NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 1800-29B

Data Confidentiality: Detect, Respond to, and Recover from Data Breaches

Volume B: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics

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DRAFT

This publication is available free of charge from https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/data-confidentiality-identifying-and-protecting-assets-against-data-breaches



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- 8 National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 1800-29B, Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol.
- 9 Spec. Publ. 1800-28B, 60 pages, (December 2023), CODEN: NSPUE2

10 FEEDBACK

- 11 You can improve this guide by contributing feedback. As you review and adopt this solution for your
- 12 own organization, we ask you and your colleagues to share your experience and advice with us.
- 13 Comments on this publication may be submitted to: ds-nccoe@nist.gov
- 14 Public comment period: December 13, 2023 through January 15, 2024
- 15 All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act.

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22 NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

- 23 The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), a part of the National Institute of Standards
- 24 and Technology (NIST), is a collaborative hub where industry organizations, government agencies, and
- 25 academic institutions work together to address businesses' most pressing cybersecurity issues. This
- 26 public-private partnership enables the creation of practical cybersecurity solutions for specific
- 27 industries, as well as for broad, cross-sector technology challenges. Through consortia under
- 28 Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), including technology partners—from
- 29 Fortune 50 market leaders to smaller companies specializing in information technology security—the
- 30 NCCoE applies standards and best practices to develop modular, adaptable example cybersecurity
- 31 solutions using commercially available technology. The NCCoE documents these example solutions in
- 32 the NIST Special Publication 1800 series, which maps capabilities to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- and details the steps needed for another entity to re-create the example solution. The NCCoE was
- established in 2012 by NIST in partnership with the State of Maryland and Montgomery County,
- 35 Maryland.

To learn more about the NCCoE, visit <u>https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/</u>. To learn more about NIST, visit

37 <u>https://www.nist.gov.</u>

38 NIST CYBERSECURITY PRACTICE GUIDES

- 39 NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guides (Special Publication 1800 series) target specific cybersecurity
- 40 challenges in the public and private sectors. They are practical, user-friendly guides that facilitate the
- 41 adoption of standards-based approaches to cybersecurity. They show members of the information
- 42 security community how to implement example solutions that help them align with relevant standards
- 43 and best practices, and provide users with the materials lists, configuration files, and other information
- 44 they need to implement a similar approach.
- 45 The documents in this series describe example implementations of cybersecurity practices that
- 46 businesses and other organizations may voluntarily adopt. These documents do not describe regulations
- 47 or mandatory practices, nor do they carry statutory authority.

48 **ABSTRACT**

- 49 Attacks that target data are of concern to companies and organizations across many industries. Data
- 50 breaches represent a threat that can have monetary, reputational, and legal impacts. This guide seeks to
- 51 provide guidance around the threat of data breaches, exemplifying standards and technologies that are
- 52 useful for a variety of organizations defending against this threat. Specifically, this guide seeks to help
- 53 organizations detect, respond, and recover from a data confidentiality attack.

54 **KEYWORDS**

- asset management; cybersecurity framework; data breach; data confidentiality; data protection; detect;
- 56 *malicious actor; malware; ransomware; recover; respond*

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- 59 The Technology Partners/Collaborators who participated in this build submitted their capabilities in
- 60 response to a notice in the Federal Register. Respondents with relevant capabilities or product
- 61 components were invited to sign a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with
- 62 NIST, allowing them to participate in a consortium to build this example solution. We worked with:

Technology Partner/Collaborator	Build Involvement
Cisco Systems	DUO
Dispel	Dispel
FireEye	FireEye Helix
PKWARE	PKWARE PKProtect

63 **DOCUMENT CONVENTIONS**

- 64 The terms "shall" and "shall not" indicate requirements to be followed strictly to conform to the
- 65 publication and from which no deviation is permitted. The terms "should" and "should not" indicate that
- 66 among several possibilities, one is recommended as particularly suitable without mentioning or
- 67 excluding others, or that a certain course of action is preferred but not necessarily required, or that (in
- 68 the negative form) a certain possibility or course of action is discouraged but not prohibited. The terms

- 69 "may" and "need not" indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the publication. The
- terms "can" and "cannot" indicate a possibility and capability, whether material, physical, or causal.

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This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use would be
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- 90 behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the assurance, provi-
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- 93 of binding each successor-in-interest.
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- 95 whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents.
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97 **Contents**

98	1	Sun	nmary		1
99		1.1	Challer	nge	3
100		1.2	Solutio	n	3
101		1.3	Benefi	ts	3
102	2	Hov	v to U	se This Guide	4
103		2.1	Typogr	aphic Conventions	5
104	3	Арр	roach		5
105		3.1	Audier	ıce	6
106		3.2	Scope		6
107		3.3	Assum	ptions	6
108		3.4	Privacy	Considerations	7
109		3.5	Risk As	sessment	8
110			3.5.1	Security Risk Assessment	9
111			3.5.2	Privacy Risk Assessment	9
112		3.6	Techno	ologies	. 10
113	4	Arc	hitectu	ıre	12
114		4.1	Archite	ecture Description	. 12
115	5	Sec	urity 8	e Privacy Characteristic Analysis	13
116		5.1	Assum	ptions and Limitations	. 13
117		5.2	Securit	y Scenarios	. 13
118			5.2.1	Exfiltration of Encrypted Data	14
119			5.2.2	Spear Phishing Campaign	14
120			5.2.3	Ransomware	15
121			5.2.4	Accidental Email	16
122			5.2.5	Lost Laptop	17
123			5.2.6	Privilege Misuse	17
124			5.2.7	Eavesdropping	18
125		5.3	Privacy	v Scenarios	. 19
126			5.3.1	User Login with Multifactor Authentication	20
127			5.3.2	Authentication to Virtual Desktop Interface Solution	24
128			5.3.3	Monitoring by Network Detection Solution	28

DRAFT

129	5.3.4	Monitoring by Logging Solution	32
130	6 Future B	uild Considerations	. 37
131	Appendix A	List of Acronyms	. 38
132	Appendix B	Glossary	.40
133	Appendix C	References	.44
134	Appendix D	Security Control Map	.46
135	Appendix E	Privacy Control Map	.49

136 List of Figures

137	Figure 1-1 Data Security Project Mapping	2
138	Figure 3-1 Cybersecurity and Privacy Risk Relationship	8
139	Figure 4-1 Data Confidentiality Detect, Respond, and Recover High-Level Architecture	12
140	Figure 5-1 Multifactor Authentication Data Flow Diagram	21
141	Figure 5-2 Virtual Desktop Interface Data Flow Diagram	25

142 List of Tables

143	Table 3-1 Products and Technologies 11
144	Table 5-1 Exfiltration of Encrypted Data Security Scenario
145	Table 5-2 Spear Phishing Campaign Security Scenario 14
146	Table 5-3 Ransomware Security Scenario15
147	Table 5-4 Accidental Email Security Scenario 16
148	Table 5-5 Lost Laptop Security Scenario 17
149	Table 5-6 Privilege Misuse Security Scenario 17
150	Table 5-7 Eavesdropping Security Scenario 18
151	Table 5-8 User Login With Multifactor Authentication Data Actions 22
152	Table 5-9 User Login with Multifactor Authentication Problematic Data Action
153	Table 5-10 Virtual Desktop Interface Data Actions 26
154	Table 5-11 Virtual Desktop Interface Problematic Data Actions 27
155	Table 5-12 Network Detection Data Actions

DRAFT

156	Table 5-13 Network Detection Problematic Data Actions	31
157	Table 5-14 Logging Data Actions	33
158	Table 5-15 Logging Problematic Data Actions	35
159	Table 6-1 Security Control Map	46
160	Table 6-2 Privacy Control Map	49

161 **1 Summary**

- 162 In our data-driven world, organizations must prioritize cybersecurity and privacy as part of their business
- risk management strategy. Specifically, data confidentiality remains a challenge as attacks against an
- 164 organization's data can compromise emails, employee records, financial records, and customer
- 165 information—impacting business operations, revenue, and reputation.
- 166 Confidentiality is officially defined as "preserving authorized restrictions on information access and
- disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information."[1] Data
- 168 confidentiality makes sure that only the right people have access to the right data. Ensuring data
- 169 confidentiality should be a priority for any organization regardless of industry. A loss of data
- 170 confidentiality can be of great impact to not just the company or organization, but also to the individual
- 171 who have trusted the organization with their data.
- 172 The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) at the National Institute of Standards and
- 173 Technology (NIST) developed an example solution to address data security and privacy needs. This
- 174 project fits within a larger series of Data Security projects that are organized by the elements of the
- 175 Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA) triad, and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework's (CSF) Core
- 176 Functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.



Note: This project was initiated before the release of the DRAFT NIST CSF 2.0 and thus does not include the newly added GOVERN function. The DRAFT NIST CSF 2.0 defines Govern as "Establish and monitor the organization's cybersecurity risk management strategy, expectations, and policy". The govern function cuts across the other CSF functions. Though this document focuses on technical capabilities, it's intended that those capabilities would support an organizational governance function in managing data confidentiality attack risk.

178 Figure 1-1 Data Security Project Mapping

Cybersecurity Framework	Information Security Goals			
Functions	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	
Identify	1800-28	1800-25		
Protect	1000-20	1800-25		
Detect		1000.00		
Respond	1800-29 (you are here)	1800-26		
Recover		1800-11		

179 The goals of this NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide are to assist organizations in detecting, responding180 to, and recovering from data confidentiality events. This guide will help organizations:

181 Monitor the enterprise's user and data activity. • 182 Detect unauthorized data flows, user behavior, and data access. • Report unauthorized activity with respect to users and data in transit, at rest, or in use to 183 • 184 centralized monitoring and reporting software. Analyze the impact of unauthorized behavior and malicious behavior on the network or end 185 186 points. Determine if a loss of data confidentiality is occurring or has occurred. 187 Mitigate the impact of such losses of data confidentiality by facilitating an effective response to • 188 a data breach scenario. 189 • Contain the effects of a data breach so that more data is not exposed. 190 Facilitate the recovery effort from data breaches by providing detailed information as to the 191 scope and severity of the breach. 192 • Enumerate data flows and problematic data actions in line with the NIST privacy framework 193 In addition to the guidance provided in these documents, NIST has many resources available to help 194 organizations detect, respond to and recover from data confidentiality attacks: 195 NIST Special Publication 1800-25, Identifying and Protecting Assets from Ransomware and Other 196 Destructive Events [2] NIST Special Publication 1800-26, Detecting and Responding to Ransomware and Other Destruc-197 198 tive Events [3] NIST Special Publication 1800-11, Recovering from Ransomware and other Destructive Events [4] 199

- NIST Special Publication 800-83, *Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling for Desk-* tops and Laptops [5]
- NIST Special Publication 800-46, *Guide to Enterprise Telework, Remote Access, and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Security* [6]
- 204 NIST Special Publication 1800-184, Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery [7]
- 205 NIST Privacy Framework [8]
- 206 NIST Cybersecurity Framework [9]
- NIST Interagency Report 8374, *Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework Profile* [10]

209 1.1 Challenge

- 210 Fundamentally, data confidentiality is a challenge because all data exists to be accessible by some
- 211 number of authorized people or systems. Data access only becomes a data breach when that access is
- by an unauthorized person or system. The quantity and diversity of an organization's data, the varying
- 213 methods of data access (on-site versus remote, computer versus mobile device) and the potential for
- the compromise of valid user credentials all challenge an organization's ability to maintain the
- 215 confidentiality of their data. NIST SP 1800-29 focuses on the Detect, Respond, and Recover functions of
- 216 the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and addresses the challenges related to categorizing authorized and
- 217 unauthorized data access. Once that ontology is developed, this document helps organizations address
- 218 detecting, responding to, and recovering from a loss of data confidentiality.
- Additional challenges arise when defining what it means to "respond to" or "recover from" a data
- 220 breach. In the NCCoE's previous work on Data Integrity (1800-25, 1800-26, and 1800-11), it was possible
- to define recovery as a rollback of the compromised data to a point in time before it was altered. With
- respect to a loss of data confidentiality, there is no such process by which to "undo" the effects of such a
- loss—once digital data is in the hands of an unauthorized user, there is no guaranteed method by which
- to get all copies of the data back. This leaves an organization and the affected individuals with non-
- technical mitigations for the consequences of the breach (financial, reputational, etc.), as well as the
- ability of the organization to apply the lessons learned to technical improvements earlier in the timeline
- 227 to prevent against future breaches.

228 **1.2 Solution**

- 229 The NCCoE developed this two-part solution to address considerations for both data security and data
- privacy to help organizations manage the risk of a data confidentiality attack. The work in 1800-28
- addressed an organization's needs prior to a loss of data confidentiality (by focusing on the NIST CSF
- 232 Functions of Identify and Protect) while this guide's focus is on the actions of an organization during and
- after a loss of data confidentiality (the remaining NIST CSF Functions of Detect, Respond, and Recover).
- The solution utilizes commercially available tools to provide certain relevant capabilities such as event
- 235 detection, log correlation, incident response information, and credential management among others.

236 **1.3 Benefits**

- 237 Organizations can use this guide to help:
- 238 Evaluate their data confidentiality concerns

- Determine whether their data security needs align with the challenges described in these
 documents
- Conduct a gap analysis to determine the distance between the organization's current state and desired state with respect to data confidentiality
- 243 Perform an assessment of the feasibility of implementing any number of these solutions
- Determine a business continuity analysis to identify potential impacts on business operations as
 a result of a loss of data confidentiality.

246 **2 How to Use This Guide**

- This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide demonstrates a standards-based reference design and provides
 users with the information they need to replicate the data confidentiality capabilities described in this
 document. This reference design is modular and can be deployed in whole or in part.
- 250 This guide contains three volumes:
- 251 NIST SP 1800-29A: Executive Summary
- NIST SP 1800-29B: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics what we built and why
 (you are here)
- NIST SP 1800-29C: *How-To Guides* instructions for building the example solution
- 255 Depending on your role in your organization, you might use this guide in different ways:
- Business decision makers, including chief security and technology officers, will be interested in the
 Executive Summary, NIST SP 1800-29A, which describes the following topics:
- 258 challenges that enterprises face in data confidentiality
- 259 example solution built at the NCCoE
- 260 benefits of adopting the example solution
- Technology or security program managers who are concerned with how to identify, understand, assess,
 and mitigate risk will be interested in this part of the guide, *NIST SP 1800-29B*, which describes what we
 did and why. The following sections will be of particular interest:
- 264 Section 3.4, Risk Assessment, provides a description of the risk analysis we performed
- 265 Security Control Map, maps the security characteristics of this example solution to cybersecurity
 266 standards and best practices
- You might share the *Executive Summary, NIST SP 1800-29A*, with your leadership team members to help
 them understand the importance of adopting standards-based solutions to detect and respond to losses
 in data confidentiality.
- 270 **IT professionals** who want to implement an approach like this will find the whole practice guide useful.
- 271 You can use the how-to portion of the guide, *NIST SP 1800-29C*, to replicate all or parts of the build
- created in our lab. The how-to portion of the guide provides specific product installation, configuration,
- and integration instructions for implementing the example solution. We do not re-create the product

- 274 manufacturers' documentation, which is generally widely available. Rather, we show how we
- incorporated the products together in our environment to create an example solution.
- 276 This guide assumes that IT professionals have experience implementing security products within the
- 277 enterprise. While we have used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does
- 278 not endorse these particular products. Your organization can adopt this solution or one that adheres to
- these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and implementing
- 280 parts of detecting, responding to, and recovering from a loss of data confidentiality. Your organization's
- 281 security experts should identify the products that will best integrate with your existing tools and IT
- system infrastructure. We hope that you will seek products that are congruent with applicable standards
- and best practices. Section 3.66, <u>Technologies</u>, lists the products we used and maps them to the
- cybersecurity controls provided by this reference solution.

285 **2.1 Typographic Conventions**

Typeface/Symbol	Meaning	Example	
Italics	file names and path names;	For language use and style guidance,	
	references to documents that	see the NCCoE Style Guide.	
	are not hyperlinks; new		
	terms; and placeholders		
Bold	names of menus, options,	Choose File > Edit .	
	command buttons, and fields		
Monospace	command-line input,	mkdir	
	onscreen computer output,		
	sample code examples, and		
	status codes		
Monospace Bold	command-line user input	service sshd start	
	contrasted with computer		
	output		
blue text	link to other parts of the	All publications from NIST's NCCoE	
	document, a web URL, or an	are available at	
	email address	https://www.nccoe.nist.gov.	

286 The following table presents typographic conventions used in this volume.

287 **3 Approach**

- 288 The NCCoE is developing a set of data confidentiality projects mapped to the five Functions of the NIST
- 289 Cybersecurity Framework. This project centers on detecting, responding to, and recovering from
- 290 potential threats to confidentiality. Our commercial collaboration partners have volunteered to provide
- the products for the example solution for the problems raised in each of our use cases. Through this
- 292 collaboration, our goal is to create actionable recommendations for organizations and individuals trying
- 293 to solve data confidentiality issues.

294 **3.1 Audience**

- 295 The architecture of this project and accompanying documentation targets three distinct groups of
- 296 readers. The first is those personally managing, implementing, installing and configuring IT security
- 297 solutions for their organization. The walkthroughs of installation and configuration of the chosen
- 298 commercial products In Volume C of this guide, as well as any of our notes on lessons learned, work to
- 299 ease the challenge of implementing security best practices. This guide also serves as a starting point for
- 300 those addressing these security issues for the first time, and a reference for experienced admins who
- 301 want to do better.
- 302 The second group are those tasked with establishing broader security policies for their organizations.
- 303 Reviewing the threats each organization needs to account for and their potential solutions allows for
- 304 more robust and efficient security policy to be generated with greater ease.
- 305 The final group are those individuals responsible for the legal ramifications of breaches of
- 306 confidentiality. Many organizations have legal obligations to protect the personal data or personally
- 307 identifiable information they handle, and the ramifications for failing to at least adequately attempt to
- 308 protect that data can have severe consequences for the privacy of individuals and follow on
- 309 consequences for the organizations as a whole.
- 310 This guide will allow potential adopters to assess the feasibility of implementing data confidentiality best
- 311 practices within the IT systems of their own organization.

312 **3.2 Scope**

- 313 This document provides guidance on detecting, responding to, and recovering from a loss of data
- 314 confidentiality. Refer to Figure 1-1 to understand how this document fits within the larger set of NCCoE
- 315 Data Security projects, as organized by the CIA triad and the functions of the NIST Cybersecurity
- 316 Framework.

317 3.3 Assumptions

- 318 The technical solution developed at the NCCoE and represented in this guide does not incorporate the
- non-technical aspects of managing the confidentiality of an organization's data. The non-technicalcomponents could include (but are not limited to):
- 321 applicable legal requirements based on pertinent jurisdictions
- s22 corporate or other superseding policies relevant to confidentiality and privacy
- standard operating procedures in the event of a loss of data confidentiality
- 324 public relations strategies
- 325 This project is guided by the following assumptions:
- The solution was developed in a laboratory environment and is limited in the size and scale of
 data


Only a subset of products relevant to data confidentiality are included in this project; therefore,
 organizations should consider the guiding principles of this document when evaluating their
 organization's needs against the product landscape at the time of their IT implementation.

331 3.4 Privacy Considerations

Because privacy risks may arise as a result of a loss of confidentiality of data, this guide includes privacy
 considerations. This section gives a primer for why privacy is important to protect the relationship
 between privacy and cybersecurity risk, as well as NIST's approach to privacy risk assessment.

- 335 In today's digital landscape, consumers conduct much of their lives on the internet. Data processing,
- which includes any operations taken with data, including the collection, usage, storage, and sharing of
- data by organizations, can result in privacy problems for individuals. Privacy risks can evolve with
- 338 changes in technology and associated data processing. How organizations treat privacy has a direct
- bearing on their perceived trustworthiness. Recognizing the evolving privacy impacts of technology on
- 340 individuals, governments across the globe are working to address their concerns through new or
- 341 updated laws and regulations.
- 342 Following an open and transparent development process, NIST published the NIST Privacy Framework,
- 343 Version 1.0 to help organizations better identify and manage their privacy risks, build trust with
- 344 customers and partners, and meet their compliance obligations. The Privacy Framework Core provides
- privacy outcomes that organizations may wish to achieve as part of a privacy risk management program.
- 346 The Privacy Framework also discusses privacy engineering objectives that can be used to help
- 347 organizations prioritize their privacy risk management activities. The privacy engineering objectives are:
- Predictability: Enabling reliable assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators about data
 and their processing by a system
- Manageability: Providing the capability for granular administration of data, including collection,
 alteration, deletion, and selective disclosure
- Disassociability: Enabling the processing of data or events without association to individuals or
 devices beyond the operational requirements of the system
- 354 It is important for individuals and organizations to understand the relationship between cybersecurity
- and privacy. As noted in Section 1.2.1 of the *NIST Privacy Framework* [14], having a general
- 356 understanding of the different origins of cybersecurity and privacy risks is important for determining the
- 357 most effective solutions to address the risks. Figure 3-1 illustrates this relationship, showing that some
- 358 privacy risks arise from cybersecurity risks, and some are unrelated to cybersecurity risks.





- 360 Though a data confidentially breach may lead to privacy problems for individuals, it is important to note
- that privacy risks can arise without a cybersecurity incident. For example, an organization might process
- data in ways that violates an individual's privacy without that data having been breached or
- 363 compromised through a security incident. This type of issue can occur under a variety of scenarios, such
 364 as when data is stored for extended periods, beyond the need for which the information was initially
- 365 collected.
- 366 Privacy risks arise from privacy events—the occurrence or potential occurrence of problematic data
- 367 actions. The NIST Privacy Framework defines problematic data actions as data actions that may cause an
- 368 adverse effect for individuals. Problematic data actions might arise by data processing simply for mission
- or business purposes. Privacy risk is the likelihood that individuals will experience problems resulting
- from data processing, and the impact should they occur. [15] As reflected in the overlap of Figure 3-1,
- analyzing these risks in parallel with cybersecurity risks can help organizations understand the full
- 372 consequences of impacts of data confidentiality breaches. <u>Section 5.3</u> demonstrates scenarios where
- 373 privacy risks may arise and potential mitigations.
- Based on the reference architecture, this build considered the data actions that potentially causeproblematic data actions.

376 3.5 Risk Assessment

377 NIST SP 800-30 Revision 1, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, states that risk is "a measure of the 378 extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of: 379 (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of 380 occurrence." The guide further defines risk assessment as "the process of identifying, estimating, and 381 prioritizing risks to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation), 382 organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting from the operation of 383 an information system. Part of risk management incorporates threat and vulnerability analyses, and 384 considers mitigations provided by security controls planned or in place."

- 385 The NCCoE recommends that any discussion of risk management, particularly at the enterprise level,
- begins with a comprehensive review of NIST SP 800-37 Revision 2, Risk Management Framework for
- 387 *Information Systems and Organizations* [12]—material that is available to the public. The Risk
- 388 Management Framework (RMF) [13] guidance proved to be invaluable in giving us a baseline to assess
- risks, from which we developed the project, the security characteristics of the build, and this guide.

390 3.5.1 Security Risk Assessment

Security risk assessments often discuss the consideration of threats to an information system. NIST SP 800-30 Revision 1 defines a threat as "[a]ny circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or modification of information, and/or denial of service". Threats are actions that may compromise a system's confidentiality, integrity, or availability [11]. Threats evolve, and an organization needs to perform its own analysis when evaluating threats and risks that the organization faces.

- 398 The following threats were considered during the development of the data confidentiality solution:
- 399 exfiltration by malicious outsider actor
- 400 exfiltration by malicious internal actor (privilege misuse)
- 401 ransomware with threat to leak data
- 402 non-malicious insider actor (accidental email)
- 403 misplaced hardware

For a threat to be realized, a system, process or person must be vulnerable to a threat action. A
vulnerability is a deficiency or weakness that a threat source may exploit, resulting in a threat event.
Vulnerabilities may exist in a broader context. That is, they may be found in organizational governance
structures, external relationships, and mission/business processes.

- Organizations should consider the impact in the event that a data confidentiality breach occurs including
 potential decline in organizational trust and credibility affecting employees, customers, partners,
- 410 stakeholders as well as financial impacts due to loss of proprietary or other sensitive information.

411 3.5.2 Privacy Risk Assessment

- 412 This build also incorporates privacy as part of the build risk assessment. It is important for organizations
- 413 to address privacy risk as part of a comprehensive risk management process. The build utilized the NIST
- Privacy Framework [8] and Privacy Risk Assessment Methodology (PRAM) [14] to identify and address
- 415 privacy risks.
- 416 As part of identifying privacy risks in this build, problematic data actions were correlated to observed
- 417 privacy risks. In many cases, the security capabilities in this build will help mitigate privacy risks, but
- 418 organizations should use caution to implement these capabilities in a way that does not introduce new
- 419 privacy risks.
- 420 <u>Section 5.3</u> discusses problematic data actions and privacy considerations for this build.

421 **3.6 Technologies**

- 422 <u>Table 3-1</u> lists the technologies used in this project, and provides a mapping among the generic
- 423 application term, the specific product used, and the security control(s) that the product provides. Refer
- 424 to Table 6-1 for an explanation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategory identifiers. Table 3-1
- 425 also provides the Privacy Framework Subcategory identifiers, which are explained in <u>Appendix E</u>.

426 Table 3-1 Products and Technologies


Component	Product	Capability	NIST Cybersecurity Framework Subcategories	NIST Privacy Frame- work Subcategories
File Detection and Monitoring	PKWARE PKProtect	 Logs data protection and access activity Revokes and rotates breach- affected access and encryptions keys 	RS.MI-2	CT.DM-P8, PR.AC-P1
Network Detection and Monitoring	Cisco Stealthwatch	 Detects threats and determine affected user, device, location, and other relevant information Analyzes network traffic 	DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-4, DE.CM-7	PR.AC-P5, PR.PT-P3
Logging	FireEye Helix	 Provides aggregate view of entire environment Enables incident response 	DE.AE-1, DE.AE-2, DE.AE-3, DE.AE-4, RS.RP- 1, RS.CO-2, RS.AN-3	CT.DM-P8
User Access Control	Cisco DUO	Revokes compromised credentials	RC.RP-1	PR.AC-P1, PR.AC-P6
Network Protection	Dispel	 Provides remote access to network 	DE.AE-3, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, RS.MI-2	PR.AC-P3

427 **4** Architecture

This section presents the high-level architecture and a set of capabilities used in our data confidentiality reference design to detect, respond, and recover from data confidentiality events.

430 4.1 Architecture Description

431 Figure 4-1 Data Confidentiality Detect, Respond, and Recover High-Level Architecture



- 432 Each of the capabilities implemented plays a role in mitigating data confidentiality attacks:
- Data Protection involves maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of proprietary data, even
 in the event of a security breach or outright theft.
- Event Detection and Monitoring focuses on becoming aware of potential intrusions by tracking
 the events that may indicate a breach of security and alerting the relevant administrators.
- 437 Log collection, collation and correlation refers to the proper monitoring of activity on a system,
 438 and the analysis of that activity for any potential anomalous patterns or events.
- User access controls work to regulate and restrict the level of access different users have, so
 that they can perform their work without providing unnecessary access that can be turned to
 more malicious ends.
- Network protection provides protection for security architecture and enterprise components,
 as well as providing additional network and authentication logging data for analysis.
- These capabilities work together to detect malicious activity, respond appropriately, and aid in recovering both the system's security and any corrupted data. The data protection capability works to encrypt and manage encryption keys for the data. This data protection is critical as a line of defense against breaches; encryption ensures that data captured in a breach is effectively unusable by the

- 448 adversary. The monitoring capability analyzes network traffic to detect abnormal or malicious network
- 449 activity and the user accounts affected by it. The event detection capability similarly detects
- 450 unauthorized data access and other software related events which may be related to data breaches,
- 451 such as the usage of USBs, printers, and email to transfer sensitive files. The anomalies detected by the
- 452 event detection and monitoring capabilities can provide warnings of a potential breach, triggering
- 453 responses which the organization has set in place.
- The log collection, collation, and correlation capability collects data from other capabilities to provide
- 455 administrators with an overview of organizational health and knowledge about potential and actual data
- 456 breaches. This larger view of the entire network enables administrators to determine the extent of the 457 damage to the organization, the status of the containment of the security breach, and whether the
- damage to the organization, the status of the containment of the security breach, and whether the
 remnants of the security breach have been successfully removed. In combination with the user access
- 459 control capability, these can be used to revoke compromised user credentials, and restrict the access of
- 460 uncompromised accounts related to the breach.

461 **5 Security & Privacy Characteristic Analysis**

The following section is intended to help organization understand the extent to which the project meets its objective of demonstrating technologies and capabilities to mitigate data confidentiality risk. To support this, we developed several scenarios which organizations may consider when conducting their security and privacy risk analysis. For each scenario we discuss how our architecture might help mitigate or limit security and privacy risks.

467 **5.1 Assumptions and Limitations**

468 The following analysis has the following limitations:

- 469 It is neither a comprehensive test of all security components nor a red-team exercise.
- 470 It cannot identify all weaknesses or risks
- It does not include the lab infrastructure. It is assumed that devices are hardened. Testing these
 devices would reveal only weaknesses in implementation that would not be relevant to those
 adopting this reference architecture.

474 5.2 Security Scenarios

- 475 Our security evaluation involved assessing how well the reference design addresses the security charac-
- 476 teristics that it was intended to support. Each scenario lays out a potential cybersecurity event and dis-
- 477 cusses the responsibilities of an organization with respect to each event, and how the security capabili478 ties of our architecture would help an organization address the Cybersecurity Framework functions of
- 479 **Detecting, Responding** and **Recovering** to each proposed scenario.
- 480 NOTE: The below scenarios map to the DRAFT NIST CSF 2.0. For a mapping to the NIST CSF 1.1 please
 481 see Security Control Map in Appendix D.

482 5.2.1 Exfiltration of Encrypted Data

483 Table 5-1 Exfiltration of Encrypted Data Security Scenario

Description	An organization has unknowingly acquired a compromised machine from an outside source and has attached the machine to its trusted network. This machine periodically scans a certain part of the filesystem, which it has deemed to be potentially sensitive, and encrypts and uploads the contents to a malicious web host. Because the machine was assumed to be trusted due to human error, the delivery of this malware into the system is difficult to detect; it must be detected and stopped after it has already started run- ning.
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	DE.AE-02, DE.AE-03, DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-06, DE.CM-09, RS.MA-02, RS.AN-03, RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03, RS.MI-02
Organizational Response	In this scenario, the organization accepts an infected machine onto its net- work. As an example, this could be hardware ordered from a third-party vendor, potentially having been refurbished or modified before delivery to the organization. Because the organization connects the machine directly to the network, the acquisition of the malware happens immediately and without warning. It falls to the organization to detect any changes in the network caused by the malware. It must also understand the extent of the damage, to properly scale the response and recovery efforts.
Detect	The Monitoring capability is used to watch the network for anomalous traf- fic which may indicate a breach of data confidentiality. The tools being em- ployed monitor all data transfers and distinguish between the unauthorized and authorized. The data gathered feeds into the Logging and Reporting capabilities, which enable response and recovery.
Respond	The Reporting capability is used to set events into motion once the Moni- toring capability has alerted it to malicious activity. This will alert adminis- trators to the issue while also triggering automated responses to prevent further damage to proprietary data.
Recover	The Logging capability provides a history of what data was access and exfil- trated, as knowledge of what precisely was taken will determine exactly what liability the organization holds and which affected parties will need to be notified.

484 5.2.2 Spear Phishing Campaign

485 Table 5-2 Spear Phishing Campaign Security Scenario

Description An unknown user has successfully launched a spear phishing attack, and in the process retrieved an authorized user's login and password. This user has access to several of the organization's databases, allowing them to both view and manipulate the data contained within. This exposes proprietary data to theft and manipulation or deletion.

Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	DE.AE-02, DE.AE-03, DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-06, DE.CM-09, RS.MA- 02, RS.AN-03, RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03, RS.MI-01, RS.MI-02	
Organizational Response	This scenario illustrates the compromise of valid, privileged credentials through a spear phishing email. The user may report this themselves if they retroactively realize it was a phishing attack, or they may not. The organiza- tion will need to detect the compromised account and assess any unau- thorized access or data exfiltration.	
Detect	The Network Monitoring and Logging capabilities are used to watch for those anomalous behaviors most often associated with compromised accounts.	
Respond	The Mitigation capability demonstrated in this project allows for rapid disa- bling of account privileges in the event of compromised credentials, pre- venting further access to additional sensitive data.	
Recover	The Logging and Reporting capabilities provided a detailed picture of all sensitive data accessed by the compromised account, which will allow the organization to determine what liability it holds and what affected parties will need to be notified.	

486 5.2.3 Ransomware

487 Table 5-3 Ransomware Security Scenario

Description	An employee of the company makes a mistake while entering the URL of their company's email provider. This mistake takes them to an identical login page, but it is hosted by a malicious actor. When they enter their cre- dentials on the login page, the page records their credentials, and forwards them to the actual login page, as if the credentials were mistyped. The ma- licious actor later uses these credentials to login as the employee. They download and run a malicious ransomware executable as the user. The ran- somware executable encrypts the files and notifies the company they must pay a ransom to access their data.
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	DE.AE-02, DE.AE-03, DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-06, DE.CM-09, RS.MA- 02, RS.AN-03, RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03, RS.MI-01, RS.MI-02
Organizational Response	In this scenario, an account at the organization has downloaded malware onto the system, which has begun encrypting sensitive data. The user may or may not report the attack, though there may be clues as to its existence - a user with account troubles and traffic going to a domain name very similar to the organization's domain might be enough to send up red flags if noticed. Regardless, the organization will need to deal with a privileged user account being used to download malware and hold the confidentiality of sensitive files ransom.
Detect	The Monitoring capability for this scenario includes network monitoring, which can detect unauthorized data exfiltration out of the network and any irregular access or changes to existing data. Any exfiltration or data encryp- tion actions would also be included in logs forwarded to the tools used for Reporting and Logging capabilities.

Respond	The Mitigation capability for this scenario will allow for rapid disabling and secure re-enabling of compromised accounts once the relevant member accounts are detected. The Reporting capability is designed to quickly notify security teams of necessary actions, such as isolating the system from the network and securing any data not yet attacked by the ransomware.
Recover	The scenario build doesn't possess any technical capabilities for literal recovery of the stolen data, as the scenario predicates the data has already been successfully stolen, but the Logging capabilities should allow a detailed review of what was taken. This will allow for post-incident review of security flaws and notification of anyone inside or outside the organization affected by the security breach.

488 5.2.4 Accidental Email

489 Table 5-4 Accidental Email Security Scenario

Description	A user of the organization accidentally cc's an individual on an email. This email has an attachment containing proprietary information which the cc'd individual is not cleared for. The individual copied on the email is consid- ered a disgruntled employee, and when he sees this email, immediately downloads and saves these files.	
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	DE.AE-02, DE.AE-03, DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-06, DE.CM-09, RS.MA- 02, RS.AN-03, RS.CO-02, RS.MI-02	
Organizational Response	In the event of an accidental information leak via email, it is not unlikely that the event will be reported. Since there are multiple parties involved who are not malicious, it is possible that one of them will report the inci- dent. Regardless of whether it is reported, however, the organization should be able to track the transfer of sensitive data to the unauthorized employee's system, and also prevent that employee from reading it.	
Detect	The Monitoring and Event Detection capability watches over network traf- fic, which includes scanning emails for sensitive content and its intended recipients.	
Respond	The Mitigation capability of the scenario may block any uncleared individu- als from seeing sensitive information in the accidentally sent emails, or even remove it automatically from uncleared systems on the network. The Reporting capability is designed to quickly notify security teams so they can attempt to contain the data exposed through the email.	
Recover	As the scenario build should prevent any information from being leaked due to an uncleared email receiving sensitive information, there are no sig- nificant capabilities being used for recovery of proprietary data. However, the Logging and Reporting capabilities should allow for all organization members involved in the incident to be notified of their roles, and the ag- gregation of data regarding the incident should alert the organization if ad- ditional training on the distribution of proprietary data is necessary.	

490 5.2.5 **Lost Laptop**

491 Table 5-5 Lost Laptop Security Scenario

Description	A user has lost their work laptop, which contains proprietary information. It is unknown if the laptop was targeted for its data and access credentials by a malicious actor, or if the incident was an unfortunate accident. For the purposes of this scenario, we assume the user of the laptop has reported the missing system on their own.
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	DE.CM-03, DE.CM-09, DE.AE-06, RS.MA-01, RS.AN-03, RS.AN-08, RS.CO-2
Organizational Response	In the event of a lost laptop, it is likely that the loss will be reported by the user, as the user will directly lose their ability to work. The organization must determine the data that was on the laptop, the security posture of the laptop, and the access the laptop provided to the organization's network, so that the loss can be accurately assessed, and further data loss can be prevented.
Detect	In many cases, the user will need to report their own laptop lost or stolen. While the Logging and Monitoring components can identify if the laptop is a security risk by verifying if the laptop attempts to connect to the network, it may be impossible to detect whether the data on the laptop has been ac- cessed once network connectivity is lost. The Logging and Reporting capa- bilities create a record that can detect if data has been inappropriately ac- cessed from laptops that are reported missing, based on user logins and ac- tivity.
Respond	The Mitigation capability of this scenario should allow for remote wiping of proprietary data from laptops, should they attempt to reconnect to the organization's network. The Reporting capability is designed to quickly notify security teams so they can flag the laptop as missing and assess from back-ups what data is exposed.
Recover	This scenario build does not contain the capability for physical recovery of lost laptops. However, Logging and Reporting capabilities can determine what data was on the lost laptop, and the individuals who might be affected by the potential exposure of the laptop's contents.

492 5.2.6 Privilege Misuse

493 Table 5-6 Privilege Misuse Security Scenario

Description	A malicious insider navigates to one of the organization's shared drives, and finds sensitive information stored there. Looking to sell this infor- mation to competitors, the insider copies the information to his personal USB drive. The insider also prints these files.	
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02, DE.AE-03, DE.AE-04, RS.MA-01, RS,MA-05, RS.AN-03, RS.CO-2, RS.CO-3, RS.MI-01, RC.CO-3, RC.CO-4	

Organizational Response	It is unlikely that a malicious insider will advertise their misdoings - it falls to the organization to discover the insider behavior and protect assets from them. Through proper access control and encryption of sensitive files, organizations can hinder the insider's attempt to exfiltrate useful data. It is unlikely that an organization will be able to completely stop a determined insider through technical means, however; organizations should use the technical capabilities they have to limit the exfiltration, while also gathering information about the extent of the loss to aid in the pursuit of legal resolutions to the incident.
Detect	The Event Detection capability of the scenario is designed to watch for users accessing data they are not authorized for, the insertion of USB drives, and even the activation of printers.
Respond	The Reporting capability, combined with Event Detection , allows for security administrators to be quickly notified of potentially malicious actions. They can then respond by utilizing the Mitigation capability to restrict User Access Controls for any suspected insider accounts. Mitigation capabilities also exist to restrict copying and printing functionality.
Recover	The Logging capability in this scenario tracks user access to sensitive data, allowing for a full accounting of potentially compromised proprietary data.

494 5.2.7 Eavesdropping

495 Table 5-7 Eavesdropping Security Scenario

Description	A malicious outsider has gained access to the network traffic of the organi- zation. They possess the capability to intercept and hijack internal commu- nications via a man-in-the-middle attack. A user begins uploading a sensi- tive proposal for a new project. The malicious outsider can intercept and view these files.
Associated DRAFT CSF 2.0 Subcategories	DE.CM-01, DE.CM-03, DE.CM-09, DE.AE-02, DE.AE-03, DE.AE-04, RS.MA-01, RS,MA-05, RS.AN-03, RS.CO-2, RS.CO-3, RS.MI-01, RS.MI-02, RC.RP-01, RC.CO-3, RC.CO-4
Organizational Response	In this scenario, an organization will likely be able to see the introduction of a new device on the network. In this example, a user's sensitive upload is stolen while it is in transit. The user may see warnings about HTTPS or inva- lid certificates due to the nature of the attack, and the organization may notice anomalous traffic going through the new device on the network. The organization is responsible for identifying the new device as malicious, pro- tecting data intercepted by it through encryption, and mitigating its ability to communicate with trusted enterprise machines.
Detect	The Event Detection and Monitoring capabilities of this scenario provide the means to detect and track anomalous network activity, specifically if the flow of communication is following anomalous patterns or routing through unnecessary systems. The Logging capability would also assist in identifying the source of the leak.
Respond	If the activities of the malicious host are allowed to continue, further loss of data can occur. Because of this, it is important to stop the interception of

	data quickly. In the event that the attacker is in the building, or even read- ing the data themselves as they intercept it, swift mitigation of the leak is necessary. Through the Mitigation component, we can contain or discon- nect the malicious host from the network, to learn more information about it and prevent the leak. This can happen automatically or manually, de- pending on the reliability of the anomaly detection software.
Recover	The Logging and Reporting capabilities allow for the full accounting of the traffic and data the man-in-the-middle system touched before its detection and removal from the network, allowing for the notification of all affected parties.

496 **5.3 Privacy Scenarios**

497 The following section describes scenarios an organization may consider when conducting their privacy

- risk assessment. Based on the reference architecture used in this project each scenario is examined for
- data actions that give rise to potential privacy problems for individuals. Each table documents
- 500 problematic data actions taken from the NIST Catalogue of Problematic Data Actions and Problems [16],
- and lists privacy mitigations mapped to the NIST Privacy Framework [8]. For the privacy risks analyzed,
- 502 consideration was given to how the data is processed. The specific privacy risks found within the
- scenarios are derived from the architecture components and the data flows used in this build, but to the
 extent possible, generalized for organizations using similar components and capabilities.
- ____
- 505 Organizations may collect information affecting privacy when implementing cybersecurity or privacy-
- 506 based controls. For example, an organization might implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) using
- 507 information such as a mobile phone number. Even though collecting this information helps to protect
- 508 systems and data by supporting capabilities like non-repudiation and system auditing, it may also
- 509 generate privacy risks.
- 510 When implementing cybersecurity or privacy-based controls, organizations should consider the benefit a
- 511 user realizes, both from the use of a service and the securing of that service, before processing
- 512 information affecting privacy. This benefit can be weighed against the risk posed to both individuals and
- 513 the organization should a privacy event occur.
- 514 For example, using the MFA example mentioned above, users may feel compelled to provide
- 515 information affecting privacy, such as their personal phone number for SMS (short messaging service)
- authentication, to gain access to systems or services. However, if the user is accessing publicly-available
- 517 information, the risk of the misuse of information from collecting personal phone numbers may be
- 518 greater than the security benefit for protecting the low-sensitivity information. Additionally, if given the
- option, users may elect to use alternative authentication methods that are less privacy-invasive, such as
- 520 using a work phone number over a personal number or a hardware MFA authenticator over SMS
- authentication. The NIST Privacy Risk Assessment Methodology (PRAM) refers to this problematic data
- action, where the user is compelled to provide information disproportionate to the purpose or outcome
- 523 of the transaction, as induced disclosure.


- 524 Organizations should consider these types of risks as they design and implement systems. As
- 525 demonstrated in the scenarios below, risk mitigations should be implemented within the design to limit 526 privacy risks. These privacy risk mitigations might include the following, among others:
- Understand where and how information is processed, including collection practices and system components that store and transmit this information (data flows and mapping)
- Understand the risks and benefits of collecting different data elements to determine if it should
 not be collected
- Keep data only as long as needed for its function and destroy or de-identify it otherwise using
 proper data lifecycle management practices and in accordance with applicable laws and policies
- Keep personal data segregated in a different repository, when practicable
- Encrypt data at rest, in transit, and in use
- Use role-based access controls
- Consider what measures should be taken to address predictability and manageability before
 deciding whether data can be used beyond its initial expected and agreed upon use
- Implement privacy-enhancing technologies to increase disassociability while retaining
 confidentiality and the capability to process data for mission or business purposes

540 5.3.1 User Login with Multifactor Authentication

541 Phishing-resistant multifactor MFA is a security best practice. The architecture recommends the use of a

- password, pin or biometric with an asymmetric cryptographic key for authentication. However, it is
- 543 common practice for organizations to offer a variety of MFA solutions. Some MFA solutions, such as
- 544 biometrics or authenticating with user-owned mobile devices, might introduce privacy risks.

545 Figure 5-1 Multifactor Authentication Data Flow Diagram



- 2. Client IP Address
- 3. Transaction Identifier
- 4. Mobile device information (Cellular number)

546 Table 5-8 User Login With Multifactor Authentication Data Actions

Data Type	Data Action	Examples of Privacy Considerations
Username	Username is stored by the user workstation, and trans- ferred across the authentication process to help identify the transaction.	Usernames are unique to an individual and potentially con- tain identifiable information such as user's first and last names
Client IP (inter- net protocol) Address	The client IP address is stored by the user workstation, and transferred as part of communications where it is an endpoint.	IP addresses can be easily linkable to an individual or their device, allow tracking activities across multiple systems or services, or used to derive other information such as user's general location
Transaction Identifier	The transaction identifier is generated by active directory and transferred to the MFA solution and the mobile device.	Cross-device identifiers for a transaction can be used to re- identify information that was otherwise de-identified, such as connections between a user's name and their cellular phone number.
Mobile device information	The mobile device information is stored by the MFA solu- tion and the mobile device and transferred as a part of the communication between the mobile device and MFA solu- tion.	Mobile device information used in certain MFA transac- tions, such as phone numbers, identify individuals and their device. Furthermore, information about a user's mobile de- vice, such as device type and version, can be used to infer privacy-impacting information such as spending habits and other behaviors.

547

548 Table 5-9 User Login with Multifactor Authentication Problematic Data Action

Scenarios	Privacy Risk	Problematic Data Actions	Privacy Mitigations
User authentication may use a personally or organizationally owned mobile device as an authenticator.	Users non-work activity may be tracked by an organization.	Context: Users may not want to provide personal information, including phone number and location information, but may feel compelled to meet organizational se- curity requirements. Tracking within the work environment or even outside the work environment could be disproportion- ate to the security needs leading to unan- ticipated revelations about user activities or degradation of the dignity or autonomy of users. Problematic Data Action: Surveillance, Unanticipated Revelation, Induced Disclo- sure Problem: Loss of Autonomy: Users have no control over what information is shared in this scheme. Users may not feel comfortable using their own personal information as a security feature for an organizational ser- vice. Loss of Trust: Users may not feel comfortable with their personal phone numbers and device information being shared with third-party applications and Software as a Service providers.	 Predictability: Organizations should inform users of information that processed by login tools and viewed by administrators, such as through privacy notices when devices are enrolled. System administrators should have limited access to user authentication information. Manageability: Organizations that leverage user's personal devices for user login processes should consider tools that give the users options for registering different types of authenticators, including those that do not use personal devices and information. In this build, DUO offers a variety of authentication options, such as a hardware-based authenticator. Organizations should be auditing tools to determine what information they are using and collecting as well as who is accessing and using it. Disassociability: Organizations should explore capabilities and configurations that allow for the de-identification of phone numbers and other personal information, such as the capability to replace a phonenumber with placeholder text or privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques to limit the tracking of users.

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549 5.3.2 Authentication to Virtual Desktop Interface Solution

550 The reference architecture in this document demonstrates a Virtual Desktop Interface (VDI) solution to facilitate secure access to organizational


resources and data. Organizations may allow users' personal devices to access corporate resources using the VDI solution. Organizations should

552 consider the privacy risk of installing VDI software on personally owned devices, information revealed by the VDI protocol, and monitoring of

user activity while in the virtual environment.

DRAFT

554 Figure 5-2 Virtual Desktop Interface Data Flow Diagram



- 4. One-time password
- 5. Client time zone, computer name

555 Table 5-10 Virtual Desktop Interface Data Actions

Data Type	Data Action	Examples of Privacy Considerations	
Username	The username is stored by the user workstation and active directory. It is transferred as part of the authentication process.	Usernames potentially contain inferable PII such as user's first and last names	
Client IP Ad- dress	The Client IP Address is stored on the user workstation, and transferred as part of transactions and connections it generates.	IP addresses can be used to derive PII such as user's general location	
Token Identifier	A Token Identifier is generated by Active Directory in support of the authentication process, and transferred to the VDI.	Token identifiers can be used to re-identify other infor- mation affecting privacy that occur as part of transactions.	
Client Time Zone	The Client Time Zone is stored by the user workstation and transferred as part of an RDP (remote desktop protocol) connection to the virtual desktop.	When combined with IP addresses, Client Time Zones pro- vide greater certainty about a user's location.	
Client Computer Name	The Client Computer Name is stored by the user work- station and transferred as part of an RDP connection to the virtual desktop.	Client Computer Name can be easily linkable to an individ- ual, allow tracking activities across multiple systems and services, or used to derive other information, such as names and device locations	

556 Table 5-11 Virtual Desktop Interface Problematic Data Actions

Scenarios	Examples of Privacy Risk	Problematic Data Actions	Privacy Mitigations
User logs into a Vir- tual Desktop Inter- face solution from a personally or or- ganizationally owned device.	Information that can be associated with the user, such as their de- vice information or lo- cation, may be trans- mitted to security tools as part of the authenti- cation process. This in- formation could result in tracking a user's non- work activity or expos- ing a user's non-work related information.	 Context: Users may use a variety of devices to connect to central login platforms, including personally owned devices. Users operating under a BYOD or remote work scheme may not expect that certain data from their personal devices is shared with the organization. This can include their location and operating hours. Organizations can choose to use less identifiable information for a Client Computer Name (e.g., an asset tag number), but do not have control over how users name the personal devices they may use to authenticate. Problematic Data Action: Surveillance, Unanticipated Revelation Problem: Loss of Trust. Users may not feel comfortable with this information being shared with their employer or third-party applications. Dignity Loss. Users may have information, such as their physical location and work hours, revealed to organizations in an undesired or unexpected fashion. 	 Predictability: Users should be informed of information that is viewed and collected by login tools such as Dispel, such as through a login banner. Use privacy enhancing technologies and techniques like data minimization, encryption, obfuscation, anonymization, data minimization, and pseudonymization, among others. Manageability: Organizations that include user's personal devices in day-to-day operation should audit tools to determine what information they are using and collecting. Confidentiality: Organizations should mandate strict access control for the management and configuration of user login services, such as with MFA. Availability: Organizations that utilize central login platforms as their entry should consider the robustness of their platforms and systems. A loss of access to these systems can lead to an inability for users to access their data.

558 5.3.3 Monitoring by Network Detection Solution

559 Network detection solutions monitor network traffic to identify network patterns that may indicate ma-

560 licious or harmful activity on a system or network. As part of this monitoring, network data may be du-


561 plicated, sent to third party applications or centralized. The transmission and use of this data for net-

work monitoring may reveal more about users than necessary for security purposes, which raises pri-

563 vacy risk.

DRAFT

564 Figure 5-3 Network Detection Data Flow Diagram



Data Key

- 1. Client IP Address
- 2. User network metadata (Target IP address, Session information)
- 3. User network traffic content

565 Table 5-12 Network Detection Data Actions

Data Type	Data Action	Examples of Privacy Considerations
Client IP Ad- dress	P Ad- IP Addresses are stored on the User Workstation and Log- ging Solution, and transferred between the User Work- station, network infrastructure, Network Detection Solu- tion, and the Logging Solution. IP addresses can be used to derive a user's logent of the statement	
Network metadata	Network metadata is generated on the User Workstation and is transferred to the network infrastructure, the Net- work Detection Solution, and the Logging Solution. It is stored by the Logging Solution.	Network metadata can contain information that can be used to derive location or as a common identifier to re-iden- tify previously de-identified information.
Network traffic content	Network traffic content is generated on the User Work- station and is transferred to the network infrastructure, the Network Detection Solution, and the Logging Solution. It is stored by the Logging Solution.	Network traffic content can contain a variety of information or inferences about the individual, such as health or finan- cial data.

567

566 Table 5-13 Network Detection Problematic Data Actions


Scenarios	Examples of Privacy Risk	Problematic Data Actions	Privacy Mitigations
Netflow data is replicated to a net- work monitoring solution for analy- sis.	User data and metadata that is trans- mitted across the net- work through a net- work monitoring solu- tion increases the chance of exposure of information to organi- zational administrators and third-party tools. Further, user network traffic may be used to profile user behavior.	Context: Network monitoring tools commonly duplicate and centralize network traffic activity. This may expose information affecting privacy to third party software or to network administrators. Additionally, such monitoring capabilities can prevent or undo the effects of de-identification capabilities used by other security tools. Finally, this additional viewing and analysis might be used to profile a user, and conflict with their expectations regarding the level of scrutiny to which their data is exposed. Problematic Data Action: Surveillance, Unanticipated Revelation, Re-Identification Problem: Loss of Trust. Users may find the scrutiny of their network traffic unexpected or unwarranted. Furthermore, violation of other advertised anonymization capabilities can strongly affect trust in the security architecture.	Predictability: Users should be informed of monitoring capabilities of Cisco Stealthwatch and related tools, such as through a login banner. Use privacy en- hancing technologies and techniques to de-identify user ID and IP address like obfuscation, communication anonymiza- tion, data minimization, and pseudony- mization, among others. Manageability: Organizations seeking to secure these sorts of tools should make sure that they are configurable, and con- sider the requirements for them to oper- ate effectively. This can include de-iden- tification options within such monitoring devices. Disassociability: Organizations should employ de-identification options for data when appropriate. Furthermore, tools that rely on unaltered network traffic should consider what privacy mitigations applied to other tools may be compro- mised by their use. Confidentiality: Organizations should mandate strict access controls for secu- rity tools that can impact user privacy, including the use of MFA.

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568 5.3.4 Monitoring by Logging Solution

569 This reference architecture generates logs used to aid in response and recovery activities. These logs are essential for proper data management

- 570 and incident response. However, organizations should consider the privacy implications of data processing activities related to logging and
- 571 montioring.
- 572 Figure 5-4 Logging Data Flow Diagram



1. Usernames, IP addresses, web traffic history

573 Data processing throughout the security architecture, and the logs generated by user activities, can interact with and create information that

574 affects the privacy of users. The use of a logging solution requires that data and metadata about user's activity be generated and stored in an

additional location. Depending on the details and scope of the logging tool, this can extend the effective domain of information that affects

576 privacy used by those tools. Some examples of information affecting privacy utilized in such transactions is given below:

577 Table 5-14 Logging Data Actions

Data Type	Data Action	Examples of Privacy Considerations	
tems as well as the Logging Solution. They are transferred by and through the Security Solutions.		IP addresses can be used to determine rough locations for user-owned machines. Additionally, IP Addresses can be common across logs from many security tools, allowing for anonymized data to be re-identified and can enable tracking or surveillance in unintended ways.	
Device Identifi- ers	Device Identifiers are stored and transferred by enterprise systems as well as the Logging Solution. They are trans- ferred by and through the Security Solutions.	Under certain circumstances, Device Identifiers, such as MAC (media access control) addresses, can be used to iden- tify individuals from data that has been de-identified, or al- low for privacy-impacting correlations to be made between data logs.	

578

579 Table 5-15 Logging Problematic Data Actions

Scenarios	Examples of Privacy Risk	Problematic Data Actions	Privacy Mitigations
Security tools generate metadata that is transferred to a logging solu- tion, either directly or via an on-site forwarder.	The security system passively creates data about users, their data, and their activities and may provide insights into users or their ac- tivity that they do not anticipate. This infor- mation is transmitted across the network, stored remotely, and may be combined with other information in ways that reveal addi- tional information about users beyond what can be gleaned from any one particu- lar system.	Context: Logging systems contain data history of user activities. These logs are transmitted off the device or system in which they were created to other systems where log information is aggre- gated. The privacy impact of each log and the ag- gregation of logs must be considered. Further- more, this information is exposed to administra- tors who have access to either the individual or aggregated logs. Problematic Data Action: Unanticipated Revela- tion, Re-identification, Surveillance Problem: Loss of trust. Users may not expect the scope of information created and tracked by logs, even if they understand the scope of the security infra- structure. Dignity Loss. Embarrassing or undesired privacy information may be inferred about individuals whose actions generate logging information.	Predictability: The existence of monitor- ing systems should be disclosed to users upon their access to organizational sys- tems, such as through a login banner. Use privacy enhancing technologies and techniques to de-identify user ID and IP address like obfuscation, communication anonymization, data minimization, and pseudonymization, among others. Manageability: Organizations should evaluation how logs can be configured to collect the least amount of information necessary in order to meet security needs, especially when security tools are aggregating log information across multi- ple systems. Disassociability: Organizations should consider de-identification functions for log creation, transmission, storage and aggregation. For example, privacy-rele- vant information such as the user's name can be disassociated from their IP ad- dress or device identifier when collecting log information.

		Confidentiality: Tools that generate or
		store logs should have strict access con-
		trol applied to them such as MFA.

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581 6 Future Build Considerations

582 As shown in Figure 1-1, the NCCoE Data Security work that remains to be addressed within the

583 framework of the CIA triad is that of Data Availability. The Data Security team plans to evaluate the

584 current landscape of Data Availability challenges that organizations face and determine future relevant

585 projects to address those needs.

586	Appendix A	List of Acronyms
	BYOD	Bring Your Own Device
	СОВІТ	Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies
	CIA	Confidentiality Integrity Availability
	CIS	Center for Internet Security
	CNSSI	Committee on National Security Systems Instruction
	CRADA	Cooperative Research And Development Agreement
	CSC	Critical Security Controls
	CSF	Cybersecurity Framework
	FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
	HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
	IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
	IP	Internet Protocol
	ISA	International Society of Automation
	ISO	International Organization for Standardization
	ІТ	Information Technology
	ITL	Information Technology Laboratory
	MAC	Media Access Control
	MFA	Multi Factor Authentication
	NCCoE	National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
	NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
	NIST IR	NIST Interagency or Internal Report
	PII	Personally Identifiable Information
	PRAM	Privacy Risk Assessment Methodology
	RDP	Remote Desktop Protocol
	RMF	Risk Management Framework
	SMS	Short Messaging Service
	SP	Special Publication
	URL	Uniform Resource Location

USBUniversal Series BusVDIVirtual Desktop Interface

587 Appendix B Glossary

Access Control	The process of granting or denying specific requests to 1) obtain and use information and related information processing services and 2) enter specific physical facilities (e.g., federal buildings, military establishments, border crossing entrances).
	SOURCE: Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201-3
Adversary	Person, group, organization, or government that conducts or has the intent to conduct detrimental activities.
	SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015
Asset	A major application, general support system, high impact program, physical plant, mission critical system, personnel, equipment, or a logically related group of systems.
	SOURCE: Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 4009-2015
Authentication	Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in an information system.
	SOURCE: FIPS 200
Authorization	Access privileges granted to a user, program, or process or the act of granting those privileges.
	SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015
Backup	A copy of files and programs made to facilitate recovery if necessary.
	SOURCE: NIST SP 800-34 Rev. 1
Breach	The loss of control, compromise, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, or any similar occurrence where: a person other than an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses personally identifiable information; or an authorized user accesses personally identifiable information for another than authorized purpose.
	SOURCE: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5

Control	The means of managing risk, including policies, procedures, guidelines, practices, or organizational structures, which can be of an administrative, technical, management, or legal nature.
	SOURCE: NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 2 Rev. 1
Confidentiality	Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.
	SOURCE: FIPS 200
Data	A subset of information in an electronic format that allows it to be retrieved or transmitted.
	SOURCE: CNSSI 4008-2015
Data Action	A system/product/service data life cycle operation, including, but not limited to collection, retention, logging, generation, transformation, use, disclosure, sharing, transmission, and disposal.
	SOURCE: NIST Privacy Framework Version 1.0
Disassociability	Enabling the processing of PII or events without association to individuals or devices beyond the operational requirements of the system.
	SOURCE: NISTIR 8062
Encrypt	Cryptographically transform data to produce cipher text.
	SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015
Enterprise	An entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an organizational structure.
	SOURCE: NIST SP 800-72
Event	Any observable occurrence in a network or system.
	SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015
Exfiltration	The unauthorized transfer of information from an information system.
	SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015

Incident	An occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies.
	SOURCE: FIPS 200
Integrity	Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity.
	SOURCE: FIPS 200
Malware	Hardware, firmware, or software that is intentionally included or inserted in a system for a harmful purpose.
	SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015
Manageability	Providing the capability for granular administration of PII including alteration, deletion, and selective disclosure.
	SOURCE: NISTIR 8062
Mitigation	A decision, action, or practice intended to reduce the level of risk associated with one or more threat events, threat scenarios, or vulnerabilities.
	SOURCE: NIST SP 1800-160 Vol. 2 Rev. 1
Phishing	A technique for attempting to acquire sensitive data, such as bank account numbers, through a fraudulent solicitation in email or on a web site, in which the perpetrator masquerades as a legitimate business or reputable person.
	SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015
Predictability	Enabling reliable assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators about PII and its processing by a system.
	SOURCE: NISTIR 8062
Privacy	A condition that safeguards human dignity and autonomy by means of methods that achieve predictability, manageability, and disassociability

Risk	The level of impact on organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals resulting from the operation of an information system given the potential impact of a threat and the likelihood of that threat occurring.
	SOURCE: FIPS 200
Security Control	The safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information system or an organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information.
	SOURCE: NIST SP 800-53
Security Policy	A set of rules that governs all aspects of security-relevant system and system component behavior.
	SOURCE: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Spear Phishing	A colloquial term that can be used to describe any highly targeted phishing attack.
	SOURCE: CNSSI 4009-2015
Threat	Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through a system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service.
	SOURCE: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Vulnerability	Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source.
	SOURCE: FIPS 200

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638 Appendix D Security Control Map

- 639 The following table lists the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Functions, Categories, and Subcategories
- 640 addressed by this project and maps them to relevant NIST standards, industry standards, and controls
- 641 and best practices.
- 642 Table 6-1 Security Control Map

Cybersecuri	ity Framework v1.1		Standards & Best Practices
Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
DETECT	Anomalies and	DE.AE-1: A baseline of network	CIS CSC 1, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16
(DE)	Events (DE.AE)	operations and expected data	COBIT 5 DSS03.01
		flows for users and systems is es-	ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.3
		tablished and managed	ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.1,
			A.12.1.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, CA-3, CM-
			2, SI-4
		DE.AE-2: Detected events are an-	CIS CSC 3, 6, 13, 15
		alyzed to understand attack tar- gets and methods	COBIT 5 DSS05.07
		gets and methods	ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6,
			4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8
			ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR
			2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 3.9, SR 6.1,
			SR 6.2
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1,
			A.16.1.1, A.16.1.4
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, CA-7, IR-
		DE.AE-3: Event data are collected	4, SI-4
		and correlated from multiple	CIS CSC 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13,
		sources and sensors	14, 15, 16
			COBIT 5 BAI08.02 ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, A.16.1.7 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, CA-7, IR-
		DE AE 4: Impact of events is do	4, IR-5, IR-8, SI-4 CIS CSC 4, 6
		DE.AE-4: Impact of events is de- termined	
			COBIT 5 APO12.06, DSS03.01
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.4
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4, RA-3,
			SI-4

Cybersecurit	ty Framework v1.1		Standards & Best Practices
Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
	Security Contin-	DE.CM-1: The network is moni-	CIS CSC 1, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16
	uous Monitor-	tored to detect potential cyberse-	COBIT 5 DSS01.03, DSS03.05,
	ing (DE.CM)	curity events	DSS05.07
			ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.2
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2, AU-12,
			CA-7, CM3, SC-5, SC-7, SI-4
		DE.CM-3: Personnel activity is	CIS CSC 5, 7, 14, 16
		monitored to detect potential cy-	COBIT 5 DSS05.07
		bersecurity events	ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.2
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2, AU-12,
			AU-13, CA-7, CM-10, CM-11
		DE.CM-4: Malicious code is de-	CIS CSC 4, 7, 8, 12
		tected	COBIT 5 DSS05.01
			ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.8
			ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.2
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SI-3, SI-8
		DE.CM-7: Monitoring for unau-	CIS CSC 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16
		thorized personnel, connections,	COBIT 5 DSS05.02, DSS05.05
		devices, and software is per-	ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1,
		formed	A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-12, CA-7,
			CM-3, CM-8, PE-3, PE-6, PE-20, SI-4
RESPOND	Communica-	RS.CO-2: Incidents are reported	CIS CSC 19
(RS)	tions (RS.CO)	consistent with established crite-	COBIT 5 DSS01.03
		ria	ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.5
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.3, A.16.1.2
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, IR-6, IR-8
	Analysis (RS.AN)	RS.AN-3: Forensics are performed	COBIT 5 APO12.06, DSS03.02,
			DSS05.07
			ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR
			2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 3.9, SR 6.1
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.7
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-7, IR-4
	Mitigation	RS.MI-2: Incidents are mitigated	CIS CSC 4, 19
	(RS.MI)		COBIT 5 APO12.06
			ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6,
			4.3.4.5.10
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1, A.16.1.5
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 IR-4

Cybersecuri	ty Framework v1.1		Standards & Best Practices
Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
RECOVER	Recover (RC.RP)	RC.RP-1: Recovery plan is exe-	CIS CSC 10
(RC)		cuted during or after a cybersecu-	COBIT 5 APO12.06, DSS02.05,
		rity incident	DSS03.04
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.5
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-10, IR-4, IR-8

643 Appendix E Privacy Control Map

The following table lists the NIST Privacy Framework Functions, Categories and Subcategories addressed
by this project and maps them to relevant NIST standards, industry standards, and controls and best
practices.

NOTE: The International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission
(ISO/IEC)standard 27701 references were not mapped by NIST, but by an external organization. They
are available at the NIST Privacy Framework Repository [17] and provided here for convenience. The
Fair Information Privacy Principles (FIPPS) references are provided to aid understanding of the Privacy
Control Map.

Pri	Privacy Framework 1.0			Standards and Best Practices
	Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative Refences
	CONTROL-P (CT-P Develop and implement appropri- ate activities to enable or- ganizations or individuals to manage data with suffi- cient granularity to man- age privacy risks.	Data Processing Management (CT.DM- P): Data are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect individuals' privacy, increase manageability, and enable the implementation of privacy principles (e.g., individual participation, data quality, data minimization).	CT.DM-P8: Audit/log records are determined, documented, and reviewed in accordance with policy and incorporating the principle of data minimization.	FIPPS 4: Minimization NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AU-1, AU-2, AU-3, AU- 6, AU-7, AU-12, AU-13, AU-14, AU-16 NIST IR 8062 ISO/IEC 27701:2019 6.9.4.1, 6.9.4.2, 6.15.1.3
	PROTECT-P (PR-P): Develop and Implement appropriate data processing safeguards.	Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control (PR.AC- P): Access to data and devices is limited to authorized individuals, processes, and devices, and is managed consistent with the assessed risk of unauthorized access.	PR.AC-P1: Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized individuals, processes, and devices. PR.AC-P3: Remote access is managed.	FIPPS 8: Security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-7, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11, IA-12 NIST SP 800-63-3 ISO/IEC 27701:2019 6.6.2.1, 6.6.2.2, 6.6.4.2 FIPPS 8: Security FIPS Publication 199 NIST SP 800-46 Rev. 2 NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-1, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, SC-15 NIST SP 800-77 NIST SP 800-113 NIST SP 800-114 Rev. 1

652 Table 6-2 Privacy Control Map

Privacy Framework 1	1.0	Standards and Best Practices	
Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative Refences
			NIST SP 800-121 Rev. 2 ISO/IEC 27701:2019 6.6.2.1, 6.6.2.2
		PR.AC-P5: Network integrity is protected (e.g., network segregation, network segmentation)	FIPPS 8: Security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-4, AC-10, SC-7, SC- 10, SC-20
		PR.AC-P6: Individuals and devices are proofed and bound to credentials and authenticated commensurat e with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks)	FIPPS 8: Security NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: AC-14, AC-16, IA-1, IA- 2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11, IA- 12, PE-2, PS-3 NIST SP 800-63-3
	Protective Technology (PR.PT-P): Technical security solutions are managed to ensure the security and resilience of systems/products/serv ices and associated data, consistent with related policies, processes, procedures, and agreements.	risks). PR.PT-P3: Communicatio ns and control networks are protected.	NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (draft): AC-4, AC-17, AC-18, CP-8, SC-7 SC-20, SC-21, SC-22, SC-23, SC-24, SC-25, SC-29, SC-32, SC-36, SC-37, SC-38, SC-39, SC- 40, SC41, SC-43