Welcome to the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence Trusted IoT Onboarding: Updates to DRAFT NIST SP 1800-36 Wednesday, July 10th, 2024 | 10:00 – 11:30 AM (EDT)

We will begin shortly. This webinar will be recorded.



nccoe.nist.gov

Agenda



Time (ET)	Session	Speaker(s)
10:00–10:05 a.m.	Welcome and Introduction	 Tim McBride, Deputy Director, NIST NCCoE Paul Watrobski, Principal Investigator, NIST NCCoE
10:05–10:20 a.m.	 Project Overview Cybersecurity problem, general build architecture, and publication status of NIST SP 1800-36 	 Paul Watrobski, Principal Investigator, NIST NCCoE
10:20–10:30 a.m.	 Build 4 Discussion on Updates to Trusted Network-Layer Onboarding with the Thread Protocol 	 Brecht Wyseur, Senior Product Manager and Product Strategy, Kudelski IoT
10:30–10:40 a.m.	 Build 5 Discussion on Trusted Network- Layer Onboarding with BRSKI over Wi-Fi 	Nick Allott, CEO, NquiringMinds
10:40–10:50 a.m.	Build 6Discussion on Updates to Factory Provisioning	 Steve Clark, Security Technologist, SEALSQ Michael Richardson, Chief Scientist, Sandelman Software Works



Time (ET)	Session	Speaker(s)
10:50–10:58 a.m.	 Build 1 Discussion on Trusted Network-Layer Onboarding with Wi-Fi Easy Connect 	Dan Harkins, Fellow, HPE Aruba
10:58–11:06 a.m.	 Build 2 Discussion on Trusted Network-Layer Onboarding with Wi-Fi Easy Connect 	 Andy Dolan, Senior Security Engineer, CableLabs Craig Pratt, Lead Software Engineer, CableLabs Darshak Thakore, Principal Architect, CableLabs
11:06–11:25 a.m.	Participant Q&A	• All
11:25–11:30 a.m.	Closing Remarks Review draft and next steps, join the COI, contact us	 Paul Watrobski, Principal Investigator, NIST NCCoE

Recording Notice and Q&A



 For questions and comments, please use the Q&A feature. We will address all questions after the session presentations. Chat has been disabled.





Trusted IoT Onboarding: An Introduction to NIST SP 1800-36

Welcome and Introductory Remarks Tim McBride, Deputy Director, NIST NCCoE



Trusted IoT Onboarding: An Introduction to NIST SP 1800-36

Project Overview Paul Watrobski, Principal Investigator, NIST NCCoE



NIST SP 1800-36 Practice Guide

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-36A Trusted Internet of Things (IoT) Device Orboarding and	NET ERECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-36B	NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-36C Trusted Internet of Things (IoT) Device Network-Layer Onboarding and Lifecycle Management:		NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION of
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Executive Summary	Approach & Architecture	i i d'alde	Volume DRisFunctionalNDemonstrations	Volume E k & Compliance Aanagement

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Final Draft (May 2024)

https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/trusted-iot-device-network-layer-onboarding-and-lifecycle-management

Trusted IoT Network-Layer Onboarding: Objective



- Number of IoT devices is rapidly growing
 - Estimated 40 billion IoT devices by 2025
 - The growing number of IoT devices is leading to an expanding attack surface
 - We need scalable mechanisms to safely manage IoT devices throughout their lifecycles
 - Network credential provisioning
 - Device intent (e.g. MUD Manufacturer Usage Description)
 - Device attestation
 - Application-layer onboarding
 - Additional zero-trust-inspired mechanisms

Trusted IoT Network-Layer Onboarding: Scope

NIST NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

- Network Layer Onboarding:
 - Provisioning of network credentials to a device
 - Performed when the device is deployed (not when it is manufactured)
- **Trusted** Network-Layer Onboarding provides assurance that a network is not put at risk as new IoT devices are added to it
 - Device is provisioned with *unique* credentials
 - Device and network have the opportunity to authenticate each other
 - Provisioning occurs over an encrypted channel
 - No humans are given access to the credentials
 - Can be performed repeatedly throughout the device lifecycle

High Level Architecture





Current Scenarios



• Scenario 0: Factory Provisioning

• This scenario, which simulates the IoT device factory provisioning process, is designed to represent some high-level steps that must be performed in the factory before the device is transferred to its first post-production owner (e.g., device birth credentials, bootstrapping information, etc.).

Scenario 1: Trusted Network-Layer Onboarding

- Identities of the device and the network are authenticated.
- Network onboarding component provisions unique network credentials to the device over a secure channel.

• Scenario 2: Trusted Application-Layer Onboarding

• Trusted application-layer onboarding that is performed automatically on an IoT device after it connects to a network.

• Scenario 3: Re-Onboarding a Wiped Device

• Re-onboarding an IoT device to a network after wiping it clean of any stored data so that it can be re-credentialed and re-used.

• Scenario 4: Ongoing Device Validation

- Performing attestation, supply chain management (e.g., hardware, firmware, and software component inventory), configuration monitoring, or other asset-management-related operations on an IoT device to validate its authenticity and integrity.
- May be performed as part of a trusted boot process or at some other point before permitting the device to be onboarded to the network.

• Scenario 5: Establishing and Maintaining Credential and Device Security Posture Throughout the Lifecycle

- Downloading device firmware updates/patches.
- Securely integrate a device intent enforcement mechanism (e.g., Manufacturer Usage Description [MUD]).
- Establish and maintain the device's network credentials by provisioning X.509 certificates and updating expired credentials.



Builds

Current Builds



- Build 1: Wi-Fi Easy Connect Protocol, Aruba/HPE
 - + Independent Application-Layer Onboarding to UXI Cloud
 - Collaborators: Aruba, an HPE Company (Build Champion), CableLabs, NXP Semiconductors, SEALSQ
- Build 2: Wi-Fi Easy Connect Protocol, CableLabs, OCF
 - + Streamlined Application-Layer Onboarding to OCF IoTivity
 - Collaborators: CableLabs (Build Champion), OCF, Aruba, an HPE Company, NXP Semiconductors, SEALSQ
- Build 3: Bootstrapping Remote Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) Protocol, Sandelman Software Works
 - Collaborators: Sandelman Software Works (Build Champion), NXP Semiconductors, SEALSQ, NquiringMinds
- Build 4: Thread Protocol, Silicon Labs, Kudelski IoT
 - + Independent Application-Layer onboarding to AWS IoT Core
 - Collaborators: Kudelski IoT, Silicon Labs
- Build 5: Bootstrapping Remote Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) Protocol, NquiringMinds
 - Collaborators: NquiringMinds (Build Champion), Sandelman Software Works, SEALSQ
- Factory Provisioning Use-Case (cross-build application)
 - Collaborators: Aruba, an HPE Company, Sandelman Software Works, SEALSQ

Collaborators









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How to Get Involved



- The comment period for Draft NIST SP 1800-36 ends at <u>11:59 PM (ET) on July 30,</u> <u>2024</u>.
- Read the draft, comment, and/or join our Community of Interest by visiting the NCCoE Trusted IoT Onboarding webpage at <u>nccoe.nist.gov</u>.
- Email all questions, comments, and feedback to our team at <u>iot-</u> <u>onboarding@nist.gov</u>.







Build 4 – Thread and Cloud Onboarding

Brecht Wyseur, Senior Product Manager and Product Strategy

Kudelski IoT

Trusted Network and Application Layer Onboarding

Build 4 achievements: seamless onboarding of IoT Thread Devices

1. Thread **Network-layer** onboarding

After network onboarding, IoT devices can communicate to the internet via the Boarder Router.

2. Cloud application-layer onboarding

The lifecycle of the IoT device can be remotely managed – including cloud application onboarding.

Easy and secure, from chip to cloud

- End-to-end secure communication, from IoT device to cloud
- Using Silicon Lab HW Root of Trust: Secure Vault
- Seamless onboarding: one-time configuration, after which all devices owned by the end-user will be onboarded automatically on the user's Cloud Application.
- Demonstrated with AWS IoT onboarding
- Integrated with Silicon Labs Gecko SDK easy to put in place

Thanks to Silicon Labs and Kudelski IoT partnership



Network Layer Onboarding: Simple External Commissioning Procedure



Application-Layer: Automatic Cloud Onboarding

Kudelski IoT keySTREAM is a device lifecycle management platform that can manage Silicon Labs SoC credentials

- Allows you to manage your device efficiently at scale, through its entire lifecycle
- Facilitates onboarding using SoC bootstrap credentials

One-time platform setup

POP and CA Certificates

Use

POP Certificate

AWS IOT

keySTREAM

POP code

- Get your own keySTREAM tenant
- Setup your keySTREAM onboarding CA and import this in your AWS Account secured with Proof of Possession.
- Claim your devices



Automatic onboarding – manage devices at scale

- Your devices will automatically onboard and connect to your AWS IoT
- Secured using SoC bootstrap credentials



Your IoT Devices can now talk securely to the cloud

AWS IOT Speaks MQTT

 A light publish/subscribe-based protocol designed for IoT

AWS IoT > MQTT test client
MQTT test client Info
You can use the MQTT test client to monitor the MQTT messages being passed in your AWS account. Devices publish MQTT messages that are identified by topics to communicate their state to AWS IoT. AWS IoT also publishes MQTT message message topics and publish MQTT messages to topics by using the MQTT test client.
Connection details You can update the connection details by choosing Disconnect and making updates on the Establish connection to continue page.
Subscribe to a topic Publish to a topic
Topic filter Info The topic filter describes the topic(s) to which you want to subscribe. The topic filter can include MQTT wildcard characters.
Enter the topic filter
Additional configuration
Subscribe
Subscriptions ButtonStatus
Favorites No messages have been sent to this subscription yet. Please send a message to this subscription to see messages here.
ButtonStatus 🗸
All subscriptions

Full capability on embedded IoT Device

 We demonstrate that the IoT Device with the Silicon Labs SoC can run all the software to perform secure communication based on MQTT over Thread to AWS IoT



Thank You

brecht.wyseur@nagra.com



Silabs. com

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Kudelskiiot.com

References

- Learn more about thread: <u>https://www.silabs.com/wireless/thread</u>
- Kudelski IoT keySTREAM: <u>https://to.kudelski-iot.com/keySTREAM</u>

Trusted IoT Device Network-Layer Onboarding and Lifecycle Management Build 5 BRSK over VIII

Nick Allott, CEO



Trusted IOT Lifecycle



Big Picture – why is this important

- Usability
- Scalability
- Security improvements (continuous)
- Supply chain integration (business)





BRSKI Base Build 5



IETF Standard

International standard under a royalty free regime

Generic

Solves the general problem of joining a security domain Can be mapped to multiple physical network types

Supply chain

Models a full supply from device to network to manufacture

Strong security

Models a full supply from device to network to manufacture

BRKSK Flows





Incremental Challenge.....



Wi-Fi mapping

- Fully BRSKI mapping to Wi-Fi onboarding
- Specifically EAP-TLS certificate
- Unique onboarding certificate issued to each device
- Allows for per device revocation (lifecycle management)
- Lays ground work for more general management

Incremental Challenge.....



Flexible Policy

- Build 5 support generalised and extensible policy
- Implements the decision points implicit in BRSKI
- Extends them and drives from a generic policy engine
- Policy evidence is presented interoperable through W3C
 Verifiable credentials

Policy Policy implementation



Policy	Description	
TrustedChecks the integrity and provenance of theManufacturer(with the MASA)		
Manufacture recognises device	An additional check where the manufacture checks against issued iDevIDs	
Network owner trusts manufacturer	Network owner conditionally allows the Registrar talk to the manufactures website (MASA) (leakage)	
Device instance trusted by network owner	The network owner specifically trusts this individual device , e.g enterprise onboarding process	
Network owner trusts device type	Device type retrieved from MASA manged update server, is specifically trusted	

Policy Policy implementation



Policy	Description
Trusted behaviour	MUD descriptor retrieved from "update server" is within parameter (optional allocation to subnet)
Trusted dynamic behaviour	Behaviour is continually checked against MUD file. Exception results in revocation
Trusted CVE level	SBOM retrieved from update server. Look- up CVEs and compare to threshold
Trusted CVE level dynamic	Registrar, continually checks against CVE databases, using SBOMS. If new critical CVE discovered - escalate

Learnings Build 5



Secure: EAP-TLS is a vast improvement, providing strong single device controls, but we need good protocols to provision.

DevID lifecycle: a single IDevID is fragile. We need more sophisticated identity lifecycle to manage SBOM and MUD at scale

Secure element: secure management of local credentials is critical. Code stacks need better support (e.g. EAP-TLS)

Flexible policy: expressing flexible policy with interoperable credentials, is invaluable to support different ecosystems and business modesl

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🖿 debian-brski	add ip box	4 months ago	🛇 1 tags	
📄 nist-brski-demo/src	feat: added server certificates	7 months ago	Create a new release	

Full implementation easily replicable on off the shelf Raspberry PIs

Generic code – easily adaptable to other platforms

All open sourced

Open source assets

https://trustnetz.org https://github.com/nqminds/trustnetz

Questions

<u>nick@nquiringminds.com</u> Nick Allott

NCCoE IoT Onboarding Project

Factory Provisioning Use-Case





Minerva.Sandelman.ca Sandelman Software Works

SEALSQ
Steve Clark
Security Technologist

Sandelman Software Works

Michael Richardson
 Chief Scientist

July 10, 2024

The Factory Provisioning Use Case

Objectives:

- Demystify manufacturer provisioning
- Simulate the pre-provisioned Secure Element scenario
- Advocate that the identity of devices be provisioned by the manufacturer
- Demonstrate online Certificate Management Service (CMS)
 - Using Trusted Certificate Authority (CA)
- Document one or more flows involving BRSKI and DPP that uses a pre-provisioned secure element



- ♦ Key-Pair Generated on IoT Device
- Key-Pair Generated in Secure Element
- Key-Pair Loaded into IoT Device
- Key-Pair Pre-Provisioned onto Secure Element
- Private Key Derived from Shared Seed



- Device Board is Assembled
- Board is connected to "Bed of Nails" for setup and provisioning
- Diagnostic firmware is loaded
- Basic functionality is tested
- Keys and Certificates are loaded
 - > This step requires a secure facility
- Production firmware is loaded
- Final test of IoT device



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bed_of_nails_tester



Typical Model of IoT Device Production – with Pre-Provisioned SE

Device Board is Assembled

- > SE protects keys and certificates secure facility requirement is minimized
- Board is connected to "Bed of Nails" for setup and provisioning
- Diagnostic firmware is loaded
- Basic functionality is tested
- Production firmware is loaded
- Final test of IoT device



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bed_of_nails_tester



The Demo

Limitations

- > Key provisioning and firmware loading process for RPI involves manipulating SD cards
- Implementation
 - > Pre-provision a secure element with an immutable Identity
 - ➢ Key-Pair / Certificate
 - > Install the secure element on an IoT edge device to establish the platform hardware root of trust and Identity

Technologies

- Raspberry Pi Platform
- VaultIC40X Secure Element from SealSQ
- INeS Certificate Management System API
- INeS-Hosted Certificate Authority



Overview Factory Provisioning Use-Case Demo





THANK YOU



Build 1: Enterprise IoT Onboarding

National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce



Dan Harkins Danny Jump



HPE Retworking Device Provisioning Protocol- DPP

Robust and secure on-boarding per NIST CSWP on Network-layer onboarding and Lifecycle Management

Phases of DPP map closely with description of process in NIST CSWP

Bootstrapping- establishment of trust in a thing's public key

DPP URI contains base64-encoded public key of thing

Cloud-based, QR code based, NFC-based bootstrapping; also a Password Authenticated Key Exchange can be used to parlay a simple passcode into a trusted public keys

<u>Authentication</u> – strong authentication of device by network, weaker authentication of network by device, establishment of a secure connection

<u>Provisioning</u> – configuring network credentials in device

<u>Network Access</u> – secure connection to network to enable application-layer onboarding

Uses 802.11 action frames (pre-association, no SSID, no soft-AP)

HPE Build 1: Onboarding for Enterprise

Transfer of ownership of thing

- Purchase order transfers DPP URI from vendor cloud using open published REST API framework
- Network onboarding equipment acquires DPP URIs for all purchased things
- No soft-AP so no rogue APs, no extra SSIDs beaconing, on enterprise network

DPP Presence Announcement issued by unprovisioned things

- 802.11 action frame consisting of a hash of "chirp" + bootstrapping key
- Network onboarding equipment is able to identify things by chirps
- Only equipment that possesses a thing's DPP URI is able to provision thing
- Device is automatically discovered, recognized, and onboarded

DPP workflow is, "plug it in, turn it on...you're done"

No IoT or networking expertise needed to onboard things

- Industrial deployment (e.g. nuclear power plant, or off-shore oil rig) allow for *things* to be installed by a crew with no IT skills—just mount the device, apply power
- Remote office employee just unpacks, plugs device in, it is automatically provisioned

Misuse resistance: easy to use correctly, difficult to use incorrectly

- QR codes scan or they don't, once scanned there is nothing else to do
- Manufacturers and vendors have transfer of ownership of things worked out
- Simple, secure, robust onboarding workflow
- No rigid onboarding process to follow– bootstrapping can take place before or after device is installed
- Onboarding at scale
- Zero touch onboarding
- Can provision all credentials used in modern 802.11 networks

HPE Build 1 and the Notional Architecture

IoT Device Manufacturing and Ownership Transfer Activities



HPE Betworking Build 1's DPP Architecture – DPP As A Service



HPE networking Build 1 Capabilities

Current

Trusted Network-layer Onboarding

- Device discovery, authentication, and authorization by network
- Network authorization by device
- Provisioning of a network profile for secure access
- Provisioning of a unique device-specific credential
- Network segmentation—assigning *thing* to a network segment
- **Application-layer Onboarding**
- Device Re-Onboarding
- Integration with public, trusted CA for certificate issuance
- → Factory-generated keypair on TPM, automatically generated DPP URI and QR code

Planned

MUD (RFC 8520) integration



	Oruba

Thank You!

National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce

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Build 2

WI-FI EASY CONNECT, CABLELABS, OCF

Andy Dolan, Senior Security Engineer Craig Pratt, Lead Software Engineer

WI-FI NETWORK ONBOARDING: GOALS

Demonstrate:

- Secure network (L2/L3) onboarding
 - Using DPP/EasyConnect (WFA) and Custom Connectivity (NetReach; CableLabs) technology
- Provisioning of per-device credentials and policy for Wi-Fi devices
 - Including steering into network microsegments (Micronets)
- The secure conveyance of metadata during network onboarding
 - To facilitate application-layer (L4/L5) onboarding



CUSTOM CONNECTIVITY ARCHITECTURE

- Network Onboarding Component:
 - DPP/EasyConnect (WFA)
 - Custom Connectivity/NetReach (CableLabs)
- Authorization Service:
 - The Custom Connectivity Controller
- AP/Router/Switch:
 - AP agent controls inter-AP mesh, switch and router using SDN rules
- Supply Chain Integration Service:
 - Not provided
- IoT Devices
 - DPP-enabled Wi-Fi devices
 - Non-DPP Wi-Fi WPA2 devices





STREAMLINED ONBOARDING: GOALS

- Secure network onboarding establishes trust
 - Why not build upon that established trust at the application layer?
- Streamlined onboarding: Onboard application-layer framework using established trusted channel
 - Any application-layer framework
- Single administrative action to securely onboard device at all layers
- Simpler, and more secure



STREAMLINED ONBOARDING OVERVIEW





Build 2

THANK YOU

Audience Q & A

Please submit questions to our panelists using the Zoom Q&A feature.





Thank you for joining us!

Visit our project page for Draft NIST SP 1800-36:

https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/trusted-iot-device-network-layeronboarding-and-lifecycle-management

Comment period open until July 30, 2024



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