaDB

```
3309 [root@ozone ~]# yum install mariadb-server

3310 [root@ozone ~]# reboot

3311 [root@ozone ~]# systemctl start mariadb

3312 [root@ozone ~]# systemctl enable mariadb
```

3313 3314

#### Secure the mysql installation

3315 [root@ozone ~]# mysql secure installation

```
3316
3317
       Create the Ozone Authority database and user
3318
       [root@ozone ~] # mysql -u root -p
3319
3320
       MariaDB> create database ozone;
3321
       Query OK, 1 row affected (0.02 sec)
3322
3323
       MariaDB> create user 'ozone'@'localhost' identified by 'password';
3324
       Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.00 sec)
3325
3326
       MariaDB> grant all privileges on ozone.* to 'ozone'@'localhost';
3327
       Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.00 sec)
3328
3329
       MariaDB> flush privileges;
3330
       Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.00 sec)
3331
3332
       Install the Ozone Authority
3333
       [root@ozone local]# cd /usr/local/
3334
       [root@ozone local]# tar -xzf ~/Ozone\ Authority-2014.tar.gz
3335
3336
       Copy AuthorityConfiguration.xml to conf directory
3337
       [root@ozone local] # mv ~/AuthorityConfiguration.xml authority/conf/
3338
3339
       Copy AuthorityLicense.xml to conf directory
3340
       [root@ozone local] # mv ~/AuthorityLicense.xml authority/conf/
3341
3342
       Copy JKS to keystores directory
3343
       [root@ozone local]# mv ~/authority.jks authority/keystores/
3344
3345
       Copy administrator certificates to bin directory
3346
       [root@ozone local]# mv ~/admin1.cer authority/bin/
3347
       [root@ozone local]# mv ~/admin2.cer authority/bin/
3348
3349
       Run the Ozone Authority script
3350
       [root@ozone local]# cd authority/bin/
3351
       [root@ozone bin]# ./startAuthority.sh
3352
       Configuration file not found, would you like to create a new
3353
       installation? [Y] Y
3354
3355
       ***WARNING***
3356
       This product MUST be installed by an Ozone Certified
3357
       Engineer. Pericore, Inc. cannot be held liable for damages resulting
3358
       from negligent or fraudulent actions of unauthorized or unqualified
3359
       administrators. Please review all documentation thoroughly before
3360
       continuing. Continuation of this configuration process represents an
3361
       agreement to abide by the Pericore EULA.
3362
       Do you wish to continue? [N] : y
3363
3364
       Please select the license file for this Ozone Authority.:
3365
       1: /usr/local/authority/conf/AuthorityLicense.xml
3366
       2: Other...
       Choice [1] : 1
3367
3368
```

```
3369
       Please select the configuration file for this Ozone Authority.:
3370
       1: /usr/local/authority/conf/AuthorityConfiguration.xml
3371
       2: Other...
3372
       Choice [1] : 1
3373
3374
       Do you wish to set any passphrase complexity requirements? [N] : N
3375
3376
       Note: If you require passphrase at start, you will not be able to
3377
       restart this Ozone Authority without user intervention.
3378
       Do you wish to require a passphrase to start this Ozone Authority? [N] N
3379
3380
       Using keystore type: RSA
3381
3382
       Do you have an existing keystore you wish to use for this Ozone Authority?
3383
       [Y] : Y
3384
3385
       Please select the keystore file for this Ozone Authority::
3386
       1: /usr/local/authority/keystores/authority.jks
3387
       2: Other...
3388
       Choice [1] : 1
3389
       Please enter the passphrase. : 123456
3390
       May 15, 2015 1:24:22 PM com.pericore.util.PericoreProvider jsafeJCEinit
3391
       POST: [FIPS] FIPS-140 compliance self-test passed.
3392
3393
       What type of database do you wish to use?:
3394
       1: SQLSERVER
3395
       2: ORACLE
3396
       3: MYSQL
3397
       Choice [1] : 3
3398
       Please enter the hostname or IP address of the database server: [ozone] :
3399
       localhost
3400
       Please enter the port number for the database: [3306] 3306
3401
       Please enter the username for the database: [] : ozone
3402
       Please enter the database password: password
3403
       Using only available database: ozone
3404
3405
       How many initial administrators would you like to create? [2] : 2
3406
       Page 1 | Current Directory:
3407
       [00] ../
3408
       [01] lib/
3409
       [02] admin1.cer
3410
       [03] admin2.cer
3411
3412
3413
       Please select the file containing the administrators certificate: [ # ] : 2
3414
       3Page 1 | Current Directory:
3415
       [00] ../
3416
       [01] lib/
3417
       [02] admin1.cer
3418
       [03] admin2.cer
3419
3420
       Please select the file containing the administrators certificate: [ \# ] : 1
3421
       Please enter distinguished name(DN) of the starting Organizational
3422
       Unit (OU) for this proof tree: [OU=Ozone] : ou=Ozone, dc=NCCOE, dc=test
3423
       Is: ou=Ozone, dc=NCCOE, dc=test correct? [Y] : Y
3424
       Please enter the minimum number of administrators required to approve
3425
       changes to the initial proofs: [1] : 1
```

```
3426
       Please enter a name for the initial publication schedule: [Primary Schedule]
3427
       : Daily
3428
       Please enter the publication interval: [12] : 12
3429
       Please select the time unit::
3430
      1: Minute
3431
       2: Hour
3432
       3: Dav
3433
      Choice [1] : 2
3434
       Please enter the validity period after publication: [12] : 12
3435
       Please select the validity period time unit::
3436
       1: Minute
3437
       2: Hour
3438
       3: Day
3439
       Choice [1] : 2
3440
3441
       Please enter a name for the initial distribution point for proofs. [File
3442
       Distribution Point] : LDAP Distribution Point
3443
3444
       Please enter the initial distribution point for proofs. This may be changed
3445
       later. [file:///usr/local/authority/proofs/] : ldap://ozoneauthority/
3446
       Configuration File: /usr/local/authority/conf/AuthorityConfiguration.xml
3447
       May 15, 2015 1:25:16 PM
3448
       com.pericore.util.ObjectIdentifierFactory$OIDDataLoader debug
3449
       INFO: ObjectIdentifierFactory Read 240.165 kb in 2.511 ms; Indexed 2,415 Arcs
3450
       in 51.731 ms; 2,310(1,054:5) keys => 2.003 kb
3451
       Created proof ou=Master Authorization Group, ou=Ozone, dc=NCCOE, dc=test in
3452
       the database.
3453
       Created proof ou=Applications, ou=Master Authorization Group, ou=Ozone,
3454
       dc=NCCOE, dc=test in the database.
3455
       Created proof ou=Groups, ou=Master Authorization Group, ou=Ozone, dc=NCCOE,
3456
       dc=test in the database.
3457
       Created proof ou=Attribute Types, ou=Master Authorization Group, ou=Ozone,
3458
       dc=NCCOE, dc=test in the database.
3459
3460
       Allowing a user certificate to be associated with a directory GUID
3461
       allows for a migration path from username and password to a PKI based
3462
       authentication and authorization mechanism. However, this method
3463
      lowers the initial security settings by relying on a directory for the
3464
       association. Please be sure you understand the risks associated with
3465
       this method before allowing this mechanism to be used.
3466
       Would you like to allow users certificates to be associated with a directory
3467
       GUID? [N] : N
3468
       Do you wish to display a logon message? [N] : N
3469
3470
       Ozone Authority
3471
       Version: 2014 - 4.0.1 (Build: 475)
3472
       Copyright Pericore, Inc. 2014
3473
       _____
3474
       Started at: May 15, 2015 1:24:13 PM EDT
3475
       Licensed to: NCCOE
3476
3477
3478
       Built: ou=Master Authorization Group, ou=Ozone, dc=NCCOE, dc=test in
3479
       0:00:00.304.
3480
       Built: ou=Applications, ou=Master Authorization Group, ou=Ozone, dc=NCCOE,
3481
       dc=test in 0:00:00.243.
3482
       Built: ou=Groups, ou=Master Authorization Group, ou=Ozone, dc=NCCOE, dc=test
```

```
3483
      in 0:00:00.215.
3484
      Built: ou=Attribute Types, ou=Master Authorization Group, ou=Ozone, dc=NCCOE,
3485
      dc=test in 0:00:00.214.
3486
      Push Certificates loaded with: 0 certificates
3487
3488
      Started HTTPS Listener on port: 443
3489
      Ozone Authority>
3490
3491
3492
      Install LDAP (389) directory server
3493
      [root@ozone ~] # yum install 389-ds-base
3494
      [root@ozone ~]# vi /etc/hosts
3495
      Modify the first line of hosts file so that it is the same as below:
3496
      127.0.0.1 ozoneauthority.nccoe.test localhost localhost.localdomain
3497
      localhost4 localhost4.localdomain4
3498
3499
      Configure the directory server
3500
      [root@ozone ~]# setup-ds.pl
3501
3502
      ______
3503
3504
      This program will set up the 389 Directory Server.
3505
3506
      It is recommended that you have "root" privilege to set up the software.
3507
      Tips for using this program:
3508
       - Press "Enter" to choose the default and go to the next screen
3509
       - Type "Control-B" or the word "back" then "Enter" to go back to the
3510
      previous screen
3511
       - Type "Control-C" to cancel the setup program
3512
3513
      Would you like to continue with set up? [yes]: yes
3514
3515
      ______
3516
3517
      Your system has been scanned for potential problems, missing patches,
3518
      etc. The following output is a report of the items found that need to
3519
      be addressed before running this software in a production
3520
      environment.
3521
3522
      389 Directory Server system tuning analysis version 23-FEBRUARY-2012.
3523
3524
      NOTICE: System is x86 64-unknown-linux3.8.13-68.2.2.e17uek.x86 64 (1
3525
      processor).
3526
3527
      NOTICE: The net.ipv4.tcp keepalive time is set to 7200000 milliseconds
3528
      (120 minutes). This may cause temporary server congestion from lost
3529
      client connections.
3530
3531
      WARNING: There are only 1024 file descriptors (soft limit) available, which
3532
      limit the number of simultaneous connections.
3533
3534
      WARNING: The warning messages above should be reviewed before proceeding.
3535
3536
      Would you like to continue? [no]: yes
3537
3538
      ______
```


```
3539
3540
       Choose a setup type:
3541
3542
       1. Express
3543
       Allows you to quickly set up the servers using the most
3544
        common options and pre-defined defaults. Useful for quick
3545
        evaluation of the products.
3546
3547
        2. Typical
3548
       Allows you to specify common defaults and options.
3549
3550
       3. Custom
3551
       Allows you to specify more advanced options. This is
3552
        recommended for experienced server administrators only.
3553
3554
       To accept the default shown in brackets, press the Enter key.
3555
3556
       Choose a setup type [2]: 2
3557
3558
3559
3560
      Enter the fully qualified domain name of the computer
3561
       on which you're setting up server software. Using the form
3562
       <hostname>.<domainname>
3563
      Example: eros.example.com.
3564
3565
       To accept the default shown in brackets, press the Enter key.
3566
3567
      Warning: This step may take a few minutes if your DNS servers
3568
       cannot be reached or if DNS is not configured correctly. If
3569
       you would rather not wait, hit Ctrl-C and run this program again
3570
      with the following command line option to specify the hostname:
3571
3572
       General.FullMachineName=your.hostname.domain.name
3573
3574
       Computer name [ozone.mountaireygroup.com]: ozoneauthority.nccoe.test
3575
3576
3577
3578
      The server must run as a specific user in a specific group.
3579
      It is strongly recommended that this user should have no privileges
3580
       on the computer (i.e. a non-root user). The setup procedure
3581
       will give this user/group some permissions in specific paths/files
3582
       to perform server-specific operations.
3583
3584
      If you have not yet created a user and group for the server,
3585
       create this user and group using your native operating
3586
       system utilities.
3587
3588
       System User [nobody]: nobody
3589
       System Group [nobody]: nobody
3590
3591
      ______
3592
3593
      The standard directory server network port number is 389. However, if
3594
       you are not logged as the superuser, or port 389 is in use, the
3595
      default value will be a random unused port number greater than 1024.
```

```
3596
      If you want to use port 389, make sure that you are logged in as the
3597
      superuser, that port 389 is not in use.
3598
3599
      Directory server network port [389]: 389
3600
3601
      ______
3602
3603
      Each instance of a directory server requires a unique identifier.
3604
      This identifier is used to name the various
3605
      instance specific files and directories in the file system,
3606
      as well as for other uses as a server instance identifier.
3607
3608
      Directory server identifier [ozoneauthority]: ozoneauthority
3609
3610
      ______
3611
3612
      The suffix is the root of your directory tree. The suffix must be a valid DN.
3613
      It is recommended that you use the dc=domaincomponent suffix convention.
3614
      For example, if your domain is example.com,
3615
      you should use dc=example, dc=com for your suffix.
3616
      Setup will create this initial suffix for you,
3617
      but you may have more than one suffix.
3618
      Use the directory server utilities to create additional suffixes.
3619
3620
      Suffix [dc=nccoe, dc=test]: dc=nccoe, dc=test
3621
3622
      ______
3623
3624
      Certain directory server operations require an administrative user.
3625
      This user is referred to as the Directory Manager and typically has a
3626
      bind Distinguished Name (DN) of cn=Directory Manager.
3627
      You will also be prompted for the password for this user. The password must
3628
      be at least 8 characters long, and contain no spaces.
3629
      Press Control-B or type the word "back", then Enter to back up and start
3630
      over.
3631
3632
      Directory Manager DN [cn=Directory Manager]: cn=Directory Manager
3633
      Password: password
3634
      Password (confirm): password
3635
      Your new DS instance 'ozoneauthority' was successfully created.
3636
      Exiting . .
3637
      Log file is '/tmp/setup C4mdK.log'
3638
3639
      Setup the directory structure
3640
      Modify the file /usr/local/authority/bin/389SetupDirectory.ldif
3641
      Set the correct DN structure and passwords for the ozone authority user and tree
3642
      [root@ozone bin]# vi 389SetupDirectory.ldif
3643
      [root@ozone bin]# cat 389SetupDirectory.ldif
3644
3645
      #Create the User for Ozone Authority
3646
      dn: uid=ozone, ou=Special Users, dc=nccoe, dc=test
3647
      changetype: add
3648
      objectClass: inetorgperson
3649
      objectClass: organizationalPerson
3650
      objectClass: person
3651
      objectClass: top
```

```
3652
       cn: Ozone Authority
3653
       sn: Authority
3654
       givenName: Ozone
3655
       uid: ozone
3656
       userPassword: P@$$word
3657
3658
       #make the people writable by ozone
3659
       dn: ou=People, dc=nccoe, dc=test
3660
       changetype: modify
3661
       add: aci
3662
       aci: (targetattr="*") (version 3.0;acl "ozone authority";allow (all) (userdn =
3663
       "ldap:///uid=ozone, ou=Special Users, dc=nccoe, dc=test");)
3664
3665
3666
       #Create the Ozone OU
3667
       dn: ou=Ozone, dc=nccoe, dc=test
3668
       changetype: add
3669
       objectClass: organizationalUnit
3670
       objectClass: top
3671
       ou: Ozone
3672
       aci: (targetattr="*") (version 3.0; acl "ozone authority"; allow (all) (userdn =
3673
       "ldap:///uid=ozone, ou=Special Users, dc=nccoe, dc=test");)
3674
3675
       #Create required Attributes and Object Classes
3676
       dn: cn=schema
3677
       changeType: modify
3678
       add: attributetypes
3679
       attributetypes: (1.3.6.1.4.1.26135.1.1.1.2 NAME 'authorizationProof' DESC
3680
       'Ozone Authorization Proof' SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 SINGLE-VALUE
3681
       X-ORIGIN 'user defined' )
3682
       attributetypes: ( 2.23.136.1.1.2 NAME 'cscaMasterList' DESC 'CSCA Master
3683
       List' SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 SINGLE-VALUE X-ORIGIN 'user
3684
       defined' )
3685
3686
       dn: cn=schema
3687
       changeType: modify
3688
       add: objectclasses
3689
       objectclasses: (1.3.6.1.4.1.26135.1.1.3 NAME 'ozoneAuthority' DESC '' SUP
3690
       top STRUCTURAL MAY (authorizationProof $ cscaMasterList) X-ORIGIN 'user
3691
       defined')
3692
3693
       Modify the directory using the LDIF
3694
       [root@ozone bin] # ldapmodify -x -D "cn=Directory Manager" -W -f
3695
       /usr/local/authority/bin/389SetupDirectory.ldif
3696
       Enter LDAP Password:
3697
       adding new entry "uid=ozone, ou=Special Users, dc=nccoe, dc=test"
3698
3699
       modifying entry "ou=People, dc=nccoe, dc=test"
3700
3701
       adding new entry "ou=Ozone, dc=nccoe, dc=test"
3702
3703
       modifying entry "cn=schema"
3704
3705
       modifying entry "cn=schema"
3706
```

#### 3707 13.4 OZONE CONSOLE SERVER CONFIGURATION

- Before proceeding ensure that OzoneAuthority has been started by running startauthority.sh on the OzoneAuthority machine.
- 3710 1. Open Ozone Console.
- 3711 2. Go to *File>Properties*, Figure 160, below.
- 3712 3. Enter the Ozone Authority URL.
- 3713 4. Click Select Certificate and select the Ozone Authority Certificate.
- 3714 5. Select SHA1withRSA as the Message Signature Algorithm.
- 3715 6. Click Save to the connection information.




3716

3717 Figure 160. Ozone Authority Connection Information

## 3718 Create the publication point for the proofs

- 3719 1. Select Publication > Add Publication Point > Add LDAP Publication Point, Figure 161
- 3720 2. Enter a name for the publication point.
- 3721 3. Enter the hostname or IP address of the directory server.
- 3722 4. Enter a base context, if any.
- 3723 5. Select the port.
- 6. Enter the name of the user who has permissions to write to the directory.
- 3725 7. Enter the password for the user.
- 3726 8. Confirm the password.




3730

3728 Figure 161. Ozone LDAP Publication Point

## 3729 Import the desired groups from the RSA Adaptive directory

- 1. Right-click on the Groups proof.
- 3731 2. Select Import Group from Active Directory, Figure 162.
- 3. Enter the directory connection information.



3733

Figure 162. Ozone Directory Connection Information

- 3735 4. Select a group to import, see Figure 163.
- 3736 5. Check the box to Import New Entities.

- 3737 6. Check the box to Import Associated Groups.
- 3738 7. Then select Import




Figure 163. Ozone Import Group from Directory

- 3741 8. Select the publication schedule as shown in Figure 164.
- 9. Select the publication point as shown in Figure 164.
- 3743 10. Select the distribution point as shown in Figure 164.





Figure 164. Ozone New Proof Information

- 3746 11. Click the Administrators tab as shown in Figure 165
- 3747 12. Click the Add Administrators button.
- 3748 13. Select the users who will administer the proof.
- 3749 14. Then select Add Entities



3751 Figure 165. Ozone New Proof Administrators

3752 15. Click the Save button.

37533754

3755

## **Create the Ozone Server Configuration**

- 1. Select Configuration > Ozone Server > New...
- 3756 2. Click the Add proof from tree... button.
- 3. Select a proof Ozone Server should use for authorizations as shown in Figure 166.



3759 Figure 166. Ozone Peer Proofs

- 4. Set the number of proof references (Depth) the proof may follow in order to authorize a credential as shown in Figure 167.
- 5. Ensure that the locations where the Ozone Server will retrieve the proof are correct.




Figure 167. Ozone Add Authorization Proof

- 3765 6. Click the Save button.
- Repeat Steps 2–6 until you have selected all of the proofs Ozone Server should initially
   retrieve for Authorizations.




Figure 168. Ozone Server Configuration

- 3770 8. Click the Save configuration button as shown in Figure 168.
- 3771 9. Select a certificate to be used to digitally sign the configuration.
- 3772 10. Save the file as ServerConfiguation.xml.
- 3773 11. SCP the file to the Ozone Server machine.
- 3774 13.5 OZONE SERVER INSTALLATION

#### 3775 Create keys and certificates and store in Java Keystore (JKS)

```
3776
3777
```

## Install java

```
[root@ozone ~]# yum install java
```

#### 3778 3779 3780

#### Install Ozone Server

```
3781 [root@ozoneserver ~] # cd /usr/local/
3782 [root@ozoneserver local] # tar -xzf ~/Ozone\ Server-2014.tar.gz
```

## 3783 3784

#### Copy the keystore to the conf directory

```
3785 [root@ozoneserver local]# mkdir /usr/local/server/bin/conf/
3786 [root@ozoneserver local]# cp ~/server.jks server/bin/conf/
```

# 3787 3788

3789

#### Copy the configuration and license files to the conf directory

```
[root@ozoneserver local]# cp ~/ServerConfiguration.xml server/bin/conf/
[root@ozoneserver local]# cp ~/ServerLicense.xml server/bin/conf/
```

```
3792
       Run the Ozone Server
3793
       [root@ozoneserver bin]# ./startServer.sh
3794
       POST [MAIN] v2.1.301
3795
3796
3797
                      3798
            \overline{\setminus} | \overline{/} \overline{/} \overline{/} \overline{\mid} \overline{\mid} \overline{\mid} \overline{\mid}
3799
        3800
        3801
        \__/ /// /__ \ \<u>__</u>/ /| | | \ \ |
3802
3803
3804
3805
3806
3807
3808
                    | \ V /
3809
3810
3811
3812
3813
       Ozone (R) Server copyright (c) Pericore, Inc. 2007-2011
3814
3815
       Fri May 15 14:31:33 EDT 2015
3816
3817
3818
       May 15, 2015 2:31:35 PM com.pericore.util.PericoreProvider jsafeJCEinit
3819
       POST: [FIPS] FIPS-140 compliance self-test passed.
3820
       Found Java version: 1.8.0 31
3821
       Working in: /usr/local/server/bin
3822
       /usr/local/server/bin/conf/server.cfg not found. Run setup [Y] : Y
3823
       env.work/usr/local/server/bin
3824
       Found Java Version: 1.8.0 31
3825
3826
       Ozone Server Setup Utility
3827
       ***WARNING***
3828
       This product MUST be installed by a Pericore Certified Engineer. Pericore,
3829
       Inc. cannot be held liable for damages resulting from negligent or fraudulent
3830
       actions of unauthorized or unqualified administrators. Please review all
3831
       documentation thoroughly before continuing. Continuation of this
3832
       configuration process represents an agreement to abide by the Pericore EULA.
3833
       I agree to all terms and conditions set forth by Pericore, Inc. [N] : \mathbf{y}
3834
       Enable Startup Password? [N] : n
3835
       May 15, 2015 2:31:37 PM
3836
       com.pericore.util.ObjectIdentifierFactory$OIDDataLoader debug
3837
       INFO: ObjectIdentifierFactory Read 240.165 kb in 3.313 ms; Indexed 2,415 Arcs
3838
       in 52.438 ms; 2,310(1,054:5) keys => 2.003 kb
3839
       Server Configuration Directory:
3840
       1: /usr/local/server/bin/conf
3841
       2: Other...
       Choice [1] : 1
3842
3843
3844
       Select the XML License File:
3845
       1: /usr/local/server/bin/conf/ServerLicense.xml
3846
       2: Other...
3847
       Choice [1] : 1
```

```
3848
3849
       Select the XML Configuration File:
3850
       1: /usr/local/server/bin/conf/ServerConfiguration.xml
3851
       2: Other...
3852
       Choice [1] : 1
3853
3854
       Page 1 | Current Directory: /usr/local/server/bin
3855
       [00] ../
       [01] lib/
3856
3857
       [02] conf/
3858
       Select Server Identity Keystore [ # ] : 2
3859
       Page 1 | Current Directory: /usr/local/server/bin/conf
3860
       [00] ../
3861
       [01] server.jks
3862
3863
       Select Server Identity Keystore [ # ] : 1
3864
       Enter password for server.jks : 123456
3865
       Is the Private Key Alias 'server' correct? [Y] : Y
3866
3867
       Enable logging? [Y] : Y
3868
       Log File Roll Size (Kb) [512] : 512
3869
3870
       Configured Client Services: 0
3871
       Choose an option:
3872
       1: Configure Authorization Service
3873
       2: Configure a Proof Proxy
3874
       3: Configure an Info Page
3875
       4: Configure a Push Service
3876
       5: Done Configuring Web Services
3877
       Choice [1] : 1
3878
3879
       Configuring XACML Authorization Service
3880
       Service Port [8080] : 443
3881
       Service Context [/AuthorizationService] : /AuthorizationService
3882
       Enable WS-Security? [Y] : Y
3883
       SOAP Signature Method:
3884
       1: RSA SHA1
3885
       2: RSA SHA256
3886
       3: RSA SHA384
3887
       4: RSA SHA512
3888
       Choice [1] : 2
3889
       Enable WS-Security Client Authentication? [N] : N
3890
       Configured Client Services: 1
3891
3892
3893
       Choose an option:
3894
       1: Configure Authorization Service
3895
       2: Configure a Proof Proxy
3896
       3: Configure an Info Page
3897
       4: Configure a Push Service
3898
       5: Done Configuring Web Services
3899
       Choice [1] : 5
3900
3901
       Enable SSL? [N] : y
3902
       Service Port [8080] : 443
3903
       Enable SSL Client Authentication? [N] : N
3904
       Enable SSL? [N] : N
```

```
3905
      Modify Advanced Performance Options? [N] : N
3906
3907
      Writing server configuration...
3908
      Thank you for choosing Ozone Server
3909
      Goodbye.
3910
3911
      [root@ozoneserver local]# /usr/local/server/bin/startServer.sh
3912
      13.6 OZONE ENVOY INSTALLATION
3913
      Ozone Envoy was installed and not utilized in the builds. The functions it provides, automated
3914
      CRLs and certificate collection, were not required in the solution.
3915
3916
      Create keys and certificates and store in Java Keystore (JKS)
3917
3918
      Install java
3919
      [root@ozoneenvoy ~]# yum install java
3920
3921
      Install Ozone Envoy
3922
      [root@ozoneenvoy ~] # cd /usr/local/
3923
      [root@ozoneenvoy local] # tar -xzf ~/Ozone\ Envoy-2014.tar.gz
3924
3925
      Copy the keystore to the bin directory
3926
      [root@ozoneenvoy local] # cp ~/envoy.jks envoy/bin/
3927
3928
      Edit the envoy.txt file to set configuration options
3929
      ### Ozone Suite (c) Pericore, Inc. 2007-2014.
3930
      ### All rights reserved.
3931
3932
      3933
3934
      ### envoy.txt - Ozone Envoy 2014 Configuration File ###
3935
3936
      ### Author: Jacob Dilles <jdilles@mountaireygroup.com> ###
3937
            ###
      ###
3938
      ### Date: 1 Jan 2014
                           ###
3939
      ###
            ###
3940
      ### Notes: This is a sample Ozone Envoy 4.1.0 Setup Configuration File ###
3941
      ### demonstrating configuration options for Mobile Enrollment. ###
3942
      ###
            ###
3943
      ### In a production environment, you should exclude the /pass= ###
3944
      ### properties and provide them on the command line during setup.###
3945
      ### After installation is complete, this file should be deleted ###
3946
      ### or 'chown root; chgrp 0; chmod 000' to secure it. ###
3947
      3948
      ###
3949
3950
      ### General Envoy Configuration
3951
3952
      3953
      ######### Identity Keystore Configuration ##############
3954
      3955
      ### This keystore is used for:
```

```
3956
      ### - Authenticating with Ozone Authority
3957
      ### - Secure log signing
3958
      system/identity/store=envoy.jks
3959
3960
      ###### Authority Listener Configuration
3961
      ### This web service endpoint listens for push configuration and fetch
3962
3963
      ### from Ozone Authority. It should match what you entered in Ozone Console
3964
3965
      #authority/host.name=
3966
      authority/port=4242
3967
      authority/path=/
3968
      authority/mode=ANY
3969
3970
      ### Authority Web Service Endpoint Logging
3971
      authority/log/enable=true
3972
      authority/log/path=var/log
3973
      authority/log/rollsize=10485760
3974
      authority/log/format=CLF
3975
3976
      3977
      ######### Enrollment Configuration ################
3978
      3979
3980
      ### Enable enrollment
3981
      enroll/enable=false
3982
3983
      Run Ozone Envoy to complete the setup
3984
      [root@ozoneenvoy bin]# ./startEnvoy.sh
3985
3986
      May 15, 2015 3:09:04 PM
3987
      com.pericore.util.ObjectIdentifierFactory$OIDDataLoader debug
3988
      INFO: ObjectIdentifierFactory Read 240.165 kb in 14.366 ms; Indexed 2,415
3989
      Arcs in 63.198 ms; 2,310(1,054:5) keys => 2.003 kb
3990
      May 15, 2015 3:09:06 PM com.pericore.util.PericoreProvider jsafeJCEinit
3991
      POST: [FIPS] FIPS-140 compliance self-test passed.
3992
                  3993
3994
      3995
      3996
       3997
       \ \__/ // /__ \ \<u>__</u>/ /| | \ \ | | <u>____</u>
3998
3999
4000
4001
4002
4003
4004
4005
            4006
4007
4008
       2014 Mobile Edition | /
4009
4010
      Ozone (R) Envoy copyright (c) Pericore, Inc. 2007-2014
4011
```

```
4012
       Fri May 15 15:09:04 EDT 2015
4013
4014
       Ozone Envoy Mobile 2014 Setup Utility
4015
       Ozone Suite copyright (c) Pericore, Inc. 2007-2014.
4016
       All rights reserved.
4017
4018
       ***WARNING***
4019
       This product MUST be installed by a Pericore Certified Engineer.
4020
       Improper configuration of Ozone Envoy Tool may cause security
4021
       vulnerabilities.
4022
4023
       I agree to all terms and conditions set forth by Pericore, Inc. [N] : \mathbf{y}
4024
       envoy.jks
4025
       system/identity/store [/usr/local/envoy/bin/envoy.jks] :
4026
       Enter password for envoy.jks :
4027
       Is the Private Key Alias 'envoy' correct? [Y] : Y
4028
4029
       [POST] Starting Authority Listener: https://ozoneenvoy:4242/ ..... [ OK ]
4030
       > :
4031
4032
```

#### Return to Ozone Console to complete Ozone Envoy Configuration

#### 4033 13.7 OZONE CONSOLE ENVOY CONFIGURATION

## Create a proof to store the certificates retrieved by Ozone Envoy

4035 1. Open Ozone Console.

- 4036 2. Select an administrator certificate to log in as shown in Figure 169.
- 4037 3. Select Proof>New Proof..
- 4038 4. Enter a name for the proof.
- 4039 5. Select the publication schedule.
- 4040 6. Select the publication point(s).
- 4041 7. Select the distribution point(s).





Figure 169. Ozone New Proof Information

4042

- 4044 8. Click the Administrators tab.
- 4045 9. Select the administrators to manage the proof.
- 4046 10. Click the Authentication tab.
- 4047 11. Click the Add from file... button.
- 4048 12. Select the CA and intermediate CA certificates to be used to authenticate certificates retrieved.
- 4050 13. Select the Certificate Revocation Lists tab as shown in Figure 170.
- 4051 14. Enter a CRL grace period, the number of hours a CRL can be considered valid after its next update time.
- 4053 15. Click the Add... button to add a CRL.




4055

4067

Figure 170. Ozone New Proof Authentication CRLs

- 4056 16. Select the Source Configuration tab ash shown in Figure 171.
- 4057 17. Enter hostname or IP address of the LDAP server.
- 4058 18. Enter the port the LDAP server is listening on.
- 4059 19. Check the box for LDAPS.
- 4060 20. Enter the base context of where user certificates can be obtained.
- 21. Enter the attributeName for the certificates, either userCertificate or userCertificate; binary
- 4063 22. Enter the base context of where updated CRLs can be obtained.
- 23. Enter the attributeName for the CRLs, typically certificateRevocationList shown in Figure 156.
- 4066 24. Enter the connection information:
  - If connecting anonymously, check the box for anonymous connections.
  - If a username/password is required for the connection, enter them.
- 25. Enter the number of hours after which Ozone Envoy should check the directory for new certificates.



4072


Figure 171. Ozone New Proof Authentication Source Configuration

4073 26. Click Save.

4074 4075

### **Configure Ozone Authority to connect to Ozone Envoy**

- 4076 1. Select Enrollment>Envoy Configuration.
- 4077 2. Enter the hostname or IP address of the Ozone Envoy. See Figure 172...
- 4078 3. Enter the port number Ozone Envoy is listening on.
- 4079 4. Enter the number of hours that should elapse between connections to Ozone Envoy to check for new information.
- 5. Enter the number of minutes to before attempting to reconnect to Ozone Envoy if the connection fails.
- 4083 6. Click Save.




4085 Figure 172. Ozone Envoy Configuration

4086

#### 4087 14 PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL: XTEC XNODE

- The XNode was installed in the DMZ network. The Xnode is a standalone IdAM demonstration capability including a personal identification verification (PIV) card reader, PIV Interoperability (PIV-I) cards, keypad and electric door strike. The XNode was preconfigured to poll the IP address of the cloud based IdAM system at the Xtec control center. No additional configuration information is required. The identities on the PIV cards included access allowed and access denied status for demonstration purposes.
- 4094 14.1 SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS
- 4095 Cybersecurity Framework Categories: PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are managed for authorized devices and users
- 4097 NIST 800-53 rev 4 Security Controls: AC-2, IA Family, PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5, PE-6, PE-9
- 4098 15 ENTERPRISE PKI PLATFORM: GLOBALSIGN
- 4099 **15.1 OVERVIEW**
- 4100 The NCCoE used the GlobalSign Enterprise PKI platform to issue and manage North American
- 4101 Energy Standards Board (NAESB) WEQ-12 digital certificates used for secure network access of
- 4102 for both internal and external users, see Figure 173. The certificates were used in conjunction
- 4103 with the MAG Ozone product to provide high assurance attributes for the Personal Profile
- 4104 Application (PPA). The application has three main information groups for which actions can be
- 4105 authorized: Personal Information, Credit Reports, and Criminal History. Based on the
- 4106 authorizations associated with a credential, results pages are dynamically populated.



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Figure 173. GlobalSign Overview

The North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB) serves as an industry forum for the development and promotion of business process standards which can lead to a seamless marketplace for wholesale and retail natural gas and electricity, as recognized by its customers, business community, participants, and regulatory entities. GlobalSign is an active participant of the NAESB Cyber-Security standards committee and is a NAESB-authorized Certificate Authority (CA). For more information about NAESB, go to <a href="https://www.naesb.org/">https://www.naesb.org/</a>.

GlobalSign's NAESB-compliant certificate-based authentication solution is managed through a SaaS service accessed through a web-based portal. The web portal gives organizations control of Digital IDs issued to individuals using one of four NIST defined assurance levels. Set-up usually takes less than three days. Another advantage of the web-portal is that all of the lifecycle functions including issuance, re-issuance, renewal, and revocation are available to the administrator.

4121 4122 4123 4124 4125	15.1.1 Managing the Account  Managing the account is accomplished using the GlobalSign Certificate Management Center  (GCC). GCC is a web-based interface allowing you to access your certificates anywhere with an Internet connection. Within the platform, administrators may add additional users and delegate some or all certificate management functions.
4126 4127 4128 4129 4130	15.1.2 What Is a Profile? / Profile Management A profile, or certificate profile, contains the organization's identity information that will be used for all NAESB WEQ-12 digital certificates issued from the account. Organization identity information includes the organization legal name, country code, and optionally locality, state, and up to three fixed organization units as well as assurance level.
4131 4132 4133	15.1.3 What Is a License? GlobalSign NAESB digital certificates are valid for either (1) or (2) years and must be issued within (12) months of license ordering.
4134 4135 4136	GlobalSign NAESB digital certificates are sold in "license packs" (i.e., in quantities of 5, 10, 25, 50, etc.) Certificates are issued with either (1) or (2) year validities and must be issued within (12) months of license ordering.
4137	15.2 SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS
4138 4139	Cybersecurity Framework Categories: PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are managed for authorized devices and users
4140	NIST 800-53 rev 4 Security Controls: AC-2, IA Family
4141	15.3 How To Order Certificates
4142 4143 4144	15.3.1 Step 1: Get a GlobalSign Gcc Account Request a GlobalSign Certificate Center account here — <a href="https://www.globalsign.com/en/verticals/energy/">https://www.globalsign.com/en/verticals/energy/</a> .
4145 4146 4147	15.3.2 Step 2: Order Certificate License Pack Once you have your GCC account credentials, use the following link to login – <a href="https://www.globalsign.com/en/login/">www.globalsign.com/en/login/</a> . See Figure 174.

# Ordering Certificates from GlobalSign is Quick & Easy User Name: e.g) PAR\*\*\*\*admin Password: English one byte characters

4148

Figure 174. GlobalSign Login Page

4150

4151

4149

Click on the "Enterprise PKI" tab as shown in Figure 175.



Figure 175. GlobalSign Enterprise PKI Tab

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4155

Click "Order Licenses" from the left hand menu as shown in Figure 176.



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4157


Figure 176. GlobalSign Order Licenses Page

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Choose the "Enterprise PKI Pro For Personal Digital ID" license pack you intend to purchase and click next as shown in Figure 177.



4162

Figure 177. GlobalSign License Selection Page

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Choose your validity period (1 or 2 year certificate), see Figure 178.

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4164



#### Product Details - Enterprise PKI Pro For Personal Digital ID 50 pack




4166

4167

Figure 178. GlobalSign Product Details

4168 Provide payment details as shown in Figure 179.


#### **Payment Details**



#### Figure 179. GlobalSign Payment Details

4171 Confirm your order details and check the box confirming you understand that the license pack 4172 will expire 12 months from the order date, Figure 180.

#### **Confirm Details**



4173

4174

Figure 180. GlobalSign Confirm Details

4175 15.3.3 Step 3: Set Up Organization Profile

4176 Click "Order Additional Profiles" from the left navigation menu as shown in Figure 181.



4177


4178

Figure 181. GlobalSign Order Additional Profiles

Enter your Organization Profile details. Please note the details you enter will be vetted and included as the certificate identity within your issued certificate, see Figure 182.

4181 Additionally select the Assurance level appropriate for the risk associated with the transaction.

Contact GlobalSign NAESB experts for additional guidance on this topic.



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Figure 182. GlobalSign Certificate Profile Details

Confirm your profile details (Figure 183) and then review and accept the EPKI Service Agreement that includes important NAESB WEQ-012 obligations. Note the EPKI Service Agreement binds you to obligations as outlined in the GlobalSign Certificate Policy and Certificate Practice Statements, including Local Registration Authority, end user, and relying party, as defined in the NAESB Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Standards – WEQ-012.

Certificate Practice Statements can be found at http://www.globalsign.com/repository/

#### **Confirm Details**



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Figure 183. GlobalSign Confirm Details


#### **4193** 15.3.4 Step 4: Vetting

Once you have placed your order, all of your information will be sent to GlobalSign's vetting department. The organization details you provided for your profile will be vetted by GlobalSign using third party checks.

### 4197 15.3.5 Step 5: Register for Your EPKI Administrator Certificate

Once your company profile has been approved, you will need to register for what is known as an "EPKI Administrator Certificate." An EPKI Administrator Certificate is required to authenticate to secure areas of the EPKI service to register and manage end user certificates.

- Login into GCC
  - 2. Select "View Admin Menu Options" in the left hand menu to start the enrollment process, see Figure 184.



4204 4205

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4208

Figure 184. GlobalSign View Admin Menu Options

- 4206 3. Choose a certificate password. It is very important to remember this password.
  - 4. Download your administrator certificate and follow the on screen prompts to install your certificate.


Please follow the guide <a href="http://www.globalsign.com/support/ordering-guides/epki-authentication-user-guide.pdf">http://www.globalsign.com/support/ordering-guides/epki-authentication-user-guide.pdf</a> for step-by-step instructions on how to order, install, and use your Administrator Certificate.

- 4212 CAUTION: If you need to access the EPKI administrator menu options from multiple machines,
- 4213 you can copy your .pfx file to other computers and repeat the import process. Instructions for
- 4214 importing your certificate can be found here -
- 4215 https://support.globalsign.com/customer/portal/articles/1211387.
- 4216 15.3.6 Step 6: Register and Issue Certificates to Individual Users
- 4217 Click "Order Certificates" in the left navigation menu as shown in Figure 185.
- 4218 NOTE: If you haven't already authenticated to the secure section of the portal with your
- 4219 Administrator Certificate, you may see "View Admin Menu Options" instead of the menu
- 4220 options included in the image below. Simply click the "View Admin Menu Options" link and
- 4221 select the appropriate certificate to gain access to this section of the portal.



Figure 185. GlobalSign Oder Certificates


4224 Select the profile and license you want to use and click Next, see Figure 186.



4225

Figure 186. GlobalSign Product Selection

- 4227 Complete the certificate identity details (Figure 187) for the end user of the certificate, including the common name (i.e., the individual's first and last name) and the email addresses.
- 4229 Organization name, and other fields will be pre-populated from the profile you selected.



4231

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Figure 187. GlobalSign Certificate Identity Details

You will also need to choose a "pick up password". The pick up password is a unique password that you will give to the end user of the certificate. After you have completed the registration process, the end user will receive an email invitation to pick up their certificate and at that time they will be prompted for the pick up password (you gave them in an out-of-band method) along with details of how to install their new certificate.

Finally, confirm the details of your certificate request as shown in Figure 188.




4239

Figure 188. GlobalSign Confirm Details

- 4240 Repeat this process until you have requested certificates for all of your end users.
- 4241 For further information on the features available in your GlobalSign Certificate Center please
- 4242 visit: http://www.globalsign.com/support/ordering-guides/globalsign-epki-admin-guide.pdf
- 4243 15.4 GLOBALSIGN'S IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT SOLUTION FOR MANAGING EXTERNAL USERS
- 4244 For use cases involving external users (e.g. Independent System Operators (ISOs) operating
- 4245 wholesale electric marketplaces), GlobalSign PKI can provide an identity and access
- 4246 management (IAM) solution that enables management of external user (customer and partner)
- identities and the online services and applications they can access.
- 4248 **15.5 GETTING HELP**
- 4249 GlobalSign provides technical support through our Client Service departments around the
- 4250 world. Visit <a href="https://www.support.globalsign.com">https://www.support.globalsign.com</a> for detailed instructions on installing and
- 4251 managing certificates, or contact support@globalsign.com or 1-877-467-7543 with specific
- 4252 questions.
- 4253 16 INDUSTRIAL FIREWALL: SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC
- 4254 A Schneider Electric (SE) industrial firewall is installed on the physical network that contains the
- 4255 industrial control system/SCADA components that can be accessed and controlled via the OT
- 4256 network. The firewall is configured to monitor the data passing between the RADiFlow SCADA

- firewall and the OT network. The SE industrial firewall will alert if out-of- policy traffic is detected on the network segment connecting the OT network and the SCADA network of devices.
- 4260 Install and Configure Schneider Tofino Firewall
  - 1. Download the ConneXium software from the Schneider site as stated in the instructions accompanying the firewall, start the ConneXium Tofino Configurator.
  - 2. At the startup screen, click 'Create New Project...', Figure 189.



4261 4262

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
4265

4266

4267

Figure 189. Create New Project


3. In Project name, enter the name you would like to use for the project, as shown in Figure 190. Also fill in the Company field. When finished, click Next.



4269

Figure 190. New Project Wizard

4270 4271 4. In the Project Protection screen, Figure 191, choose a password to protect the project. Then click Next.



4273

4274

Figure 191. Project Protection

In the Administrator Password screen,




5. Figure 192, choose the administrator password. Then click Finish.

4276

#### Figure 192. Administrator Password

4278 4279 4280 6. In the Project Explorer Window, Figure 193, right click 'Tofino SAs' and select 'New Tofino SA'. \*Note: You can also chose to create a folder for the SAs to help organize multiple areas.




4281

4282

Figure 193. Project Explorer Window

7. In the Tofino ID field, Figure 194, enter the MAC address listed on the firewall hardware 4283 sticker. Fill out the rest of the fields as necessary. Then click Finish. 4284



4286

Figure 194. Tofino SA/MAC Address

4287 8. Right click on the 'Assets' icon in the Project Explorer frame, Figure 195, and click 'New 4288 Asset.'





Figure 195.
Project
Explorer


9. In the New Asset window, Figure 196, set the name of the device, as well as the type and all other fields as necessary. Then click Next.



4295

4296

- 4298 10. Fill in the IP address and/or the MAC address fields, Figure 197, then click Finish.
  - 11. Repeat steps 8-10 for all devices on the network. When they are configured, click on the 'Assets' icon, Figure 197, in the Project Explorer frame (if it isn't already selected) and there should be a list of all the configured Assets.



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
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4304 4305 4306

Figure 197. Project Explorer Assets Icon

12. Under the Project Explorer frame, click the dropdown arrow next to 'Tofino SAs', then choose the SA created earlier, Figure 198. From there, click on 'Firewall' in the Project Explorer frame to display current firewall rules. This should be empty currently.



4308 Figure 198. Project Explorer Tofino SA Icon

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13. To create the first rule, click on the '+ Create Rule' button above the Tofino SA-Firewall title, Figure 198, above. Then ensure the 'Standard rule' radio button is selected and click 'Next', Figure 199.




Figure 199. Rule Type


4315 4316

4317

4318 4319

4320 4321


14. On the next screen, Figure 200, there a few options to determine. First is Asset 1, you must choose the interface. This will be where the traffic is coming from into the device. In the Lab Build, Asset 1 is the OT Workstation, which is connected to a network that is connect to the External interface on the firewall. Select the 'Select an asset from the list below' radio button for both Asset 1 and Asset 2, and select the systems to create a rule between. Also, select the direction of the traffic using the arrow buttons in the middle. When finished, select Next.



4322

Figure 200. Firewall Rule Wizard

15. On the Asset Rule Profiles, Figure 201, select the 'Manually create the firewall rules for the selected assets' radio button. Click Next.



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Figure 201. Asset Rule Profiles

16. On the Protocol screen, Figure 202, choose the protocol to be checked against. There are drop down menus for 'Common Industrial', 'Common IT', and 'Vendor Specific.' For this example, we are choosing SSH and Telnet (by holding the CTRL key, you can select multiple protocols). Then choose the Permission on the right side of the screen, as well as whether to log or not. Then click Finish.

## Note: By default, any traffic that does not match the rules in the firewall will automatically be denied.






Figure 202. Protocol Window

4336 17. After that is completed, the firewall rule should be listed in the Rule Table, Figure 203.



4337 Figure 203. Rule Table

- 18. Repeat steps 13 through 17 for the remainder of the rules needed. 4338
- 4339 19. Finally, press the save button on the menu bar. Circled in red below in Figure 204.




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
- Figure 204. Save rules in Project Explorer
- 20. Place a FAT/FAT32 formatted USB device into the computer running the ConneXium Tofino Configurator, then right click 'Tofino SAs' in the Project Explorer pane and select 'Apply.' If the project asks you to save, press 'OK'.



21. In the Apply Configuration pane, Figure 205, ensure that your SA is selected in the table at the top, and the 'USB Drive' radio button is selected. Then browse to the top-level directory of your USB drive. Then click Finish.

Figure 205. Apply Configuration Pane

22. A popup, Figure 206, will notify you of successful completion.



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4351	Figure 206. Loadable USB Drive Popup
4352 4353 4354	23. Ensure the firewall has been powered on and has been running for at least one minute, then plug the USB device used to copy the Tofino configuration to into the USB port on the back of the firewall.
4355 4356 4357 4358	24. Press the Save/Load/Reset button twice, setting it to the Load setting (Pressing once should turn the indicator light to green, pressing it again will change it from green to amber). After a few seconds, the device will begin displaying lights that move from right to left across the LEDs on the back, indicating the configuration is being loaded.
4359 4360 4361	25. Once the lights stop moving right to left, wait a few seconds, and ensure the Fault LED does not light up. Then remove the USB drive and place it back into the computer running the ConneXium Tofino Configurator software.
4362	26. Right click 'Tofino SAs' in the Project Explorer pane and select 'Verify'.
4363 4364 4365	27. At the Verify Loaded Configuration window, select the Tofino SA in the table, and select the 'USB Drive' radio button. Then select the USB drive using the Browse button. Finally, press Finish.
4366	28. A popup will notify you of successful verification, and configuration is complete.
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4368	17 OPERATING SYSTEM STIG COMPLIANCE REPORTS
4369 4370 4371 4372 4373	STIG compliance reports were generated for the STIG-compliant OS installations that were used in the build. The reports for each installation are provided in the following subsections. Neither the Windows 7 Console on the IT network nor the OT Management Windows 7 Workstation on the OT network were STIG-compliant installations, so compliance reports for those OSs are not provided.
4374 4375 4376 4377 4378	The Linux implementations (except SUSE Linux) were configured to meet the DoD CentOS 6 STIG, because no CentOS 7 STIG was available at the time the build was implemented. The STIG guidelines are available on-line at <a href="http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/Pages/index.aspx">http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/Pages/index.aspx</a> . The OS configurations for each Linux implementation are listed below. The compliance results reports identify the configuration items that do not conform to the STIG configuration guide.
4379	Compliance reports are provided for the following OSs:
4380 4381 4382 4383 4384	<ul> <li>SQL Server on IdAM Network STIG Compliance Report</li> <li>RSA IMG SUSE Linux Server STIG Compliance Report</li> <li>RSA Adaptive Directory Centos 7 Server STIG Compliance Report</li> <li>AlertEnterprise Microsoft Server STIG Compliance Report</li> <li>IT Domain Controller STIG Compliance Report</li> </ul>

- IT Windows 7 Workstations STIG Compliance Report
- Ozone Authority and Ozone Server Centos 6 Server STIG Compliance Report
- Ozone Envoy Centos 6 Server STIG Compliance Report
  - OT Domain Controller STIG Compliance Report
  - OT ConsoleWorks Windows Server 2012 STIG Compliance Report
- OT Windows 7 Workstations STIG Compliance Report
- PACS Domain Controller STIG Compliance Report
  - PACS Console Windows Server 2012 STIG Compliance Report
  - Baseline CentOS 7 Linux Configuration

#### 4395 17.1 SQL SERVER ON IDAM NETWORK STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT

Status	STIG ID	Rule ID	Vuln ID	Severity	Rule Title
N/A	SQL2-00- 000300	SV-53912r1_rule	V-41389	CAT II	SQL Server must maintain and support organization-defined security labels on stored information.
N/A	SQL2-00- 000400	SV-53914r1_rule	V-41391	CAT II	SQL Server must maintain and support organization-defined security labels on information in process.
N/A	SQL2-00- 000500	SV-53916r1_rule	V-41392	CAT II	SQL Server must maintain and support organization-defined security labels on data in transmission.
N/A	SQL2-00- 000900	SV-53917r1_rule	V-41393	CAT II	SQL Server must allow authorized users to associate security labels to information in the database.
N/A	SQL2-00- 00920	SV-53920r1_rule	V-41395	CAT II	SQL Server must be protected from unauthorized access by developers.
N/A	SQL2-00- 009300	SV-53921r1_rule	V-41396	CAT II	SQL Server must be protected from unauthorized access by developers on shared production/development host systems.
PASS	SQL2-00- 00950	SV-53922r2_rule	V-41397	CAT II	Administrative privileges, built-in server roles and built-in database roles must be assigned to the DBMS login accounts that require them via custom roles, and not directly.
PASS	SQL2-00- 011050	SV-53918r2_rule	V-41394	CAT II	SQL Server utilizing Discretionary Access Control (DAC) must enforce a policy that limits propagation of access rights.
UNKNOWN What is considered auditable?	SQL2-00- 011200	SV-53928r2_rule	V-41402	CAT II	SQL Server must provide audit record generation capability for organization-defined auditable events within the database.

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#### 17.2 RSA IMG SUSE LINUX SERVER STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT

#### 4398 OpenSCAP Evaluation Report

#### 4399 17.2.1 Evaluation Characteristics

Target machine dvd-acm

**Benchmark URL** U\_RedHat\_6\_V1R6\_STIG\_SCAP\_1-1\_Benchmark-xccdf.xml

#### 4400 17.2.2 Compliance and Scoring 4401 The target system did not satisfy the conditions of 107 rules! Furthermore, the results of 12 rules 4402 were inconclusive. Please review rule results and consider applying remediation. 4403 17.2.3 Rule Results 4404 60 passed 4405 107 failed 4406 12 other 4407 17.2.4 Severity of Failed Rules 4408 0 other 4409 53 low 4410 53 medium 4411 1 high 4412 17.2.5 Score Scoring system Score Maximum **Percent** 33.519554 100.000000 urn:xccdf:scoring:default 33.52% 4413 Search Severity Title Result Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 Security Technical Implementation Guide 107x fail 12x error SRG-OS-999999 1x error Automated file system mounting tools must not be low error enabled unless needed. SRG-OS-000062 1x fail Auditing must be enabled at boot by setting a kernel low fail parameter. SRG-OS-999999 1x fail The /etc/gshadow file must be owned by root. medium fail SRG-OS-999999 1x fail The /etc/gshadow file must be group-owned by root. medium fail SRG-OS-999999 1x fail The /etc/gshadow file must have mode 0000. medium fail SRG-OS-999999 1x fail The system must use a separate file system for /tmp. low fail SRG-OS-999999 1x fail The system must use a separate file system for /var. low fail SRG-OS-999999 1x fail The system must use a separate file system for /var/log. low fail SRG-OS-000259 1x fail Library files must be owned by root. medium fail SRG-OS-000044 1x fail The system must use a separate file system for the low fail system audit data path. SRG-OS-000045 1x fail The audit system must alert designated staff members medium fail when the audit storage volume approaches capacity. SRG-OS-000259 1x fail All system command files must be owned by root. medium fail SRG-OS-999999 1x fail The system must use a separate file system for user low fail

Performed by

root

le	Severity	Result
home directories.		
SRG-OS-000078 1x fail		
The system must require passwords to contain a minimum	medium	fail
of 14 characters.	modiam	Tan
SRG-OS-000075 1x fail		
Users must not be able to change passwords more than	medium	fail
once every 24 hours.		
SRG-OS-000076 1x fail		
User passwords must be changed at least every 60 days.  SRG-OS-000071 1x fail	medium	fail
The system must require passwords to contain at least	low	fail
one numeric character.	IOW	Iali
SRG-OS-000103 1x fail		
The system package management tool must		
cryptographically verify the authenticity of system software	medium	fail
packages during installation.		
SRG-OS-000232 1x fail		
A file integrity tool must be installed.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000273 1x fail		
The operating system must enforce requirements for the	no o dium	foil
connection of mobile devices to operating systems.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000248 1x fail		
There must be no .rhosts or hosts.equiv files on the	hiah	foil
system.	high	fail
SRG-OS-000249 1x fail		
The system must disable accounts after excessive login		foil
failures within a 15-minute interval.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The /etc/shadow file must be group-owned by root.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The /etc/shadow file must have mode 0000.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
IP forwarding for IPv4 must not be enabled, unless the		foil
system is a router.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000146 1x error		
The operating system must prevent public IPv4 access		
into an organizations internal networks, except as		
appropriately mediated by managed interfaces employing	medium	error
boundary protection devices.		
SRG-OS-000231 1x fail		
The systems local IPv4 firewall must implement a deny-all,		
allow-by-exception policy for inbound packets.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000096 1x fail		
The Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) must		4
be disabled unless required.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000096 1x fail		
The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) must		
be disabled unless required.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000096 1x fail		
The Reliable Datagram Sockets (RDS) protocol must be		
disabled unless required.	low	fail
SRG-OS-000096 1x fail		
The Transparent Inter-Process Communication (TIPC)		
	medium	fail
protocol must be disabled unless required.  SRG-OS-000215 1x fail		
SING-OS-000Z13 IX Idli		

Fitle	Severity	Result
The operating system must back up audit records on an organization defined frequency onto a different system or	medium	fail
media than the system being audited.	medium	Idii
SRG-OS-000043 1x fail		
The operating system must support the requirement to		
centrally manage the content of audit records generated	medium	fail
by organization defined information system components.		
SRG-OS-000062 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all attempts		6.11
to alter system time through settimeofday.  SRG-OS-999999 1x fail	low	fail
The system must not accept IPv4 source-routed packets		f = :1
on any interface.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must not accept ICMPv4 redirect packets on		£ = !1
any interface.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must not accept ICMPv4 secure redirect	medium	fail
packets on any interface.	medium	Idii
SRG-OS-000062 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all attempts	low	fail
to alter system time through clock_settime.	IOW	Iali
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must log Martian packets.	low	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must not accept IPv4 source-routed packets	medium	fail
by default.	modium	1011
SRG-OS-000062 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all attempts	low	fail
to alter system time through /etc/localtime.		
SRG-OS-000004 1x fail		
The operating system must automatically audit account	low	fail
<u>creation.</u>		
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must not accept ICMPv4 secure redirect	medium	fail
packets by default.		
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must ignore ICMPv4 redirect messages by	low	fail
default.		
SRG-OS-000239 1x fail		
The operating system must automatically audit account	low	fail
modification.		
SRG-OS-999999		
The system must not respond to ICMPv4 sent to a	low	pass
broadcast address.		'
SRG-OS-000240 1x fail		
The operating system must automatically audit account	low	fail
disabling actions.		
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail	low	foil
The system must ignore ICMPv4 bogus error responses.	low	fail
SRG-OS-000241 1x fail The operating exetom must automatically audit account		
The operating system must automatically audit account termination.	low	fail
SRG-OS-000142 1x fail		
The system must be configured to use TCP syncookies.	medium	fail
The system must be configured to use TOF symbookles.	medialli	iaii

le SRG-OS-999999 1x fail	Severity	Resul
The audit system must be configured to audit		
modifications to the systems Mandatory Access Control	low	fail
(MAC) configuration (SELinux).	IOW	ian
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all		
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail
using chmod.		
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must use a reverse-path filter for IPv4 network	medium	fail
traffic when possible by default.	mediam	Iali
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all		
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail
using chown.		
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The IPv6 protocol handler must not be bound to the	medium	fail
network stack unless needed.	mediam	iaii
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all		
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail
using fchmod.		
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must ignore ICMPv6 redirects by default.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all		
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail
using fchmodat.		
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all		
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail
using fchown.		
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all		
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail
using fchownat.		
SRG-OS-000152 1x error		
The system must employ a local IPv4 firewall.	medium	error
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all		
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail
using fremovexattr.		
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all		
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail
using fsetxattr.		
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all		
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail
using Ichown.		
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all		
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail
using Iremovexattr.		

tle	Severity		Result
The audit system must be configured to audit all			
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail	
using lsetxattr. SRG-OS-000064 1x fail			
The audit system must be configured to audit all			
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail	
using removexattr.	IOW	Iali	
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail			
The audit system must be configured to audit all			
discretionary access control permission modifications	low	fail	
using setxattr.			
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail			
The audit system must be configured to audit successful	i		
file system mounts.	low	fail	
SRG-OS-000069 1x fail			
The system must require passwords to contain at least	la	fo:I	
one uppercase alphabetic character.	low	fail	
SRG-OS-000266 1x fail			
The system must require passwords to contain at least	low	fail	
one special character.	IOW	Iall	
SRG-OS-000070 1x fail			
The system must require passwords to contain at least	low	fail	
one lowercase alphabetic character.	10 00	Tall	
SRG-OS-000072 1x fail			
The system must require at least four characters be			
changed between the old and new passwords during a	low	fail	
password change.			
SRG-OS-000021 1x fail			
The system must disable accounts after three consecutive	medium	fail	
unsuccessful logon attempts.			
SRG-OS-000120 1x fail			
The system must use a FIPS 140-2 approved	m o dium	foil	
cryptographic hashing algorithm for generating account	medium	fail	
password hashes (system-auth). SRG-OS-000064 1x fail			
The audit system must be configured to audit user deletions of files and programs.	low	fail	
SRG-OS-000120 1x fail			
The system must use a FIPS 140-2 approved			
cryptographic hashing algorithm for generating account	medium	fail	
password hashes (login.defs).	medium	Tall	
SRG-OS-000120 1x fail			
The system must use a FIPS 140-2 approved			
cryptographic hashing algorithm for generating account	medium	fail	
password hashes (libuser.conf).	modiam	1011	
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail			
The audit system must be configured to audit changes to			
the /etc/sudoers file.	low	fail	
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail			
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be	on a divina	fo:I	
owned by root.	medium	fail	
SRG-OS-000064 1x fail			
The audit system must be configured to audit the loading	medium	fail	
and unloading of dynamic kernel modules.	medium	Idll	
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail			

Title	Severity	Result
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be group-owned by root.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000096 1x error		
The xinetd service must be disabled if no network services		
utilizing it are enabled.	medium	error
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must have	medium	fail
mode 0600 or less permissive.	medium	Iali
SRG-OS-000096 1x fail		
The xinetd service must be uninstalled if no network	low	fail
services utilizing it are enabled.	10 00	iaii
SRG-OS-000080 1x fail		
The system boot loader must require authentication.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000080 1x fail		
The system must require authentication upon booting into	medium	fail
single-user and maintenance modes.		
SRG-OS-000080 1x fail		
The system must not permit interactive boot.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000022 1x fail		
The system must require administrator action to unlock an	medium	fail
account locked by excessive failed login attempts.		
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail	m o dium	fail
The system must not send ICMPv4 redirects by default.  SRG-OS-999999 1x fail	medium	Iall
The system must not send ICMPv4 redirects from any		
interface.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000096 1x error		
The ypbind service must not be running.	medium	error
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail	mediam	GITOI
The cron service must be running.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x error	modium	Tall
The avahi service must be disabled.	low	error
SRG-OS-000056 1x error		
The system clock must be synchronized continuously, or	Р	
at least daily.	medium	error
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must set a maximum audit log file size.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-000062 1x fail		
The audit system must be configured to audit all attempts	low	fail
to alter system time through adjtimex.	10 00	iali
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must retain enough rotated audit logs to cover	medium	fail
the required log retention period.	modium	ian
SRG-OS-000096 1x error		
The atd service must be disabled.	low	error
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system default umask for daemons must be 027 or	low	fail
022.		
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail The system default umask in /ote/legip defa must be 0.77	low	foil
The system default umask in /etc/login.defs must be 077.  SRG-OS-999999 1x fail	low	fail
The system default umask in /etc/profile must be 077.	low	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail	10 00	ıaıı
The system default umask for the csh shell must be 077.	low	fail
SRG-OS-000096 1x error	10 44	ian
SAC SO COUCOU IN CITO		

Title  The rdisc service must not be running.	Severity low	Result error
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail The system default umask for the bash shell must be 077.	low	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x error	IOW	iaii
The postfix service must be enabled for mail delivery.	low	error
SRG-OS-000096 1x error		01101
The netconsole service must be disabled unless required.	low	error
SRG-OS-000248 1x fail		
X Windows must not be enabled unless required.	medium	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
Process core dumps must be disabled unless needed.	low	fail
SRG-OS-000027 1x fail		
The system must limit users to 10 simultaneous system	levi	fail
logins, or a site-defined number, in accordance with operational requirements.	low	fail
SRG-OS-000160 1x fail		
The system must provide VPN connectivity for		
communications over untrusted networks.	low	fail
SRG-OS-000024 1x fail		
A login banner must be displayed immediately prior to, or	medium	fail
as part of, graphical desktop environment login prompts.	medium	Idli
SRG-OS-000034 1x error		
The Bluetooth service must be disabled.	medium	error
GEN006660 1x fail	1.	6-9
Accounts must be locked upon 35 days of inactivity.  SRG-OS-000118 1x fail	low	fail
The operating system must manage information system		
identifiers for users and devices by disabling the user		
identifier after an organization defined time period of	low	fail
inactivity.		
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
All public directories must be owned by a system account.	low	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must use a Linux Security Module configured	medium	fail
to enforce limits on system services.	modium	1011
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The system must use a Linux Security Module configured to limit the privileges of system services.	low	fail
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The operating system, upon successful logon/access,		
must display to the user the number of unsuccessful		
logon/access attempts since the last successful	medium	fail
logon/access.		
SRG-OS-999999 1x fail		
The audit system must switch the system to single-user		
mode when available audit storage volume becomes	medium	fail
dangerously low.		
17.3 RSA ADAPTIVE DIRECTORY CENTOS 7 SERVER STIG COMPLIANCE REPOR	RT	
XCCDF Test Result		

4414

- 4416
- 4417 Introduction

cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise\_linux:6

### 4418 Test Result

Result ID	Profile	Start time	End time	Benchmark	Benchmark version
xccdf_org.open- scap_testresult_default-profile	(Default profile)	2015-04-08 08:16	2015-04-08 08:17	embedded	1

4419 Target info

**Targets** 

#### Addresses

**Platforms** 

- adaptivedir
- 127.0.0.1
- 172.16.4.3
- 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1
- fe80:0:0:0:250:56ff:fe89:8965

4420 Score

	system	score	max	%	bar
urn:x	cccdf:scoring:default	96.65	100.00	96.65%	

# 4421 17.3.1 Rule Results Summary

pass	fixed	fail	error	not selected	not checked	not applicable	informational	unknown	total
173	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	179
				T	itle				Result
Auditing must be enabled at boot by setting a kernel parameter.						fail			
The audit system must be configured to audit modifications to the systems Mandatory Access Control (MAC) configuration (SELinux).							fail		
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be owned by root.							fail		
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be group-owned by root.							fail		
The syst	em boot loa	ader config	guration file	e(s) must ha	ve mode 06	00 or less peri	missive.		fail
The syst	em boot loa	ader must i	equire auth	entication.					fail

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#### 17.4 ALERTENTERPRISE MICROSOFT SERVER STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT

Non-Compliance Report - U\_Windows\_2008\_R2\_MS\_V1R15\_STIG\_SCAP\_1-0\_Benchmark

4426 SCAP Compliance Checker - 3.1.2

Score | System Information | Stream Information | Results | Detailed Results

4428 Score

30.04%

Adjusted Score: 30.04%
Original Score: 30.04%
Compliance Status: RED

4429

Pass: 79 Not Applicable: 0 BLUE: Score equals 100 Fail: 184 Not Checked: 0 GREEN: Score is greater the

Fail: 184 Not Checked: 0 GREEN: Score is greater than or equal to 90 Error: 0 Not Selected: 0 YELLOW: Score is greater than or equal to 80

Unknown: 0 Total: 263 RED: Score is greater than or equal to 0

# 4430 System Information

Target:	WIN-IPERGL2ELUD
Operating System:	Windows Server 2008 R2 Standard
OS Service Pack:	

### 4431 Results

- Unsupported Service Packs
- 4433 O Systems must be at supported service pack (SP) or release levels. Fail
- 4434 Legal Notice Display
- 4435 O The required legal notice will be configured to display before console logon. (CCE-10673-2) Fail
- Caching of logon credentials
- Ocaching of logon credentials will be limited. (CCE-10926-4) Fail
- 4438 Anonymous shares are not restricted
- 4439 O Anonymous enumeration of shares will be restricted. (CCE-10557-7) Fail
- 4440 Bad Logon Attempts
- 4441 O The number of allowed bad-logon attempts will meet minimum requirements. (CCE-11046-0) Fail
- 4442 Bad Logon Counter Reset
- 4443 O The time before the bad-logon counter is reset will meet minimum requirements. (CCE-11059-3) Fail
- 4444 Lockout Duration

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- The lockout duration will meet minimum requirements. (CCE-10399-4) Fail
- 4446 Rename Built-in Guest Account
- 4447 o The built-in guest account will be renamed. (CCE-10747-4) Fail
- 4448 Rename Built-in Administrator Account
- The built-in administrator account will be renamed. (CCE-10976-9) Fail
- 4450 LanMan Authentication Level
  - The LanMan authentication level will be set to Send NTLMv2 response only\refuse LM & NTLM. (CCE-10984-3)
     Fail
- 4453 Deny Access from the Network
  - The Deny access to this computer from the network user right on member servers must be configured to
    prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts and local administrator accounts on domain systems
    and unauthenticated access on all systems. (CCE-10733-4) Fail
- 4457 Smart Card Removal Option
  - o The Smart Card removal option will be configured to Force Logoff or Lock Workstation. (CCE-10573-4) Fail
- 4459 Format and Eject Removable Media
  - Ejection of removable NTFS media is not restricted to Administrators. (CCE-10637-7) Fail
- 4461 Password Expiration Warning
  - Users will be warned in advance that their passwords will expire. (CCE-10930-6) Fail
- 4463 Disable Media Autoplay
  - O Autoplay will be disabled for all drives. (CCE-11126-0) Fail
- 4465 Anonymous Access to Named Pipes
  - Named pipes that can be accessed anonymously will be configured to contain no values. (CCE-10944-7) Fail
- Remote Assistance Solicit Remote Assistance
- 4468 O Solicited Remote Assistance will not be allowed. (CCE-11723-4) Fail
- 4469 Undock Without Logging On
  - O A system must be logged on to before removing from a docking station. (CCE-10883-7) Fail
- 4471 Storage of Passwords and Credentials
- 4472 O The system will be configured to prevent the storage of passwords and credentials (CCE-10292-1) Fail
- Force Logoff When Logon Hours Expire
- The system will be configured to force users to log off when their allowed logon hours expire. (CCE-10588-2) Fail

4476 Session Security for NTLM SSP Based Clients 4477 The system will be configured to meet the minimum session security requirement for NTLM SSP based clients. -4478 (CCE-10035-4) - Fail 4479 **FIPS Compliant Algorithms** 4480 The system will be configured to use FIPS-compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing. - (CCE-4481 10789-6) - Fail 4482 TS/RDS - Session Limit 4483 Remote Desktop Services will limit users to one remote session. - (CCE-12016-2) - Fail 4484 TS/RDS - Password Prompting Remote Desktop Services will always prompt a client for passwords upon connection. - (CCE-11299-5) - Fail 4485 4486 TS/RDS - Set Encryption Level 4487 Remote Desktop Services will be configured with the client connection encryption set to the required level. -4488 (CCE-11677-2) - Fail 4489 TS/RDS - Do Not Use Temp Folders 4490 Remote Desktop Services will be configured to use session-specific temporary folders. - (CCE-10669-0) - Fail 4491 TS/RDS - Delete Temp Folders 4492 Remote Desktop Services will delete temporary folders when a session is terminated. - (CCE-12046-9) - Fail 4493 TS/RDS - Time Limit for Disc. Session 4494 o Remote Desktop Services will be configured to set a time limit for disconnected sessions. - (CCE-11117-9) - Fail 4495 TS/RDS - Time Limit for Idle Session 4496 Remote Desktop Services will be configured to disconnect an idle session after the specified time period. - (CCE-4497 11506-3) - Fail 4498 Remote Assistance - Offer Remote Assistance 4499 The system will be configured to prevent unsolicited remote assistance offers. - (CCE-11625-1) - Fail 4500 **Error Reporting - Report Errors** 4501 The system will be configured to prevent automatic forwarding of error information. - (CCE-11750-7) - Fail 4502 Safe DLL Search Mode 4503 The system will be configured to use Safe DLL Search Mode. - (CCE-10772-2) - Fail 4504 Media Player - Disable Automatic Updates 4505 Media Player must be configured to prevent automatic checking for updates. - (CCE-11298-7) - Fail 4506 Session Security for NTLM SSP based Servers 4507 The system will be configured to meet the minimum session security requirement for NTLM SSP based servers. -4508 (CCE-10040-4) - Fail 4509 **Audit Log Warning Level** 4510 The system will generate an audit event when the audit log reaches a percent full threshold. - (CCE-11011-4) -4511 4512 **Disable IP Source Routing** 4513 The system will be configured to prevent IP source routing. - (CCE-10732-6) - Fail 4514 **Disable ICMP Redirect** 4515 The system will be configured to prevent ICMP redirects from overriding OSPF generated routes. - (CCE-10518-4516 9) - Fail 4517 **Disable Router Discovery** The system will be configured to disable the Internet Router Discover Protocol (IRDP). - (CCE-10768-0) - Fail 4518 4519 TCP Connection Keep-Alive Time 4520 The system will be configured to limit how often keep-alive packets are sent. - (CCE-10381-2) - Fail 4521 Name-Release Attacks 4522 The system will be configured to ignore NetBIOS name release requests except from WINS servers. - (CCE-4523 10653-4) - Fail 4524 **TCP Data Retransmissions** 4525 The system will limit how many times unacknowledged TCP data is retransmitted. - (CCE-10941-3) - Fail 4526 **Screen Saver Grace Period** 4527 The system will be configured to have password protection take effect within a limited time frame when the 4528 screen saver becomes active. - (CCE-10019-8) - Fail 4529 Remotely Accessible Registry Paths and Sub-Paths 4530 Unauthorized remotely accessible registry paths and sub-paths will not be configured. - (CCE-10935-5) - Fail

4531 **Strong Key Protection** 4532 Users will be required to enter a password to access private keys. - (CCE-11035-3) - Fail 4533 **Optional Subsystems** 4534 Optional Subsystems will not be permitted to operate on the system. - (CCE-10913-2) - Fail 4535 **Software Restriction Policies** 4536 Software certificate restriction policies will be enforced. - (CCE-10900-9) - Fail 4537 TS/RDS - Secure RPC Connection. 4538 The Remote Desktop Session Host will require secure RPC communications. - (CCE-11368-8) - Fail 4539 **Group Policy - Registry Policy Processing** 4540 Group Policy objects will be reprocessed even if they have not changed. - (CCE-12754-8) - Fail 4541 **SMB Client Packet Signing (Always)** 4542 The Windows SMB client will be enabled to always perform SMB packet signing. - (CCE-10970-2) - Fail 4543 Minimum Password Length 4544 For systems utilizing a logon ID as the individual identifier, passwords will, at a minimum, be 14 characters. -4545 (CCE-10372-1) - Fail 4546 **Display of Last User Name** 4547 The system will be configured to prevent the display of the last user name on the logon screen. - (CCE-10788-8) 4548 - Fail 4549 **Audit Policy Subcategory Setting** 4550 Audit policy using subcategories will be enabled. - (CCE-10112-1) - Fail 4551 IPSec Exemptions 4552 O IPSec Exemptions will be limited. - (CCE-10018-0) - Fail 4553 **UAC - Admin Approval Mode** 4554 User Account Control approval mode for the built-in Administrator will be enabled. - (CCE-11028-8) - Fail 4555 **UAC - Admin Elevation Prompt** 4556 User Account Control will, at a minimum, prompt administrators for consent. - (CCE-11023-9) - Fail 4557 **UAC - User Elevation Prompt** 4558 User Account Control will automatically deny standard user requests for elevation. - (CCE-10807-6) - Fail 4559 **Enumerate Administrator Accounts on Elevation** 4560 The system will require username and password to elevate a running application. - (CCE-11450-4) - Fail 4561 TS/RDS - Prevent Password Saving 4562 Passwords will not be saved in the Remote Desktop Client. - (CCE-11905-7) - Fail 4563 TS/RDS - Drive Redirection 4564 Local drives will be prevented from sharing with Remote Desktop Session Hosts (Remote Desktop Services 4565 Role). - (CCE-11709-3) - Fail 4566 **RPC - Unauthenticated RPC Clients** 4567 Unauthenticated RPC clients will be restricted from connecting to the RPC server. - (CCE-10881-1) - Fail 4568 **RPC - Endpoint Mapper Authentication** 4569 Client computers will be required to authenticate for RPC communication. - (CCE-10715-1) - Fail 4570 Internet Download / Online Ordering 4571 Web publishing and online ordering wizards will be prevented from downloading a list of providers. - (CCE-4572 11136-9) - Fail 4573 **Printing Over HTTP** 4574 Printing over HTTP will be prevented. - (CCE-11360-5) - Fail 4575 **HTTP Printer Drivers** 4576 Downloading print driver packages over HTTP will be prevented. - (CCE-11563-4) - Fail 4577 **Windows Update Device Drive Searching** 4578 Windows will be prevented from using Windows Update to search for drivers. - (CCE-10357-2) - Fail 4579 **IPv6 Transition** 4580 IPv6 will be disabled until a deliberate transition strategy has been implemented. - Fail 4581 **Windows Peer to Peer Networking** 4582 Windows Peer-to-Peer networking services will be turned off. - (CCE-11604-6) - Fail 4583 **Prohibit Network Bridge** 4584 Network Bridges will be prohibited in Windows. - (CCE-12074-1) - Fail 4585 **Root Certificates Update** 

4586 Root Certificates will not be updated automatically from the Microsoft site. - (CCE-11264-9) - Fail 4587 **Event Viewer Events.asp Links** 4588 Event Viewer Events.asp links will be turned off. - (CCE-10693-0) - Fail 4589 **Internet File Association Service** 4590 The Internet File Association service will be turned off. - (CCE-10697-1) - Fail 4591 **Order Prints Online** 4592 The Order Prints Online wizard will be turned off. - (CCE-11243-3) - Fail 4593 4594 The classic logon screen will be required for user logons. - (CCE-11256-5) - Fail 4595 **RSS Attachment Downloads** 4596 Attachments will be prevented from being downloaded from RSS feeds. - Fail 4597 Windows Explorer - Shell Protocol Protected Mode 4598 Windows Explorer shell protocol will run in protected mode. - (CCE-11530-3) - Fail 4599 Windows Installer – IE Security Prompt 4600 Users will be notified if a web-based program attempts to install software. - (CCE-10343-2) - Fail 4601 Windows Installer - User Control 4602 Users will be prevented from changing installation options. - (CCE-10906-6) - Fail 4603 Windows Installer - Vendor Signed Updates 4604 Non-administrators will be prevented from applying vendor signed updates. - (CCE-11468-6) - Fail 4605 Media Player - First Use Dialog Boxes 4606 Users will not be presented with Privacy and Installation options on first use of Windows Media Player. - (CCE-4607 11596-4) - Fail 4608 Network - Mapper I/O Driver 4609 The Mapper I/O network protocol driver will be disabled. - (CCE-10484-4) - Fail 4610 Network - Responder Driver 4611 The Responder network protocol driver will be disabled. - (CCE-11304-3) - Fail 4612 **Network - WCN Wireless Configuration** 4613 The configuration of wireless devices using Windows Connect Now will be disabled. - (CCE-11242-5) - Fail 4614 Network - Windows Connect Now Wizards 4615 The Windows Connect Now wizards will be disabled. - (CCE-11155-9) - Fail 4616 Device Install - PnP Interface Remote Access 4617 Remote access to the Plug and Play interface will be disabled for device installation. - (CCE-11248-2) - Fail 4618 Device Install – Drivers System Restore Point 4619 A system restore point will be created when a new device driver is installed. - (CCE-10546-0) - Fail 4620 Device Install – Generic Driver Error Report 4621 An Error Report will not be sent when a generic device driver is installed. - (CCE-12274-7) - Fail 4622 **Driver Install - Device Driver Search Prompt** 4623 Users will not be prompted to search Windows Update for device drivers. - (CCE-11319-1) - Fail 4624 **Handwriting Recognition Error Reporting** 4625 Errors in handwriting recognition on Tablet PCs will not be reported to Microsoft. - (CCE-11030-4) - Fail 4626 Power Mgmt - Password Wake on Battery 4627 Users will be prompted for a password on resume from sleep (on battery). (Applicable to Server 2008 R2 if the 4628 system is configured to sleep.) - (CCE-12088-1) - Fail 4629 Power Mgmt - Password Wake When Plugged In 4630 The user will be prompted for a password on resume from sleep (Plugged In). (Applicable on Server 2008 R2 if 4631 the system is configured to sleep.) - (CCE-11651-7) - Fail 4632 Remote Assistance - Session Logging 4633 Remote Assistance log files will be generated. - (CCE-11263-1) - Fail 4634 **Game Explorer Information Downloads** 4635 Game explorer information will not be downloaded from Windows Metadata Services. - (CCE-11739-0) - Fail 4636 **Error Reporting – Logging** 4637 Error Reporting events will be logged in the system event log. - (CCE-11621-0) - Fail 4638 **Error Reporting - Windows Error Reporting** 4639 Windows Error Reporting to Microsoft will be disabled. - (CCE-11708-5) - Fail 4640 **Error Reporting - Additional Data** 

4641 Additional data requests in response to Error Reporting will be declined. - (CCE-11584-0) - Fail 4642 Windows Explorer – Heap Termination 4643 Windows Explorer heap termination on corruption will be disabled. - (CCE-10981-9) - Fail 4644 **Logon – Report Logon Server** 4645 Users will be notified if the logon server was inaccessible and cached credentials were used. - (CCE-12260-6) -4646 4647 Media DRM - Internet Access 4648 Windows Media Digital Rights Management will be prevented from accessing the Internet. - (CCE-11052-8) -4649 Fail 4650 TS/RDS - COM Port Redirection 4651 The system will be configured to prevent users from mapping local COM ports and redirecting data from the 4652 Remote Desktop Session Host to local COM ports. (Remote Desktop Services Role) - (CCE-10600-5) - Fail 4653 TS/RDS - LPT Port Redirection 4654 The system will be configured to prevent users from mapping local LPT ports and redirecting data from the 4655 Remote Desktop Session Host to local LPT ports. (Remote Desktop Services Role) - (CCE-11623-6) - Fail 4656 TS/RDS - PNP Device Redirection 4657 The system will be configured to prevent users from redirecting Plug and Play devices to the Remote Desktop 4658 Session Host. (Remote Desktop Services Role) - (CCE-11128-6) - Fail 4659 TS/RDS - Smart Card Device Redirection 4660 The system will be configured to ensure smart card devices can be redirected to the Remote Desktop Session. 4661 (Remote Desktop Services Role) - (CCE-11517-0) - Fail 4662 TS/RDS - Printer Redirection 4663 The system will be configured to allow only the default client printer to be redirected in the Remote Desktop 4664 session. (Remote Desktop Services Role) - (CCE-10977-7) - Fail 4665 TS/RDS - Remove Disconnect Option 4666 The system will be configured to remove the Disconnect option from the Shut Down Windows dialog box on the 4667 Remote Desktop Client. (Remote Desktop Services Role) - (CCE-11997-4) - Fail 4668 **Windows Customer Experience Improvement Program** 4669 The Windows Customer Experience Improvement Program will be disabled. - (CCE-11354-8) - Fail 4670 **SPN Target Name Validation Level** 4671 The service principal name (SPN) target name validation level will be turned off. - (CCE-10617-9) - Fail 4672 **Computer Identity Authentication for NTLM** 4673 Services using Local System that use negotiate when reverting to NTLM authentication will use the computer 4674 identity vs. authenticating anonymously. - (CCE-10817-5) - Fail 4675 NTLM NULL Session Fallback 4676 NTLM will be prevented from falling back to a Null session. - (CCE-10812-6) - Fail 4677 **PKU2U Online Identities Authentication** 4678 PKU2U authentication using online identities will be prevented. - (CCE-10839-9) - Fail 4679 **Kerberos Encryption Types** 4680 Kerberos encryption types will be configured to prevent the use of DES encryption suites. - (CCE-10843-1) - Fail 4681 4682 IPv6 source routing will be configured to highest protection. - (CCE-10888-6) - Fail 4683 **IPv6 TCP Data Retransmissions** 4684 IPv6 TCP data retransmissions will be configured to prevent resources from becoming exhausted. - (CCE-10804-4685 3) - Fail 4686 Elevate when setting a network's location 4687 Domain users will be required to elevate when setting a network's location. - (CCE-11610-3) - Fail 4688 Direct Access – Route Through Internal Network 4689 All Direct Access traffic will be routed through the internal network. - (CCE-11300-1) - Fail 4690 Windows Update Point and Print Driver Search 4691 Windows Update will be prevented from searching for point and print drivers. - (CCE-11976-8) - Fail 4692

Device metadata retrieval from the Internet will be prevented. - (CCE-11589-9) - Fail

Device driver searches using Windows Update will be prevented. - (CCE-11787-9) - Fail

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4693

4694

4695

Prevent device metadata retrieval from Internet

Prevent Windows Update for device driver search

4696 **MSDT Interactive Communication** 4697 Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) interactive communication with Microsoft will be prevented. - (CCE-4698 10855-5) - Fail 4699 **Windows Online Troubleshooting Service** 4700 Access to Windows Online Troubleshooting Service (WOTS) will be prevented. - (CCE-11161-7) - Fail 4701 Disable PerfTrack 4702 Responsiveness events will be prevented from being aggregated and sent to Microsoft. - (CCE-11889-3) - Fail 4703 **Application Compatibility Program Inventory** 4704 The Application Compatibility Program Inventory will be prevented from collecting data and sending the 4705 information to Microsoft. - (CCE-11043-7) - Fail 4706 Autoplay for non-volume devices 4707 Autoplay will be turned off for non-volume devices. - (CCE-11375-3) - Fail 4708 **Turn Off Game Updates** 4709 Downloading of game update information will be turned off. - (CCE-11807-5) - Fail 4710 **Prevent Joining Homegroup** 4711 The system will be prevented from joining a homegroup. - (CCE-10691-4) - Fail 4712 Windows Anytime Upgrade 4713 Windows Anytime Upgrade will be disabled. - (CCE-10544-5) - Fail 4714 **Explorer Data Execution Prevention** 4715 Explorer Data Execution Prevention will be enabled. - (CCE-12161-6) - Fail 4716 **Default Autorun Behavior** 4717 The default autorun behavior will be configured to prevent autorun commands. - (CCE-11431-4) - Fail 4718 **Legal Banner Dialog Box Title** 4719 The Windows dialog box title for the legal banner will be configured. - (CCE-10010-7) - Fail 4720 Access this computer from the network 4721 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Access this computer from the network" user right. - (CCE-10086-7) -4722 4723 Adjust memory quotas for a process 4724 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Adjust memory quotas for a process" user right. - (CCE-10849-8) - Fail 4725 Allow log on locally 4726 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Allow log on locally" user right. - (CCE-10853-0) - Fail 4727 Back up files and directories 4728 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Back up files and directories" user right. - (CCE-10880-3) - Fail 4729 Bypass traverse checking 4730 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Bypass traverse checking" user right. - (CCE-10369-7) - Fail 4731 Change the system time 4732 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Change the system time" user right. - (CCE-10122-0) - Fail 4733 Change the time zone 4734 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Change the time zone" user right. - (CCE-10897-7) - Fail 4735 Deny log on as a batch job 4736 The Deny log on as a batch job user right on member servers must be configured to prevent access from highly 4737 privileged domain accounts on domain systems and unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-10596-5) -4738 Fail 4739 Deny log on as service 4740 The Deny log on as a service user right on member servers must be configured to prevent access from highly 4741 privileged domain accounts on domain systems. No other groups or accounts must be assigned this right. -4742 (CCE-10226-9) - Fail 4743 Deny log on locally 4744 The Deny log on locally user right on member servers must be configured to prevent access from highly 4745 privileged domain accounts on domain systems and unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-10750-8) -4746 Fail 4747 Deny log on through Remote Desktop \ Terminal Services 4748 The Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services user right on member servers must be configured to prevent 4749 access from highly privileged domain accounts and local administrator accounts on domain systems and

unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-10878-7) - Fail

4751 Force shutdown from a remote system 4752 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Force shutdown from a remote system" user right. - (CCE-10785-4) -4753 4754 **Generate security audits** 4755 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Generate security audits" user right. - (CCE-10274-9) - Fail 4756 Impersonate a client after authentication 4757 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Impersonate a client after authentication" user right. - (CCE-9946-5) -4758 4759 Increase a process working set 4760 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Increase a process working set" user right. - (CCE-10548-6) - Fail 4761 Load and unload device drivers 4762 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Load and unload device drivers" user right. - (CCE-10202-0) - Fail 4763 Log on as a batch job 4764 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Log on as a batch job" user right. - (CCE-10549-4) - Fail 4765 Replace a process level token 4766 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Replace a process level token" user right. - (CCE-10599-9) - Fail 4767 Restore files and directories 4768 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Restore files and directories" user right. - (CCE-10805-0) - Fail 4769 Shut down the system 4770 Unauthorized accounts will not have the "Shut down the system" user right. - (CCE-10439-8) - Fail 4771 **Audit - Credential Validation - Failure** 4772 The system will be configured to audit "Account Logon > Credential Validation" failures. - Fail 4773 **Audit - Computer Account Management - Failure** 4774 The system will be configured to audit "Account Management > Computer Account Management" failures. - Fail 4775 **Audit - Other Account Management Events - Success** 4776 The system will be configured to audit "Account Management > Other Account Management Events" successes. 4777 - Fail 4778 Audit - Other Account Management Events - Failure 4779 The system will be configured to audit "Account Management > Other Account Management Events" failures. -4780 4781 **Audit - Security Group Management - Failure** 4782 The system will be configured to audit "Account Management > Security Group Management" failures. - Fail 4783 **Audit - User Account Management - Success** 4784 Audit - User Account Management - Failure 4785 The system will be configured to audit "Account Management > User Account Management" failures. - Fail 4786 **Audit - Process Creation - Success** 4787 The system will be configured to audit "Detailed Tracking > Process Creation" successes. - Fail 4788 Audit - File System - Failure 4789 The system will be configured to audit "Object Access > File System" failures. - Fail 4790 Audit - Registry - Failure 4791 The system will be configured to audit "Object Access > Registry" failures. - Fail 4792 **Audit - Audit Policy Change - Failure** 4793 The system will be configured to audit "Policy Change > Audit Policy Change" failures. - Fail 4794 Audit - Sensitive Privilege Use - Success 4795 The system will be configured to audit "Privilege Use > Sensitive Privilege Use" successes. - Fail 4796 Audit - Sensitive Privilege Use - Failure 4797 The system will be configured to audit "Privilege Use > Sensitive Privilege Use" failures. - Fail 4798 **Audit - IPSec Driver - Success** 4799 The system will be configured to audit "System > IPSec Driver" successes. - Fail 4800 Audit - IPSec Driver - Failure 4801 The system will be configured to audit "System > IPSec Driver" failures. - Fail 4802 **Audit - Security State Change - Failure** 4803 The system will be configured to audit "System > Security State Change" failures. - Fail 4804 **Audit - Security System Extension - Success** 4805 The system will be configured to audit "System > Security System Extension" successes. - Fail

4806 Audit - Security System Extension - Failure 4807 The system will be configured to audit "System > Security System Extension" failures. - Fail 4808 6to4 State 4809 The 6to4 IPv6 transition technology will be disabled. - (CCE-11356-3) - Fail 4810 **IP-HTTPS State** 4811 The IP-HTTPS IPv6 transition technology will be disabled. - (CCE-10832-4) - Fail 4812 ISATAP State 4813 The ISATAP IPv6 transition technology will be disabled. - (CCE-11141-9) - Fail 4814 Teredo State 4815 The Teredo IPv6 transition technology will be disabled. - (CCE-11865-3) - Fail 4816 **Maximum Log Size - Application** 4817 The Application event log will be configured to a minimum size requirement. - (CCE-11143-5) - Fail 4818 **Maximum Log Size - Security** 4819 The Security event log will be configured to a minimum size requirement. - (CCE-11033-8) - Fail 4820 Maximum Log Size - Setup 4821 The Setup event log will be configured to a minimum size requirement. - (CCE-11717-6) - Fail 4822 Maximum Log Size - System 4823 The System event log will be configured to a minimum size requirement. - (CCE-11174-0) - Fail 4824 **Device Install Software Request Error Report** 4825 Windows will be prevented from sending an error report when a device driver requests additional software 4826 during installation. - (CCE-11336-5) - Fail 4827 **Always Install with Elevated Privileges Disabled** 4828 The Windows Installer Always install with elevated privileges must be disabled. - (CCE-12401-6) - Fail 4829 Local admin accounts filtered token policy enabled on domain systems. 4830 Local administrator accounts must have their privileged token filtered to prevent elevated privileges from being 4831 used over the network on domain systems. - Fail 4832 WINCC-000078 4833 The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) system-wide Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) 4834 must be enabled and configured to Application Opt In. - Fail 4835 4836 The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Default Protections for Internet Explorer must be enabled. -4837 Fail 4838 WINCC-000080 4839 The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Default Protections for Recommended Software must be 4840 enabled. - Fail 4841 WINCC-000081 4842 The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Default Protections for Popular Software must be enabled. 4843 - Fail 4844 WINCC-000082 4845 The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) system-wide Data Execution Prevention (DEP) must be 4846 enabled and configured to at least Application Opt Out. - Fail 4847 WINCC-000083 4848 The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) system-wide Structured Exception Handler Overwrite 4849 Protection (SEHOP) must be configured to Application Opt Out. - Fail 4850 WINGE-000100 4851 The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) V4.1 Update 1 or later must be installed on the system. -4852 Fail 4853 WINGE-000200 4854 A group named DenyNetworkAccess must be defined on domain systems to include all local administrator 4855 accounts. - Fail

4857 17.5 IT DOMAIN CONTROLLER STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT

4858 Non-Compliance Report - U\_Windows2012\_DC\_V1R3\_STIG\_SCAP\_1-1\_Benchmark

4859 SCAP Compliance Checker - 3.1.2

Score | System Information | Stream Information | Results | Detailed Results

4861 Score

4860

91.13%

Adjusted Score: 91.13% Original Score: 91.13% Compliance Status: GREEN

4862

Pass: 267 Not Applicable: 0 BLUE: Score equals 100
Fail: 26 Not Checked: 0 GREEN: Score is greater than or equal to 90
Error: 0 Not Selected: 0 YELLOW: Score is greater than or equal to 80
Unknown: 0 Total: 293 RED: Score is greater than or equal to 0

# 4863 System Information

Target:	ITDC
Operating System:	Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard
OS Service Pack:	
Domain:	ES-IDAM-B1

## 4864 Results

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4865 • Bad Logon Attempts

o The number of allowed bad logon attempts must meet minimum requirements. - (CCE-23909-5) - Fail

- 4867 Force Logoff When Logon Hours Expire
- 4868 O The system must be configured to force users to log off when their allowed logon hours expire. (CCE-25367-4) 4869 Fail
- 4870 LDAP Signing Requirements
  - O Domain controllers must require LDAP access signing. (CCE-23587-9) Fail
- 4872 Computer Account Password Change
  - O Domain controllers must be configured to allow reset of machine account passwords. (CCE-24692-6)
- 4875 Remotely Accessible Registry Paths and Sub-Paths
  - O Unauthorized remotely accessible registry paths and sub-paths must not be configured. (CCE-25426-8) Fail
- 4877 Minimum Password Length
- 4878 O Passwords must, at a minimum, be 14 characters. (CCE-25317-9) Fail
- 4879 Media DRM Internet Access
  - Software Certificate Installation Files
    - O Software certificate installation files must be removed from a system. Fail
- 4882 Legal Banner Dialog Box Title
  - The Windows dialog box title for the legal banner must be configured. (CCE-24020-0) Fail
- 4884 Access this computer from the network
- 4885 O Unauthorized accounts must not have the Access this computer from the network user right on domain controllers. Fail
- 4887 Allow log on locally

4888 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Allow log on locally user right. - (CCE-25228-8) - Fail 4889 Back up files and directories 4890 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Back up files and directories user right. - (CCE-25380-7) - Fail 4891 Bypass traverse checking 4892 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Bypass traverse checking user right. - (CCE-25271-8) - Fail 4893 Change the system time 4894 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Change the system time user right. - (CCE-24185-1) - Fail 4895 Change the time zone 4896 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Change the time zone user right. - (CCE-24632-2) - Fail 4897 Force shutdown from a remote system 4898 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Force shutdown from a remote system user right. - (CCE-24734-6) -4899 4900 Increase a process working set 4901 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Increase a process working set user right. - (CCE-24162-0) - Fail 4902 Increase scheduling priority 4903 Load and unload device drivers 4904 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Load and unload device drivers user right. - (CCE-24779-1) - Fail 4905 Log on as a batch job 4906 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Log on as a batch job user right. - (CCE-23386-6) - Fail 4907 Restore files and directories 4908 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Restore files and directories user right. - (CCE-25518-2) - Fail 4909 Shut down the system 4910 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Shut down the system user right. - (CCE-23500-2) - Fail 4911 Add workstations to domain 4912 Unauthorized accounts must not have the Add workstations to domain user right. - (CCE-23271-0) - Fail 4913 **Audit Directory Service Access - Success** 4914 The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Access successes. - Fail 4915 Audit - Directory Service Access - Failure 4916 The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Access failures. - Fail 4917 **Audit - Directory Service Changes - Success** 4918 The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Changes successes. - Fail 4919 **Audit - Directory Service Changes - Failure** 4920 The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Changes failures. - Fail 4921 WINGF-000100 4922 The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) V4.1 Update 1 or later must be installed on the system. -4923 Fail 4924 4925 17.6 IT WINDOWS 7 WORKSTATIONS STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT 4926 Non-Compliance Report - U\_Windows\_7\_V1R23\_STIG\_SCAP\_1-0\_Benchmark 4927 **SCAP Compliance Checker - 3.1.2** 4928 Score | System Information | Stream Information | Results | Detailed Results

94.72%

4929

Score

Adjusted Score: 94.72%
Original Score: 94.72%
Compliance Status: GREEN

4930

Pass: 251 Not Applicable: 0 BLUE: Score equals 100
Fail: 14 Not Checked: 0 GREEN: Score is greater than or equal to 90
Error: 0 Not Selected: 0 YELLOW: Score is greater than or equal to 80
Unknown: 0 Total: 265 RED: Score is greater than or equal to 0

### 4931 System Information

Target:	ITWORKS1
Operating System:	Windows 7 Enterprise
OS Service Pack:	Service Pack 1
Domain:	ES-IDAM-B1
Processor:	Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 0 @ 2.20GHz
Processor Architecture:	Intel64 Family 6 Model 45 Stepping 7
Processor Speed:	2200 MHz
Physical Memory:	6144 mb
Manufacturer:	VMware, Inc.
Model:	VMware Virtual Platform
Serial Number:	VMware-42 09 b3 57 32 50 16 c6-cb 47 45 dd e3 a9 68 f1
BIOS Version:	6.00
Interfaces:	<ul> <li>[00000007] Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection</li> <li>172.16.5.6</li> <li>00:50:56:89:A2:29</li> </ul>

# 4932 Results

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- 4933 Legal Notice Display
  - The required legal notice must be configured to display before console logon. (CCE-8973-0) Fail
  - Bad Logon Attempts
    - o Number of allowed bad-logon attempts does not meet minimum requirements. (CCE-9136-3) Fail
- 4937 Secure Print Driver Installation
  - o Print driver installation privilege is not restricted to administrators. (CCE-9026-6) Fail
- 4939 Deny Access from the Network
  4940 The Deny access to this com
  - The Deny access to this computer from the network user right on workstations must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts and local administrator accounts on domain systems and unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-9244-5) - Fail
  - Force Logoff When Logon Hours Expire
    - The system is not configured to force users to log off when their allowed logon hours expire. (CCE-9704-8) Fail
  - Minimum Password Length
    - For systems utilizing a logon ID as the individual identifier, passwords must be a minimum of 14 characters in length. (CCE-9357-5) Fail
- 4949 TS/RDS Remote User Connections
  - Terminal Services / Remote Desktop Services Prevent users from connecting using Terminal Services or Remote Desktop. - (CCE-9985-3) - Fail
- 4952 Unnecessary Features Installed
  - Unnecessary features are installed. Fail

cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise\_line

- 4954 Deny log on as a batch job
  - The Deny log on as a batch job user right on workstations must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems and unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-9212-2) - Fail
- 4957 Deny log on as service

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- The Deny log on as a service user right on workstations must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems. No other groups or accounts must be assigned this right. -(CCE-9098-5) - Fail
- 4961 Deny log on locally 4962 • The Deny log or
  - The Deny log on locally user right on workstations must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems and unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-9239-5) - Fail
  - Deny log on through Remote Desktop \ Terminal Services
    - The Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services user right on workstations must prevent all access if RDS is not used by the organization. If RDS is used, it must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts and local administrator accounts on domain systems and unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-9274-2) - Fail
- 4969 Enable accounts to be trusted for delegation
- 4970 WINGE-000100
  - The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) V4.1 Update 1 or later must be installed on the system. -Fail
- 4973 WINGE-000200
- 4974 O A group named DenyNetworkAccess must be defined on domain systems to include all local administrator accounts. Fail
- \_
- 4977 17.7 OZONE AUTHORITY AND OZONE SERVER CENTOS 6 SERVER STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT
- 4978 XCCDF Test Result
- **4979** 17.7.1 Introduction
- 4980 Test Result

Result ID	Profile	Start time	End time	Benchmark	Benchmark version
xccdf_org.open- scap_testresult_default-profile	(Default profile)	2015-04-08 07:58	2015-04-08 07:59	embedded	1

4981 Target info

Targets Addresses Platforms

- localhost.localdomain
- 127.0.0.1
- 172.16.4.11
- 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1
- fe80:0:0:0:250:56ff:fe89:76dd

### 4982 Score

system	score	max	0/0	bar
urn:xccdf:scoring:default	95.53	100.00	95.53%	

# 4983 17.7.2 Rule Results Summary

pass	fixed	fail	error	not selected	not checked	not applicable	informational	unknown	total
171	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	179

Title	Result
Auditing must be enabled at boot by setting a kernel parameter.	fail
Library files must be owned by root.	fail
The audit system must be configured to audit modifications to the systems Mandatory Access Control (MAC) configuration (SELinux).	fail
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be owned by root.	fail
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be group-owned by root.	fail
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must have mode 0600 or less permissive.	fail
The system boot loader must require authentication.	fail
The system must provide VPN connectivity for communications over untrusted networks.	fail

4985

4986

# 17.8 OZONE ENVOY CENTOS 6 SERVER STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT

4987 **XCCDF Test Result** 

4988 17.8.1 Introduction

4989 Test Result

Result ID	Profile	Start time	End time	Benchmark	Benchmark version
xccdf_org.open- scap_testresult_default-profile	(Default profile)	2015-04-08 08:02	2015-04-08 08:03	embedded	1

Target info 4990

**Targets** 

### Addresses

### **Platforms**

• cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise\_linu

localhost.localdomain

- 127.0.0.1
- 172.16.4.12
- 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1
- fe80:0:0:0:250:56ff:fe89:980a

4991 Score

system	score	max	0/0	bar
urn:xccdf:scoring:default	96.09	100.00	96.09%	

#### 4992 17.8.2 Rule Results Summary

pass	fixed	fail	error	not selected	not checked	not applicable	informational	unknown	total
172	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	179
				T	itle				Result
Auditing	must be er	nabled at bo	oot by setti	ng a kernel	parameter.				fail
The audit system must be configured to audit modifications to the systems Mandatory Access Control								fail	
(MAC) configuration (SELinux).									
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be owned by root.							fail		
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be group-owned by root.							fail		
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must have mode 0600 or less permissive.								fail	
The syste	m boot loa	der must r	equire auth	entication.					fail
The syste	m must pr	ovide VPN	connectiv	ity for com	munications	over untruste	d networks.		fail

4996 17.9 OT DOMAIN CONTROLLER STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT

4997 Non-Compliance Report - U\_Windows2012\_DC\_V1R3\_STIG\_SCAP\_1-1\_Benchmark

4998 SCAP Compliance Checker - 3.1.2

4999 Score | System Information | Stream Information | Results | Detailed Results

5000 Score

91.13%

Adjusted Score: 91.13% Original Score: 91.13% Compliance Status: GREEN

5001

Pass: 267 Not Applicable: 0 BLUE: Score equals 100

Fail: 26 Not Checked: 0 GREEN: Score is greater than or equal to 90 Error: 0 Not Selected: 0 YELLOW: Score is greater than or equal to 80 Unknown: 0 Total: 293 RED: Score is greater than or equal to 0

# 5002 System Information

Target:	OTDC
Operating System:	Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard
OS Service Pack:	
Domain:	OT-ES-IDAM-B1

## 5003 Results

5005

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- 5004 Bad Logon Attempts
  - O The number of allowed bad logon attempts must meet minimum requirements. (CCE-23909-5) Fail
  - B
- 5007 Force Logoff When Logon Hours Expire
  - The system must be configured to force users to log off when their allowed logon hours expire. (CCE-25367-4)
     Fail
- **5010** LDAP Signing Requirements
- 5011 O Domain controllers must require LDAP access signing. (CCE-23587-9) Fail
- 5012 Computer Account Password Change
  - o Domain controllers must be configured to allow reset of machine account passwords. (CCE-24692-6) Fail
- Remotely Accessible Registry Paths and Sub-Paths
  - O Unauthorized remotely accessible registry paths and sub-paths must not be configured. (CCE-25426-8) Fail
- 5016 Minimum Password Length
  - o Passwords must, at a minimum, be 14 characters. (CCE-25317-9) Fail
- 5018 Software Certificate Installation Files
  - Software certificate installation files must be removed from a system. Fail
- Legal Banner Dialog Box Title
  - The Windows dialog box title for the legal banner must be configured. (CCE-24020-0) Fail
- Access this computer from the network
- 5023 O Unauthorized accounts must not have the Access this computer from the network user right on domain controllers. Fail
- Adjust memory quotas for a process
- 5026 Allow log on locally

```
5027
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Allow log on locally user right. - (CCE-25228-8) - Fail
5028
              Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services
5029
              Back up files and directories
5030
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Back up files and directories user right. - (CCE-25380-7) - Fail
5031
              Bypass traverse checking
5032
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Bypass traverse checking user right. - (CCE-25271-8) - Fail
5033
              Change the system time
5034
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Change the system time user right. - (CCE-24185-1) - Fail
5035
              Change the time zone
5036
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Change the time zone user right. - (CCE-24632-2) - Fail
5037
              Force shutdown from a remote system
5038
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Force shutdown from a remote system user right. - (CCE-24734-6) -
5039
                  Fail
5040
              Increase a process working set
5041
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Increase a process working set user right. - (CCE-24162-0) - Fail
5042
              Load and unload device drivers
5043
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Load and unload device drivers user right. - (CCE-24779-1) - Fail
5044
              Log on as a batch job
5045
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Log on as a batch job user right. - (CCE-23386-6) - Fail
5046
              Restore files and directories
5047
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Restore files and directories user right. - (CCE-25518-2) - Fail
5048
              Shut down the system
5049
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Shut down the system user right. - (CCE-23500-2) - Fail
5050
              Add workstations to domain
5051
                  Unauthorized accounts must not have the Add workstations to domain user right. - (CCE-23271-0) - Fail
5052
              Audit Directory Service Access - Success
5053
                  The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Access successes. - Fail
5054
              Audit - Directory Service Access - Failure
5055
                  The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Access failures. - Fail
5056
              Audit - Directory Service Changes - Success
5057
                  The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Changes successes. - Fail
5058
              Audit - Directory Service Changes - Failure
5059
                  The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Changes failures. - Fail
5060
              WINGF-000100
5061
                  The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) V4.1 Update 1 or later must be installed on the system. -
5062
                  Fail
5063
          17.10 OT CONSOLEWORKS WINDOWS SERVER 2012 STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT
5064
          Non-Compliance Report - U Windows2012 MS V1R3 STIG SCAP 1-1 Benchmark
5065
          SCAP Compliance Checker - 3.1.2
5066
          Score | System Information | Stream Information | Results | Detailed Results
5067
          Score
           97.13%
                                                                      Adjusted Score: 97.13%
                                                                       Original Score: 97.13%
```

5068

Pass: 271 Not Applicable: 0 BLUE: Score equals 100

Not Checked: 0 Fail: 8 GREEN: Score is greater than or equal to 90

Compliance Status: GREEN

Error: 0 Not Selected: 0 YELLOW: Score is greater than or equal to 80 Unknown: 0 Total: 279 RED: Score is greater than or equal to 0

# 5069 System Information

Target:	OT-CONSOLEWORKS				
Operating System:	Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard				
OS Service Pack:					
Domain:	OT-ES-IDAM-B1				
Processor:	Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 0 @ 2.20GHz				
Processor Architecture:	ntel64 Family 6 Model 45 Stepping 7				
Processor Speed:	2200 MHz				
Physical Memory:	8192 mb				
Manufacturer:	VMware, Inc.				
Model:	VMware Virtual Platform				
Serial Number:	VMware-42 09 c2 cc c1 37 31 5c-2d 94 63 96 80 d2 05 fe				
BIOS Version:	6.00				
Interfaces:	<ul> <li>[00000010] Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection</li> <li>172.16.6.8</li> <li>00:50:56:89:56:86</li> </ul>				

# 5070 Results

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5071 • Bad Logon Attempts

O The number of allowed bad logon attempts must meet minimum requirements. - (CCE-23909-5) - Fail

- Force Logoff When Logon Hours Expire
  - The system must be configured to force users to log off when their allowed logon hours expire. (CCE-25367-4)
     Fail
- Minimum Password Length
  - O Passwords must, at a minimum, be 14 characters. (CCE-25317-9) Fail
- 5078 Legal Banner Dialog Box Title
  - o The Windows dialog box title for the legal banner must be configured. (CCE-24020-0) Fail
  - Deny log on as a batch job
    - The Deny log on as a batch job user right on member servers must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems, and from unauthenticated access on all systems. (CCE-25215-5) Fail
    - Deny log on as service
      - The Deny log on as a service user right on member servers must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems. No other groups or accounts must be assigned this right. -(CCE-23117-5) - Fail
- 5088 Deny log on locally
  - The Deny log on locally user right on member servers must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems, and from unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-24460-8) - Fail
- 5092 WINGE-000100
  - The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) V4.1 Update 1 or later must be installed on the system. -Fail

## 5095 17.11 OT WINDOWS 7 WORKSTATIONS STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT

5096 Non-Compliance Report - U\_Windows\_7\_V1R23\_STIG\_SCAP\_1-0\_Benchmark

5097 SCAP Compliance Checker - 3.1.2

5098 Score | System Information | Stream Information | Results | Detailed Results

5099 Score

95.47%

Adjusted Score: 95.47% Original Score: 95.47% Compliance Status: GREEN

5100

Pass: 253 Not Applicable: 0 BLUE: Score equals 100

Fail: 12 Not Checked: 0 GREEN: Score is greater than or equal to 90 YELLOW: Score is greater than or equal to 80 Unknown: 0 Total: 265 RED: Score is greater than or equal to 0

# 5101 System Information

Target:	OTWORKS1				
Operating System:	Windows 7 Enterprise				
OS Service Pack:	Service Pack 1				
Domain:	OT-ES-IDAM-B1				
Processor:	Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 0 @ 2.20GHz				
Processor Architecture:	Intel64 Family 6 Model 45 Stepping 7				
Processor Speed:	2200 MHz				
Physical Memory:	4096 mb				
Manufacturer:	VMware, Inc.				
Model:	VMware Virtual Platform				
Serial Number:	VMware-42 09 49 1e 0a 42 38 8e-03 d2 8f e6 31 25 5a 63				
BIOS Version:	6.00				
Interfaces:	<ul> <li>[00000007] Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT Network Connection</li> <li>172.16.6.6</li> <li>00:50:56:89:0B:7A</li> </ul>				

# 5102 Results

5104

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5106

5103 • Legal Notice Display

O The required legal notice must be configured to display before console logon. - (CCE-8973-0) - Fail

- Bad Logon Attempts
  - O Number of allowed bad-logon attempts does not meet minimum requirements. (CCE-9136-3) Fail
- 5107 Secure Print Driver Installation

5108

O Print driver installation privilege is not restricted to administrators. - (CCE-9026-6) - Fail

Deny Access from the Network

The Deny access to this computer from the network user right on workstations must be

 The Deny access to this computer from the network user right on workstations must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts and local administrator accounts on domain systems and unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-9244-5) - Fail

#### • Force Logoff When Logon Hours Expire

The system is not configured to force users to log off when their allowed logon hours expire. - (CCE-9704-8) -

### Minimum Password Length

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 For systems utilizing a logon ID as the individual identifier, passwords must be a minimum of 14 characters in length. - (CCE-9357-5) - Fail

# Deny log on as a batch job

 The Deny log on as a batch job user right on workstations must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems and unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-9212-2) - Fail

#### Deny log on as service

The Deny log on as a service user right on workstations must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems. No other groups or accounts must be assigned this right. - (CCE-9098-5) - Fail

#### Deny log on locally

 The Deny log on locally user right on workstations must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems and unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-9239-5) - Fail

## Deny log on through Remote Desktop \ Terminal Services

The Deny log on through Remote Desktop Services user right on workstations must prevent all access if RDS is not used by the organization. If RDS is used, it must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts and local administrator accounts on domain systems and unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-9274-2) - Fail

#### WINGE-000100

The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) V4.1 Update 1 or later must be installed on the system. - Fail

#### WINGE-000200

 A group named DenyNetworkAccess must be defined on domain systems to include all local administrator accounts. - Fail

# 5140 17.12 PACS DOMAIN CONTROLLER STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT

All Settings Report - U\_Windows2012\_DC\_V1R3\_STIG\_SCAP\_11\_Benchmark

SCAP Compliance Checker - 3.1.2

Score | System Information | Stream Information | Results | Detailed Results

# Score

91.47 %

Adjusted Score: 91.47 %
Original Score: 91.47 %
Compliance Status: GREEN

Pass: 268 Not Applicable: 0 Fail: 25 Not Checked: 0 BLUE: Score equals 100

Score is greater than or equal to 90

Error: 0 Not Selected: 0

YELLOW: Score is greater than or equal to 80

Unknown: 0

Total: 293 RED: Score is greater than or equal to 0

System Information

PACSDC
Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard
PACS-ES-IDAM-B1

Stream Information

Release Info	• Release: 3 Benchmark Date: 28 Oct 2014
Stream:	U_Windows2012_DC_V1R3_STIG_SCAP_1-1_Benchmark
Title:	Windows Server 2012 / 2012 R2 Domain Controller Security Technical Implementation Guide
Description:	The Windows Server 2012 / 2012 R2 Domain Controller Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) is published as a tool to improve the security of Department of Defense (DoD) information systems. Comments or proposed revisions to this document should be sent via e-mail to the following address: disa.letterkenny.FSO.mbx.stig-customer-support-mailbox@mail.mil.
Notice:	Developed_by_DISA_for_the_DoD
Target Platforms:	• cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2012:-
Identity Authenticated:	true

# 5141 5142

5143

# **Detailed Results**

1. Bad Logon Attempts - The number of allowed bad logon attempts must meet minimum requirements. - (CCE-23909-5) - Fail

```
5144
                 2. Force Logoff When Logon Hours Expire - The system must be configured to force users to log off when their allowed logon hours
5145
                      expire. - (CCE-25367-4) - Fail
5146
                     LDAP Signing Requirements - Domain controllers must require LDAP access signing. - (CCE-23587-9) - Fail
5147
                 4. Computer Account Password Change - Domain controllers must be configured to allow reset of machine account passwords. -
5148
5149
                 5. Remotely Accessible Registry Paths and Sub-Paths - Unauthorized remotely accessible registry paths and sub-paths must not be
5150
                      configured. - (CCE-25426-8) - Fail
5151
                     Minimum Password Length - Passwords must, at a minimum, be 14 characters. - (CCE-25317-9) - Fail
5152
                 7.
                     Legal Banner Dialog Box Title - The Windows dialog box title for the legal banner must be configured. - (CCE-24020-0) - Fail
5153
                     Access this computer from the network - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Access this computer from the network user
5154
                      right on domain controllers. - Fail
5155
                     Allow log on locally - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Allow log on locally user right. - (CCE-25228-8) - Fail
5156
                 10. Back up files and directories - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Back up files and directories user right. - (CCE-25380-7) - Fail
5157
                 11. Bypass traverse checking - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Bypass traverse checking user right. - (CCE-25271-8) - Fail
5158
                 12. Change the system time - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Change the system time user right. - (CCE-24185-1) - Fail
5159
                 13. Change the time zone - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Change the time zone user right. - (CCE-24632-2) - Fail
5160
                 14. Force shutdown from a remote system Unauthorized accounts must not have the Force shutdown from a remote system user right. -
5161
5162
                 15. Increase a process working set - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Increase a process working set user right. - (CCE-24162-0)
5163
5164
                 16. Load and unload device drivers - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Load and unload device drivers user right. -
5165
5166
                 17. Log on as a batch job - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Log on as a batch job user right. - (CCE-23386-6) - Fail
5167
                 18. Restore files and directories - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Restore files and directories user right. - (CCE-25518-2) - Fail
5168
                 19. Shut down the system - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Shut down the system user right. - (CCE-23500-2) - Fail
5169
                 20. Add workstations to domain - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Add workstations to domain user right. - (CCE-23271-0) - Fail
5170
                 21. Audit Directory Service Access - Success - The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Access successes. -
5171
5172
                 22. Audit - Directory Service Access - Failure - The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Access failures. - Fail
5173
                 23. Audit - Directory Service Changes - Success - The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Changes
5174
5175
                 24. Audit - Directory Service Changes - Failure - The system must be configured to audit DS Access - Directory Service Changes failures. -
5176
5177
                 25. WINGE-000100 - The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) V4.1 Update 1 or later must be installed on the system. - Fail
5178
5179
            17.13 PACS CONSOLE WINDOWS SERVER 2012 STIG COMPLIANCE REPORT
5180
            Non-Compliance Report - U Windows2012 MS V1R3 STIG SCAP 1-1 Benchmark
5181
            SCAP Compliance Checker - 3.1.2
5182
            Score | System Information | Stream Information | Results | Detailed Results
```

5183 Score

96.06%

Adjusted Score: 96.06% Original Score: 96.06% Compliance Status: GREEN

5184

Pass: 268 Not Applicable: 0 BLUE: Score equals 100 Fail: 11 Not Checked: 0 Error: 0 Not Selected: 0 Unknown: 0 Total: 279 RED: Score is greater than or equal to 0

GREEN: Score is greater than or equal to 90 YELLOW: Score is greater than or equal to 80

5185 **System Information** 

Target:	PACS-CONSOLE PACS-CONSOLE
Operating System:	Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard
OS Service Pack:	
Domain:	PACS-ES-IDAM-B1
Processor:	Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 0 @ 2.20GHz
Processor Architecture:	Intel64 Family 6 Model 45 Stepping 7
Processor Speed:	2200 MHz
Physical Memory:	8192 mb
Manufacturer:	VMware, Inc.
Model:	VMware Virtual Platform
Serial Number:	VMware-42 09 dc 00 da 26 44 78-07 ea f5 33 59 b9 af 46
BIOS Version:	6.00
Interfaces:	<ul> <li>[00000010] Intel(R) 82574L Gigabit Network Connection</li> <li>172.16.7.11</li> <li>00:50:56:89:F8:E0</li> </ul>

#### 5186 Results

5187

5188

5189

5190

5191

5193

5196

5197

5202

5203

5204

5205

5206

5207

5210

5211

- **Bad Logon Attempts** 
  - The number of allowed bad logon attempts must meet minimum requirements. (CCE-23909-5) Fail
- Force Logoff When Logon Hours Expire
  - The system must be configured to force users to log off when their allowed logon hours expire. (CCE-25367-4) Fail
- 5192 **Minimum Password Length** 
  - Passwords must, at a minimum, be 14 characters. (CCE-25317-9) Fail
- 5194 **Legal Banner Dialog Box Title** 5195
  - The Windows dialog box title for the legal banner must be configured. (CCE-24020-0) Fail
  - Adjust memory quotas for a process
    - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Adjust memory quotas for a process user right. (CCE-25112-4) Fail
- 5198 Bypass traverse checking 5199
  - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Bypass traverse checking user right. (CCE-25271-8) Fail
- 5200 Deny log on as a batch job 5201
  - The Deny log on as a batch job user right on member servers must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems, and from unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-25215-5) - Fail
  - Deny log on as service
    - The Deny log on as a service user right on member servers must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems. No other groups or accounts must be assigned this right. -(CCE-23117-5) - Fail
- 5208 Deny log on locally 5209
  - The Deny log on locally user right on member servers must be configured to prevent access from highly privileged domain accounts on domain systems, and from unauthenticated access on all systems. - (CCE-24460-8) - Fail
- 5212 Replace a process level token
  - Unauthorized accounts must not have the Replace a process level token user right. (CCE-24555-5) Fail
- 5214 WINGE-000100

```
5215
         O The Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) V4.1 Update 1 or later must be installed on the system. -
5216
             Fail
5217
        17.14 BASELINE CENTOS 7 LINUX CONFIGURATION
5218
        How To STIG/Configure Centos 7
5219
        Install fresh Centos 7 server image, using Minimal Install. The following are assumptions in the
5220
        installation:
              Separate partitions for /var, /var/log, /var/log/audit, /tmp, /home
5221
5222
              Networking is configured for your network
5223
5224
       yum update -y
5225
        yum install wget openscap-utiles aide libreswan iptables-service ntp
5226
       mkdir {reports,xml}
5227
        cd xml
5228
        wget http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/Documents/u RedHat 6 V1R6 STIG SCAP 1-
5229
       1 Benchmark.zip
5230
       unzip u RedHat*
5231
5232
                   ------ Run Initial Test ------
5233
5234
        oscap xccdf eval --report ../reports/report.html --cpe *cpe-
5235
        dictionary.xml *Benchmark-xccdf.xml
5236
       python -m SimpleHTTPServer
5237
5238
                      Go to http://<Centos 7 IP Address>:8000/ to view the results of the STIG test
5239
           1. Next add the following files to the following locations:
5240
                     rules d-audit.rules > /etc/audit/rules.d/audit.rules
5241
5242
                     audit.rules > /etc/audit/audit.rules
5243
                     audit.conf > /etc/audit/audit.conf
5244
                     system-auth > /etc/pam.d/system-auth
5245
                     system-au0 0 * * * root /sbin/aide -checkth-ac > /etc/pam.d/system-auth-ac

    sysctl.conf > /etc/sysctl.conf

5246
5247
                     password-auth-ac > /etc/pam.d/password-auth-ac
                     iptables > /etc/sysconfig/iptables
5248
           2. Next edit the following files:
5249
5250
              1. In /etc/logindefs add/change variables to:
5251
        PASS MIN LEN 14
5252
        PASS MIN DAYS 1
5253
        PASS MAX DAYS 60
5254
              2. Add the following to /etc/crontab:
```

```
00*** root /sbin/aide -check
5255
5256
              3. In /etc/modprobe.d/disabled.conf (create if doesn't exist), add:
5257
        install usb-storage /bin/false
5258
        install dccp /bin/false
        install sctp /bin/false
5259
5260
        install rds /bin/false
5261
       install tipc /bin/false
5262
        install ipv6 /bin/false
5263
              4. Remove any line in /etc/securetty that starts with 'vc' or 'ttyS'
5264
              5. Add to /etc/rsyslog.conf
5265
        *.* @@<any remote syslog server IP address>:514
5266
               6. Add to /etc/sysconfig/init
5267
        SINGLE=/sbin/sulogin
5268
        PROMPT=no
5269
              7. Edit /etc/ntp.conf
5270
                     place '#' in front of any line that starts with 'server'
5271
                     Add'server tick.usno.navy.mil'
              8. For all files /etc/csh.cshrc, /etc/profile, /etc/login.defs, and /etc/bashrc
5272
                     Change any 'umask' line to 'umask 077' and any 'UMASK' line to 'UMASK 077'
5273
5274
              9. Add to /etc/inittab
5275
        id:3:initdefault:
5276
              10. Add to /etc/security/limits.conf
5277
        * hard core 0
5278
        * hard maxlogins 0
              11. Edit /etc/default/useradd
5279
                     Change 'INACTIVE=-1' to 'INACTIVE=35'
5280
              12. yum remove firewalld
5281
5282
              13. chkconfig ntpd on
5283
              14. service ntpd start
              15. In -sf /lib/systemd/system/multi-user.target /etc/systemd/system/default.target
5284
5285
        17.14.1 Baseline CentOS 7 Configuration Files
              1. Audit.rules file contents:
5286
              2. Audit.conf file contents:
5287
5288
              3. iptables file contents:
5289
              4. Password auth-ac file contents
              5. rules d-audi.rules file contents
5290
5291
              6. Sysctl.conf files contents
5292
              7. system-auth file contents
5293
              8. system-auth-ac file contents
5294
```

```
5295
       17.14.2 Audit.rules File Contents
5296
5297
       # This file controls the configuration of the audit daemon
5298
5299
5300
       log file = /var/log/audit/audit.log
5301
       log format = RAW
5302
       log group = root
5303
       priority boost = 4
5304
       flush = INCREMENTAL
5305
       freq = 20
5306
       num logs = 5
5307
       disp qos = lossy
5308
       dispatcher = /sbin/audispd
5309
       name format = NONE
5310
       ##name = mydomain
5311
       \max \log file = 6
5312
       max log file action = ROTATE
5313
       space left = 75
5314
       space left action = email
5315
       action mail acct = root
5316
       admin space left = 50
5317
       admin space left action = SINGLE
5318
       disk full action = SUSPEND
5319
       disk error action = SUSPEND
5320
       ##tcp listen port =
5321
       tcp listen queue = 5
5322
       tcp max per addr = 1
5323
       ##tcp client ports = 1024-65535
5324
       tcp client max idle = 0
5325
       enable krb5 = no
5326
       krb5 principal = auditd
5327
       ##krb5 key file = /etc/audit/audit.key
5328
5329
       17.14.3 Audit.conf File Contents
5330
5331
       # This file controls the configuration of the audit daemon
5332
5333
5334
       log file = /var/log/audit/audit.log
5335
       log format = RAW
       log_group = root
5336
5337
       priority boost = 4
5338
       flush = INCREMENTAL
5339
       freq = 20
5340
       num logs = 5
5341
       disp qos = lossy
5342
       dispatcher = /sbin/audispd
5343
       name format = NONE
5344
       ##name = mydomain
5345
       \max log file = 6
5346
       max log file action = ROTATE
5347
       space left = 75
```

```
5348
       space left action = email
5349
       action mail acct = root
5350
       admin space left = 50
5351
       admin space left action = SINGLE
5352
       disk full action = SUSPEND
5353
       disk error action = SUSPEND
5354
       ##tcp listen port =
5355
       tcp listen queue = 5
5356
       tcp max per addr = 1
5357
       ##tcp client ports = 1024-65535
5358
       tcp_client max idle = 0
5359
       enable krb5 = no
5360
       krb5 principal = auditd
5361
       ##krb5 key file = /etc/audit/audit.key
5362
5363
       17.14.4 iptables File Contents
5364
       # Generated by iptables-save v1.4.21 on Tue Jan 27 13:28:25 2015
5365
5366
       :PREROUTING ACCEPT [219:23061]
5367
       :INPUT ACCEPT [2:120]
5368
       :OUTPUT ACCEPT [125:7804]
5369
       :POSTROUTING ACCEPT [125:7804]
5370
       :OUTPUT direct - [0:0]
5371
       :POSTROUTING ZONES - [0:0]
5372
       :POSTROUTING ZONES SOURCE - [0:0]
5373
       :POSTROUTING direct - [0:0]
5374
       :POST public - [0:0]
5375
       :POST public allow - [0:0]
5376
       :POST public deny - [0:0]
5377
       :POST public log - [0:0]
       :PREROUTING ZONES - [0:0]
5378
5379
       :PREROUTING ZONES SOURCE - [0:0]
5380
       :PREROUTING direct - [0:0]
5381
       :PRE public - [0:0]
5382
       :PRE public allow - [0:0]
5383
       :PRE public deny - [0:0]
5384
       :PRE public log - [0:0]
5385
       -A PREROUTING -j PREROUTING direct
       -A PREROUTING -j PREROUTING ZONES SOURCE
5386
5387
       -A PREROUTING -j PREROUTING ZONES
5388
       -A OUTPUT -j OUTPUT direct
5389
       -A POSTROUTING -j POSTROUTING direct
5390
       -A POSTROUTING -j POSTROUTING_ZONES_SOURCE
5391
       -A POSTROUTING -j POSTROUTING ZONES
5392
       -A POSTROUTING ZONES -o ens160 -g POST public
5393
       -A POSTROUTING ZONES -g POST public
5394
       -A POST_public -j POST_public_log
5395
       -A POST public -j POST public deny
5396
       -A POST public -j POST public allow
5397
       -A PREROUTING ZONES -i ens160 -g PRE public
5398
       -A PREROUTING ZONES -g PRE public
5399
       -A PRE public -j PRE public log
5400
       -A PRE public -j PRE public deny
```

```
5401
       -A PRE public -j PRE public allow
5402
       COMMIT
5403
       # Completed on Tue Jan 27 13:28:25 2015
5404
       # Generated by iptables-save v1.4.21 on Tue Jan 27 13:28:25 2015
5405
       *mangle
5406
       :PREROUTING ACCEPT [94235:148159541]
5407
       :INPUT ACCEPT [94155:148151187]
5408
       :FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
5409
       :OUTPUT ACCEPT [43012:2796100]
5410
       :POSTROUTING ACCEPT [43027:2798919]
5411
       :FORWARD direct - [0:0]
5412
       :INPUT direct - [0:0]
5413
       :OUTPUT direct - [0:0]
5414
       :POSTROUTING direct - [0:0]
       :PREROUTING ZONES - [0:0]
5415
5416
       :PREROUTING ZONES SOURCE - [0:0]
5417
       :PREROUTING direct - [0:0]
5418
       :PRE_public - [0:0]
5419
       :PRE public allow - [0:0]
5420
       :PRE public deny - [0:0]
5421
       :PRE public log - [0:0]
5422
       -A PREROUTING -j PREROUTING direct
5423
      -A PREROUTING -j PREROUTING ZONES SOURCE
5424
       -A PREROUTING -j PREROUTING ZONES
5425
       -A INPUT -j INPUT direct
5426
       -A FORWARD -j FORWARD direct
5427
       -A OUTPUT -j OUTPUT direct
5428
       -A POSTROUTING -j POSTROUTING direct
5429
       -A PREROUTING ZONES -i ens160 -g PRE public
5430
       -A PREROUTING ZONES -g PRE public
5431
       -A PRE public -j PRE public log
5432
       -A PRE public -j PRE public deny
5433
       -A PRE public -j PRE public allow
5434
       COMMIT
5435
       # Completed on Tue Jan 27 13:28:25 2015
5436
       # Generated by iptables-save v1.4.21 on Tue Jan 27 13:28:25 2015
5437
       *security
5438
       :INPUT ACCEPT [94003:148133781]
5439
      :FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
5440
       :OUTPUT ACCEPT [43012:2796100]
5441
       :FORWARD direct - [0:0]
5442
       :INPUT direct - [0:0]
5443
       :OUTPUT direct - [0:0]
5444
       -A INPUT -j INPUT direct
5445
       -A FORWARD -j FORWARD direct
5446
       -A OUTPUT -j OUTPUT direct
5447
       COMMIT
5448
       # Completed on Tue Jan 27 13:28:25 2015
5449
       # Generated by iptables-save v1.4.21 on Tue Jan 27 13:28:25 2015
5450
       *raw
5451
       :PREROUTING ACCEPT [94236:148159577]
5452
       :OUTPUT ACCEPT [43012:2796100]
5453
       :OUTPUT direct - [0:0]
5454
       :PREROUTING direct - [0:0]
```

```
5455
       -A PREROUTING -j PREROUTING direct
5456
       -A OUTPUT -j OUTPUT direct
5457
       COMMIT
5458
       # Completed on Tue Jan 27 13:28:25 2015
5459
       # Generated by iptables-save v1.4.21 on Tue Jan 27 13:28:25 2015
5460
       *filter
5461
       :INPUT DROP [0:0]
5462
      :FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
5463
       :OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
5464
       :FORWARD IN ZONES - [0:0]
5465
       :FORWARD IN ZONES SOURCE - [0:0]
5466
       :FORWARD OUT ZONES - [0:0]
5467
       :FORWARD OUT ZONES SOURCE - [0:0]
5468
       :FORWARD direct - [0:0]
5469
       :FWDI public - [0:0]
5470
       :FWDI public allow - [0:0]
5471
       :FWDI_public_deny - [0:0]
5472
       :FWDI_public_log - [0:0]
5473
       :FWDO public - [0:0]
5474
       :FWDO_public allow - [0:0]
       :FWDO_public_deny - [0:0]
5475
5476
       :FWDO public log - [0:0]
5477
       :INPUT ZONES - [0:0]
5478
       :INPUT ZONES SOURCE - [0:0]
5479
       :INPUT direct - [0:0]
5480
       :IN public - [0:0]
5481
       :IN public allow - [0:0]
5482
       :IN public deny - [0:0]
       :IN public_log - [0:0]
5483
5484
       :OUTPUT direct - [0:0]
5485
       -A INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED, ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
5486
       -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
5487
       -A INPUT -j INPUT direct
       -A INPUT -j INPUT_ZONES_SOURCE
5488
5489
       -A INPUT -j INPUT ZONES
5490
       -A INPUT -p icmp -j ACCEPT
5491
       -A INPUT -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-host-prohibited
5492
      -A FORWARD -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED, ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
5493
      -A FORWARD -i lo -j ACCEPT
5494
       -A FORWARD -j FORWARD direct
       -A FORWARD -j FORWARD IN ZONES SOURCE
5495
5496
       -A FORWARD -j FORWARD IN ZONES
5497
       -A FORWARD -j FORWARD OUT ZONES SOURCE
5498
       -A FORWARD -j FORWARD OUT ZONES
5499
       -A FORWARD -p icmp -j ACCEPT
5500
       -A FORWARD -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-host-prohibited
5501
       -A OUTPUT -j OUTPUT direct
5502
       -A FORWARD IN ZONES -i ens160 -g FWDI public
5503
       -A FORWARD IN ZONES -g FWDI public
5504
       -A FORWARD OUT ZONES -o ens160 -g FWDO public
5505
       -A FORWARD OUT ZONES -q FWDO public
5506
       -A FWDI public -j FWDI public log
5507
       -A FWDI_public -j FWDI_public_deny
5508
       -A FWDI public -j FWDI public allow
```

```
5509
       -A FWDO public -j FWDO public log
5510
       -A FWDO public -j FWDO public deny
5511
       -A FWDO public -j FWDO public allow
5512
       -A INPUT ZONES -i ens160 -g IN public
      -A INPUT_ZONES -g IN_public -A IN_public -j IN_public_log
5513
5514
5515
       -A IN public -j IN public deny
5516
       -A IN public -j IN public allow
5517
       -A IN public allow -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j
5518
       ACCEPT
5519
      COMMIT
5520
       # Completed on Tue Jan 27 13:28:25 2015
5521
5522
      17.14.5 Password auth-ac File Contents
5523
       #%PAM-1.0
5524
       # This file is auto-generated.
5525
       # User changes will be destroyed the next time authconfig is run.
5526
      auth required pam env.so
5527
       auth sufficient pam unix.so nullok try first pass
5528
      auth [default=die] pam faillock.so authfail deny=3 unlock time=604800
5529
      fail interval=900
5530
      auth required pam faillock.so authsucc deny=3 unlock time=604800
5531
      fail interval=900
5532
      auth requisite pam succeed if.so uid >= 1000 quiet success
5533
      auth required pam deny.so
5534
5535
       account required pam unix.so
5536
      account sufficient pam localuser.so
5537
      account sufficient pam succeed if.so uid < 1000 quiet
5538
      account required pam permit.so
5539
5540
      password requisite pam pwquality.so try first pass local users only
5541
      retry=3 authtok type=
5542
      password sufficient pam unix.so sha512 shadow nullok try first pass
5543
      use authtok
5544
      password required pam deny.so
5545
5546
      session optional pam keyinit.so revoke
       session required pam_limits.so
5547
5548
      -session optional pam systemd.so
5549
      session [success=1 default=ignore] pam succeed if.so service in crond
5550
      quiet use uid
5551
      session required pam unix.so
5552
5553
       17.14.6 rules d-audi.rules File Contents
5554
       # This file contains the auditctl rules that are loaded
5555
       # whenever the audit daemon is started via the initscripts.
5556
       # The rules are simply the parameters that would be passed
5557
      # to auditctl.
5558
5559
       # First rule - delete all
5560
      -D
```

```
5561
5562
       # Increase the buffers to survive stress events.
5563
       # Make this bigger for busy systems
5564
      -b 320
5565
5566
       # Feel free to add below this line. See auditctl man page
5567
       # STIG Stuff Below
5568
5569
       # audit time rules
5570
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S settimeofday -S clock settime -k
5571
       audit time rules
5572
      -w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules
5573
5574
       # audit account changes
5575
       -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit account changes
5576
       -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit account changes
5577
       -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit account changes
5578
       -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_account_changes
5579
      -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit account changes
5580
5581
       # MAC-policy
5582
      -w /etc/selinux -p wa -k MAC-policy
5583
5584
       # export
5585
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5586
5587
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F auid=0 -k export
5588
5589
       # delete
5590
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S rmdir -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S
5591
      renameat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k delete
5592
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S rmdir -S unlink -S unlinkat -S rename -S
5593
       renameat -F auid=0 -k delete
5594
5595
       # actions
5596
      -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions
5597
5598
       # modules
5599
      -w /sbin/insmod -p x -k modules
5600
       -w /sbin/rmmod -p x -k modules
5601
       -w /sbin/modprobe -p x -k modules
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -S delete module -k modules
5602
5603
5604
       # perm mod
5605
       -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5606
      perm mod
5607
       -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5608
       -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5609
5610
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5611
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5612
      perm mod
5613
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid=0 -k perm mod
```

```
5614
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5615
      perm mod
5616
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5617
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5618
5619
      perm mod
5620
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5621
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5622
      perm mod
5623
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5624
5625
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5626
      perm mod
5627
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5628
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5629
      perm mod
5630
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5631
5632
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5633
      perm mod
5634
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5635
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5636
      perm mod
5637
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5638
5639
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5640
      perm mod
5641
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5642
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5643
      perm mod
5644
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5645
5646
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=500 -F
      auid!=4294967295 -k perm_mod
5647
5648
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5649
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=500 -F
5650
      auid!=4294967295 -k perm mod
5651
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5652
5653
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -
5654
      k perm mod
5655
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5656
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -
5657
      k perm mod
5658
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5659
5660
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5661
      perm mod
5662
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5663
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5664
5665
      -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5666
```

```
5667
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=500 -F
5668
       auid!=4294967295 -k perm mod
5669
       -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5670
       -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=500 -F
5671
       auid!=4294967295 -k perm mod
5672
       -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5673
5674
       -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -
5675
       k perm mod
5676
       -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
       -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -
5677
5678
       k perm mod
5679
       -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5680
5681
       -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295
5682
       -k perm mod
5683
       -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5684
       -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295
5685
       -k perm mod
5686
       -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5687
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5688
5689
      perm mod
5690
      -a always, exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5691
       -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295 -k
5692
      perm mod
5693
       -a always, exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -k perm mod
5694
5695
      17.14.7 Sysctl.conf Files Contents
5696
       # System default settings live in /usr/lib/sysctl.d/00-system.conf.
5697
       # To override those settings, enter new settings here, or in an
5698
       /etc/sysctl.d/<name>.conf file
5699
5700
       # For more information, see sysctl.conf(5) and sysctl.d(5).
5701
      net.ipv4.ip forward = 0
5702
      net.ipv4.conf.all.accept source route = 0
5703
      net.ipv4.conf.all.accept redirects = 0
5704
      net.ipv4.conf.all.secure redirects = 0
5705
      net.ipv4.conf.all.log martians = 1
5706
      net.ipv4.conf.default.accept source route = 0
5707
      net.ipv4.conf.default.secure redirects = 0
5708
      net.ipv4.conf.default.accept redirects = 0
5709
      net.ipv4.icmp echo ignore broadcasts = 1
5710
      net.ipv4.icmp ignore bogus error responses = 1
5711
      net.ipv4.tcp syncookies = 1
5712
      net.ipv4.conf.all.rp filter = 1
5713
      net.ipv4.conf.default.rp filter = 1
5714
      net.ipv6.conf.default.accept redirects = 0
5715
      net.ipv4.conf.default.send redirects = 0
5716
      net.ipv4.conf.all.send redirects = 0
5717
```

```
5718
      17.14.8 system-auth File Contents
5719
      #%PAM-1.0
5720
      # This file is auto-generated.
5721
      # User changes will be destroyed the next time authconfig is run.
5722
      auth required pam env.so
5723
      auth sufficient pam unix.so try first pass
5724
      auth [default=die] pam faillock.so authfail deny=3 unlock time=604800
5725
      fail interval=900
5726
      auth required pam faillock.so authsucc deny=3 unlock time=604800
5727
      fail interval=900
5728
      auth requisite pam succeed if.so uid >= 1000 quiet success
5729
      auth required pam deny.so
5730
5731
      account required pam unix.so
5732
      account sufficient pam localuser.so
5733
      account sufficient pam succeed if.so uid < 1000 quiet
5734
      account required pam permit.so
5735
5736
      password required pam cracklib.so retry=3 minlen=14 dcredit=-1 ucredit=-1
5737
      ocredit=-1 lcredit=-1 difok=4
5738
      password requisite pam pwquality.so try first pass local users only
5739
      retry=3 authtok type=
5740
      password sufficient pam unix.so sha512 shadow try first pass use authtok
5741
      password required pam deny.so
5742
5743
      session optional pam keyinit.so revoke
5744
      session required pam limits.so
5745
      -session optional pam systemd.so
5746
      session [success=1 default=ignore] pam succeed if.so service in crond
5747
      quiet use uid
5748
      session required pam unix.so
      session required pam lastlog.so showfailed
5749
5750
      session required
                             pam limits.so
5751
5752
      17.14.9 system-auth-ac File Contents
5753
      #%PAM-1.0
5754
      # This file is auto-generated.
5755
      # User changes will be destroyed the next time authconfig is run.
5756
      auth required pam env.so
5757
      auth sufficient pam unix.so try first pass
5758
      auth [default=die] pam faillock.so authfail deny=3 unlock time=604800
5759
      fail interval=900
5760
      auth required pam faillock.so authsucc deny=3 unlock time=604800
5761
      fail interval=900
5762
      auth requisite pam succeed if.so uid >= 1000 quiet success
5763
      auth required pam deny.so
5764
5765
      account required pam unix.so
5766
      account sufficient pam_localuser.so
      account sufficient pam succeed if.so uid < 1000 quiet
5767
5768
      account required pam permit.so
5769
```

5770 password required pam cracklib.so retry=3 minlen=14 dcredit=-1 ucredit=-1 5771 ocredit=-1 lcredit=-1 difok=4 5772 password requisite pam pwquality.so try first pass local users only 5773 retry=3 authtok type= 5774 password sufficient pam unix.so sha512 shadow try first pass use authtok 5775 password required pam deny.so 5776 5777 session optional pam keyinit.so revoke session required pam\_limits.so 5778 5779 -session optional pam\_systemd.so 5780 session [success=1 default=ignore] pam succeed if.so service in crond 5781 quiet use uid 5782 session required pam unix.so session required pam lastlog.so showfailed 5783 5784 session required pam limits.so 5785

#### 5786 17.15 BASELINE CENTOS 7 STIG COMPLIANCE

- 5787 Note the STIG compliance test is based on the CentOS 6 STIG compliance analysis. At the time 5788 this testing was completed the CentOS 7 STIG had not been published.
- 5789 Introduction

#### 5790 Test Result

Result ID	Profile	Start time	End time	Benchmark	Benchmark version
xccdf_org.open- scap_testresult_default- profile	(Default profile)	2015- 03-11 12:25	2015- 03-11 12:26	embedded	1

#### Target info 5791

Addresses **Platform Targets** 

- localhost.localdomain
- 127.0.0.1

cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise linux:6

- 10.32.2.59
- 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1
- fe80:0:0:0:250:56ff:fe89:5cab

#### 5792 Score

system	score	max	%	bar
urn:xccdf:scoring:default	96.65	100.00	96.65%	

#### 5793 Results overview

# 5794 Rule Results Summary

pass	fixed	fail	error	not selected	not checked	not applicable	informational	unknown	total
173	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	179

# 5795 17.15.1 Rule Results Summary

Title	Result
Auditing must be enabled at boot by setting a kernel parameter.	fail
The audit system must be configured to audit modifications to the systems Mandatory Access Control (MAC) configuration (SELinux).	fail
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be owned by root.	fail
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must be group-owned by root.	fail
The system boot loader configuration file(s) must have mode 0600 or less permissive.	fail
The system boot loader must require authentication.	fail

# **18 ACRONYMS**

Acronym	Literal Translation
AD	Active Directory
CA	Certificate authority (also used as shorthand for the name of the company "CA Technologies")
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
.csv	Comma-Separated Value
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DoD	Department of Defense
EMS	Energy Management System
ICS	Industrial Control System
IdAM	Identity and Access Management
iEMS	RADiFlow ICS/SCADA router configuration management software
ISE	Identity Services Engine
iSIM	Industrial Service Management Tool
IT	Information Technology
JRE	Java Runtime Environment
NAS	Network Attached Storage
NCCoE	National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
os	Operating System
ОТ	Operational Technology
PACS	Physical Access Control System

Acronym	Literal Translation	
PLC	Programmable Logic Controller	
RAM	Random Access Memory	
RTU	Remote Terminal Unit	
SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition	
STIG	Security Technical Implementation Guideline	
VLAN	Virtual Local Area Network	
VM	Virtual Machine	
VPN	Virtual Private Network	
WAR	Web Application Archive	

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