Cyber Al Profile Working Sessions: Securing Al System Components

August 26, 2025





Agenda




- Cyber Al Profile Project Overview
- Today's Plan
- Refresher from Working Session Introduction
- CSF 2.0 Category Considerations: Securing AI System Components
- Close-out

Submitting Questions




Please use the Q&A function to enter your questions.

We will do our best to answer all questions during the Q&A portion of this event.



1. To open the Q&A function, click on the "Q&A" icon at the bottom of your screen



2. Type your question in the text box and click Send

Captions and Raising Hand




To enable captioning during the event, click on the "Show captions" icon at the bottom of your screen.



To raise your hand during the Q&A sessions, click on the "Raise hand" icon at the bottom of your screen.







Cybersecurity, Privacy, and Al





The diverse use and rapid proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) promises unique value for industry, consumers, and broader society, but like many technologies, to recognize these benefits to the greatest potential, new risks from these advancements in AI must be managed.

In NIST's <u>Applied Cybersecurity Division</u> (ACD), our key concern is how advancements in the broad adoption of AI may impact current cybersecurity and privacy risks and risk management approaches.

NIST Cybersecurity-focused work on AI



- Al Risk Management Framework a framework to better manage risks to individuals, organizations, and society associated with artificial intelligence
- The Secure Software Development Practices for Generative AI and Dual-Use Foundation Models
- NIST Al 100-2 E2023: Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations
- <u>Dioptra</u> a software test platform for assessing the trustworthy characteristics of artificial intelligence
- Federated Learning on Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) Evaluating Differential Privacy Guarantees
- TrojAl Challenge Rounds Based on Data Poisoning: Test & Evaluation of Trojan detectors
- NIST SP 800-53 Overlays: Agents; LLM; Prediction; Classification
- <u>Automotive Cybersecurity Community of Interest (COI)</u>: Community of interest examining challenges from increased cybersecurity risk and the adoption of AI and opportunities
- National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence exploring new projects for Cybersecurity in Al and cybersecurity of Al: Al SecDevOps; Agent Identities

The Case for a Cyber Al Profile



Purpose:

Support cybersecurity programs as they manage the impacts of advancements in AI to their organization

Areas of focus:


- Cybersecurity risks that arise from the use of AI by organizations, including securing AI systems, components, and machine learning infrastructures, and minimizing data leakage.
- Determining how to defend against Al-enabled attacks.
- Assisting organizations in the use of AI with their cyber defense activities and using AI to improve privacy protections.

Outcomes:

- Establishes a shared understanding of Al-related cybersecurity priorities and considerations for any organization
- Fosters collaboration and communication across the Al and cybersecurity communities
- Enables organizations that are using AI technologies to demonstrate a degree of commitment and trustworthiness using a common set of outcomes in the Profile

Cyber Al Profile Roadmap










How You Contribute Today





- Please raise your virtual hand or type in the chat to contribute
- Members of the press, please identify yourself and your organization
- Be respectful of others
- Please don't be shy we would love to hear from everyone!
- Please remain on mute when not speaking
- We will use Slido to facilitate some of our discussions

Using Slido



- We will be using Slido to facilitate some of our discussions
- Options to join via QR code or URL + event code
- Works on mobile phone and computer
- Responses are anonymous
- We want to hear your feedback this provides a useful way to capture what we hear from you



Slido Screens





☐ Intro Questions	0 왕
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Consumer Goods	
Education	
☐ Energy	
Financial Services/Banking	
Government	




Slido: Getting to Know You

- What sector do you work in?
- Which NIST Frameworks does your organization use?



Slido Results: Getting to Know You (1 of





Slido Results: Getting to Know You (2 of



5)



Slido Results: Getting to Know You (3 of

6 %




5

Getting to Know You (1/2) What sector do you work in? (3/3)Telecommunications 4 % Think Tank 1 % **Trade Association 1** % Transportation 3 % Other

Slido Results: Getting to Know You (4 of



5)



18

Slido Results: Getting to Know You (5 of



Getting to Know You (2/2) Which NIST frameworks does your organization use? (2/2)Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Other 23 %

Today's Focus: CSF 2.0 Categories for Securing Al System Components



- **Scope:** Identifying cybersecurity challenges when integrating Al into organizational ecosystems and infrastructure
- Focus Area characteristics cybersecurity considerations regarding:
 - Preparing an organization to develop and/or deploy AI capabilities
 - Managing and AI system throughout is lifecycle
 - Understanding the threat and vulnerability landscape for AI technology components
- Examples of AI Technology System Components:
 - Al Model (e.g., LLMs, computer vision models, RL)
 - Data pipeline and storage (e.g., understanding provenance, training, cleaning, anomalies)
 - System Interfaces, internal tool callings (e.g., AI agents, interfaces)
 - Third-party AI platforms/services, external tool callings (e.g., LLMs, AI agents, APIs)

Challenge Areas

- Data Governance, Security, and Privacy
- Adversarial Attacks
- Unauthorized Access and Use
- Identifying, Detecting, and Responding to AI Component Vulnerabilities and Adverse Events
- Supply Chain Security
- Model Drift and Onset of Unexpected or Inaccurate Results

General Discussion Plan




- Walk through each CSF Function using Slido to foster discussion
- Questions we would like to address for each Function:
 - What are the:
 - What is unique about securing AI systems?
 - Most critical mitigations?
 - Based on the heatmaps:
 - Are the necessary Categories emphasized? Which Categories are over/under emphasized and why?
 - How well does the heatmap reflect current practices or other necessary outcomes?
 - Are there other important outcomes that are not represented?
 - Where do you need additional guidance, examples, or implementation resources to help your organization adopt AI-enabled technologies?
 - What resources are available to inform priorities (e.g., standards, mappings, tools)?



CSF 2.0 PDF



Cybersecurity Framework page





Working Sessions Introduction Video





To help us maximize our working time during these sessions, we recorded an introduction video to provide background for anyone that is new to this process. The recording includes the following topics:

- Introduction to the NCCoE
- Background and Purpose for the Cyber Al Profile
- Overview of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0
- Overview of Community Profiles
- Summary of Feedback in Early 2025
- Working Session Approach
- Resources



NIST CSF 2.0 Components



High-level hierarchy of cybersecurity outcomes that enable an organization to discuss and flexibly manage risk




rigor of an organization's cybersecurity risk governance and management practices

Provide a way to understand, tailor, assess, prioritize, and communicate the Core's outcomes based on mission objectives, stakeholder expectations, threat landscape, and requirements

Each Component reinforces the connection between mission/business goals and cybersecurity outcomes.

NIST CSF 2.0 Core Structure





Notional Example Format



Assumption: The organization already has a cybersecurity program in place

Profile: Supplements the cybersecurity program by contemplating the unique cybersecurity risk management considerations that arise for each of the Cyber AI Profile Focus Areas

CSF Core	Securing Al System Components	Thwarting Al-enabled Cyber Attacks	Conducting Al-enabled Cyber Defense	Informative References / Mappings
CSF.XX-01: [Subcategory text]	[Al-specific implications and considerations for achieving this cybersecurity outcome.]	[Al-specific implications and considerations for achieving this cybersecurity outcome.]	[Al-specific implications and considerations for achieving this cybersecurity outcome.]	[Pointers to related, laws, regulations, guidance, mappings, etc.]
CSF.XX-02: [Subcategory text]	[Al-specific implications and considerations for achieving this cybersecurity outcome.]	[Al-specific implications and considerations for achieving this cybersecurity outcome.]	[Al-specific implications and considerations for achieving this cybersecurity outcome.]	[Pointers to related, laws, regulations, guidance, mappings, etc.]
CSF.XX-03: [Subcategory text]	[Al-specific implications and considerations for achieving this cybersecurity outcome.]	[Al-specific implications and considerations for achieving this cybersecurity outcome.]	[Al-specific implications and considerations for achieving this cybersecurity outcome.]	[Pointers to related, laws, regulations, guidance, mappings, etc.]

Example Content - Extreme Fast Charging Profile (CSF 1.1)




CSF Core	Ecosystem-Wide	Electric Vehicles (EV)	eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC)/ Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE)	Cloud/Third-Party Organizations	Utilities/Building Systems	Informative References / Mappings
GV-2: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities are coordinated and aligned with internal roles and external partners.	Agreements with external organizations or partners are typically made in advance and documented in a service-level agreement (SLA), memorandum of understanding (MOU), or other forms of agreement. These agreements clearly define cybersecurity roles and responsibilities to properly define how their cybersecurity programs should function in a coordinated manner and allow for accountability for participant responsibilities.	Roles and responsibilities may include those involved in vehicle design, pre/post-sales support, software/firmware lifecycle activities, and supporting nominal vehicle operations such as charging, maintenance, and patching.	Roles and responsibilities may include those during EVSE installation design, construction, maintenance, updating, and operation. EVSE manufacturers can also consider defining roles to better support the needs of EV/XFC partners and customers, which may follow established OT or IT processes and methods for equipment, remote services, and capabilities.	Applicable, no additional Cloud/Third-Party-specific considerations.	Applicable, no additional Utility/Building Management Systemspecific considerations.	Ecosystem: [NIST-SP800-53r5] PM-1, PM-2, PM-29, PS-7, PS-9 EV: ISO/SAE 21434 RQ-07-04, RQ-07-06, WP-07-01 SFC/EVSE: ISA/IEC 62443-2- 1:D4E1 ORG 1.3 Cloud/Third-Party: [NIST-SP800-53r5] PM-1, PM-2, PM-29 Utilities/Building Systems: ISA/IEC 62443-2- 1:D4E1 ORG 1.3

CSF 2.0 Category Considerations: Securing Al System Components



Importance of CSF Functions for Securing AI System Components






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Slido Results: *Importance of CSF Functions for Securing AI System Components (1 of 2)*





Slido Results: *Importance of CSF Functions* for Securing AI System Components (2 of 2)



Getting to Know You (2/2) Which NIST frameworks does your organization use? (2/2)Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Other 23 %

Al Cybersecurity Threats and Mitigations



- Goal: Build on growing body of AI cybersecurity mitigations to identify impactful CSF 2.0 Subcategories for the 3 Cyber AI Profile Focus Areas
- Approach: Constructed a "heatmap" based on various frameworks and best practices documents published by:
 - Research Organizations
 - Non-profit Organizations
 - Technology Companies
- NOTE: The heatmaps presented during these working sessions were developed as a tool for facilitating Cyber AI Profile development discussions and is not intended to be used for any other purpose.

Example Sources of Inputs

Concept Documents	Mapped Documents			
 Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) Institute for Security + Technology (IST) R Street 	 Databricks European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) Google MITRE ATLASTM OWASP 			

Questions for discussion:

- What additional resources should we use in our analysis?
- Are there critical mitigations that are missing from the current body of work?

Align Industry Mitigations to NIST CSF 2.0



Step 1: Examine available publications



Step 2:
Assess whether the identified threats and mitigations are addressed by CSF 2.0



Step 3: Align threat mitigations with CSF Subcategories and assess their coverage

CSF Category Coverage

Sources of Example Inputs

Sources of Example Inputs							
Concept Documents	Mapped Documents						
 Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) Institute for Security + Technology (IST) R Street 	 Databricks European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (enisa) Google MITRE ATLASTM OWASP 						



HIST Conduit Fact Implies ASSAST Secretaria
Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations
. SIAT THE YORK
they make the work of all they make the work of the second
NST

				e-Berne	
Category	Count	Normalized		Priority	Color
αv	160	0.5		Low	
ID	136	0.4		Medium	
PR.	315	1.0		High	
DE	41	0.1			
RS	13	0.0			
RC	1	0.0			
CSF Sub	category C	overage		1.	
Subcategory	Count	Normalized		'Ola	
CV.OC	46	Normalized R DISC JRPO	. دح		
GV.RM	17		())		
GV.RR	20	~151	, ,	$\sim M_{\rm P}$	•
GV.PO		, ()\ ¹	-c \		
GV.OV	-01		・トフ		
GV.5.	LO.	\sim 0	フレー		
ID.AM	•	Syn			
ID.RA	\sim	IL,			
ID.IM	יץ				
PRJAA	•	0.3			
PRAT		0.4			
PRDS	117	1.0			
PRJPS	56	0.5			
PR.IR	69	0.5			
DE.CM	24	0.2			
DEAE	17	0.1			
RS.MA	8	0.1			
RS.AN	1	0.0			
RS.CO	6	0.1			
RS.MI	0	0.0			
RC.RP	1	0.0			
BC.CO	0	0.0			

Summary View

(GV.SC)



GOVERN	Heatmap	IDENTIFY	Heatmap	PROTECT	Heatmap	DETECT	Heatmap	RESPOND	Heatmap	RECOVER	Heatmap
Organizational Context (GV.OC)	0.40	Asset Management	0.65	Identity Management, Authentication	0.42	Continuous Monitoring	0.56	Incident Management	0.19	Incident Recovery Plan	0.13
Risk Management	0.56	(ID.AM) Risk Assessment		and Access Control (PR.AA)	0.12	(DE.CM) Adverse Event		(RS.MA)		Execution (RC.RP)	
Strategy (GV.RM) Roles,		(ID.RA)	0.92	Awareness and		Analysis (DE.AE)	0.48	Incident	0.15	Incident	
Responsibilities,	0.06	Improvement	0.44	Training (PR.AT)	0.10			Analysis (RS.AN)	0.15	Recovery Communications	0.10
and Authorities (GV.RR)	0.00	(ID.IM)	0.44	Data Security	0.37			Incident Response		(RC.CO)	
				(PR.DS)	0.07			Reporting and			
Policy (GV.PO)	0.12			Platform Security (PR.PS)	0.44			Communication (RS.CO)			
Oversight (GV.OV)	0.27			Technology Infrastructure	0.31			Incident Mitigation	0.02		
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk				Resilience (PR.IR)	0.31			(RS.MI)	0.02		
Management	1.0										

FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY

Heatmap Legend 0-1 (degree of current emphasis):

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Category	Description	Heatmap
Asset Management (ID.AM)	Assets (e.g., data, hardware, software, systems, facilities, services, people) that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to organizational objectives and the organization's risk strategy.	0.65
Improvement (ID.IM)	Improvements to organizational cybersecurity risk management processes, procedures and activities are identified across all CSF Functions.	0.44
Risk Assessment (ID.RA)	The cybersecurity risk to the organization, assets, and individuals is understood by the organization.	0.92

FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY

Heatmap Legend 0-1 (degree of current emphasis):

Slide Results: *Identify* (1 of 2)

Improvement (ID.IM)



IDENTIFY: Please rank these Categories from highest to lowest importance for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area.



1.04

Asset Management (ID.AM)
 Risk Assessment (ID.RA)
 2.38

Slide Results: *Identify (2 of 2)*







Asset Management (ID.AM)

52 %

Improvement (ID.IM)

14 %

Risk Assessment (ID.RA)

79 %

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Category	Description	Heatmap
Adverse Event Analysis (DE.AE)	Anomalies, indicators of compromise, and other potentially adverse events are analyzed to characterize the events and detect cybersecurity incidents.	0.48
Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)	Assets are monitored to find anomalies, indicators of compromise, and other potentially adverse events.	0.56

FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY

Heatmap Legend 0-1 (degree of current emphasis):

Slido Results: Detect (1 of 2)

Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)



DETECT: Which of these Categories have unique considerations for Securing AI System Components?

Adverse Event Analysis (DE.AE)

62 %

Slido Results: Detect (2 of 2)



DETECT: Please rank these Categories from highest to lowest importance for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area.



1. Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)

1.52

2. Adverse Event Analysis (DE.AE)

1.17

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
Category	Description	Heatmap
Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (GV.SC)	Cyber supply chain risk management processes are identified, established, managed, monitored, and improved by organizational stakeholders	1.0
Organizational Context (GV.OC)	The circumstances — mission, stakeholder expectations, dependencies, and legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements — surrounding the organization's cybersecurity risk management decisions are understood	0.40
Oversight (GV.OV)	Results of organization-wide cybersecurity risk management activities and performance are used to inform, improve, and adjust the risk management strategy	0.27
Policy (GV.PO)	Organizational cybersecurity policy is established, communicated, and enforced	0.12
Risk Management Strategy (GV.RM)	The organization's priorities, constraints, risk tolerance and appetite statements, and assumptions are established, communicated, and used to support operational risk decisions	0.56
Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (GV.RR)	Cybersecurity roles, responsibilities, and authorities to foster accountability, performance assessment, and continuous improvement are established and communicated	0.06

FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY

Heatmap Legend 0-1 (degree of current emphasis):

Slido Results: Govern (1 of 4)





Slido Results: Govern (2 of 4)



GOVERN: Which of these Categories have unique considerations for Securing AI System Components?



(2/2)

Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (GV.RR)

46 %

Slido Results: Govern (3 of 4)



GOVERN: Please rank these Categories from highest to lowest importance for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area. (1/2)

0 6 7

3.05

1.	Risk Management Strategy (GV.RS)	
		4.25
2.	Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (GV.SC)	
		3.72
3.	Policy (GV.PO)	
		3.22
4.	Organizational Context (GV.OC)	
		3.08
5.	Oversight (GV.OV)	

Slido Results: Govern (4 of 4)



GOVERN: Please rank these Categories from highest to lowest importance for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area. (2/2)



6. Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (GV.RR)

3.03

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
Category	Description	Heatmap
Awareness and Training (PR.AT)	The organization's personnel are provided with cybersecurity awareness and training so that they can perform their cybersecurity-related tasks.	0.10
Data Security (PR.DS)	Data are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.	0.37
Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control (PR.AA)	Access to physical and logical assets is limited to authorized users, services, and hardware and managed commensurate with the assessed risk of unauthorized access.	0.42
Platform Security (PR.PS)	The hardware, software (e.g., firmware, operating systems, applications), and services of physical and virtual platforms are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect their confidentiality, integrity, and availability.	0.44
Technology Infrastructure Resilience (PR.IR)	Security architectures are managed with the organization's risk strategy to protect asset confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and organizational resilience.	0.31

FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY

Heatmap Legend 0-1 (degree of current emphasis):

Slido Results: Protect (1 of 2)





Slido Results: Protect (2 of 2)



PROTECT: Please rank these Categories from
highest to lowest importance for the Securing
AI System Components Focus Area.

0 2 8

1.	Data Security (PR.DS)	
2.	Awareness and Training (PR.AT)	4.2
		3.14
3.	Identity Mangement, Authentication, and Access Control (PR.AA)	
		2.7
4.	Platform Security (PR.PS)	2.29
		2.2
5.	Technology Infrastructure and Resilience (PR.IR)	





Category	Description	Heatmap
Incident Analysis (RS.AN)	Investigations are conducted to ensure effective response and support forensics and recovery activities.	0.15
Incident Management (RS.MA)	Responses to detected cybersecurity incidents are managed.	0.19
Incident Mitigation (RS.MI)	Activities are performed to prevent expansion of an event and mitigate its effects.	0.02
Incident Response Reporting and Communication (RS.CO)	Response activities are coordinated with internal and external stakeholders as required by laws, regulations, or policies.	0.17

FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY

Heatmap Legend 0-1 (degree of current emphasis):

Slido Results: Respond (1 of 2)



RESPOND: Which of these Categories have unique considerations for Securing AI System Components?	0 5 7
Incident Analysis (RS.AN)	68 %
Incident Management (RS.MA)	70.06
Incident Mitigation (RS.MI)	70 70
Incident Response Reporting and Communication (RS.CO) 56 %	63 %

Slido Results: Respond (2 of 2)



RESPOND: Please rank these Categories from highest to lowest importance for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area.



Incident Mangement (RS.MA)

 Incident Analysis (RS.AN)
 Incident Mitigation (RS.MI)

 Incident Response Reporting and Communications (RS.CO)

 1.77

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Category	Description	Heatmap
Incident Recovery Communications (RC.CO)	Restoration activities are coordinated with internal and external parties.	0.10
Incident Recovery Plan Execution (RC.RP)	Restoration activities are performed to ensure operational availability of systems and services affected by cybersecurity incidents.	0.13

FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY

Heatmap Legend 0-1 (degree of current emphasis):

Slido Results: Recover (1 of 2)





0 5 2

Incident Recovery Communication (RC.CO)

40 %

Incident Recovery Plan Execution (RC.RP)

87 %

Slido Results: Recover (2 of 2)



RECOVER: Please rank these Categories from highest to lowest importance for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area.



1. Incident Recovery Plan Execution (RC.RP)

1.84

2. Incident Recovery Communication (RC.CO)

1.00

Describing the Securing Al System Components Focus Area



- **Scope:** Identifying cybersecurity challenges when integrating Al into organizational ecosystems and infrastructure
- Focus Area characteristics cybersecurity considerations regarding:
 - Preparing an organization to develop and/or deploy AI capabilities
 - Managing and AI system throughout is lifecycle
 - Understanding the threat and vulnerability landscape for AI technology components
- Examples of AI Technology System Components:
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 - Data pipeline and storage (e.g., understanding provenance, training, cleaning, anomalies)
 - System Interfaces, internal tool callings (e.g., AI agents, interfaces)
 - Third-party AI platforms/services, external tool callings (e.g., LLMs, AI agents, APIs)

Challenge Areas

- Data Governance, Security, and Privacy
- Adversarial Attacks
- Unauthorized Access and Use
- Identifying, Detecting, and Responding to Al Component Vulnerabilities and Adverse Events
- Supply Chain Security
- Model Drift and Onset of Unexpected or Inaccurate Results

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Slido Results: Securing AI System Components Focus Area (1 of 7)



Securing AI System Components (1/2)



What additional concepts should be considered to the Securing AI System Components Focus Area (scope and characteristics)? (1/2)

- All looks good as a starter.
- What about integration thruout the firm instead of just in IT. Thank you!
- Potential risk of emergent or invasive synthetic intelligence in AI environments.
- Clear business leadership ownership of AI...
- Explainable AI--blackbox
- .
- Cognitive inference risk,

- anthropomorphic, user influence, persuasion attack, user cognitive profiling
- I think you need to define your scope better for this entire working session. Does this consider development of AI systems, or deployment and integration?
- Interaction between AI components and risk of privilege escalation.

Slido Results: Securing Al System Components Focus Area (2 of 7)



Securing AI System Components (1/2)



What additional concepts should be considered to the Securing AI System Components Focus Area (scope and characteristics)? (2/2)

- Well-defined logical boundaries and areas of responsibility and authority within the implementation.
- Using automation with AI.
- More focus on its autonomy, full control of information systems, and what it means to all factors for the framework.
- AI training considerations (i.e., the quality of the model and the trained • AI Vendor Contract and Data data in use).

- Identifying Shadow IT/AI used that can be incorporated into risk management.
- operational risks of autonomous agents
- Data flows
- N/A
- New threats, changes to traditional defense
- Protection legal clauses

Slido Results: Securing AI System Components Focus Area (3 of 7)



Securing AI System Components (2/2)

0 2 1

What adjustments do we need to make to the Challenge Areas to adequately surface AI-specific cybersecurity considerations for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area? (1/5)

- Great starting point.
- A big issue is how the AI is used. A self-driving lawnmower is different from a self-driving car is different from an AI agent that can commit the organization's resources. These different uses have different cybersecurity considerations.
 Interactions between components and systems.
- Training at all levels of the firm.
- Rapid development and deployment of ai tools for cybersecurity automation and continuous monitoring, assessment and validation of dynamic environments/threatscapes.
- AI generated data repository accountability

• . 58

Slido Results: Securing AI System Components Focus Area (4 of 7)



Securing AI System Components (2/2)



What adjustments do we need to make to the Challenge Areas to adequately surface AI-specific cybersecurity considerations for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area? (2/5)

- White Box and Black Box Control
- Integrate cognitive inference protection into the TEVV framework. This includes recognizing: Risks of adversarial inference, where AI systems derive sensitive or unintended insights from

user interaction Erosion of agency
through behavioral nudging,
consent loops, and misaligned
system feedback Lack of traceability
in context evolution between
humans and systems that use
dynamic learning or state retention
These risks are

Slido Results: Securing AI System Components Focus Area (5 of 7)



Securing AI System Components (2/2)



What adjustments do we need to make to the Challenge Areas to adequately surface AI-specific cybersecurity considerations for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area? (3/5)

not abstract. They are already materializing in real-world systems, especially those leveraging generative or interactive AI.
Without clear constraints and testing around inference behavior, TEVV cannot fully serve its role in building trust or ensuring safety.

 I think the main issue is maybe prior to this, defining your scope and "terms" around AI. Sorry if I missed this, but I don't know that it was defined. Does this include LLMs / foundational transformer-based AI, generative AI, or all types of AI/ML deployments (not just "agentic" LLMs either)?

 Least Privilege and how interaction between AI

Slido Results: Securing Al System Components Focus Area (6 of 7)



Securing AI System Components (2/2)

0 2 1

What adjustments do we need to make to the Challenge Areas to adequately surface AI-specific cybersecurity considerations for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area? (4/5)

- components can create unforeseen zero day vulnerabilities.
- Stricter definitions of terms and elements of AI whether it be an LLM or agent.
- AI automation of Zero Trust networks.
- I believe Data Governance has multiple facets; it includes

- preventing insertion of bias or manipulation into the data, but also the governance of PHI+PII in both the input data and the output data. AI, censor thyself!
- Proper build requirements available for any user in the organization who is building with AI or building AI independently.
- I find it adequate. However, while thinking of AI, despite it not

Slido Results: Securing AI System Components Focus Area (7 of 7)



Securing AI System Components (2/2)

0 2 1

What adjustments do we need to make to the Challenge Areas to adequately surface AI-specific cybersecurity considerations for the Securing AI System Components Focus Area? (5/5)

being part of the framework, I cannot ignore geopolitics in this subject.

- User training on supervising/validating AI-generated information.
- Better training for EEs to understand fundamentals of AI usage.
- supply chain security, access

control, and vulnerability management

- Dealing with aspects that, in the moment, might be hard to decide if they come under cyber or other risk management.
- N/A
- DLP solution, and Data classification





We Appreciate Your Input





THANK YOU

Your input is a critical part of this process! Thank you for contributing to the development of the Cyber Al Profile!

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Slido Results: Close-out (1 of 3)



Close-out (1/2)




What additional resources (e.g., other guidelines, whitepapers, research, standards) should we use in our analysis as we develop the Cyber AI Profile?

- International standards.
- to be determined. Thank you.
- Unsure, I just don't know.
- Roles and suggested policies (templates).
- Standards
- More AI & ML, great job!

Slido Results: Close-out (2 of 3)





Slido Results: Close-out (3 of 3)



Close-out (2/2)



How did you hear about this event? (2/2)

Social media post

0 %

Colleague

0 %

Other



Working Session Schedule

August 19, 2025

Conducting Alenabled Cyber Defense



August 26, 2025

Securing AI System Components



September 2, 2025 1:00 – 4:00pm EDT

> Thwarting Alenabled Cyber Attacks





Working Sessions Next Steps



Conduct remaining what we learned session

Way Incorporate what we learned preliminary Draft

Begin writing the Preliminary Draft

If you have a resource we should review during our analysis or we missed your input today, please feel free to email us: CyberAIProfile@nist.gov!

Resources



Cyber AI Profile

- NIST Cybersecurity, Privacy, and Al Program
- Blog post: Managing Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: Launching a New Program at NIST | NIST
- NCCoE Project Page: Cyber Al Profile
- Cybersecurity and AI Workshop Concept Paper (posted in advance of the April 3, 2025, workshop)
- April 3rd Cyber Al Profile Workshop recording
- Blog post: Reflections from the First Cyber AI Profile Workshop
- Cyber AI Profile COI Working Sessions Introduction Video

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

- https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/
- https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/faqs
- https://www.nist.gov/informative-references
- https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/events-and-presentations

NIST Resources for Applying NIST Frameworks

https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/applying-frameworks-resources

Community Profiles

- https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/examples-community-profiles
- https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/creating-community-profiles-faqs



https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/cyber-ai-profile CyberAlProfile@nist.gov





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