CONTINUOUS MONITORING FOR IT INFRASTRUCTURE

Techniques for auditing user activity and detecting irregular activity events within small and medium-size businesses

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- 1 The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), a part of the National Institute of
- 2 Standards and Technology (NIST), is a collaborative hub where industry organizations,
- 3 government agencies, and academic institutions work together to address businesses' most
- 4 pressing cybersecurity challenges. Through this collaboration, the NCCoE develops modular,
- 5 easily adaptable example cybersecurity solutions demonstrating how to apply standards and
- 6 best practices by using commercially available technology. To learn more about the NCCoE, visit
- 7 <u>http://www.nccoe.nist.gov</u>. To learn more about NIST, visit <u>http://www.nist.gov</u>.
- 8 This document describes a problem that is relevant across small- and medium-size businesses.
- 9 NCCoE cybersecurity experts will address this challenge through collaboration with members of
- 10 the small and medium-size business community and vendors of cybersecurity solutions. The
- 11 resulting reference architecture will detail an approach that can be used by small and medium
- 12 businesses.

13 **Abstract**

- 14 Many organizations monitor business information technology (IT) infrastructure by manual
- inspection or computer-aided audits, which can result in after-the-fact detection of malicious-user access events.
- 17 This project explores continuous monitoring capabilities that can effectively, efficiently, and
- 18 automatically detect when a malicious actor, be it an authorized user or an external actor,
- 19 attempts to perform an action in an organization's IT infrastructure that could result in financial,
- 20 reputational, and operational impacts to the organization by collecting appropriate log data
- 21 from the IT infrastructure. Furthermore, the continuous monitoring capabilities can also be used
- to automate analysis and reporting of the log data to alert the proper personnel in the
- organization with actionable information and guidance so they may take measures toward
- 24 resolving the detected issue.
- 25 This project will result in a freely available NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide, which includes a
- 26 reference architecture, a fully implemented example solution, and a detailed guide of practical
- 27 steps needed to implement the solution.

28 Keywords

Access management; compliance; continuous monitoring; medium business; small business;
 unauthorized access; user access control.

31 **DISCLAIMER**

- 32 Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials may be identified in this
- 33 document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such
- 34 identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE, nor
- is it intended to imply that the entities, equipment, products, or materials are necessarily the
- 36 best available for the purpose.

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- 38 Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods
- 39 and provide feedback. All publications from NIST's National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
- 40 are available at <u>http://www.nccoe.nist.gov</u>.
- 41 Comments on this publication may be submitted to smb_nccoe@nist.gov.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

44	1	Executive Summary	3
45		Purpose	
46		Scope	. 3
47		Assumptions	.4
48		Background	.4
49	2	Scenarios	4
50		Scenario 1: Unauthorized Use of User Credentials	.4
51		Scenario 2: Malicious Access Attempts	.4
52		Scenario 3: Simultaneous Logins	.4
53		Scenario 4: Activity from Multiple Geographic Locations	. 5
54	3	High-Level Architecture	5
55		Data to Be Collected	. 6
56		Component List	. 6
57		Desired Capabilities	. 7
58	4	Relevant Standards and Guidance	7
59	5	Security Control Map	7
60	Ар	pendix A References	9

61 **1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

62 Purpose

63 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National Cybersecurity Center of 64 Excellence (NCCoE) is interested in supporting small- and medium-size businesses by providing 65 cybersecurity guidance to improve their continuous monitoring programs. This project will 66 enhance an adopting organization's ability to detect out-of-policy access activity as well as 67 reduce the resources required for compliance reporting, such as certification and recertification. 68 The resulting publication can assist in evaluation or assessment, design, acquisition, and 69 integration of a continuous monitoring effort at an adopting organization. Specifically, the 70 NCCoE is requesting feedback on this project idea.

This project is the first in a series of continuous monitoring projects that cover a range of
 subjects, including networks, assets, and privileged user activity. The NCCoE intends that the

- project, via the resulting practice guide, will provide adopting organizations with the followingpotential benefits:
- 75 detection of privilege escalation
- 76 detection of unauthorized access to sensitive data
- detection of malicious system-access attempts
- 78 detection of suspicious login events
- 79 minimization of workload
- support of compliance and reporting efforts with real-time information

This project will result in a publicly available NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide, a detailed implementation guide of the practical steps needed to implement a cybersecurity reference design that addresses this challenge. The reference design describes a vendor/technologyagnostic approach that illustrates a solution. An example solution (proof of concept), included in the Practice Guide, will illustrate an integration of commercial and open-source products, which demonstrates an implementation based on the reference architecture and conforming to cybersecurity standards and best practices. The publication can be used to assist in design,

- acquisition, and integration of a continuous monitoring effort at an adopting organization.
- 89 Scope

90 The scope of this project includes continuous monitoring of an information technology (IT)

- 91 infrastructure for user activity, such as normal and anomalous activity (malicious or not), and
- 92 compliance support. The results will include a reference architecture and example
- 93 implementation to enable the reader to understand and implement the proposed approach to
- 94 monitoring user activity across an IT infrastructure. The logging and auditing functions
- associated with authorization, authentication, and system/application access processes are the
- 96 primary sources of data to be monitored and analyzed.
- 97 The project will not address other aspects of identity and access management, such as vetting,
- 98 credential management, rights management, and provisioning. Functions other than logging and
- auditing for authorization, authentication, and system/application access processes are not
- 100 included in the project.

101 Assumptions

- 102 Continuous monitoring is a desirable outcome for an organization monitoring its IT
- 103 infrastructure. In addition, the NCCoE assumes that an organization will perform a risk
- assessment to determine the value of an investment in one or more of the continuous
- 105 monitoring capabilities included in the architecture. The NCCoE also assumes that all privacy,
- 106 legal, and ethical issues of data collection for continuous monitoring will be considered.

107 Background

108 Malicious actors are known to exploit security vulnerabilities that enable access to sensitive

- 109 data. Organizations understand that by continuously monitoring their IT, they can limit their
- 110 exposure to operational and compliance risks by detecting malicious activity quickly. Many
- 111 industries, such as the financial sector, must adhere to regulations that require monitoring. Also,
- 112 most cybersecurity best practices and frameworks include monitoring as an enabling technique
- 113 to detect incidents (both accidental and malicious).

114 **2** Scenarios

- 115 The following scenarios have been used to develop this project description. They will become
- the use cases for the reference architecture in the practice guide. The scenarios focus on
- 117 continuous monitoring of user access. Although not specifically mentioned in the scenarios,

118 continuous monitoring can also assist with compliance by providing log management, access

- 119 certification reporting, and audit support by using automation.
- 120 Scenario 1: Unauthorized Use of User Credentials
- 121 A system user—either an authorized insider or an unauthorized outsider—gains access to the
- 122 network and steals the credentials of another user. The malicious user then accesses critical
- assets containing sensitive data that the user is not authorized to view, such as nonpublicpersonal information.
- 125 Continuous monitoring solutions can help detect such malicious behavior by monitoring user
- 126 activity logs, including correlation and analytics based on known user access policies. Anomalies
- 127 and suspicious activity such as accessing unusual data or systems, or writing and executing
- 128 binaries, can be detected quickly.
- 129 Scenario 2: Malicious Access Attempts
- A malicious actor gains access to a network to upload malware, access sensitive data, or move
 laterally or vertically within the network (e.g., using privilege escalation).
- 132 Collecting log data on login and access events, both successful and failed, can help detect such 133 intrusion attempts, especially if a high number of failed authentication attempts is found or a
- user is logging in at unusual times or with unusual frequency.

135 Scenario 3: Simultaneous Logins

- 136 A user's credentials are used to log in on two devices on the network at the same time (e.g., a
- 137 second login occurs while a first login is still active). Although there are legitimate use cases with
- 138 system administrators and lab system users, one of the connections could have been made by a
- malicious actor who gained access to the credentials of the authorized user and has used them
- 140 to connect to the network.

141 Monitoring for simultaneous usage of user accounts can be detected by collecting log data on

- 142 the time, duration, and system associated with each user session. If simultaneous sessions are
- detected, IT personnel can communicate with the user (e.g., through the sessions or out-of-
- band methods) to determine if both sessions were made by the authorized user.
- 145 Scenario 4: Activity from Multiple Geographic Locations

A user's credentials are used to log in, within a short period of time, from two different locations
(simultaneously or subsequently) that are geographically far apart. This situation indicates the
user has logged in by using different network connections such as Wi-Fi and virtual private
network, or a second connection was made in the second location, possibly by a malicious actor

150 who has gained access to the credentials of the authorized user and has used them to connect 151 to the network.


152 Collecting and monitoring account logging data that contains internet protocol addresses paired

with geo-location tagging (or other knowledge of the organization's network topography) will
allow detection of this type of unauthorized user activity. If this activity is detected, IT personnel
can communicate with the user to determine if both sessions were made by the authorized
user.

157 **3 HIGH-LEVEL ARCHITECTURE**

The high-level architecture diagram in Figure 1 introduces continuous monitoring into the IT infrastructure of an organization. The architecture and monitoring techniques could be applied to different types of accounts, such as normal user accounts, privileged user accounts, thirdparty accounts (business partners, contractors, etc.), and departing employee accounts. The high-level architecture addresses the scope noted in Section 1 and the desired requirements

163 noted below.



164 Figure 1: High-Level Architecture

- 166 The above figure identifies a high-level architecture of the enterprise system and the associated
- 167 components for this project. During development of the laboratory environment implementing
- this project, the figure will be refined to describe detailed components and to map the physical
- architecture in the lab environment for the specific scenario being implemented. A goal of this
- 170 figure is to help spur identification of vendor participants and hardware and software
- 171 components for collaborative use in a laboratory environment to build open, standards-based,
- 172 modular, end-to-end example implementations.

173 Data to Be Collected

- 174 It is important to collect event data (containing when, where, who, and what information) from
- 175 multiple sources, including firewalls, intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems, end-
- point security sources, and application sources [1, 2]. A security information and event
- 177 management system can process the log data and provide information on authentication and
- authorization failures, privilege escalation, and suspicious login events.
- 179 The logs generated by different operating systems, devices, and systems will likely contain 180 information in different formats, which may require some transformation on the log data to 181 normalize it for analysis. This document identifies some data at a high level that should be 182 monitored to support improved security and compliance.
- 183 These are the types of log data that should be collected for monitoring and analysis:
- authentication and authorization failures and successes
- 185 application errors and system events
- 186 changes to privileges
- 187 use of a system's administrative privileges
- 188 access to sensitive data
- successful/unsuccessful logins
- 190 Component List

200

- 191 The NCCoE is seeking collaborating vendors to provide components to develop an example192 solution, including the following components that:
- 193 collect and normalize user access activity data from
- 194 o workstations and servers
- 195 o directories and databases
- 196 operating systems and applications
- 197 o devices that perform authentication or authorization
- 198 o network and perimeter security devices
- 199 o intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention systems
 - host-based security software
- analyze user access activity data to identify suspicious/malicious activity
- provide alerts and information about suspicious/malicious access activity to
 cybersecurity analysts

204 Desired Capabilities

The desired security capabilities, behaviors, and life-cycle security requirements of the solution are identified in the following list:

- user access monitoring
- identification and analysis of user access behavior
- detection and alerting of malicious user access activity

210 4 RELEVANT STANDARDS AND GUIDANCE

- NIST, Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf
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 Systems Security Engineering Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the
 Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems, March 2018
- K. Kent and M. Souppaya, NIST SP 800-92, *Guide to Computer Security Log Management*, September 2006
- M. Souppaya and K. Scarfone, NIST SP 800-83 Rev. 1, Guide to Malware Incident
 Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops, July 2013

220 5 SECURITY CONTROL MAP

221The security control map in Table 2 lists the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure222Cybersecurity (also known as NIST Cybersecurity Framework) Subcategories relevant to the

desired solution.

224 Table 2: Security Control Map

Function	Category	Subcategory
PROTECT (PR)	Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control (PR.AC): Access to physical and logical assets and associated facilities is limited to authorized users, processes, and devices, and is managed consistent with the assessed risk of unauthorized access to authorized activities and transactions.	PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices, users, and processes.
	Protective Technology (PR.PT): Technical security solutions are managed to ensure the security and resilience of systems and assets, consistent with related policies, procedures, and agreements.	PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy.
DETECT (DE)	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE): Anomalous activity is detected, and the potential impact of events is understood.	DE.AE-1: A baseline of network operations and expected data flows for users and systems is established and managed.

Function	Category	Subcategory
		DE.AE-2: Detected events are analyzed to understand attack targets and methods.
		DE.AE-3: Event data are collected and correlated from multiple sources and sensors.
		DE.AE-5: Incident alert thresholds are established.
	Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM): The information system and assets are monitored to identify cybersecurity events and verify the effectiveness of protective measures.	DE.CM-1: The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.
		DE.CM-2: The physical environment is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.
		DE.CM-3: Personnel activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.
		DE.CM-6: External service provider activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.
	Detection Processes (DE.DP): Detection processes and procedures are maintained and tested to ensure awareness of anomalous events.	DE.DP-2: Detection activities comply with all applicable requirements.
		DE.DP-4: Event detection information is communicated.

225 **APPENDIX A REFERENCES**

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- 227 <u>https://www.owasp.org/index.php/About_The_Open_Web_Application_Security_Project.</u>
- 228 [2] B. Todd, Creating a Logging Infrastructure, SANS Institute, Information Security Reading
- 229 Room. Available: <u>https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/logging/creating-</u>
- 230 <u>logging-infrastructure-38130</u>.