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Implementing a Zero Trust Architecture

Volume D:

Functional Demonstrations

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You can improve this guide by contributing feedback. As you review and adopt this solution for your own organization, we ask you and your colleagues to share your experience and advice with us.

Comments on this publication may be submitted to: nccoe-zta-project@list.nist.gov.

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NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guides (Special Publication 1800 series) target specific cybersecurity challenges in the public and private sectors. They are practical, user-friendly guides that facilitate the adoption of standards-based approaches to cybersecurity. They show members of the information security community how to implement example solutions that help them align with relevant standards and best practices, and provide users with the materials lists, configuration files, and other information they need to implement a similar approach.

The documents in this series describe example implementations of cybersecurity practices that businesses and other organizations may voluntarily adopt. These documents do not describe regulations or mandatory practices, nor do they carry statutory authority.

ABSTRACT

In this project, the NCCOE and its collaborators use commercially available technology to build interoperable, open, standards-based ZTA implementations that align to the concepts and principles in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-207, *Zero Trust Architecture*. This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide explains how commercially available technology can be integrated and used to build various ZTAs. This volume of the practice guide defines the demonstrations that were designed to showcase the ZTA capabilities of the example implementations that have been built to support the use case scenarios in the project description. It also provides the demonstration results for each implementation.

61 **KEYWORDS**

62 *enhanced identity governance (EIG); identity, credential, and access management (ICAM); zero trust;*
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1 Introduction

To demonstrate the security characteristics supported by each zero trust architecture (ZTA) build that is implemented as part of the NCCoE ZTA project, a variety of use cases have been defined, each of which consists of numerous demonstrations that each have a specific expected outcome. The use cases are designed to showcase ZTA security capabilities under a variety of conditions.

[Section 2](#) of this document describes the use cases that have been defined. It also defines various types of user IDs and endpoints, resources, user and access profiles, assumptions, and other information that is required to fully describe the use cases. The purpose of this section of the document is to guide operators as they perform each demonstration.

[Section 3](#) of this document describes the results of performing these demonstrations using each of the builds that have been implemented.

1.1 How to Use this Guide

This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide will help users develop a plan for migrating to ZTA. It demonstrates a standards-based reference design for implementing a ZTA and provides users with the information they need to replicate two different implementations of this reference design. Each of these implementations, which are known as *builds*, are standards-based and align to the concepts and principles in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-207, *Zero Trust Architecture*. The reference design described in this practice guide is modular and can be deployed in whole or in part, enabling organizations to incorporate ZTA into their legacy environments gradually, in a process of continuous improvement that brings them closer and closer to achieving the ZTA goals that they have prioritized based on risk, cost, and resources.

NIST is adopting an agile process to publish this content. Each volume is being made available as soon as possible rather than delaying release until all volumes are completed. Work continues on implementing the example solutions and developing other parts of the content. As a preliminary draft, we will publish at least one additional draft for public comment before it is finalized.

When complete, this guide will contain four volumes:

- NIST SP 1800-35A: *Executive Summary* – why we wrote this guide, the challenge we address, why it could be important to your organization, and our approach to solving this challenge
- NIST SP 1800-35B: *Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics* – what we built and why
- NIST SP 1800-35C: *How-To Guides* – instructions for building the example implementations, including all the security-relevant details that would allow you to replicate all or parts of this project

- NIST SP 1800-35D: *Functional Demonstrations* – use cases that have been defined to showcase ZTA security capabilities and the results of demonstrating them with each of the example implementations (**you are here**)

Depending on your role in your organization, you might use this guide in different ways:

Business decision makers, including chief security and technology officers, will be interested in the *Executive Summary*, NIST SP 1800-35A, which describes the following topics:

- challenges that enterprises face in migrating to the use of ZTA
- example solution built at the NCCoE
- benefits of adopting the example solution

Technology or security program managers who are concerned with how to identify, understand, assess, and mitigate risk will be interested in this part of the guide, NIST SP 1800-35B, which describes what we did and why.

You might share the *Executive Summary*, NIST SP 1800-35A, with your leadership team members to help them understand the importance of migrating toward standards-based ZTA implementations that align to the concepts and principles in NIST SP 800-207, *Zero Trust Architecture* [1].

IT professionals and operators who want to implement similar solutions will find the whole practice guide useful. You can use the how-to portion of the guide, NIST SP 1800-35C, to replicate all or parts of the builds created in our lab. The how-to portion of the guide provides specific product installation, configuration, and integration instructions for implementing the example solution. We do not re-create the product manufacturers' documentation, which is generally widely available. Rather, we show how we incorporated the products together in our environment to create an example solution. Also, you can use NIST SP 1800-35D, which provides the use cases that have been defined to showcase ZTA security capabilities and the results of demonstrating them with each of the example implementations.

This guide assumes that IT professionals have experience implementing security products within the enterprise. While we have used a suite of commercial products to address this challenge, this guide does not endorse these particular products. Your organization can adopt this solution or one that adheres to these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting point for tailoring and implementing parts of a ZTA. Your organization's security experts should identify the products that will best integrate with your existing tools and IT system infrastructure. We hope that you will seek products that are congruent with applicable standards and recommended practices.

A NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide does not describe "the" solution, but example solutions. This is a preliminary draft guide. As the project progresses, the preliminary draft will be updated, and additional volumes will also be released for comment. We seek feedback on the publication's contents and welcome your input. Comments, suggestions, and success stories will improve subsequent versions of this guide. Please contribute your thoughts to nccoe-zta-project@list.nist.gov.

2 Functional Demonstration Playbook

This section is intended to guide the operator through the set of ZTA scenarios and use cases that have been defined for demonstration in this project. To reduce the number of iterations, some potential demonstrations have been omitted because they are not sufficiently different from another demonstration that has been included. For example, if the requester's access to a resource is blocked due to a non-compliant on-premises resource, then it is sufficient to demonstrate this once with an on-premises-to-on-premises request; this demonstration does not need to be repeated making the request from a branch office or remote access location because the location of the requester in this demonstration is irrelevant. The demonstration playbook is not exhaustive, and it does not capture all possible demonstration cases.

This playbook is still under development. Additional scenarios and use cases will be included in the next version as the implementations evolve and add capabilities. For this current draft of the document and as discussed in Volume B of this guide, the scenarios are limited to on-premises resources or public internet resources with only enhanced identity governance (EIG) considered. Subject endpoints are located on-premises or at branch or remote locations. Only EIG approach solutions are currently present in the builds. Microsegmentation and software-defined perimeter (SDP) solutions are currently out of scope.

2.1 Definitions

2.1.1 Network IDs

As defined in NIST SP 800-63, an *identity* is an attribute or set of attributes that uniquely identifies a subject [2]. A *network identity* is used here simply as an identity that allows the subject to identify itself to all connected enterprise resources. The following definitions are used for network IDs:

- **Enterprise-ID:** A network ID issued and maintained by the enterprise. It is stored in one (or more) identity stores maintained by the enterprise.
- **Federated-ID:** A network ID issued and maintained by another enterprise in a community of interest, and partner enterprises have a trusted means to authenticate the ID. This could include things such as a common PKI, etc.
- **Other-ID:** A network ID issued and maintained by another enterprise but known or registered by the first enterprise. Examples include contractors, customers, etc. The other enterprise has limited means to authenticate to the first enterprise.
- **No-ID:** An anonymous network ID unknown to the enterprise that the enterprise would be unable to authenticate. This is also referred to as a "guest" to the enterprise.

2.1.2 Subject and Requested Resource Types

In zero trust, all enterprise data, assets, etc. are considered resources. To clarify the actors (subject and requested resource) in the following scenarios, the following more detailed definitions are used:

- **Enterprise endpoint (EP):** Owned and fully managed by the enterprise. The enterprise can inspect and modify any data on the endpoint. An EP is usually acting as the requesting subject but can be the target of a management utility.
- **Enterprise resource (RSS):** Fully managed by the enterprise. The enterprise can inspect and modify the resource. An RSS is usually acting as the target of a request.
- **Bring Your Own Device (BYOD):** Not owned by the enterprise and not fully managed. The enterprise can inspect the device but cannot directly manage or wipe the device. User agents, certificates, etc. may be pre-installed by a private owner, but the endpoint cannot be managed. A BYOD is usually acting as the requesting subject or as the target of a management utility.
- **Guest device:** Not owned or managed by the enterprise and is opaque to the enterprise. The enterprise can only see what is emitted and received by its enterprise managed infrastructure. Examples include browser user agents and DNS queries. A guest device is usually acting as the requesting subject or as the target of a management utility.

2.1.3 Resource and Querying Endpoint Compliance Classification

The following definitions are used for endpoint and resource security compliance policies:

- **(EIG) Endpoint Compliance:** Policy that requires the endpoint device to be uniquely identified and to conform to the enterprise security policy for the device.
- **(EIG) Resource Compliance:** Policy that requires the enterprise-managed resource can be identified and conforms to the enterprise security policy for the resource.

2.1.4 Desired Outcomes

The following definitions are used for desired outcomes:

- **Access to Network:** Endpoint is allocated an address on enterprise infrastructure and enrolled/updated into any monitoring system in place. This result is only applicable to select on-premises (or branch) demonstrations.
- **Access to Public Network:** Endpoint is allocated an address, but only allowed access to the (public) internet; cannot reach/access non-public enterprise resources. This result is only applicable to select on-premises (or branch) demonstrations.
- **Limited Access to Network:** Endpoint is allocated an address with strict traffic restrictions. This may include a quarantine state with only access to update/patch management system. This result is only applicable to select on-premises (or branch) demonstrations.

- **No Access to Network:** Endpoint is not allocated an address and cannot send or receive communication. This result is only applicable to select on-premises (or branch) demonstrations.
- **Access (to Resource) Successful:** Access to the resources that are specified in the profile is achieved.
- **Access (to Resource) Limited:** Access to a subset, but not all, of the resources that are specified in the profile is achieved.
- **Access (to Resource) Not Successful:** No access to the requested resource is achieved.
- **Keep Access (to Resource):** Access remains at the previous state.
- **Max. Limited Access to Network:** This outcome is specific for device-based assets that will be authenticated. This means that portions of the network or some RSS will not be available to be accessed by this subject.
- **Terminate Access (to X):** The session is terminated or all access to the network is terminated (i.e., no longer allowed to send/receive communications).
- **Other Outcome:** Some demonstrations use explicit text that informs of a desired action. Examples: *“Terminate all sessions”* or *“Log API call.”*

2.1.5 Authentication Status

Table 2-1 explains the authentication status codes used in the demonstration use case tables below.

Table 2-1 Authentication Status Codes

Activity	Description	Examples
A+	Authentication successful	All provided credentials matched
A-	Authentication not successful	Password failure, MFA failure, account does not exist, account blocked, suspicions raised
RA+	Successful re-authentication of a previously successful authentication	All provided credentials matched
RA-	Failed re-authentication of a previously successful authentication	Password failure, MFA failure, account does not exist, account blocked, suspicious activity
A	Actively authenticated	Previously authenticated but no need for re-authentication yet
---	Not authenticated yet	

2.2 General Configurations

This section focuses on the configurations and specifications used within the demonstration use cases.

2.2.1 Access Level

Table 2-2 defines the access levels used in the demonstration scenarios. An *access level* specifies a set of available actions or access allowed to a subject. Downgrading an access level means the access level will be replaced by the new downgraded access level. For example, if a subject with access level “Full Access” gets downgraded to access level “Limited Access,” this means the subject only has access to resources and/or functions that require at least “Limited Access.” Similarly, if a subject with access level “Limited Access” gets downgraded, the subject will have no further access to anything. Downgraded access levels can be reversed to their original state.

Table 2-2 Access Levels

Access Level	Can Downgrade to	Description
Full Access	Limited Access	This allows the subject to use all functions available on the selected resource.
Limited Access	None	This allows the subject to use a subset of functions available on the selected resource.
None	None	No access

2.2.2 Access Profiles

Table 2-3 defines the access levels used in the demonstration scenarios. Access profiles provide the configuration and maximum access level that can be used. Access levels within the profile can be downgraded to the next lower level when the demonstration directs the operator to limit the access.

Table 2-3 Access Profiles

Access Profile	Maximum Access Level	Description
P_FULL	Full Access	This provides the capability to access all capabilities of each available resource.
P_LIMITED	Limited Access	This provides the capability to select a limited set of capabilities by the available resources.
P_NONE	none	No access

2.2.3 Resources and Capabilities

Table 2-4 defines the resources and capabilities used in the demonstration scenarios. Resources (RSS) and capabilities (CAP) specify items and actions used within the demonstrations. Access to them requires a minimum access level. For convenience, the *Access Profile* column lists the access profiles

that will provide access to the given resource or capability. The *Example* column provides suggestions regarding resources and capabilities that the access level could be representing.

Table 2-4 Resources and Capabilities

Component	Type	<u>Minimum Access Level</u>	<u>Access Profile</u>	Example
RSS1	Resource	Full Access	P_FULL	GitLab only accessible by P_FULL
RSS2	Resource	Limited Access	P_FULL, P_LIMITED	File server
CAP1-RSS1	Capability	Full Access	P_FULL	Create and access repositories
CAP2-RSS1	Capability	Full Access	P_FULL	Access repositories
CAP1-RSS2	Capability	Full Access	P_FULL	Read and write access
CAP2-RSS2	Capability	Limited Access	P_FULL, P_LIMITED	Read-only access to all or limited part of resource
URL1	Resource	Full Access	P_FULL	https://www.nccoe.nist.gov
URL2	Resource	Limited Access	P_FULL, P_LIMITED	https://www.nist.gov

2.2.4 User Profiles

Table 2-5 contains the different user profiles (UP) used with an enterprise-ID (UP-E) or other-ID (UP-O) for the demonstrations. Some profiles might be redundant (e.g., UP-E1 and UP-E4). This is done to help keep the profile configuration simple because the demonstrations that the redundant profiles are used in utilize different resources.

Table 2-5 User Profiles

User Profile	<u>Access Profile</u>	<u>Resource</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Downgrade Trigger Examples</u>
UP-E1 UP-O1	P_FULL	RSS1 RSS2	Active	Endpoint falls out of compliance
UP-E2 UP-O2	P_LIMITED	RSS2	Active	Endpoint falls out of compliance
UP-E3 UP-O3	none	none	Deactivated or deleted	

User Profile	Access Profile	Resource	Status	Downgrade Trigger Examples
UP-E4 UP-O4	P_FULL	URL1 URL2	Active	Endpoint falls out of compliance
UP-E5 UP-O5	P_LIMITED	URL1 URL2	Active	Endpoint falls out of compliance Internet access only during specific times
UP-E6 UP-O6	P_FULL	RSS1	Active	Detection of multiple logins from different locations Detection of second login from enterprise-owned device not assigned to user Detection of login from location outside of the country
UP-E7 UP-O7	P_FULL	RSS1	Active	Account reported compromised. Using old MFA method (stolen PIV card)

2.3 Demonstration Methodology

We are leveraging two types of demonstration methodologies: manual and automated. Demonstrations that require human interaction (e.g., user performs multifactor authentication) must be performed manually. Demonstrations that do not require human interaction can be performed either manually or automated, or both. It is also possible to perform demonstrations in a hybrid manner in which the early part of a demonstration that requires user authentication is performed manually, followed by an automated portion of the demonstration. This approach can be helpful for demonstrations that are complicated, yet nevertheless require human interaction.

In this document, demonstrations that can utilize automated components are performed by Mandiant Security Validation (MSV). Each demonstration contains an MSV column with a “Y” or “N” denoting whether MSV can be used in that particular demonstration. Demonstrations that cannot be automated are performed manually.

We deployed MSV throughout the project’s laboratory environment to enable us to monitor and verify various security characteristics of the builds. MSV automates a testing program that provides visibility and evidence of how security controls are performing by emulating attackers to safely process advanced cyberattack security content within production environments. It is designed so defenses respond to it as if an attack is taking place within the enterprise. VMs that are intended to operate as actors are deployed on each of the subnetworks in each of the enterprises. These actors can be used to initiate various actions for the purpose of verifying that security controls are working to support the objectives of zero trust. We also deployed three VMs that operate as directors, two of which function as applications within enterprise 1 and enterprise 3 that are used by those enterprises to monitor and

audit their own traffic, and one of which is an overarching director that is located within the management and orchestration domain and used by the project team to demonstrate and audit operations that span multiple enterprises. (See Section 4.3 of NIST SP 1800-35B.)

This setup enabled the following dual-purpose MSV deployment:

1. **A typical MSV deployment, in which each enterprise deploys MSV as an application within its own enterprise and uses it for self-auditing and testing.** Each enterprise deploys a director and multiple actors that function as applications within the enterprise, enabling the enterprise to monitor and test its own enterprise security capabilities, verifying the protections it receives from the ZTA and its ability to operate as expected. In this capacity, MSV is treated just like any other application deployed within that enterprise. The components may be protected by PEPs according to enterprise policies, and directors and actors exchange traffic over the same data communications paths as other enterprise applications. Firewalls and policies within the ZTA must be configured to permit the communications that the MSV components send and receive, including traffic that is sent between actors and the director to control the actions that are performed to test various security controls.
2. **The NCCoE project team, as testers, use MSV to monitor and audit enterprise and inter-enterprise actions.** The project team deploys an overarching director and a management backchannel connecting that director to all actors throughout the laboratory environment. This overarching director is used as a tool to verify the security controls provided by each of the ZTAs in the various enterprises and to monitor and audit inter-enterprise interactions. In this capacity, MSV is not functioning as an application deployed or controlled by the enterprises, but rather as a tool being used to monitor and audit enterprise and inter-enterprise activity. Communications between the actors and this overarching director occur on a management channel that is separate from the data networks in each of the enterprises. Using a separate backchannel ensures that the tool being used to monitor and verify the various ZTA architectures is not itself impacting those architectures. Enabling the overarching MSV director to control the actor VMs via a backchannel requires each of the actor VMs to have two network interface cards (NICs), one for enterprise data and one for MSV tool interoperation. Use of a separate backchannel ensures that enterprise ZTA policies and firewalls don't need to be modified to accommodate the overarching MSV testing by permitting traffic between the overarching director and the actors that would not normally be expected to transit any of the enterprise networks. Such policy and firewall modification would have been undesirable and would, in effect, have amounted to unauthorized channels into the enterprise networks.

An MSV protective theater was also created in the lab. This is a virtualized system that allows destructive actions to be tested without adversely impacting the enterprise deployments themselves. For example, to understand the effects that malware might have on a specific system in one of the

enterprises, that system could be imported into the protective theater and infected with malware to test what the destructive effects of the malware might be.

2.4 Use Case A: Discovery and Identification of IDs, Assets, and Data Flows

NIST SP 800-207 [1] discusses the discovery and cataloging of all enterprise IDs, assets, and data flows as the initial step before migrating to a ZTA. An enterprise needs to identify and understand the workflows used in business processes, the IDs used, and the resources involved. Then it can move on to creating policies around those workflows. This use case covers this initial exercise.

The following discovery use cases did not originally appear in the Project Description [3] but were subsequently included to reflect the full ZTA migration process described in NIST SP 800-207.

2.4.1 Scenario A-1: Discovery and authentication of endpoint assets

Discovery here is focused on detecting assets and flows on the network, mapping them to identified assets and flows, and providing access accordingly.

Pre-Condition: Enterprise-owned components (RSS and EP) have already undergone initial onboarding for the enterprise, and BYODs have already registered with the enterprise. Any necessary agents, certificates, etc. have been installed. Non-onboarded enterprise-owned components as well as non-registered BYODs are treated the same as unknown guest devices. BYOD devices must have a software agent installed that allows inspection of the devices to create a report of the device hygiene (e.g., look for accepted virus scanner and approved OS). The enterprise infrastructure is a macrosegmented local network with an “enterprise” segment with resources that can only be accessed by authorized enterprise IDs and a “guest” segment with access to the public internet only.

Demonstration: Connect the device to the network and demonstrate network connectivity.

Purpose and Outcome: This scenario demonstrates the capability to authenticate assets at a specific location and provide enterprise network access.

Table 2-6 Scenario A-1 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	<u>Subj</u> <u>Type</u>	Onboarded/ Registered	<u>Auth</u> <u>Stat</u>	Compl	Subj Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
A-1.1	a	N	RSS	Y	A+	Y	On- Prem	Access to Network
	b		RSS	Y	A+	N		No Access to Network
	c		RSS	Y	A-	---		No Access to Network
	d		RSS	N	---	---		No Access to Network

Demo ID		MSV	Subj Type	Onboarded/ Registered	Auth Stat	Compl	Subj Loc	Desired Outcome	
	e		EP	Y	A+	Y		Access to Network	
	f		EP	Y	A+	N		Max. Limited Access to Network	
	g		EP	Y	A-	---		No Access to Network	
	h		EP	N	---	---		Access to Public Network	
	i		BYOD	Y	A+	Y		Access to Network	
	j		BYOD	Y	A+	N		Limited Access to Network	
	k		BYOD	Y	A-	---		No Access to Network	
	l		BYOD	N	---	---		Access to Public Network	
	m		Guest Dev.	---	---	---		Access to Public Network	
Comment: f & j : Limited access (only limited RSS or Cap access); h, l, m : Unknown assets all treated like guest devices									
A-1.2	a	N	RSS	Y	A+	Y	Branch	Access to Network	
	b		RSS	Y	A+	N		No Access to Network	
	c		RSS	Y	A-	---		No Access to Network	
	d		RSS	N	---	---		No Access to Network	
	e		EP	Y	A+	Y		Access to Network	
	f		EP	Y	A+	N		Limited Access to Network	
	g		EP	Y	A-	---		No Access to Network	
	h		EP	N	---	---		Access to Public Network	
	i		BYOD	Y	A+	Y		Access to Network	
	j		BYOD	Y	A+	N		Limited Access to Network	
	k		BYOD	Y	A-	---		No Access to Network	
	l		BYOD	N	---	---		Access to Public Network	

Demo ID		MSV	Subj Type	Onboarded/ Registered	Auth Stat	Compl	Subj Loc	Desired Outcome
	m		Guest Dev.	---	---	---		Access to Public Network
Comment: f & j : Limited access (only limited RSS or Cap access); h, l, m : Unknown assets all treated like guest devices								
A-1.3	a	N	EP	Y	A+	Y	Re- mote	Access to Network
	b		EP	Y	A+	N		Max. Limited Access to Net- work
	c		EP	Y	A-	---		No Access to Network
	d		BYOD	Y	A+	Y		Access to Network
	e		BYOD	Y	A+	N		Max. Limited Access to Net- work
	f		BYOD	Y	A-	---		No Access to Network
Comment: b & e : Limited access (only limited RSS or Cap access)								
A-1.4	a	N	RSS	Y	A+	Y	Cloud	Access to Network
	b		RSS	Y	A+	N		No Access to Network
	c		RSS	Y	A-	---		No Access to Network
	d		RSS	N	---	---		No Access to Network
	e		EP	Y	A+	Y		Access to Network
	f		EP	Y	A+	N		Max. Limited Access to Net- work
	g		EP	Y	A-	---		No Access to Network
Comment: f : Limited access (only limited RSS or Cap access)								

2.4.2 Scenario A-2: Reauthentication of identified assets

Once an asset is identified and authenticated, continuous re-authentication is necessary.

Pre-Condition: The asset (user endpoint, resource) underwent previous authentication and is ready for operation.

Demonstration: The asset is reauthenticated and will either pass or fail reauthentication.

465 **Purpose and Outcome:** This scenario demonstrates the proper reauthentication of an asset and
 466 performs the desired action accordingly.

467 **Table 2-7 Scenario A-2 Demonstrations**

Demo ID		MSV	<u>Subj Type</u>	<u>Onboarded/ Registered</u>	<u>Auth Stat</u>	Compl	Subj Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
A-2.1	a	N	RSS	Y	RA+	Y	On-Prem	Keep Access to Network
	b		RSS	Y	RA+	N		Terminate Access to Network
	c		RSS	Y	RA-	---		Terminate Access to Network
	d		EP	Y	RA+	Y		Keep Access to Network
	e		EP	Y	RA+	N		Max. Limited Access to Network
	f		EP	Y	RA-	---		Terminate Access to Network
	g		BYOD	Y	RA+	Y		Keep Access to Network
	h		BYOD	Y	RA+	N		Max. Limited Access to Network
	i		BYOD	Y	RA-	---		Terminate Access to Network
Comment: e & h : Limited access (only limited RSS or Cap access)								
A-2.2	a	N	RSS	Y	RA+	Y	Branch	Keep Access to Network
	b		RSS	Y	RA+	N		Terminate Access to Network
	c		RSS	Y	RA-	---		Terminate Access to Network
	d		EP	Y	RA+	Y		Keep Access to Network
	e		EP	Y	RA+	N		Max. Limited Access to Network
	f		EP	Y	RA-	---		Terminate Access to Network
	g		BYOD	Y	RA+	Y		Keep Access to Network
	h		BYOD	Y	RA+	N		Max. Limited Access to Network
	i		BYOD	Y	RA-	---		Terminate Access to Network

Demo ID	MSV	Subj Type	Onboarded/ Registered	Auth Stat	Compl	Subj Loc	Desired Outcome	
Comment: e & h : Limited access (only limited RSS or Cap access)								
A-2.3	a	N	EP	Y	RA+	Y	Re- remote	Keep Access to Network
	b		EP	Y	RA+	N		Max. Limited Access to Net- work
	c		EP	Y	RA-	---		Terminate Access to Network
	d		BYOD	Y	RA+	Y		Keep Access to Network
	e		BYOD	Y	RA+	N		Max. Limited Access to Net- work
	f		BYOD	Y	RA-	---		Terminate Access to Network
Comment: b & e : Limited access (only limited RSS or Cap access)								
A-2.4	a	N	RSS	Y	RA+	Y	Cloud	Keep Access to Network
	b		RSS	Y	RA+	N		Terminate Access to Network
	c		RSS	Y	RA-	---		Terminate Access to Network
	d		EP	Y	RA+	Y		Keep Access to Network
	e		EP	Y	RA+	N		Max. Limited Access to Net- work
	f		EP	Y	RA-	---		Terminate Access to Network
Comment: e : Limited access (only limited RSS or Cap access)								

2.4.3 Scenario A-3: Discovery of transaction flows

This scenario demonstrates the monitoring of transactions between endpoints. Transactions include user access to a resource or service-to-service communication.

Pre-Condition: User (Enterprise-ID or Other-ID) has a set of privileges to a resource and can successfully authenticate. Requesting endpoints are considered successfully authenticated. Some mechanism is present either on the endpoints or along the communication path that can observe and log actions.

Demonstration: Logs are produced that map user access requests, API calls, etc. between resources. The logs may be on a third resource.

Purpose and Outcome: This scenario demonstrates the discovery and recording of metadata of traffic flows between resources and user access requests/actions. The actual inspection of traffic is not necessary.

Table 2-8 Scenario A-3 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	Endpoint Type	Req Loc	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
A-3.1	a	N	USER	On-Prem	On-Prem	User request and action is recorded
	b		RSS/Service			API call is recorded
A-3.2	a	N	USER	On-Prem	Cloud	User request and action is recorded
	b		RSS/Service			API call is recorded
A-3.3	a	N	USER	Branch	On-Prem	User request and action is recorded
	b		RSS/Service			API call is recorded
A-3.4	a	N	USER	Branch	Cloud	User request and action is recorded
	b		RSS/Service			API call is recorded
A-3.5	a	N	USER	Remote	On-Prem	User request and action is recorded
A-3.6	a	N	USER	Remote	Cloud	User request and action is recorded

2.5 Use Case B: Enterprise ID Access

Demonstrations in this use case deal with different scenarios using access to enterprise resources as well as non-enterprise resources located on-premises, in the cloud, and on the internet.

Each activity demonstrates the capability of authentication from within a given setting. The access is authenticated with an “enterprise-ID” using an enterprise-owned endpoint (EP) as well as a privately owned endpoint (BYOD). Each scenario provides a set of pre-conditions as well as multiple demonstrations.

2.5.1 Scenario B-1: Full/limited resource access using an enterprise endpoint

This scenario deals with a request using different enterprise ID profiles, one with access to all provided resources and one with access to a limited set of resources (e.g., only RSS1 but not RSS2), or limited functionality while accessing an enterprise-controlled resource (e.g., read-only vs. read/write).

Pre-Condition: The enterprise provides multiple user accounts with different access levels. The P_FULL access profile specifies access to all resources (RSS) within the enterprise and/or all capabilities (Cap) of resources within the enterprise. Additionally, the P_LIMITED access profile specifies access to either a subset of the resources and/or only limited functionality of each resource. Both endpoints' compliance (Compl) is already verified, and systems are authenticated per demonstration policy.

Demonstration: Each requestor using an enterprise-ID will attempt to successfully access an enterprise resource or a functionality of an enterprise resource.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on user privilege, authentication/re-authentication, the endpoint and RSS location, and the compliance of endpoints.

Table 2-9 Scenario B-1 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
B-1.1	a	N	E1	On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
	o	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
B-1.2	a	N	E1	Branch → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
o	N	E1	A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful			
p	N	E2	A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful			
B-1.3	a	N	E1	Remote → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	N	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	N	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
B-1.4	a	N	E1	On-Prem → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	Y	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	Y	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	Y	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	Y	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	Y	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
B-1.5	a	N	E1	Branch → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
B-1.6	a	N	E1	Remote → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	N	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	N	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID	MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome
				User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS	
	k	N	E1	RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited
	l	N	E1	A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful
	m	N	E1	A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited
	n	N	E1	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful
	o	N	E1	A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful
	p	N	E2	A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful

2.5.2 Scenario B-2: Full/limited internet access using an enterprise endpoint

This scenario deals with access from an enterprise-owned device to non-enterprise-managed internet resources using different enterprise ID profiles: one with access to the internet, one with limited access to the internet, and one with no access to the internet.

Pre-Condition: The enterprise provides multiple user accounts with different access levels to the internet. The internet access will be performed using an enterprise-owned endpoint. RSS types are OK for approved and not OK for not-approved internet resources. The approval depends on the user's policy. User endpoints are checked for compliance (Compl) per demonstration policy. "Out of Hours" refers to the request taking place outside of marked business hours, which would fall outside of normal access behaviors seen for the ID.

Demonstration: Each requestor using an Enterprise-ID will attempt to successfully access a non-enterprise resource.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the endpoint location as well as the resource location.

Table 2-10 Scenario B-2 Demonstrations

Demo ID	MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome
				User	EP		EP	Out of Hours	
B-2.1	a	N	E4	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful
	b	N	E4	A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful
	c	N	E4	A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP		EP	Out of Hours		
	d	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	e	Y	E4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	f	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	h	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	i	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	j	Y	E5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful	
	l	N	E4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful	
	o	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful	
B-2.2	a	N	E4	Branch → Internet	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful	
	b	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	c	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	d	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	e	Y	E4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	f	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	h	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	i	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	j	Y	E5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful	
	l	N	E4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		<u>MSV</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Req. > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Access	<u>Compl</u>		<u>Desired Outcome</u>		
					User	EP		EP	Out of Hours			
	m	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful		
	n	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful		
	o	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful		
	p	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful		
B-2.3	a	N	E4	Remote → Internet	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful		
	b	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful		
	c	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	d	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	e	Y	E4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	f	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
	g	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful		
	h	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful		
	i	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful		
	j	Y	E5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	k	N	E4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful		
	l	N	E4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	m	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful		
	n	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful		
	o	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful		
	p	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful		

519 **Pre-Condition:** The requestor's credential is stolen and is used to attempt accessing the enterprise
 520 resource RSS1 using an enterprise endpoint. The endpoints are compliant and authenticated, and so is
 521 the resource.

522 **Demonstration:** Two requests for the same enterprise resource are performed using the same user
 523 credentials. The "Real Request" is performed using the latest credentials, which are modified/replaced
 524 after reported stolen. The "Hostile Request" is performed using a stolen enterprise-ID. All authentication
 525 methods of the Hostile Request are compromised. Re-authentication always follows a previously
 526 successful authentication.

527 **Purpose and Outcome:** This demonstration focuses on the detection of a stolen requester's enterprise-
 528 ID and enforcement of isolation.

529 **Table 2-11 Scenario B-3 Demonstrations**

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
B-3.1	a	N	E6	On-Prem On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	Y	E6		A-	---	N	Access Not Successful	---	
	c	N	E6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E6		A+	A	N	Access Not Successful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	E6		A-	A	N	Access Not Successful	Keep Access	
	i	N	E7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	E7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	k	Y	E7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>		
					Real Req	Hostile Req					
	l	N	E7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---		
	m	N	E7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	n	N	E7		---	A	Y	---	All Sessions Terminated		
	o	N	E7		A	---	Y	All Sessions Terminated	---		
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were reported stolen											
B-3.2	a	N	E6	On-Prem Branch → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---		
	b	Y	E6		A-	---	N	Access Not Successful	---		
	c	N	E6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Successful		
	d	N	E6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Successful		
	e	N	E6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful		
	f	Y	E6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Successful		
	g	N	E6		A+	A	N	Access Not Successful	Change to Access Limited		
	h	N	E6		A-	A	N	Access Not Successful	Keep Access		
	i	N	E7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---		
	j	N	E7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Successful		
	k	Y	E7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	l	N	E7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---		
	m	N	E7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Successful		

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
	n	N	E7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	
	o	N	E7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re- ported stolen										
B-3.3	a	N	E6	Branch On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	Y	E6		A-	---	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	---	
	c	N	E6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	d	N	E6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	e	N	E6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	g	N	E6		A+	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	E6		A-	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Keep Access	
	i	N	E7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	E7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	k	Y	E7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	l	N	E7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	E7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	n	N	E7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
	o	N	E7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re- ported stolen										
B-3.4	a	N	E6	Remote On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	N	E6		A-	---	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	---	
	c	N	E6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	d	N	E6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	e	N	E6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	g	N	E6		A+	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	E6		A-	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Keep Access	
	i	N	E7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	E7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	k	Y	E7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	l	N	E7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	E7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	n	N	E7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	
o	N	E7	A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---			

Demo ID	<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>		
				Real Req	Hostile Req					
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re-ported stolen										
B-3.5	a	N	E6	On-Prem Remote → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	Y	E6		A-	---	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	---	
	c	N	E6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	d	N	E6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	e	N	E6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	N	E6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	g	N	E6		A+	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	E6		A-	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Keep Access	
	i	N	E7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	E7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	k	N	E7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	l	N	E7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	E7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	n	N	E7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	
	o	N	E7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re-ported stolen										

2.5.4 Scenario B-4: Full/limited resource access using BYOD

This scenario deals with requests using different enterprise ID profiles, one with access to all provided resources and one with access to a limited set of resources (e.g., only RSS1 but not RSS2) or limited functionality while accessing an enterprise-controlled resource (e.g., read-only vs. read/write). In this scenario, the device used is BYOD.

Pre-Condition: The enterprise provides multiple User accounts with different access levels. The P_FULL access profile specifies access to either all resources (RSS) within the enterprise and/or all capabilities (Cap) of resources within the enterprise. Additionally, the P_LIMITED access profile specifies access to either a subset of the resources and/or limited functionality of each resource. Both endpoints' compliance (Compl) is already verified, and systems are authenticated per demonstration policy.

Demonstration: Each requestor using an enterprise-ID will attempt to successfully access an enterprise resource or a functionality of an enterprise resource.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on user privilege, authentication/re-authentication, the endpoint and RSS location, and the compliance of endpoints.

Table 2-12 Scenario B-4 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
B-4.1	a	N	E1	On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	N	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
	n	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
B-4.2	a	N	E1	Branch → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
B-4.3	a	N	E1	Remote → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	N	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	N	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS	
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited
	l	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful
	m	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited
	n	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful
	o	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful
B-4.4	a	N	E1	On-Prem → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful
	c	Y	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited
	l	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful
	m	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited
	n	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful
	o	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful

Demo ID	<u>MSV</u>		<u>UP</u>	Location Req. > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>			Access	<u>Compl</u>		<u>Desired Outcome</u>	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
B-4.5	a	N	E1	Branch → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	j	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	l	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	m	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	o	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	q	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
B-4.6	a	N	E1	Remote → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	N	E1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	N	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	E1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
	j	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	E1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	

2.5.5 Scenario B-5: Full/limited internet access using BYOD

This scenario deals with access from an enterprise-owned device to non-enterprise-managed internet resources using different enterprise ID profiles: one with access to the internet, one with limited access to the internet, and one with no access to the internet.

Pre-Condition: The enterprise provides multiple user accounts with different access levels to the internet. Internet access will be performed using an enterprise-owned endpoint. RSS types are OK for approved and not OK for not-approved internet resources. The approval depends on the user's policy. User endpoints are checked for compliance (Compl) per demonstration policy.

Demonstration: Each requestor using an enterprise-ID will attempt to successfully access a non-enterprise resource.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the endpoint location and the resource location.

Table 2-13 Scenario B-5 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome
					User	EP		EP	Out of Hours	
B-5.1	a	N	E4	On-Prem → Internet	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful
	b	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful
	c	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful
	d	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful
	e	Y	E4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP		EP	Out of Hours		
	f	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	h	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	i	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	j	Y	E5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful	
	l	N	E4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful	
	o	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful	
B-5.2	a	N	E4	Branch → Internet	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful	
	b	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	c	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	d	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	e	Y	E4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	f	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	h	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	i	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	j	Y	E5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful	
	l	N	E4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP		EP	Out of Hours		
	n	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful	
	o	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful	
B-5.3	a	N	E4	Remote → Internet	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful	
	b	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	c	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	d	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	e	N	E4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	f	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	h	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	i	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	E5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful	
	l	N	E4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	E4		A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	E4		A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful	
	o	N	E5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful	

2.5.6 Scenario B-6: Stolen credential using BYOD

This scenario deals with a request using a stolen credential. It does not matter if the access is performed using an enterprise endpoint or BYOD device.

Pre-Condition: The requestor's credential is stolen and is used to attempt accessing the enterprise resource RSS1 using an enterprise endpoint. The endpoints are compliant and authenticated, and so is the resource.

Demonstration: Two requests for the same enterprise resource are performed using the same user credentials. The “Real Request” is performed using the latest credentials, which are modified/replaced after reported stolen, and that request can succeed. The “Hostile Request” is performed using a stolen enterprise-ID. All authentication methods are compromised for the Hostile Request. Re-authentication always follows a previously successful authentication.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the detection of a stolen requester’s enterprise-ID and enforcement of isolation.

Table 2-14 Scenario B-6 Demonstrations

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Sto- len	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
B-6.1	a	N	E6	On-Prem On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	Y	E6		A-	---	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	---	
	c	N	E6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	d	N	E6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	e	N	E6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	g	N	E6		A+	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	E6		A-	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Keep Access	
	i	N	E6		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N			A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	k	Y			---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	l	N	E6		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	E6		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Sto- len	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
	n	N	E6		---	A	Y	---	All Sessions Termi- nated	
	o	N	E6		A	---	Y	All Sessions Termi- nated	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re- ported stolen										
B-6.2	a	N	E6	On-Prem Branch → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	Y	E6		A-	---	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	---	
	c	N	E6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	d	N	E6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	e	N	E6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	N	E6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	g	N	E6		A+	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	E6		A-	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Keep Access	
	i	N	E7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	E7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	k	Y	E7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	l	N	E7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	E7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	n	N	E7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Sto- len	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
	o	N	E7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re- ported stolen										
B-6.3	a	N	E6	Branch On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	Y	E6		A-	---	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	---	
	c	N	E6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	d	N	E6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	e	N	E6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	N	E6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	g	N	E6		A+	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	Y	E6		A-	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Keep Access	
	i	N	E7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	E7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	k	N	E7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	l	N	E7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	E7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	n	N	E7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	
o	N	E7	A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---			

Demo ID	<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Sto- len	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>		
				Real Req	Hostile Req					
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re- ported stolen										
B-6.4	a	N	E6	Remote On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	N	E6		A-	---	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	---	
	c	N	E6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	d	N	E6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	e	N	E6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	g	N	E6		A+	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	Y	E6		A-	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Keep Access	
	i	N	E7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	E7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	k	Y	E7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	l	N	E7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	E7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	n	N	E7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	
	o	N	E7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re- ported stolen										
B-6.5	a	N	E6	On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
	b	Y	E6	Remote → On-Prem	A-	---	N	Access Not Successful	---	
	c	N	E6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	N	E6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E6		A+	A	N	Access Not Successful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	E6		A-	A	N	Access Not Successful	Keep Access	
	i	N	E7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	E7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	E7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	l	N	E7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	E7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	E7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	
	o	N	E7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were reported stolen										

2.6 Use Case C: Collaboration: Federated-ID Access

2.6.1 Scenario C-1: Full resource access using an enterprise endpoint

This scenario deals with a request using a successfully authenticated federated-ID accessing an enterprise-controlled resource. In this scenario, the maximum access configuration of the requester for the enterprise-managed resource is set to full access.

Pre-Condition: The requestor is identified and authenticated. Per configuration, the requestor is authorized with full access to the resource.

Demonstration: The requestor using a federated-ID will attempt to access an enterprise resource using an enterprise-owned endpoint.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the endpoint location with endpoint/resource compliance (Compl).

Table 2-15 Scenario C-1 Demonstrations

Demo ID		<u>MSV</u>	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS EP Compl	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
C-1.1	a	Y	Y	On-Prem	Y	On-Prem	Access Successful
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		N		Access Limited
	d		N		N		Access Not Successful
Comment: In this set of demonstrations, the desired outcome will be to deny access to the resource in case the endpoint is not compliant. If the endpoint is compliant but the resource is not compliant, the access is restricted.							
C-1.2	a	Y	Y	Branch	Y	On-Prem	Access Successful
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
C-1.3	A	N	Y	Remote	Y	On-Prem	Access Successful
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
C-1.4	a	Y	Y	On-Prem	Y	Cloud	Access Successful
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		N		Access Limited
	d		N		N		Access Not Successful

Demo ID	MSV	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS EP Compl	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
C-1.5	a	Y	Branch	Y	Cloud	Access Successful
	b			Y		Access Not Successful
C-1.6	a	N	Remote	Y	Cloud	Access Successful
	b			Y		Access Not Successful

2.6.2 Scenario C-2: Limited resource access using an enterprise endpoint

This scenario deals with a request using a successfully authenticated Federated-ID accessing an enterprise-controlled resource. In this scenario, the maximum access configuration of the requester for the enterprise-managed resource is set to limited access.

Pre-Condition: The requestor is identified and authenticated. Per configuration, the requestor is authorized with limited access to the resource.

Demonstration: The requestor using a Federated-ID will attempt to access an enterprise resource using an enterprise-owned endpoint.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the endpoint location with endpoint/resource compliance (Compl).

Table 2-16 Scenario C-2 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS EP Compl	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
C-2.1	a	Y	Y	On-Prem	Y	On-Prem	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		N		Access Limited
	d		N		N		Access Not Successful
Comment: In this set of demonstrations, the desired outcome will be to deny access to the resource in case the endpoint is not compliant. If the endpoint is compliant but the resource is not compliant, the access is restricted.							
C-2.2	a	Y	Y	Branch	Y	On-Prem	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful

Demo ID		<u>MSV</u>	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS EP Compl	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
C-2.3	a	N	Y	Remote	Y	On-Prem	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
C-2.4	a	Y	Y	On-Prem	Y	Cloud	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		N		Access Limited
	d		N		N		Access Not Successful
C-2.5	a	Y	Y	Branch	Y	Cloud	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
C-2.6	a	N	Y	Remote	Y	Cloud	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful

2.6.3 Scenario C-3: Limited internet access using an enterprise endpoint

This scenario deals with a request using a successfully authenticated Federated-ID accessing a non-enterprise-controlled resource in the public internet using an enterprise-owned endpoint device with limited internet access.

Pre-Condition: The requestor is identified and authenticated. Per configuration, the requestor is authorized with limited access to the Internet.

Demonstration: The requestor using a Federated-ID will attempt to access two resources located in the public Internet. The resources are not controlled by the enterprise. One resource is allowed, the other one is blocked.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the endpoint resource compliance with access of non-enterprise-controlled resources on the internet by a requester with internet access using an enterprise-controlled resource.

606 Table 2-17 Scenario C-3 Demonstrations

Demo ID		<u>MSV</u>	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS Access Policy	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
C-3.1	a	Y	Y	On-Prem	Allowed RSS 1	Internet	Access Successful
	b		N		Allowed RSS 1		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
	d		N		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
C-3.2	a	Y	Y	Branch	Allowed RSS 1	Internet	Access Successful
	b		N		Allowed RSS 1		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
	d		N		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
C-3.3	a	N	Y	Remote	Allowed RSS 1	Internet	Access Successful
	b		N		Allowed RSS 1		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
	d		N		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful

607 2.6.4 Scenario C-4: No internet access using an enterprise endpoint

608 This scenario deals with a request using a successfully authenticated Federated-ID accessing a non-
609 enterprise-controlled resource in the public internet using an enterprise-owned endpoint device with
610 internet access disabled.

611 **Pre-Condition:** The requestor is identified and authenticated. Per configuration, the requestor is
612 authorized with no access to the Internet.

613 **Demonstration:** The requestor using a Federated-ID will attempt to access two resources both located
614 in the public Internet. The resources are not controlled by the enterprise. One resource is allowed, the
615 other one is blocked.

616 **Purpose and Outcome:** This demonstration focuses on the endpoint resource compliance with access of
617 non-enterprise-controlled resources on the internet by a requestor with no internet access.

618 Table 2-18 Scenario C-4 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS Access Policy	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
C-4.1	a	Y	Y	On-Prem	Allowed RSS 1	Internet	Access Not Successful
	b		N		Allowed RSS 1		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
	d		N		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
C-4.2	a	Y	Y	Branch	Allowed RSS 1	Internet	Access Not Successful
	b		N		Allowed RSS 1		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
	d		N		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
C-4.3	a	N	Y	Remote	Allowed RSS 1	Internet	Access Not Successful
	b		N		Allowed RSS 1		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
	d		N		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful

619 2.6.5 Scenario C-5: Internet access using BYOD

620 This scenario deals with a request using a successfully authenticated federated-ID accessing a resource
621 on the Internet using privately owned devices. For this scenario, it is not needed to perform additional
622 testing depending on the access level (full, limited) towards the resource because the access level is set
623 to be restricted due to the device being BYOD.

624 **Pre-Condition:** The requestor is identified and authenticated. Per configuration, the requestor is
625 authorized with limited access to the Internet. Both resources RSS1 and RSS2 are not managed by the
626 enterprise. For example, RSS1 could be a gambling site and RSS2 could be a search engine.

627 **Demonstration:** The requestor using a federated-ID will attempt to access two resources both located in
628 the public Internet. The resources are not controlled by the enterprise. One resource is allowed, the
629 other one is blocked. The endpoint itself is of type BYOD.

630 **Purpose and Outcome:** This demonstration focuses on BYOD endpoint compliance with access of non-
631 enterprise-controlled resources on the internet by a requester with limited internet access.

632 Table 2-19 Scenario C-5 Demonstrations

Demo ID		<u>MSV</u>	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS Access Policy	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
C-5.1	a	Y	Y	On-Prem	Allowed RSS 1	Internet	Access Successful
	b		N		Allowed RSS 1		Access Not Successful/Limited
	c		Y		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
	d		N		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
Comment: Compliance on the endpoint might not be completely determined.							
C-5.2	a	Y	Y	Branch	Allowed RSS 1	Internet	Access Successful
	b		N		Allowed RSS 1		Access Not Successful/Limited
	c		Y		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
	d		N		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
Comment: Compliance on the endpoint might not be completely determined.							
C-5.3	a	N	Y	Remote	Allowed RSS 1	Internet	Access Successful
	b		N		Allowed RSS 1		Access Not Successful/Limited
	c		Y		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
	d		N		Blocked RSS 2		Access Not Successful
Comment: Compliance on the endpoint might not be completely determined.							

633 2.6.6 Scenario C-6: Access resources using BYOD

634 This scenario deals with a request using a successfully authenticated federated-ID accessing an
635 enterprise-controlled resource using privately owned devices. For this scenario it is not needed to
636 perform additional testing depending on the access level (full, limited) towards the resource because
637 the access level is set to be restricted due to the device being BYOD.

638 **Pre-Condition:** The requestor is identified and authenticated. Per configuration, the requestor is
639 authorized with full access to the resource. The system setup must lower the access level to the
640 resource into a restricted access mode due to the usage of BYOD.

641 **Demonstration:** The requestor using a federated-ID will attempt to access an enterprise resource using
642 a privately owned device.

643 **Purpose and Outcome:** This demonstration focuses on the endpoint device (BYOD), lowering access
644 level rights, and endpoint compliance and location.

645 Table 2-20 Scenario C-6 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	Req. EP Compl	Req. Loc	RSS EP Compl	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
C-6.1	a	N	Y	On-Prem	Y	On-Prem	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		N		Access Limited/Restricted
	d		N		N		Access Not Successful
Comment: In this set of demonstrations, the desired outcome will be to deny access to the resource in case the endpoint is not compliant. If the endpoint is compliant, but the resource is not compliant, the access is restricted.							
C-6.2	a	N	Y	Branch	Y	On-Prem	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
C-6.3	a	N	Y	Remote	Y	On-Prem	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
C-6.4	a	N	Y	On-Prem	Y	Cloud	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
	c		Y		N		Access Limited/Restricted
	d		N		N		Access Not Successful
C-6.5	a	N	Y	Branch	Y	Cloud	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful
C-6.6	a	N	Y	Remote	Y	Cloud	Access Limited
	b		N		Y		Access Not Successful

646 2.6.7 Scenario C-7: Stolen credential using an enterprise endpoint

647 This scenario deals with a request using a stolen credential employing an enterprise endpoint.

648 **Pre-Condition:** The requestor's credential is stolen and is used to attempt accessing an enterprise
 649 resource using an enterprise endpoint.

650 **Demonstration:** The requestor, using a stolen federated-ID, will attempt to access an enterprise
 651 resource using an enterprise endpoint.

652 **Purpose and Outcome:** This demonstration focuses on the requester's federated-ID as well as the
 653 endpoint status (stolen vs. not stolen).

654 **Table 2-21 Scenario C-7 Demonstrations**

Demo ID		<u>MSV</u>	Req Credential	Req Loc	Req EP	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
C-7.1	a	Y	Active	On-Prem	Active	On-Prem	Access Successful
	b		Active		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
	c		Flagged Stolen		Active		Access Not Successful
	d		Flagged Stolen		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail							
C-7.2	a	Y	Active	Branch	Active	On-Prem	Access Successful
	b		Active		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
	c		Flagged Stolen		Active		Access Not Successful
	d		Flagged Stolen		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail							
C-7.3	a	N	Active	Remote	Active	On-Prem	Access Successful
	b		Active		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
	c		Flagged Stolen		Active		Access Not Successful
	d		Flagged Stolen		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail							
C-7.4	a	Y	Active	On-Prem	Active	Cloud	Access Successful
	b		Active		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
	c		Flagged Stolen		Active		Access Not Successful
	d		Flagged Stolen		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail							
C-7.5	a	Y	Active	Branch	Active	Cloud	Access Successful
	b		Active		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
	c		Flagged Stolen		Active		Access Not Successful
	d		Flagged Stolen		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful

Demo ID	<u>MSV</u>	Req Credential	Req Loc	Req EP	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>	
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail							
C-7.6	a	N	Active	Remote	Active	Cloud	Access Successful
	b		Active		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
	c		Flagged Stolen		Active		Access Not Successful
	d		Flagged Stolen		Flagged Stolen		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail							

2.6.8 Scenario C-8: Stolen credential using BYOD

This scenario deals with a request using a stolen credential employing a BYOD endpoint.

Pre-Condition: The requestor’s credential is stolen and is used to attempt accessing an enterprise resource using a privately owned device (BYOD).

Demonstration: The requestor using a stolen federated-ID will attempt to access an enterprise resource using a BYOD endpoint.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the requester’s federated-ID status (stolen vs. not stolen).

Table 2-22 Scenario C-8 Demonstrations

Demo ID		<u>MSV</u>	Req Credential	Req Loc	Req EP Compliance	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
C-8.1	a	Y	Active	On-Prem	Y	On-Prem	Access Successful
	b		Flagged Stolen		Y		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail, BYOD outside compliance must not be granted access (see C-5/6)							
C-8.2	a	Y	Active	Branch	Y	On-Prem	Access Successful
	b		Flagged Stolen		Y		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail, BYOD outside compliance must not be granted access (see C-5/6)							
C-8.3	a	N	Active	Remote	Y	On-Prem	Access Successful
	b		Flagged Stolen		Y		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail, BYOD outside compliance must not be granted access (see C-5/6)							

Demo ID		<u>MSV</u>	Req Credential	Req Loc	Req EP Compliance	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
C-8.4	a	Y	Active	On-Prem	Y	Cloud	Access Successful
	b		Flagged Stolen		Y		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail, BYOD outside compliance must not be granted access (see C-5/6)							
C-8.5	a	Y	Active	Branch	Y	Cloud	Access Successful
	b		Flagged Stolen		Y		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail, BYOD outside compliance must not be granted access (see C-5/6)							
C-8.6	a	N	Active	Remote	Y	Cloud	Access Successful
	b		Flagged Stolen		Y		Access Not Successful
Comment: For “Flagged Stolen” credentials, MFA should fail, BYOD outside compliance must not be granted access (see C-5/6)							

2.7 Use Case D: Other-ID Access

Demonstrations in this use case deal with different scenarios using access to enterprise resources as well as non-enterprise resources located on-premises, in the cloud, and on the internet. Each activity demonstrates the capability of authentication from within a given setting. The access is authenticated with an “other-ID” using enterprise-owned endpoints (EP) as well as privately owned endpoints (BYOD). Each scenario provides a set of pre-conditions as well as multiple demonstrations.

2.7.1 Scenario D-1: Full/limited resource access using an enterprise endpoint

This scenario deals with a request using different “other-ID” profiles, one with access to all provided resources and one with access to a limited set of resources (e.g., only RSS1 but not RSS2) or with limited functionality while accessing an enterprise-controlled resource (e.g., read-only vs. read/write).

Pre-Condition: The enterprise provides multiple User accounts with different access levels. The P_FULL access profile specifies access to all resources (RSS) within the enterprise and/or access to all capabilities (Cap) of resources within the enterprise. Additionally, the P_LIMITED access profile specifies access to either a subset of the resources and/or only limited functionality of each resource. Both endpoints’ compliance (Compl) is already verified, and systems are authenticated per demonstration policy.

Demonstration: Each requestor using an “other-ID” will attempt to successfully access an enterprise resource or a functionality of an enterprise resource.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on user privilege, authentication/re-authentication, and endpoint and RSS location, as well as the compliance of endpoints.

683 Table 2-23 Scenario D-1 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
D-1.1	a	N	O1	On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
D-1.2	a	N	O1	Branch → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
D-1.3	a	N	O1	Remote → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	N	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
D-1.4	a	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
	b	N	O1	On-Prem → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
D-1.5	a	N	O1	Branch → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	O2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	O3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome		
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS			
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful		
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited		
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
	o	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
	p	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
D-1.6	a	N	O1	Remote → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	c	N	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	d	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful		
	e	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	f	N	O2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	g	N	O3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful		
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited		
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful		
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited		
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
	o	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
	p	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful		

2.7.2 Scenario D-2: Full/limited internet access using an enterprise endpoint

This scenario deals with access from an enterprise-owned device to non-enterprise-managed internet resources using different enterprise ID profiles: one with access to the internet, one with limited access to the internet, and one with no access to the internet.

Pre-Condition: The enterprise provides multiple user accounts with different access levels to the internet. The Internet access will be performed using an enterprise-owned endpoint. RSS types are OK for approved and not OK for not-approved internet resources. The approval depends on the user's policy. User endpoints are checked for compliance (Compl) per demonstration policy.

Demonstration: Each requestor using an enterprise-ID will attempt to successfully access a non-enterprise resource.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the endpoint location as well as the resource location.

Table 2-24 Scenario D-2 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. → RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP		EP	Out of Hours		
D-2.1	a	N	O4	On-Prem → Internet	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful	
	b	N	O4		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	c	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	d	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	e	Y	O4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	f	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	h	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	i	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	j	Y	O5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful	
	l	N	O4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
m	N	O4	A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful			
n	N	O4	A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful			

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. → RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP		EP	Out of Hours		
	o	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	O5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful	
D-2.2	a	N	O4	Branch → Internet	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful	
	b	N	O4		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	c	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	d	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	e	Y	O4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	f	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	h	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	i	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	j	Y	O5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful	
	l	N	O4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	O4		A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful	
	o	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	O5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful	
D-2.3	a	N	O4	Remote → Internet	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful	
	b	N	O4		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	c	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	d	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	e	N	O4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	f	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	

Demo ID	MSV	UP	Location Req. → RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome
				User	EP		EP	Out of Hours	
	h	N	O5	A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful
	i	N	O5	A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful
	j	N	O5	A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful
	k	N	O4	RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful
	l	N	O4	RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful
	m	N	O4	A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful
	n	N	O4	A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful
	o	N	O5	A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful
	p	N	O5	A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful

2.7.3 Scenario D-3: Stolen credential using BYOD or enterprise endpoint

This scenario deals with a request using a stolen credential. It does not matter if the access is performed using an enterprise endpoint or BYOD device.

Pre-Condition: The requestor's credential is stolen and is used to attempt accessing enterprise resource RSS1 using an enterprise endpoint. The requesting endpoint and requested resource are both in compliance.

Demonstration: Two requests for the same enterprise resource from an enterprise endpoint are performed using the same user credentials. The "Real Request" is performed using the latest credentials, which are modified/replaced after reported stolen, and that request can succeed. The "Hostile Request" is performed using a stolen enterprise-ID. All authentication methods are compromised. Re-authentication always follows a previously successful authentication.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the detection of a stolen requester's enterprise-ID and enforcement of isolation.

710 Table 2-25 Scenario D-3 Demonstrations

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
D-3.1	a	N	O6	On-Prem On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	N	O6		A-	---	N	Access Not Successful	---	
	c	N	O6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	O6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	O6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	N	O6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O6		A+	A	N	Access Not Successful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	O6		A-	A	N	Access Not Successful	Keep Access	
	i	N	O7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	O7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	l	N	O7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	O7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	O7		---	A	Y	---	All Sessions Terminated	
	o	N	O7		A	---	Y	All Sessions Terminated	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were reported stolen										
D-3.2	a	N	O6	On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	

Demo ID	<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>		
				Real Req	Hostile Req					
	b	N	O6	Branch → On-Prem	A-	---	N	Access Not Successful	---	
	c	N	O6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	O6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	O6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	N	O6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O6		A+	A	N	Access Not Successful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	O6		A-	A	N	Access Not Successful	Keep Access	
	i	N	O7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	O7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	l	N	O7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	O7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	O7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	
	o	N	O7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were reported stolen										
D-3.3	a	N	O6	Branch On-Prem →	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	N	O6		A-	---	N	Access Not Successful	---	

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
	c	N	O6	On-Prem	A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	O6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	O6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	N	O6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O6		A+	A	N	Access Not Successful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	O6		A-	A	N	Access Not Successful	Keep Access	
	i	N	O7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	O7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	l	N	O7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	O7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	O7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	
	o	N	O7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were reported stolen										
D-3.4	a	N	O6	Remote On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	N	O6		A-	---	N	Access Not Successful	---	
	c	N	O6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID	<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>		
				Real Req	Hostile Req					
	d	N	O6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	e	N	O6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	N	O6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	g	N	O6		A+	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	O6		A-	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Keep Access	
	i	N	O7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	O7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	k	N	O7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	l	N	O7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	O7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	n	N	O7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	
	o	N	O7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re- ported stolen										
D-3.5	a	N	O6	On-Prem Remote → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	N	O6		A-	---	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	---	
	c	N	O6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	d	N	O6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful	
	e	N	O6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	

Demo ID	M S V	UP	Location Real Hostile > RSS	Auth Stat		Rep. Stolen	Desired Outcome for Real Request	Desired Outcome for Hostile Request
				Real Req	Hostile Req			
	f	N	O6	---	A-	N	---	Access Not Successful
	g	N	O6	A+	A	N	Access Not Successful	Change to Access Limited
	h	N	O6	A-	A	N	Access Not Successful	Keep Access
	i	N	O7	A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---
	j	N	O7	A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Successful
	k	N	O7	---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Successful
	l	N	O7	RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---
	m	N	O7	---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Successful
	n	N	O7	---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited
	o	N	O7	A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were reported stolen								

2.7.4 Scenario D-4: Full/limited resource access using BYOD

This scenario deals with a request using different enterprise ID profiles, one with access to all provided resources and one with access to a limited set of resources (e.g., only RSS1 but not RSS2) or with limited functionality while accessing an enterprise-controlled resource (e.g., read-only vs. read/write). In this scenario the device used is BYOD.

Pre-Condition: The enterprise provides multiple user accounts with different access levels. The P_FULL access profile specifies access to either all resources (RSS) within the enterprise and/or all capabilities (Cap) of resources within the enterprise. Additionally, the P_LIMITED access profile specifies access to either a subset of the resources and/or only limited functionality of each resource. Both endpoints' compliance (Compl) is already verified, and systems are authenticated per demonstration policy.

721 **Demonstration:** Each requestor using an enterprise-ID will attempt to successfully access an enterprise
 722 resource or a functionality of an enterprise resource.

723 **Purpose and Outcome:** This demonstration focuses on user privilege, authentication/re-authentication,
 724 the endpoint and RSS location, as well as the compliance of endpoints.

725 **Table 2-26 Scenario D-4 Demonstrations**

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
D-4.1	a	N	O1	On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	E2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	Y	E2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
o	N	O1	A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful			
p	N	E2	A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful			
D-4.2	a	N	O1	Branch → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	Y	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
	f	Y	O2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	Y	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
D-4.3	a	N	O1	Remote → On-Prem	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	N	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	N	O2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	E3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
m	N	O1	A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited			

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome		
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS			
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
	o	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
	p	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
D-4.4	a	N	O1	On-Prem → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	c	Y	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	d	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful		
	e	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	f	Y	O2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	g	Y	O3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful		
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited		
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful		
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited		
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
	o	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
	p	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful		
D-4.5	a	N	O1	Branch → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	c	Y	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		
	d	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful		
	e	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful		
	f	Y	O2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful		

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS		
	g	Y	O2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	o	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
D-4.6	a	N	O1	Remote → Cloud	A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	b	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	c	N	O1		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	O2		A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	f	N	O2		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O3		A-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	h	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	i	N	O1		RA-	A	---	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	j	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O1		RA+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	l	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	N	Y	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS2	N	Y	Access Limited	
	n	N	O1		A+	A	A	RSS1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID	MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat			Access	Compl		Desired Outcome
				User	EP	RSS		EP	RSS	
	o	N	O1	A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful
	p	N	O2	A+	A	A	RSS2	Y	N	Access Not Successful

2.7.5 Scenario D-5: Full/limited internet access using BYOD

This scenario deals with access from an enterprise-owned device to non-enterprise-managed internet resources using different enterprise ID profiles: one with access to the internet, one with limited access to the internet, and one with no access to the internet.

Pre-Condition: The enterprise provides multiple user accounts with different access levels to the internet. The internet access will be performed using a BYOD endpoint. RSS types are OK for approved and not OK for not-approved internet resources. The approval depends on the user's policy. User endpoints are checked for compliance (Compl) per demonstration policy.

Demonstration: Each requestor using an enterprise-ID will attempt to successfully access a non-enterprise resource.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the endpoint location as well as the resource location.

Table 2-27 Scenario D-5 Demonstrations

Demo ID	MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome
				User	EP		EP	Out of Hours	
D-5.1	a	N	O4	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful
	b	N	O4	A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful
	c	N	O4	A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful
	d	N	O4	A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful
	e	Y	O4	A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful
	f	N	O5	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful
	g	N	O5	A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful
	h	N	O5	A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful
	i	N	O5	A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP		EP	Out of Hours		
	j	Y	O5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful	
	l	N	O4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	O4		A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful	
	o	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	O5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful	
D-5.2	a	N	O4	Branch ➔ Internet	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful	
	b	N	O4		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	c	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	d	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	e	Y	O4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	f	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	h	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	i	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	j	Y	O5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful	
	l	N	O4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	O4		A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful	
	o	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	O5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		MSV	UP	Location Req. > RSS	Auth Stat		Access	Compl		Desired Outcome	
					User	EP		EP	Out of Hours		
D-5.3	a	N	O4	Remote → Internet	A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Successful	
	b	N	O4		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	c	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	d	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Successful	
	e	Y	O4		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	f	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	N	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O5		A+	A	URL2	Y	N	Access Successful	
	h	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	i	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	Y	Y	Access Not Successful	
	j	Y	O5		A-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	k	N	O4		RA+	A	URL1	Y	---	Access Successful	
	l	N	O4		RA-	A	---	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	m	N	O4		A+	A	URL1	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	O4		A+	A	URL2	N	---	Access Successful	
	o	N	O5		A+	A	URL1	N	N	Access Not Successful	
	p	N	O5		A+	A	URL2	N	N	Access Not Successful	

2.7.6 Scenario D-6: Stolen credential using BYOD

This scenario deals with a request using a stolen credential. It does not matter if the access is performed using an enterprise endpoint or BYOD device.

Pre-Condition: The requestor's credential is stolen and is used to attempt accessing enterprise resource RSS1 using an enterprise endpoint. The endpoints and requested resources are considered compliant.

Demonstration: One request is performed and is successful, in parallel using the same user credentials from 2 separate devices to one resource. One of the requestors is using a stolen enterprise-ID will attempt to access an Enterprise Resource using a BYOD endpoint.

747 The “Real Req” always uses the latest credentials which are modified/replaced after reported stolen. Re-
 748 Authentication always follows a previously successful authentication.

749 All authentication methods are compromised

750 Two requests for the same enterprise resource from at least one BYOD endpoint are performed using
 751 the same user credentials. The “Real Request” is performed using the latest credentials, which are
 752 modified/replaced after reported stolen, and that request can succeed. The “Hostile Request” is
 753 performed using a stolen enterprise-ID. All authentication methods are compromised. Re-authentication
 754 always follows a previously successful authentication.

755 **Purpose and Outcome:** This demonstration focuses on the detection of a stolen requester’s enterprise-
 756 ID and enforcement of isolation.

757 **Table 2-28 Scenario D-6 Demonstrations**

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
D-6.1	a	N	O6	On-Prem On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	Y	O6		A-	---	N	Access Not Successful	---	
	c	N	O6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	O6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	O6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	Y	O6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O6		A+	A	N	Access Not Successful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	O6		A-	A	N	Access Not Successful	Keep Access	
	i	N	O7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	O7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
	k	Y	O7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	l	N	O7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	O7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	O7		---	A	Y	---	All Sessions Terminated	
	o	N	O7		A	---	Y	All Sessions Terminated	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were reported stolen										
D-6.2	a	N	O6	On-Prem Branch → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	Y	O6		A-	---	N	Access Not Successful	---	
	c	N	O6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	O6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	O6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	Y	O6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O6		A+	A	N	Access Not Successful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	O6		A-	A	N	Access Not Successful	Keep Access	
	i	N	O7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	O7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	k	Y	O7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	l	N	O7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>	
					Real Req	Hostile Req				
	m	N	O7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	n	N	O7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited	
	o	N	O7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---	
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were reported stolen										
D-6.3	a	N	O6	Branch On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---	
	b	Y	O6		A-	---	N	Access Not Successful	---	
	c	N	O6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Successful	
	d	N	O6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	e	N	O6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful	
	f	Y	O6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Successful	
	g	N	O6		A+	A	N	Access Not Successful	Change to Access Limited	
	h	N	O6		A-	A	N	Access Not Successful	Keep Access	
	i	N	O7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	j	N	O7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Successful	
	k	Y	O7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	
	l	N	O7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---	
	m	N	O7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Successful	

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>		
					Real Req	Hostile Req					
	n	N	O7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited		
	o	N	O7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---		
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re- ported stolen											
D-6.4	a	N	O6	Remote On-Prem → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---		
	b	Y	O6		A-	---	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	---		
	c	N	O6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	d	N	O6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	e	N	O6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful		
	f	Y	O6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	g	N	O6		A+	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Change to Access Limited		
	h	N	O6		A-	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Keep Access		
	i	N	O7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---		
	j	N	O7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	k	N	O7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	l	N	O7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---		
	m	N	O7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	n	N	O7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited		

Demo ID		<u>M</u> <u>S</u> <u>V</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>		
					Real Req	Hostile Req					
	o	N	O7		A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---		
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were re- ported stolen											
D-6.5	a	N	O6	On-Prem Remote → On-Prem	A+	---	N	Access Successful	---		
	b	Y	O6		A-	---	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	---		
	c	N	O6		A	A+	N	Change to Access Limited	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	d	N	O6		A	A-	N	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	e	N	O6		---	A+	N	---	Access Successful		
	f	Y	O6		---	A-	N	---	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	g	N	O6		A+	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Change to Access Limited		
	h	N	O6		A-	A	N	Access Not Suc- cessful	Keep Access		
	i	N	O7		A+	---	Y	Access Successful	---		
	j	N	O7		A	A-	Y	Keep Access	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	k	N	O7		---	A-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	l	N	O7		RA+	---	Y	Access Successful	---		
	m	N	O7		---	RA-	Y	---	Access Not Suc- cessful		
	n	N	O7		---	A	Y	---	Change to Access Limited		
o	N	O7	A	---	Y	Change to Access Limited	---				

Demo ID	<u>M</u>	<u>UP</u>	Location Real Hostile > RSS	<u>Auth Stat</u>		Rep. Stolen	<u>Desired Outcome for Real Request</u>	<u>Desired Outcome for Hostile Request</u>
	<u>S</u> <u>V</u>			Real Req	Hostile Req			
Comment: l, m, n, o : Initial authentication successful and while authenticated credentials were reported stolen								

2.8 Use Case E: Guest: No-ID Access

2.8.1 Scenario E-1: Guest requests public internet access

For No-ID access, the only deciding factor is the type of device used and any known compliance state of the device. Authentication/authorization is not a factor (No-ID). Enterprise resource compliance is likewise assumed, as resources would not be visible otherwise.

Pre-Condition: The requestor does not need to authenticate (i.e., guest access). Per configuration, the requestor is authorized with default universal access to the resource (i.e., no authentication or authorization checks are performed). A request to access the enterprise resource is granted and a session is established. The resource is assumed to be in compliance.

Demonstration: Systems can differentiate between device classifications and perform some action based on policy to restrict privileged devices (i.e., enterprise-managed, BYOD) based on endpoint compliance policy.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on device identification and compliance (when applicable).

Table 2-29 Scenario E-1 Demonstrations

Demo ID		<u>MSV</u>	Location of Subject.	Access	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
E-1.1	a	Y	On-Prem	Public resource	Access Successful
	b	Y		Public internet	Access Successful
E-1.2	a	Y	Branch	Public resource	Access Successful
	b	Y		Public internet	Access Successful

2.9 Use Case F: Confidence Level

2.9.1 Scenario F-1: User reauthentication fails during active session

This scenario is based on a successful request with an established session to an enterprise resource using an enterprise-owned endpoint. The requestor's reauthentication will fail and reduces the confidence level. This leads to terminating the active session.

Pre-Condition: The requestor is identified and authenticated. Per configuration, the requestor is authorized with full access to the resource. A request to access the enterprise resource is granted and a session is established.

Demonstration: The reauthentication of the requestor fails, and the session will be terminated.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the requestor's identification, which fails re-authentication during an active session.

Table 2-30 Scenario F-1 Demonstrations

Demo ID	MSV	Re-auth.	Req Loc	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
F-1.1	a	N	On-Prem	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-1.2	a	N	Branch	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-1.3	a	N	Remote	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-1.4	a	N	On-Prem	Cloud	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-1.5	a	N	Branch	Cloud	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-1.6	a	N	Remote	Cloud	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated

Demo ID	MSV	Re-auth.	Req Loc	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome

2.9.2 Scenario F-2: Requesting endpoint reauthentication fails during active session

This scenario is based on a successful request with an established session to an enterprise resource using an enterprise-owned endpoint. The reauthentication of the requesting endpoint will fail and reduces the confidence level. This leads to terminating the active session.

Pre-Condition: The requestor is identified and authenticated. Per configuration, the requestor is authorized with full access to the resource. A request to access the enterprise resource is granted and a session is established.

Demonstration: The reauthentication of the requestor's endpoint fails, and the session will be terminated.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the requester's endpoint identification, which fails re-authentication during an active session.

Table 2-31 Scenario F-2 Demonstrations

Demo ID	MSV	Re-auth.	Req. Loc	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
F-2.1	a	N	On-Prem	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-2.2	a	N	Branch	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-2.3	a	N	Remote	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-2.4	a	N	On-Prem	Cloud	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-2.5	a	N	Branch	Cloud	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated

Demo ID	MSV	Re-auth.	Req. Loc	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
F-2.6	a	N	Remote	Cloud	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated

2.9.3 Scenario F-3: Resource reauthentication fails during active session

This scenario is based on a successful request with an established session to an enterprise resource. The reauthentication of the resource will fail and reduces the confidence level. This leads to terminating the active session.

Pre-Condition: The requestor is identified and authenticated. Per configuration, the requestor is authorized with full access to the resource. A request to access the enterprise resource is granted and a session is established.

Demonstration: The reauthentication of the resource fails, and the session will be terminated.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the resource identification, which fails re-authentication during an active session.

Table 2-32 Scenario F-3 Demonstrations

Demo ID	MSV	Re-auth	Req. Loc	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
F-3.1	a	N	On-Prem	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-3.2	a	N	Branch	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-3.3	a	N	Remote	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-3.4	a	N	On-Prem	Cloud	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-3.5	a	N	Branch	Cloud	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated

Demo ID	MSV	Re-auth	Req. Loc	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
F-3.6	a	N	Remote	Cloud	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated

2.9.4 Scenario F-4: Compliance fails during active session

This scenario is based on a successful request with an established session to an enterprise resource using an enterprise-owned endpoint. The endpoint will fall out of compliance and reduce the confidence level. This terminates the session.

Pre-Condition: The requestor is identified and authenticated. The endpoint used is tested and considered compliant. A request to access the enterprise resource is granted and a session is established.

Demonstration: The requesting endpoint falls out of policy (becomes not compliant), and the session will be terminated. The requesting endpoint is either enterprise-owned or BYOD. It cannot be a guest endpoint for these demonstrations.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the requester's endpoint compliance, which changes from compliant to not compliant during an active session.

Table 2-33 Scenario F-4 Demonstrations

Demo ID	MSV	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS Loc	Desired Outcome
F-4.1	a	N	On-Prem	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-4.2	a	N	Branch	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-4.3	a	N	Remote	On-Prem	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated
F-4.4	a	N	On-Prem	Cloud	Session stays active
	b				Session will be terminated

Demo ID		MSV	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
F-4.5	a	N	Y	Branch	Cloud	Session stays active
	b		N			Session will be terminated
F-4.6	a	N	Y	Remote	Cloud	Session stays active
	b		N			Session will be terminated

2.9.5 Scenario F-5: Compliance improves between requests

This scenario is the inverse of scenario F-4. Here, there is an initial rejection due to compliance issues, followed by a mitigation that improves the confidence level. Then a repeat request will be successful and establishes a session to an enterprise resource.

Pre-Condition: The requestor is identified and could be authenticated, depending on when authentication takes place in the process. The endpoint used is tested and initially considered noncompliant. The endpoint then improves its compliance status and the request is re-issued. A request to access the enterprise resource is granted and a session is established.

Demonstration: The requesting endpoint is initially out of policy (not compliant) but can remediate the issue and is successful in a repeated request for the same resource.

Purpose and Outcome: This demonstration focuses on the requester's endpoint compliance, which changes from not compliant to compliant before fully establishing a session.

Table 2-34 Scenario F-5 Demonstrations

Demo ID		MSV	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
F-5.1	a	N	N	On-Prem	On-Prem	Access Not Successful
	b		Y			Access Successful
F-5.2	a	N	N	Branch	On-Prem	Access Not Successful
	b		Y			Access Successful
F-5.3	a	N	N	Remote	On-Prem	Access Not Successful

Demo ID		MSV	Req EP Compl	Req Loc	RSS Loc	<u>Desired Outcome</u>
	b		Y			Access Successful
F-5.4	a	N	N	On-Prem	Cloud	Access Not Successful
	b		Y			Access Successful
F-5.5	a	N	N	Branch	Cloud	Access Not Successful
	b		Y			Access Successful
F-5.6	a	N	N	Remote	Cloud	Access Not Successful
	b		Y			Access Successful

3 Functional Demonstration Results

3.1 EIG Crawl Phase Demonstration Results

This section lists the demonstration results for each of the builds that was implemented as part of the EIG crawl phase, as defined in *NIST SP 1800-35B: Approach, Architecture, and Security Characteristics*.

3.1.1 Enterprise 1 Build 1 (E1B1) Demonstration Results

[Table 3-1](#) lists the results for all EIG crawl phase demonstrations run in Enterprise 1 Build 1 (E1B1). In all demonstrations that were conducted, the ZTA functionality included in the build performed as expected. All demonstrations that lend themselves to both manual and automated execution (as described in [Section 2.3](#)) were performed twice using both methodologies.

While the technology deployed in E1B1 was able to determine endpoint compliance for mobile devices and prevent noncompliant mobile endpoints from accessing resources, it was not able to determine the compliance status of desktop endpoints and automatically use that as a determining factor in deciding whether access requests originating from that desktop endpoint should be granted. Consequently, the results listed in this section only include demonstrations in which the requesting endpoints are mobile devices. No demonstrations were performed in which the requesting device was a desktop system.

849 Table 3-1 Demonstration Results for E1B1 EIG Crawl Phase

Demo ID	Expected Outcome	Observed Outcome	Comments
A-1.1.a-m	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build. All devices are already joined to the network. There is no tool that can keep any entity (RSS, EP, BYOD, or guest device) from joining the network based on its authentication status.
A-1.2.a-m	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build.
A-1.3.a-f	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build.
A-1.4.a-g	N/A	N/A	Cloud-based resources are out of scope until the run phase.
A-2.1.a-i	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build. There is no tool that can reauthenticate any entity (RSS, EP, BYOD, or guest device) and terminate its network access based on authentication status.
A-2.2.a-i	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build based on reauthentication status.
A-2.3.a-f	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build based on reauthentication status.
A-2.4.a-f	N/A	N/A	Cloud-based resources are out of scope until the run phase.
A-3.1.a, A-3.3.a, A-3.5.a	User request and action is recorded	User login to an application is logged	Success: Okta records the authentication logs. Administrators can log in to Okta and view logs of when a user logged onto an application and whether the authentication was successful or not.
A-3.1.b, A-3.3.b	API call is recorded	Logs contain relevant API information	Success: Okta logs have relevant information about the authentication between the user and resource.

Demo ID	Expected Outcome	Observed Outcome	Comments
A-3.2.a-b, A-3.4.a-b, A-3.6.a	N/A	N/A	Cloud-based resources are out of scope until the run phase.
B-1.1.a, B-1.2.a, B-1.3.a, B-4.1.a, B-4.2.a, B-4.3.a, D-1.1.a, D-1.2.a, D-1.3.a, D-4.1.a, D-4.2.a, D-4.3.a	Access Successful	Access Successful	Partial success: For the mobile endpoint, user access to resource RSS1 is based on endpoint compliance. However, we cannot validate compliance of RSS1.
B-1.1.b, B-1.2.b, B-1.3.b, B-4.1.b, B-4.2.b, B-4.3.b, D-1.1.b, D-1.2.b, D-1.3.b, D-4.1.b, D-4.2.b, D-4.3.b	Access Successful	Access Successful	Partial success: For the mobile endpoint, user access to resource RSS1 is based on endpoint compliance. However, we cannot validate compliance of RSS1.
B-1.1.c, B-1.2.c, B-1.3.c, B-4.1.c, B-4.2.c, B-4.3.c, D-1.1.c, D-1.2.c, D-1.3.c, D-4.1.c, D-4.2.c, D-4.3.c	Access Not Successful	Access Not Successful	Partial success: Demonstrated user authentication failure at the mobile endpoint, but we cannot validate compliance on RSS1. Partial demonstration completed with user not able to log in to mobile device.
B-1.1.d, B-1.2.d, B-1.3.d, B-4.1.d, B-4.2.d, B-4.3.d, D-1.1.d, D-1.2.d, D-1.3.d, D-4.1.d, D-4.2.d, D-4.3.d	Access Not Successful	Access Not Successful	Partial success: Mobile: Based on configuration in Ent1, the E2 is not authorized to access RSS1 based on enterprise governance policy. Also, RSS compliance cannot be demonstrated in this phase. In this case, user is not granted access to RSS1.
B-1.1.e, B-1.2.e, B-1.3.e, B-4.1.e, B-4.2.e, B-4.3.e, D-1.1.e, D-1.2.e, D-1.3.e, D-4.1.e, D-4.2.e, D-4.3.e	Access Successful		Partial success: Mobile: User access to RSS2 is based on the EP's compliance. Cannot validate compliance on RSS2. Partial demonstration.
B-1.1.f, B-1.2.f, B-1.3.f, B-4.1.f, B-4.2.f, B-4.3.f, D-1.1.f, D-1.2.f, D-1.3.f, D-4.1.f, D-4.2.f, D-4.3.f	Access Not Successful		Partial success: Mobile: User authentication failure is at the endpoint. Cannot validate compliance on RSS1. Partial demonstration completed with user not able to login to mobile device.

Demo ID	Expected Outcome	Observed Outcome	Comments
B-1.1.g, B-1.2.g, B-1.3.g, B-4.1.g, B-4.2.g, B-4.3.g, D-1.1.g, D-1.2.g, D-1.3.g, D-4.1.g, D-4.2.g, D-4.3.g	Access Not Successful		Demonstration cannot be completed. Mobile: must have certain tools installed to manage the mobile device and its compliance. The only way this happens is if the user forgets the login password on the mobile device.
B-1.1.h, B-1.2.h, B-1.3.h, B-4.1.h, B-4.2.h, B-4.3.h, D-1.1.h, D-1.2.h, D-1.3.h, D-4.1.h, D-4.2.h, D-4.3.h	Access Successful	Access Successful	Success: GitLab session timeout is set to one minute for demonstration purposes. After session timed out, user was re-authenticated.
B-1.1.i, B-1.2.i, B-1.3.i, B-4.1.i, B-4.2.i, B-4.3.i, D-1.1.i, D-1.2.i, D-1.3.i, D-4.1.i, D-4.2.i, D-4.3.i	Access Not Successful	N/A	Success: Only way to do this is to not use Okta FastPass, which would make this case invalid. We pressed “No” on Okta FastPass and access was denied.
B-1.1.j, B-1.2.j, B-1.3.j, B-4.1.j, B-4.2.j, B-4.3.j, D-1.1.j, D-1.2.j, D-1.3.j, D-4.1.j, D-4.2.j, D-4.3.j	Access Not Successful	Access Not Successful	Success: On Ivanti, after initial authentication, implemented a block on the Mobile Iron cloud. After GitLab timed out, re-authentication was unsuccessful.
B-1.1.k, B-1.2.k, B-1.3.k, B-4.1.k, B-4.2.k, B-4.3.k, D-1.1.k, D-1.2.k, D-1.3.k, D-4.1.k, D-4.2.k, D-4.3.k	Access Limited	N/A	Partial success: Access to RSS2 is blocked. Currently cannot perform limited access.
B-1.1.l-m, B-1.2.l-m, B-1.3.l-m, B-4.1.l-m, B-4.2.l-m, B-4.3.l-m, D-1.1.l-m, D-1.2.l-m, D-1.3.l-m, D-4.1.l-m, D-4.2.l-m, D-4.3.l-m	Access Denied	Access Denied	Success. User was denied access because the endpoint was non-compliant.
B-1.1.n-p, B-1.2.n-p, B-1.3.n-p, B-4.1.n-p, B-4.2.n-p, B-4.3.n-p, D-1.1.n-p, D-1.2.n-p,	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be run. Unable to perform compliance checks on RSS.

Demo ID	Expected Outcome	Observed Outcome	Comments
D-1.3.n-p, D-4.1.n-p, D-4.2.n-p, D-4.3.n-p			
B-1.2.a-p			The results are the same as B-1.1 since network policies allow access from branch to Ent1. See results from B-1.1.
B-1.3.a-p			The results are the same as B-1.1 given that network policies allow the user/device to access the enterprise remotely using a VPN connection. See results from B-1.1.
B-1.4.a-p, B-1.5.a-p, B-1.6.a-p, B-4.4.a-p, B-4.5.a-q, and B-4.6.a-p	N/A	N/A	Cloud-based resources are out of scope until run phase.
B-2.1.a-p, B-2.2.a-p, B-5	N/A	N/A	Out of scope until run phase. Tools are needed to create policies to allow or deny access to internet resources.
B-3, B-6	N/A	N/A	Out of scope until run phase.
B-4			As documented in the rows above, the results of all B-4 use case demonstrations are the same as the results of the B-1 use cases because the device is both authenticated and compliant. In this case, a BYOD device will have to install both the Ivanti Neurons for UEM agent and Okta Verify App. See results from B-1.1 for B-4.1, B-4.2, and B-4.3.
All C Use Cases	N/A	N/A	Demonstrations cannot be performed. Currently, no federation configuration has been set up between Ent1, Ent2, and Ent3.
All D Use Cases			As documented in the rows above, the results of all D use case demonstrations are the same as the results of the B use cases. Note that the user is a contractor and will have access to resources based on need. The Ivanti Neurons for UEM agent and Okta Verify App will have to be installed on the contractor's device, whether it's provided by the enterprise or BYOD.
All E Use Cases	N/A	N/A	Guest (No-ID) access is considered out of scope for the EIG crawl phase.

Demo ID	Expected Outcome	Observed Outcome	Comments
All F Use Cases	N/A	N/A	Confidence level use cases are considered out of scope for the EIG crawl phase.

3.1.2 Enterprise 2 Build 1 (E2B1) Demonstration Results

These results will be included in the next version of this draft document.

3.1.3 Enterprise 3 Build 1 (E3B1) Demonstration Results

Table 3-2 lists the demonstration results for all EIG crawl phase demonstrations run in Enterprise 3 Build 1 (E3B1). In all demonstrations that were conducted, the ZTA functionality included in the build performed as expected. All demonstrations that lend themselves to both manual and automated execution (as described in [Section 2.3](#)) were performed twice, using both methodologies.

Table 3-2 Demonstration Results for E3B1 EIG Crawl Phase

Demo ID	Expected Outcome	Observed Outcome	Comments
A-1.1.a-m	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build. All devices are already joined to the network. There is no tool that can keep any entity (RSS, EP, BYOD, or guest device) from joining the network based on its authentication status.
A-1.2.a-m	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build.
A-1.3.a-f	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build.
A-1.4.a-g	N/A	N/A	Cloud-based resources are out of scope until run phase.
A-2.1.a-i	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build. There is no tool that can reauthenticate any entity (RSS, EP, BYOD, or guest device) and terminate its network access based on authentication status.
A-2.2.a-i	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build based on reauthentication status.

Demo ID	Expected Outcome	Observed Outcome	Comments
A-2.3.a-f	N/A	N/A	Demonstration cannot be completed. There is no network-level enforcement present in this build based on reauthentication status.
A-2.4.a-f	N/A	N/A	Cloud-based resources are out of scope until run phase.
A-3.1.a, A-3.3.a, A-3.5.a	User re- quest and action is recorded	User login to an ap- plication is logged	Success: Azure AD records the authentication logs. Administra- tors can log in to Azure AD and view logs of when a user logged onto an application and whether the authentication was suc- cessful or not.
A-3.1.b, A-3.3.b	API call is recorded	Logs con- tain rele- vant API infor- mation	Success: Azure AD logs have relevant information about the au- thentication between the user and resource.
A-3.2.a-b, A-3.4.a-b, A-3.6.a	N/A	N/A	Cloud-based resources are out of scope until run phase.
B-1.1.a	Access Successful	Access Successful	Partial Success: Users access RSS1 based on the EP compliance. Cannot validate compliance of RSS1, so can only partially demonstrate.
B-1.1.b	Access Successful		Partial Success: Authenticated user access to RSS2 successful. Can only partially demonstrate because cannot validate compli- ance on RSS2.
B-1.1.c	Access Not Suc- cessful	Access Not Suc- cessful	Partial Success: User authentication failure prevents access. Cannot validate compliance on RSS1. Partial demonstration completed with user not able to authenticate.
B-1.1.d	Access Not Suc- cessful	Access Not Suc- cessful	Partial Success: Based on configuration in Ent 3, the E2 is not authorized to access RSS1 based on enterprise governance pol- icy. Also, RSS compliance cannot be demonstrated in this phase. In this case, user is not granted access to RSS1.
B-1.1.e	Access Successful		Partial Success: Authenticated user access to RSS2 successful. Can partially demonstrate. Cannot validate compliance on RSS2.
B-1.1.f	Access Not Suc- cessful	Access Not Suc- cessful	User authentication failure prevents access. Demonstration successful.

Demo ID	Expected Outcome	Observed Outcome	Comments
B-1.1.g	Access Not Successful	Access Not Successful	User authentication failure prevents access. Demonstration successful.
B-1.1.h	Access Successful	Access Successful	GitLab session timeout is set to one minute for demonstration purposes. After session timed out, user was re-authenticated. Partial demonstration. Cannot validate RSS1 compliance.
B-1.1.i	Access Not Successful	N/A	Demonstration successful. Unauthenticated users were prevented from accessing resources.
B-1.1.j	Access Not Successful	Access Not Successful	Partial Success: Authenticated user access to RSS1 successful. Can partially demonstrate. Cannot validate compliance on RSS1. After GitLab timed out, re-authentication was unsuccessful.
B-1.1.k	Access Limited	N/A	Not able to demonstrate with current set of technologies. Cannot limit access based on device non-compliance.
B-1.1.l-p	N/A	N/A	Cannot demonstrate. Unable to perform compliance checks on RSS.
B-1.2.a-p			Cannot test because there is no branch office in Ent. 3.
B-1.3.a-p			The results are the same as B-1.1 given that network policies allow the user/device to access the enterprise remotely using a VPN connection. See results from B-1.1.
B-1.4.a-p, B-1.5.a-p, and B-1.6.a-p	N/A	N/A	Cloud-based resources are out of scope until run phase.
B-2, B-5	N/A	N/A	Out of scope until run phase. Tools are needed to create policies to allow or deny access to internet resources.
B-3, B-6			Out of scope until run phase.
B-4			All demonstrations here are the same as B-1 since the device is both authenticated and compliant.
All C Use Cases	N/A	N/A	Demonstrations cannot be performed. Currently, no federation configuration has been set up between Ent1, Ent2, and Ent3.
All D Use Cases			All demonstrations here are the same as B-1 since the device is both authenticated and compliant. Note that the user is a contractor.

Demo ID	Expected Outcome	Observed Outcome	Comments
All E Use Cases	N/A	N/A	Guest (No-ID) access is considered out of scope for the EIG crawl phase.
All F Use Cases	N/A	N/A	Confidence level use cases are considered out of scope for the EIG crawl phase.

858 **3.1.4 Enterprise 4 Build 1 (E4B1) Demonstration Results**

859 These results will be included in the next version of this draft document.

860 **Appendix A List of Acronyms**

AD	Active Directory
API	Application Programming Interface
BYOD	Bring Your Own Device
CRADA	Cooperative Research and Development Agreement
DNS	Domain Name System
E1B1	Enterprise 1 Build 1
E2B1	Enterprise 2 Build 1
E3B1	Enterprise 3 Build 1
E4B1	Enterprise 4 Build 1
EIG	Enhanced Identity Governance
EP	Enterprise Endpoint
ICAM	Identity, Credential, and Access Management
IP	Internet Protocol
IT	Information Technology
ITL	Information Technology Laboratory
MFA	Multifactor Authentication
MSV	Mandiant Security Validation
NCCoE	National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
NIC	Network Interface Card
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS	Operating System
PEP	Policy Enforcement Point
PIV	Personal Identity Verification
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
RSS	Enterprise Resource

SP	Special Publication
UEM	Unified Endpoint Management
UP	User Profile
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
VM	Virtual Machine
VPN	Virtual Private Network
ZTA	Zero Trust Architecture

Appendix B References

- [1] S. Rose, O. Borchert, S. Mitchell, and S. Connelly, *Zero Trust Architecture*, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-207, Gaithersburg, Md., August 2020, 50 pp. Available: <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207>.
- [2] P. Grassi, M. Garcia, and J. Fenton, *Digital Identity Guidelines*, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-63-3, Gaithersburg, Md., June 2017, 75 pp. Available: <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-3>.
- [3] “National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) Zero Trust Cybersecurity: Implementing a Zero Trust Architecture,” Federal Register Vol. 85, No. 204, October 21, 2020, pp. 66936-66939. Available: <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/10/21/2020-23292/national-cybersecurity-center-of-excellence-nccoe-zero-trust-cybersecurity-implementing-a-zero-trust>.